In this paper I argue that, in at least two cases - his discussions of the temporal precedence o f polytheism over monotheism and of the origins of civil society - we see Hume consigning to historical development certain aspects of reason which, as a comparison with Locke will show, have sometimes been held to be uniform. In the first of these cases Hume has recourse to claims about the general historical development of human thought. In the second case, the (...) origin of the civil institution of justice and government is not linked directly to external circumstances and the principles of human nature, as it is in contractarian theories, but makes a detour through the historical acquisition of certain concepts. Because Hume's position does not conform in any simple sense to Dugald Stewart's 'incontrovertible logical maxim' that the capacities of the human mind have been the same in all ages, Stewart's account of the method of conjectural history is, in any simple sense, inadequate as a description of Hume's practice. (shrink)

An often-ignored Humean contribution to Scottish Enlightenment is ‘conjectural history’, an eighteenth-century historical genre that attempted to trace the origins and development of particular institutions from prehistory to modernity. But conjectural methodology prevented histories from establishing any facts. What was then its point? I propose a way to justify Hume's practice of conjectural history by appealing to his scattered comments on historical explanation. Conjectural histories explain the origin of modern institutions by offering the rationale (...) that must have caused their emergence and stability and that justifies their current approbation, providing the reader with means for understanding and criticism. (shrink)

Dugald Stewart claims that conjectural history is ‘the peculiar glory of the latter half of the eighteenth century’. Yet it is hard to see why, in his view, conjectural histories are not merely confabulated just-so stories. This paper examines Stewart's views about the epistemic and moral value of conjectural history.

Frank Palmeri sees the conjectural histories of Rousseau, Hume, Herder, and other Enlightenment philosophers as a template for the development of the social sciences in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Without documents or memorials, these thinkers, he argues, employed conjecture to formulate a naturalistic account of society's commercial and secular progression. This approach can be traced in the work of political economists, anthropologists, sociologists, and sociologists of religion, and its speculative framework creates a surprising ambivalence toward modernity in (...) these disciplines. In addition, Palmeri shows that conjectural histories by Darwin and Nietzsche opened the way to new disciplines in the late twentieth century. (shrink)

This article undertakes a comparative study of the conjectural histories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Ferguson, focusing on the convergences in the moral and political ideals expressed and grounded in these histories. In comparison with Scots like Adam Smith and John Millar, the conjectural histories of Ferguson and Rousseau follow a similar historical trajectory as regards the development and progress of commercial, political and cultural arts. However, their assessment of the moral progress of humanity does not, or in (...) a much more limited way than in Smith and Millar, correlate with this trajectory. Rousseau and Ferguson see a candour and vigour in savage and barbarian societies that is much less easily supported by the complex socio-economic framework of modern, commercial societies. It is argued that the convergences in their conjectural histories arise from a similar fusion of these histories with Stoic and republican perspectives. While Rousseau and Ferguson do not see history as cyclical, they think that the forces that push towards moral decline are strong and can, on the political level, only be countered by firm republican policies. Furthermore, their shared Stoic ideal of the life lived according to nature informs their solutions for modern societies. (shrink)

This article undertakes a comparative study of the conjectural histories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Ferguson, focusing on the convergences in the moral and political ideals expressed and grounded in these histories. In comparison with Scots like Adam Smith and John Millar, the conjectural histories of Ferguson and Rousseau follow a similar historical trajectory as regards the development and progress of commercial, political and cultural arts. However, their assessment of the moral progress of humanity does not, or in (...) a much more limited way than in Smith and Millar, correlate with this trajectory. Rousseau and Ferguson see a candour and vigour in savage and barbarian societies that is much less easily supported by the complex socio-economic framework of modern, commercial societies. It is argued that the convergences in their conjectural histories arise from a similar fusion of these histories with Stoic and republican perspectives. While Rousseau and Ferguson do not see history as cyclical, they think that the forces that push towards moral decline are strong and can, on the political level, only be countered by firm republican policies. Furthermore, their shared Stoic ideal of the life lived according to nature informs their solutions for modern societies. (shrink)

