A major controversy in the study of the "Analects" has been over the relation between two central concepts, ren (humanity, human excellence) and li (rites, rituals of propriety). Confucius seems to have said inconsistent things about this relation. Some passages appear to suggest that ren is more fundamental than li, while others seem to imply the contrary. It is therefore not surprising that there have been different interpretations and characterizations of this relation. Using the analogy of language grammar and mastery (...) of a language, it is proposed here that we should understand li as a cultural grammar and ren as the mastery of a culture. In this account, society cultivates its members through li toward the goal of ren, and persons of ren manifest their human excellence through their practice of li. (shrink)

Analects 2.3 is a key passage in the construal of Confucius' political and legal thought, but readings of it diverge. Many scholars view it as a broader evaluation of the rule of law relative to that of rites, while some read it more specifically as pertaining to the coercive enforcement of morality. Some read the quotation as an instrumental, conformist tenet, whereas some perceive its humanistic and ethical nature. Textual and contextual findings show that the latter categories in both cases (...) are the more plausible. This clarification illuminates differences between Confucius' notion of virtue-rites guidance and later variations that may lack respect for moral autonomy. (shrink)

What effects do archaeological discoveries, and in particular some of the new archaeological discoveries, have on research into ancient history and culture, and especially on the research into [ancient] intellectual culture that all of us present today are concerned about? This is a subject that very much deserves to be studied. Archaeological discoveries have a very substantial effect on research into history. I believe everyone recognizes this fact today. This is probably a matter of common knowledge. However, very few people (...) give any thought to its effect on research into intellectual culture. People do not attach sufficient importance to this. Very few people realize that it has such an effect. Why is that? I believe that one of the reasons is that the archaeology of earlier times did not emphasize research into intellectual culture. For a very long period of time we were, in particular, influenced by Britain's Gordon Childe. As we all know, Childe was, in a certain sense, a Marxist. For instance, we can see in his books, such as What Happened in History and others, that he was basically a Marxist. However, we also note that he brought with him the influence of the Danish school of thought in early archaeology. The Danish school of thought started out by operating museums, and its founder was the person who invented such terms as "Stone Age," "Bronze Age," and "Iron Age." They operated museums and displayed objects but did little explaining. Nor was it possible in those times to talk about ideology and culture. That is why Childe's books brought that kind of an influence. We all know that for a long time in the former Soviet Union, the archaeological research institutes were not called "archaeological institutes," nor did they use the term "archaeology." Their institutes were called "institutes of material culture." What is "material culture?" This term is unclear, because the things discovered by archaeology cannot be defined simply as "material culture." How can one call all the things dug up by archaeology "material culture?" I myself have never looked at the matter that way. That is why I wrote that pamphlet "Dong Zhou yu Qin dai wenming" , and especially put in that particular statement. Many people have since quoted that statement, and fortunately everyone seems to think it is all right. What I meant to say is that the things discovered by archaeology are, of course, material things, but many of them also reflect spiritual things. Actually, the reason is simple. A tomb, for example, always has to do with certain funerary ceremonies and certain rites, and all of these reflect things of the spirit. A bronze vessel, or a pottery vessel—such things reflect the society and the customs and habits of those times. If you are only looking at it from the material side, then the effects of this [other] sort of archaeology are worth considering. This is my view of the matter, and I hope everyone will comment on it. So, today I would like to talk about the influence of archaeological culture on things of the spirit. (shrink)

The Confucianist learning of rites and related code systems are full of performing details realized in patterned conducts, programmed processes and multiplemedia-emblematic network most of which exhibit themselves as nonverbal signs and rhetoric. Those nonverbal ritual codes and the related regular performance exercise an extremely effective impact on the directed communication and domination of the society. As a result, in the Li-System the nonverbal signs and codes could function more relevantly and effectively than the related verbal part which itself functions (...) also at a quasi-nonverbal level. (shrink)