This article undertakes a comparative study of the conjectural histories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Ferguson, focusing on the convergences in the moral and political ideals expressed and grounded in these histories. In comparison with Scots like Adam Smith and John Millar, the conjectural histories of Ferguson and Rousseau follow a similar historical trajectory as regards the development and progress of commercial, political and cultural arts. However, their assessment of the moral progress of humanity does not, or in (...) a much more limited way than in Smith and Millar, correlate with this trajectory. Rousseau and Ferguson see a candour and vigour in savage and barbarian societies that is much less easily supported by the complex socio-economic framework of modern, commercial societies. It is argued that the convergences in their conjectural histories arise from a similar fusion of these histories with Stoic and republican perspectives. While Rousseau and Ferguson do not see history as cyclical, they think that the forces that push towards moral decline are strong and can, on the political level, only be countered by firm republican policies. Furthermore, their shared Stoic ideal of the life lived according to nature informs their solutions for modern societies. (shrink)

SummaryThis article introduces some previously unknown Egyptological discussions written in Britain between 1680 and 1740. They are significant in their own right: the last of them, a manuscript ‘Essay towards illustrating the History, Chronology, and Mythology of the Ancient Egyptians’ by the Aberdonian antiquary Alexander Gordon, has a claim to being the most important European Egyptological tract of the period, even if its contents are currently entirely unknown to scholarship. But it will also be argued that the treatises permit (...) some broader reconsideration of historiographical culture in the period. First, they suggest that antiquarian rhetoric was not necessarily matched with antiquarian practice, and that, contrary to the famous claims of Arnaldo Momigliano and some of his more recent followers, eighteenth-century ‘antiquarianism’ was not always so different from seventeenth-century historical criticism. Second, they allow us to make some revisionist judgements about the origins of conjectural history: conjectural-developmental accounts often stemmed less from philosophical assumptions and more from developments in seventeenth-century source criticism, as Hellenistic accounts of ancient history came more and more to be questioned. This finding permits some important revisionist judgements about William Warburton's famous analysis of the hieroglyphs, and about eighteenth-century historiography more generally. (shrink)

This classic remains one of Karl Popper's most wide-ranging and popular works, notable not only for its acute insight into the way scientific knowledge grows, but also for applying those insights to politics and to history.

This paper presents folk impressions of the University of Manchester’s difficulties in becoming a great university, but by means of a fiction imitating a distinguished writer from the Indian subcontinent. The impressions concern past efforts and the difficulties they faced.

_Conjectures and Refutations_ is one of Karl Popper's most wide-ranging and popular works, notable not only for its acute insight into the way scientific knowledge grows, but also for applying those insights to politics and to history. It provides one of the clearest and most accessible statements of the fundamental idea that guided his work: not only our knowledge, but our aims and our standards, grow through an unending process of trial and error.

_Conjectures and Refutations_ is one of Karl Popper's most wide-ranging and popular works, notable not only for its acute insight into the way scientific knowledge grows, but also for applying those insights to politics and to history. It provides one of the clearest and most accessible statements of the fundamental idea that guided his work: not only our knowledge, but our aims and our standards, grow through an unending process of trial and error.

The way in which knowledge progresses, and especially our scientific knowledge, is by unjustified anticipations, by guesses, by tentative solutions to our problems, by conjectures. These conjectures are controlled by criticism: that is, by attempted refutations, which include severely critical tests. They may survive these tests; but they can never be positively justified: they can neither be established as certainly true nor even as 'probable'. Criticism of our conjectures is of decisive importance: by bringing out our mistakes it makes us (...) understand the difficulties of the problems which we try to solve. This is how we become better acquainted with our problem, and able to propose more mature solutions: the very refutation of a theory - that is, of a tentative solution to our problem - is always a step forward that takes us nearer the truth. And this is how we can learn from our mistakes. As we learn from our mistakes our knowledge grows, even though we may never know - that is, know for certain. Since our knowledge can grow, there can be no reason here for despair of reason. And since we can never know for certain, the can be no authority here for any claim to authority, for conceit over our knowledge, or for smugness. The essays and lectures of which this book is composed apply this thesis to many topics, ranging from problems of the philosophy and history of the physical and social sciences to historical and political problems. (shrink)

Taking its distance from classical liberalism, political liberalism seeks to avoid controversial metaphysical assumptions by starting from institutional features of modern polities. Political liberalism also extends the limits of liberal toleration by envisioning societies that it considers nonliberal but decent. This article is concerned with the relationship between these two dimensions of political liberalism, specifically as they are instantiated in the work of John Rawls. I show that these two dimensions are in tension with each other. Put simply, if political (...) liberalism is institutional, then decent societies are impossible. Decent societies are only conceivable within the ahistorical realm of values—a realm that Rawls sometimes slips into, even though its avoidance is central to political liberalism’s claim of distinctiveness. Rawls’s appeal to hypotheticals to defend his account of decent societies only serves to mask this tension and to foreclose important avenues of inquiry about the non-Western world. I also deploy throughout the article archival material that evinces Rawls’ concern with ethnocentrism but also the difficulties he faced in coming up with an adequate account of non-Western societies. On the argument I offer here, this intractability is to be expected, since Rawls did not recognize that the problems with his account were not purely philosophical, but in fact, sociological, political, and historical. (shrink)

We survey the history of Shelah’s conjecture on strongly dependent fields, give an equivalent formulation in terms of a classification of strongly dependent fields and prove that the conjecture implies that every strongly dependent field has finite dp-rank.

Natural sociability and the basic features of human nature stood at the centre of Thomas Abbt's confrontation with conjectural history, the popular eighteenth-century mode of reconstructing the evolution of human culture. Abbt (1738–1766) criticised conjectural histories due to their arbitrary character, and opted for a synthetic approach consisting of both sacred and secular history. He suggested that the anthropology of Genesis should be accepted as the starting point for a conjectural history, since it left (...) ample room for further questions and speculations. Yet his own perspective on human nature and its evolution remained naturalistic, as attested by his divergent interpretations of the confusion of tongues at Babel. Attempting to shed new light on the lesser-known elements of Abbt's work, the essay links his views on the Bible and conjectural history to his debate with Moses Mendelssohn over the constitution and destination of man. In this debate, both Mendelssohn and Abbt dealt with the contemporary controversy over the natural or artificial character of sociability, self-interest, and fellow-feeling. (shrink)

Elaborating on an old conjecture by Blackett, we formulate a new conjecture about the neutrality of matter according to which any physical system possesses an active electric charge proportional to its mass. We discuss limits on the conjecture coming from existing laboratory experiments on the neutrality of matter and from the observation of the global surface electric field of the Earth. In a cosmological setting, we show that a cosmic rotation of the Universe is inevitable if our conjecture is true (...) and if the magnetic fields observed today in large-scale gravitationally bounded objects and cosmic voids have a primordial origin. Finally, we discuss the possibility that the angular momentum of spiral galaxies could be a signature of a rotating Universe. (shrink)

In this article, I put forward, as a suspicion only, that Kant never thought Black lives had dignity but only price. I follow Michel-Rolph Trouillot's argument that the Haitian Revolution is unthinkable for Enlightenment philosophers to examine what Kant could have, would have, or should have said about this world-historical event. By making conjectures about Kant's silence on the Haitian Revolution, I also draw from Kant's writings on the American and French Revolutions. If my suspicion is right, then Kantianism cannot (...) accommodate an antiracist program. This ought to change how we talk about racism, slavery, and colonialism in Kant scholarship and in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

In this article, I propose a conjecture concerning the transmission of Spinoza’s Korte Verhandeling in the 1670s involving Leibniz. On the basis of a report about Spinoza’s philosophy written down by Leibniz after some conversations with Tschirnhaus in early 1676, I suggest that Tschirnhaus may have had in his possession a manuscript copy of KV and that his account of Spinoza’s doctrine to Leibniz was colored by this text. I support the hypothesis partly by means of external evidence, but mainly (...) through a comparative analysis of Leibniz’s report and the doctrine contained in KV, showing that the report in important respects corresponds better to this text than to Ethics. I finally point to the importance that this hypothesis, if true, would have for our knowledge of Tschirnhaus’ role in the first diffusion of Spinoza’s philosophy outside Holland and for our understanding Leibniz’s reception of Spinoza in the mid-1670s. (shrink)

In this article, I propose a conjecture concerning the transmission of Spinoza’s Korte Verhandeling (KV) in the 1670s involving Leibniz. On the basis of a report about Spinoza’s philosophy written down by Leibniz after some conversations with Tschirnhaus in early 1676, I suggest that Tschirnhaus may have had in his possession a manuscript copy of KV and that his account of Spinoza’s doctrine to Leibniz was colored by this text. I support the hypothesis partly by means of external evidence, but (...) mainly through a comparative analysis of Leibniz’s report and the doctrine contained in KV, showing that the report in important respects corresponds better to this text than to Ethics. I finally point to the importance that this hypothesis, if true, would have for our knowledge of Tschirnhaus’ role in the first diffusion of Spinoza’s philosophy outside Holland and for our understanding Leibniz’s reception of Spinoza in the mid-1670s. (shrink)