Western Zhou Dynasty Western Zhou bronze inscriptions is to study the history of one of the most important historical data, subject to accurate staging and the Interpretation of the premise. Mid-Western Zhou season Ding, Jin Yang Gui and other information in the "Sikou" is not the official said, there is always a judicial official weekly generation "Sikou" of the set or with a similar view can not be established. Zhou, "Sikou" the establishment of very late times, can only be derived (...) up to the West weekend leaves, and its position is not high, in order to arrest Koudao, maintaining social order as the main ministry. Bureaucracy in the recovery of the Western Zhou Dynasty, it should distinguish Officials with the ministry, and not with the "Rites" and other literature forced analogy. Bronze inscriptions in Western Thou can become a vital historical evidence to study its history, only on the condition of a prudent periodization and explanation. Sikou in bronze inscriptions on xiaojiding and yanggui is not a name for official rank. The argument that there ever existed a judicial office of sikou and alike during the whole Thou Dynasty is problematic. Instead, it was set up as late as in the end of Western Zhou. Ranked rather low, sikou was mainly in charge of conning after robbers and guarding the social security. When doing research on the reinstatement of the bureaucracy in Western Thou, the official rank and its responsibility should be considered in separation, and any effort to conform them to that in zhouli is questionable. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Zhuangzi ed. by Kim-chong ChongLuyao Li (bio)Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Zhuangzi. Edited by Kim-chong Chong. Dordrecht: Springer, 2022. Pp. 835. Hardcover US $133.15, isbn 978-3-030-92330-3.Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Zhuangzi, edited by Kim-chong Chong, is the sixteenth volume in the Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy series. This volume includes a total of 34 chapters and is (...) divided into six parts: "Authorship and Commentary" (Part I), "Concepts" (Part II), "Language and Metaphor" (Part III), "Zhuangzi in the Context of Chinese Philosophy" (Part IV), "Ethical, Social, and Epistemic Issues" (Part V), and "The Zhuangzi and Western Philosophy" (Part VI). These six parts not only provide students or non-specialists with a clear overview of the various possible aspects and approaches to Zhuangzi studies, but also present the latest discussions and diverse perspectives on crucial issues in the Zhuangzi, making the volume a valuable resource for experts in this field.Each part of the Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Zhuangzi extensively explores diverse research perspectives on a specific theme in Zhuangzi studies. Part IV, "Zhuangzi in the Context of Chinese Philosophy," serves as an exemplary illustration of this approach. Considering the possibility that Laozi and the Logicians may have influenced the thought in the Zhuangzi to some extent, this part is comprised of two chapters that respectively examine the connections and distinctions between Zhuangzi and Laozi, and Zhuangzi and the Logicians. Regarding scholars who may have lived after Zhuangzi, Angel On Ki TING envisions Zhuangzi's response to Xunzi's criticism, exploring their respective attitudes towards rites (li 禮) through examining the motivation for action. Additionally, there are chapters that discuss the influence of Zhuangzi's thoughts after the Warring States period, on Neo-Daoism, Buddhism, and Neo-Confucianism, as well as on inner alchemy and religious Daoism.In Part II, however, such extensive exploration proves to be less satisfactory. Here, some crucial concepts in the Zhuangzi are illustrated, including heaven (tian 天) and human (ren 人), transformation (hua 化), vast or big (da 大) and minute (xiao 小), true person (zhen ren 真人) and true knowledge (zhen zhi 真知), no-emotion (wu qing 无情), and ming 命 (fate, destiny, mandate and command). It is unclear why certain concepts are chosen, whereas the central concepts of Dao (道) and de (德) are not focused on. It would perhaps be worthwhile to look closer into more of the above listed concepts, and the [End Page 1] relevance of Dao and de, particularly in terms of Dao and de's relationships to closely connected notions like heaven (tian 天) and ming (命).Furthermore, clear distinctions of themes in various parts of this edited volume overlook the connections among them. Certain terms and issues are addressed in chapters of different parts, with little or no communication between them. For example, the true person is the main concern in a number of chapters: "The True Person and True Knowledge in the Zhuangzi" (Part II, pp. 179-198); "Those Who Fly Without Wings: Depictions of the Supreme Idea Figure in the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi" (Part III, pp. 305-376); and "Zhuangzi's Notion of the True Master and Wittgenstein's Grammatical Investigation" (Part VI, pp.807-824). Such exploration of various perspectives on a particular theme is noteworthy. It is regrettable, however, that there is a lack of correspondence between those perspectives. Some discussion on interactions among relevant chapters would certainly enhance the volume.In addition to presenting an extensive range of studies on the Zhuangzi, the Dao Companion to the Philosophy of the Zhuangzi also makes contributions to specific issues, which will be appealing to specialists in this field. I will elaborate on three of these contributions drawing on various parts of the volume.First, this work contributes to discussions on the issue of authorship. The traditional viewpoint attributes the Inner Chapters, or at least their main part, to the historical figure Zhuang Zhou, and assumes that they were written in the Warring States period and composed earlier than other chapters. Therefore, the Inner Chapters are prioritized in studies of the Zhuangzi. Esther Klein has previously challenged the view that the Inner... (shrink)