In this article, I propose a conjecture concerning the transmission of Spinoza’s Korte Verhandeling in the 1670s involving Leibniz. On the basis of a report about Spinoza’s philosophy written down by Leibniz after some conversations with Tschirnhaus in early 1676, I suggest that Tschirnhaus may have had in his possession a manuscript copy of KV and that his account of Spinoza’s doctrine to Leibniz was colored by this text. I support the hypothesis partly by means of external evidence, but mainly (...) through a comparative analysis of Leibniz’s report and the doctrine contained in KV, showing that the report in important respects corresponds better to this text than to Ethics. I finally point to the importance that this hypothesis, if true, would have for our knowledge of Tschirnhaus’ role in the first diffusion of Spinoza’s philosophy outside Holland and for our understanding Leibniz’s reception of Spinoza in the mid-1670s. (shrink)

In this article, I propose a conjecture concerning the transmission of Spinoza’s Korte Verhandeling (KV) in the 1670s involving Leibniz. On the basis of a report about Spinoza’s philosophy written down by Leibniz after some conversations with Tschirnhaus in early 1676, I suggest that Tschirnhaus may have had in his possession a manuscript copy of KV and that his account of Spinoza’s doctrine to Leibniz was colored by this text. I support the hypothesis partly by means of external evidence, but (...) mainly through a comparative analysis of Leibniz’s report and the doctrine contained in KV, showing that the report in important respects corresponds better to this text than to Ethics. I finally point to the importance that this hypothesis, if true, would have for our knowledge of Tschirnhaus’ role in the first diffusion of Spinoza’s philosophy outside Holland and for our understanding Leibniz’s reception of Spinoza in the mid-1670s. (shrink)

In this paper art history and visual studies, the disciplines that study visual culture, are presented as a field whose conjectural paradigm can be used to understand the epistemic problems associated with abduction. In order to do so, significant statements, concepts and arguments from the work of several specialists in this field have been highlighted. Their analysis shows the fruitfulness and potential for understanding the study of visual culture as a field that is interwoven with the assumptions of (...) abductive cognition. (shrink)

I survey the difficulties of several probabilistic views of non-deductive argument and of inductive probability and propose to explicate non-deductive reasoning in terms of rational preference. Following a critical examination of Popper’s allegedly deductive theory of rational preference, I draw upon the work of Popper and Rescher to present my view which includes: (i) the conjecturing of a set of alternative answers to or theories or hypotheses about the questions prompting the inquiry and (ii) the “reduction” of this set via (...) plausibilistic principles of rational preference. (shrink)

I survey the difficulties of several probabilistic views of non-deductive argument and of inductive probability and propose to explicate non-deductive reasoning in terms of rational preference. Following a critical examination of Popper’s allegedly deductive theory of rational preference, I draw upon the work of Popper and Rescher to present my view which includes: (i) the conjecturing of a set of alternative answers to or theories or hypotheses about the questions prompting the inquiry and (ii) the “reduction” of this set via (...) plausibilistic principles of rational preference. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Between the first two Critiques, Kant wrote what he called a “conjectural history” of the development of human freedom through a reading of Genesis. In the essay, reason itself is conceived of in terms of its “genesis,” and Kant primarily reads “Genesis” as an account of reason’s ascension or becoming. Just as humankind becomes itself through the Fall, so too does reason simultaneously come into its own. Adam indeed acts as a template for the conception of moral (...) agency that Kant will go on to develop in much more detail in the second critique. More significantly, however, as I argue below, the “genesis” and ascension of reason is only made possible through Eve’s covering up of herself. I argue that the act naturalizes both shame and clothing onto a feminine body conceived as un-reasonable. It is against this foil of unreason that reason is able to reach its own heights. I argue that Kant’s reading of Genesis in the “Conjectures” naturalizes women and clothing as superfluous: to humankind and to the ascent of reason alike. However, their function as the condition of possibility for Kant’s own system will show that they are anything but superfluous. Rather, they are essential. (shrink)

Abstract:This essay explores ways that looming climate change will affect how we think about future winters in New England. By all accounts, by the end of the twenty-first century the depth of the region's winter snow and cold will be much reduced from their historical averages. Drawing upon personal reflection, scientific data, and close readings of iconic New England authors, the essay examines potential future conceptions of the region's winters. I am particularly interested in how the expected warmer winters will (...) demand rereading literary works by iconic figures such as Emily Dickinson, Henry David Thoreau, and Robert Frost. The essay begins with an examination of the role nostalgia has played in popular images of New England winters and argues for a critically informed version of nostalgia that will enable readers to mourn for what they might lose in the future. The concluding section examines the folklore behind the January Thaw. Climate change, I argue, will usher in a period of an ongoing New England thaw to which our poetry and natural history writing will have to adapt. (shrink)