The concept of legitimacy is at the heart of the theory of power. It is essential to understand how a political power is built and how obedience is obtained among the population. We examine here the legitimacy of power for two of the most important political philosophies of classical China: Confucianism and Legalism. We show how a specific group of the population, the scholar-officials, play a specialised role in the two systems, acting as a legitimisation group. We further compare rites (...) and laws as a way to obtain social order, and morality vs punishments as a way to obtain obedience. We conclude that the Confucianist system is less fragile than the Legalist, but also more oppressive, since it allows fewer personal choices to individuals. (shrink)

Leibniz was interested in China throughout his life, and he admired its culture. Originally, his interests revolved around Chinese characters, but widened when meeting the Jesuit China missionary P. Grimaldi in Rome 1689. From that time on, Leibniz pursued the project of a knowledge exchange between both sides of the world. He was convinced that Europe and China were on the same cultural level, while diverging over advances in distinct fields. In his view, Europe was more advanced in theoretical areas, (...) such as logic, mathematics, geometry, physics, mathematical astronomy, and theory of natural religion, while China was superior in empirical disciplines, such as in observational astronomy, medicine, historiography, and moral philosophy, which he understood as natural (i.e. rational) theology. This project of knowledge exchange presupposed the recognition of Chinese culture. In this sense, Leibniz strongly supported the Jesuit position, according to which the rites of ancestral worship and reverence of Confucius are riti politici rather than literal expressions of religious faith. Leibniz’s main objection to the Pope’s negative assessment of Chinese rites was that one cannot settle the so-called Rites Controversy as long as one fails to interpret adequately Chinese culture and Confucian thought in particular. (shrink)

Edification 教化 is one of the central concepts of Confucianism. The metaphysical basis of the Confucian edification is the “philosophical theory” in the sense of rational humanism rather than the “religious doctrine” in the sense of pure faith. Confucianism did not create a system of ceremony and propriety owned by Confucians only. The system of ceremony and propriety on which Confucians depend to carry out their social edification is that of “rites and music,” the common life style of ancient China. (...) After continual metaphysical explanation and elevation, the system of ceremony and propriety and that of rites and music have undergone a sort of ever-evolving historical fluctuation, and evinced a sort of openness and forgiveness comparable to that of any other religious form. Compared with typical religious practices, whose ceremonies and rituals that have their own special fixity and exclusivity, Confucian ceremonies and rituals are fundamentally different. The edification of Confucianism can be labeled as “edification in the sense of philosophy.” As a “philosophy”, Confucianism’s vision did not focus on cognition but on completion and realization. (shrink)

THIS ESSAY PRESENTS A CONFUCIAN PERSPECTIVE ON LI. My main concern is the question, “How can a Confucian moral philosopher move from the ethical to the religious dimension of li?” Section 1 provides an analysis of the scope, evolution, functions, and a brief discussion of the question of justification of li. Section 2 deals with the inner aspect of the foundation of conduct, the motivational aspect of li-performance. Section 3 discusses the outer aspect of the foundation of li, focusing on (...) Hsün Tzu’s vision of the triad of t’ien, earth, and humanity, an interpretation of his use of t’ien, shen and shen-ming as expressing a respect for established linguistic, religious practice without an endorsement of associated popular religious beliefs. This interpretation leaves open the question of the validity of reasoned religious beliefs, while presuming the religious dimension of li as extension of Confucian ethics. Section 4 centers on the ethical significance of the li of mourning and sacrifice and the more general question on the efficacy of li, and concludes with some remarks on the transformative significance of the religious dimension of li. (shrink)

American philosopher John Dewey spent more than two years in China (1919–1921). During and after his visit, he wrote some fairly perceptive and insightful commentaries on China. These were published in periodicals such as the New Republic, Asia, and the China Review, and sometimes in newspapers such as the Baltimore Sun. However, there is hardly any discussion of Chinese philosophy in Dewey’s published works or even his papers and correspondence. Among his rare mentions of Chinese philosophy was an article published (...) in 1922, “As the Chinese Think,” which discussed the teachings of Lao Zi and Confucius (M13 : 217–27).1 This was an attempt to improve Western (or at least American) understanding of Chinese attitudes .. (shrink)