In January 1729 a paper written by James Bradley was read at two meetings of the Royal Society. On a newly discovered motion of the fixed stars, later described as the theory of the aberration of light, it was to transform the science of astrometry. The paper appeared as a narrative of a programme of observation first begun at Kew and finalized at Wanstead, but it was, in reality, a careful reconstruction devised to enhance his reputation in response to a (...) recognition that the programme was initially conducted in terms that were inimical to what he conceived to be his interest. The planned attempt to repeat Robert Hooke's celebrated experiment by James Pound, Samuel Molyneux and George Graham was set up at Molyneux's residence in Kew with James Bradley replacing Pound after his untimely and sudden demise. The unexpected and counterintuitive behaviour of the object star γ Draconis and the eradication of any suspicion of instrumental or systemic error led to the abandonment of the attempt to measure annual parallax and the initiation of new conjectures. An annual nutation was proposed but after the observation of a control star, 35 Camelopardalis, this conjecture was abandoned. Unknown to Bradley and Graham a premature approach was made by Molyneux to Newton claiming that the ‘nutation’ negated the whole of Newton's system. In the abandonment of the nutation yet another conjecture opposed to Newtonian theory was proposed and abandoned. Bradley determined to use his own instrument designed on different principles by Graham to observe the phenomenon in Wanstead. At Wanstead Bradley observed many stars to determine the parameters of the phenomenon. With the law of the motion described, Bradley proposed a hypothesis to explain it. Drawn from his earlier work on the ephemerides of Jupiter's satellites his hypothesis of the ‘new-discovered motion’ was quickly presented to the Royal Society as Bradley was working on a later and more definitive version of his paper. It is this later, third, unpublished version that is commonly referred to throughout this essay. It issued a challenge to ‘anti-Copernicans’ to offer an explanation of the observed phenomenon in geostatic terms. One such astronomer, Eustachio Manfredi, had examined the phenomenon of ‘aberrations’ in detail, the term being his. It was Bradley who first applied the term to the ‘new-discovered motion’ and within a short time ‘aberration’ was being applied by astronomers in the reduction of their observations. Annual aberration was widely accepted as evidence of the motion of the Earth. The paper enhanced Bradley's reputation and projected him into the forefront of European astronomers. (shrink)

Review of James Franklin, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

In this paper, I will analyze Charles S. Peirce’s “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God.” I want to argue for two conclusions: 1) that Peirce’s conception of spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason allows for a rationally justified belief in the reality of God; and 2) that this belief is not the result of a sound argument or even a complete argument and thus is not a secure belief. This paper is divided into three parts. First, I will explain (...) some Peircean philosophical notions that are essential background information for a genuine understanding of the neglected argument. Second, I will present a sketch of Peirce’s three stages of inquiry and explain each stage’s relevance to the neglected argument. Finally, I will analyze Peirce’s first stage of inquiry, also known as the humble argument for the reality of God, and show how this incomplete argument can provide a rationally justified belief in the reality of God. (shrink)

How were reliable predictions made before Pascal and Fermat's discovery of the mathematics of probability in 1654? What methods in law, science, commerce, philosophy, and logic helped us to get at the truth in cases where certainty was not attainable? The book examines how judges, witch inquisitors, and juries evaluated evidence; how scientists weighed reasons for and against scientific theories; and how merchants counted shipwrecks to determine insurance rates. Also included are the problem of induction before Hume, design arguments for (...) the existence of God, and theories on how to evaluate scientific and historical hypotheses. It is explained how Pascal and Fermat's work on chance arose out of legal thought on aleatory contracts. The book interprets pre-Pascalian unquantified probability in a generally objective Bayesian or logical probabilist sense. (shrink)

In an article published in 1974, Menas conjectured that any stationary subset of can be split in many pairwise disjoint stationary subsets. Even though the conjecture was shown long ago by Baumgartner and Taylor to be consistently false, it is still haunting papers on. In which situations does it hold? How much of it can be proven in ZFC? We start with an abridged history of the conjecture, then we formulate a new version of it, and finally we keep (...) weakening this new assertion until, building on the work of Usuba, we hit something we can prove. (shrink)