Ritual (li) is central to Confucian ethics and political philosophy. Robert Neville believes that Chinese Philosophy has an important role to play in our times by bringing ritual theory to the analysis of global moral and political issues. In a recent work, Neville maintains that ritual ‘needs a contemporary metaphysical expression if its importance is to be seen.’ This paper examines Neville's claim through a detailed study of the ‘ethics of ritual’ in one of the early Confucian texts, the Xunzi. (...) This text has sometimes been read as offering a form of naturalism in its discussions of ‘heaven (tian)’ as analogous to Western, even modern, concept of ‘nature,’ while other interpreters insist that tian is a normative notion. Does this concept of tian offer a metaphysical ground for ethics of ritual advocated in the text? If so, what kind of metaphysics is it? Does Confucian ritual ethics need any metaphysical grounding? There is no specific metaphysical theory in the Xunzi and passages which could be referring to or implying metaphysical assumptions are open to hermeneutical debates. Even if metaphysical assumptions are necessary or beneficial to an ethics of ritual, the paper argues that the ‘metaphysical flexibility’ of the text could work to its advantage in remaining relevant in contemporary context. The conclusion explores some possible directions for further exploring the metaphysics of ritual in a modern understanding of Xunzi. (shrink)

本书包括:祭祀仪式与礼意、礼器与礼意、恭敬撙节退让的礼学意义、孔子礼学的文质相合观、老子礼学的重质轻文观、孟子礼学的本质观等8章。.

The aim of this article is to show, first, that ritual in general and the Confucian li in particular can serve an important pedagogical function, and, secondly, that the sophisticated treatment of li by Confucius and his immediate followers demonstrates that they were consciously aware of this particular potential of li. The discussion takes off by considering formal, ritualized performances from an educational point of view by making use of some seminal, largely Western, research on ritual, though always with an (...) eye on li. It then turns more specifically to li as exemplifying informal interpersonal conduct, whereby pre-Qin Confucian writings will be consulted to construct an interpretation of li as creative and personalized edifying embodiments of a cultural legacy. It will be argued that both aspects of ritual, formal and informal, are potentially of value as a pedagogical tool for instilling a communal sense in the practitioners as well as enabling them to contribute creatively to the ongoing evolution of their cultural habitat. (shrink)

이 글의 목적은 『의례』에서 빈번하게 행해진 祭를 고찰하기 위해 祭儀節의 구체적인 형상에 주안점을 두고, 제지내는 의절이 제를 의미하는 형상으로 해명하고, 이 과정에서 祭와 祭禮의 차이를 명료하게 드러내는 데 있다. 『의례』 17편 가운데 12편에서 수많은 제가 의절에서 제례와 구별되지 않았던 점에 주목한 것이다. 연구를 위해 『주례』의 九祭를 통해 주소가의 해석을 참고하고, 『역전』에서 본뜸의 형상론과 춘추시대의 子産(정나라 大夫)의 사상에서 드러나는 法象論에 기댄다. 따라서 이 연구는 제 의절을 해명하려는 시론적 고찰이다.BR 祭가 祭祀혹은 祭禮를 포함하는 원형으로 쓰이거나 민속적인 고수레로도 널리 해석되는데 굳이 이들을 구분하지 (...) 않았던 까닭은 무엇일까? 제지내는 儀節을 고려하지 않았기 때문이다. 振祭·隋祭·擩祭등의 이름에서 드러나 듯 흔드는 형상, 제기 사이에 떨어뜨려 놓는 형상, 소금과 젓갈에 묻히고 적시는 형상이 곧 제지냄이다. 의절의 의미가 그 형상에 부여된 것으로 보기 때문이다. 희생을 들어 올린 것이 공경을 의미하고 일상에서 음식을 섭취하는 과정과 음식을 다루는 과정을 제 의절로 삼았는데 注疏家는 이를 음식과 음식을 처음 만든 이에게 보본반시하는 마음으로 말한다. 그런데 제 의절은 제지내는 형상이기에 제의 의미는 형상에서 발견되어야 한다. 이 과정에서 제지내는 주체가 몸소 제 의절에 동참해야 비로소 제지냄이 성립되는 것을 보이고자 한다. (shrink)

本书将先秦诸子置于先秦时期广阔的历史和文化背景之下,有别于学界常用的从史学或经学维度研究礼学,而是注重对先秦诸子礼学的哲学和思想层面的研究,既从哲学高度考察和梳理了先秦道家、儒家、墨家和法家代表性人物 如老子、庄子、孔子、孟子、苟子、墨子、商鞅、韩非等人礼学思想的基本内容和基本结构.