In this paper, I will analyze Charles S. Peirce’s “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God.” I want to argue for two conclusions: 1) that Peirce’s conception of spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason allows for a rationally justified belief in the reality of God; and 2) that this belief is not the result of a sound argument or even a complete argument and thus is not a secure belief. This paper is divided into three parts. First, I will explain (...) some Peircean philosophical notions that are essential background information for a genuine understanding of the neglected argument. Second, I will present a sketch of Peirce’s three stages of inquiry and explain each stage’s relevance to the neglected argument. Finally, I will analyze Peirce’s first stage of inquiry, also known as the humble argument for the reality of God, and show how this incomplete argument can provide a rationally justified belief in the reality of God. (shrink)

In this article, I propose a conjecture concerning the transmission of Spinoza’s Korte Verhandeling (KV) in the 1670s involving Leibniz. On the basis of a report about Spinoza’s philosophy written down by Leibniz after some conversations with Tschirnhaus in early 1676, I suggest that Tschirnhaus may have had in his possession a manuscript copy of KV and that his account of Spinoza’s doctrine to Leibniz was colored by this text. I support the hypothesis partly by means of external evidence, but (...) mainly through a comparative analysis of Leibniz’s report and the doctrine contained in KV, showing that the report in important respects corresponds better to this text than to Ethics. I finally point to the importance that this hypothesis, if true, would have for our knowledge of Tschirnhaus’ role in the first diffusion of Spinoza’s philosophy outside Holland and for our understanding Leibniz’s reception of Spinoza in the mid-1670s. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine the considerations on stochastic arts in Antiquity and to show how Galen’s analysis concerning the “art of conjecturing” constitutes a preferable alternative to the traditional ways used by philosophers to explain the inherent fallibility in the medical art. By distinguishing the scientific diagnosis from the conjectural one, Galen encompasses all cases relevant to the medical art. The former, because of its general nature, can be theorized. As for the latter, it concerns (...) only the individual and is therefore not likely to enter the theory, except by the method that makes it possible. This paper attempts to outline the modus operandi underlying the technical conjecture in order to illustrate Galen’s deftly developed position on a subject almost exclusively investigated by philosophers until then. (shrink)

SUMMARYThis is a translation of a short text in Latin by John Toland, with an introduction and annotations. Toland's text is a conjecture on the influence of a passage from Cicero on modern printing. The translator's introduction discusses the theories mentioned by Toland, and sketches the background of the text. It discusses Toland's interest in Cicero and the context of the text's publication in 1722 by Michel Maittaire, and Toland's and Maittaire's intertwined circles of literary patronage.

Under contract for the series Elements in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant. -/- The focus of this Element is Kant’s history of human reason: his teleological vision of the past development of our rational capacities from their very emergence until Kant’s own “age of Enlightenment”. One of the goals of this Element is to connect Kant’s speculative account of the very beginning of rationality – a topic which has thus far been largely neglected or at least under-studied in Kantian (...) scholarship – to his well-known theory of humankind’s progress. By doing so, I hope to elucidate Kant’s hopes with regard to reason’s future progress and his guidelines for how to achieve this progress by unifying them with his vision of reason’s past. Another goal of this Element is to bring more attention to Kant’s essay “Conjectural Beginning of Human History” (1786), where a large part of this account is presented, and to show that this “somewhat unusual” (Yovel 1989) text does not stand in conflict with Kant’s critical philosophy and is not merely tangentially related to it, but actually illuminates and complements certain aspects of Kant’s critical philosophy. -/- This Element is divided into three parts. Part 1 introduces Kant’s speculations about the transition our species underwent from non-rational animals into primitive, rational humans. It also shows how these speculations fit with Kant’s broader view of the development of humans’ reason, or of the species’ gradual process of learning how to make a mature (enlightened) use of reason. -/- Part 2 focuses on a text where the speculative account of the beginning of human history is presented in most detail: the “Conjectural Beginning of Human History”. I defend the exegetical importance of this essay for Kant’s practical philosophy by arguing that the claims Kant makes in it are not merely fictional or imaginative, but play a key role in his teleological view of the progression of human history. I also assess the contribution that Kant makes to the conjectural history genre through this essay and discuss how distinct it is from the most prominent and well-studied conjectural histories of the Enlightenment era. -/- Part 3 focuses on what Kant’s account of the history of reason tells us about his political and pedagogical guidelines for the continuance of humanity’s progress toward the fulfillment of its vocation and for the progress of any given individual. I also present and defend my understanding of what it means to think and act in an enlightened (or as Kant also calls it, a “pluralistic”) way, connecting this idea to the three maxims of good thinking, the public use of reason, and the role of interpersonal communication in advancing our rational capacities. (shrink)