朱熹是宋代理学的集大成者，也是成就斐然的礼学大家。他一生议礼、考礼，对礼的本质、价值、结构、功能进行了具有理学特色的阐述，对古代礼制也悉心潜玩，博考深辨，其见解多为后代礼学家所称引。朱熹礼学是其宏大的 理学体系的重要组成部分，在经学思想史上具有非常重要的地位，对宋元以降的中国乃至整个东亚社会产生了深刻的影响。本书从朱熹的三《礼》学思想入手，从学、理、用三个层面对朱熹礼学进行了系统论述，将文本分析与思 想、社会、政治的互动结合起来，考察了朱熹礼学思想形成的背景、内容及其特点。对困惑学界多年的朱熹晚年思想转型、朱熹为何要编撰《仪礼经传通解》、朱熹如何处理礼学与理学的关系等重要学术问题也作了进一步的探索 。.

A pervasive misunderstanding of Confucian philosophy’s concepts considers them to be directives that call for deference and subordination, principally associated with the concept Lǐ 禮 which is understood as rites, rituals, manners, or generally “propriety”. Imposing Lǐ 禮 is considered a path to social and personal harmony. However, an analysis of the conditions and implications of Lǐ 禮 in early Confucian thinking shows that authentic respect, not obedience, is considered the essential condition for good governance and an ordered society. Significantly, (...) authentic respect can only originate from within the self, it cannot be commanded. Based upon self-cultivation, participation in ritual and exemplary conduct establishes a commitment to respect, and the purposeful distinctions expressed through Lǐ 禮 make social order intelligible. Considering the essence of respect in depth, and comparing it to the ethics conceived by Immanuel Kant, neither Confucian nor Kantian ethics are truly deontological in the sense of a “duty that is owed to an external instance”, rather they both rest on the autonomy of the self. A synthesis of both implies that extending authentic respect to an other in an encounter within the context of Lǐ 禮 gives rise to “Existential Reciprocity”: a virtuous cycle which mutually affirms both the self and the other, while rejecting a dichotomous opposition between self-esteem and morality. This is not contingent on external factors, but accessible from a self-determined, autonomous engagement with self-affirming conduct and productive encounters. Benefits are immediate and personal, and this forms the conditions in which harmonious relationships are a natural outcome. (shrink)

Yuejiao was the primary form of education ever since the time of Emperors Yao and Shun. This tradition of valuing Yue over Li lasted till the Three Dynasties period. After the Spring and Autumn Period, Lijiao became the dominant form, but it still consisted of a lot of yue. Seeing the declining of this tradition, Confucius claimed to “follow upon Zhou”. That is, he wanted to recover and inherit this ideology that engages primarily in music cultivation supplemented by ritual normalization. (...) His statement: “Let a man be first incited by the Songs, then given a firm footing by the study of ritual, and finally perfected by music,” also shows his emphasis on Yue. More proofs can be found in Confucian classics such as Analects and the Record of Rites, in which discourses on/ about beauty and goodness are characterized by the juxtaposition of Li and Yue to serve a higher purpose for the pre-Qin Confucians. However, this ideology was not inherited by later Confucians. And the consequence is with the increasing status and impact of Confucianism in China in the past 2500 years, such a tradition of valuing Yue over Li gradually turned into a tradition of valuing Li over Yue. This, however, is inconsistent with both Confucius’ ideology of Li and Yue and the real characteristic of Chinese cultural tradition. (shrink)

이글은 도가와 유가의 정신(精神) 관념의 변천과 특징을 들어내기 위한 마지막 작업으로 『대학』과 『중용』의 정과 신의 용법을 소개한다. 이를 위해 『노자』,『장자』, 『회남자』가 보여주는 정신의 용례를 간략하게 정리했다. 우리가 노자, 장자, 회남자라는 인물의 선후관계를 떠나 『노자』, 『장자』, 『회남자』라는 서적의 역사적 발전과정만을 기준으로 본다면, 정과 신이 차지하는 역할이 점차 높아짐을 알 수 있다. 나아가 『회남자』에 이르면 ‘정신’이라는 관념이 드디어 정립되고 있다. 이는 철학사적으로 매우 의미 있는 일이다. 무엇보다도 중요한 것은 육체에 대한 정신의 우위가 이러한 진행을 통해 안정화된다는 사실이다. 신은 정보다 존재가치가 우월해지고, 정신은 (...) 형해를 능가하는 지위를 갖게 된다. 한마디로 정신은 육체보다 앞서는 것이다. 그리고 이러한 판단은 도가철학에서 강조하는 개인, 주체, 자율성, 독립성과 어울리면서 그들의 색채를 다른 학파와 다르게 고유화한다. 공자와 맹자는 어떠했는가? 인간세계에서 그것이 유지되는 사회적 원리나 도덕적 규범을 강조하는 유가답게 그들에게는 개별화될 수 있는 정신보다는 문화적 질서를 표상하는 예(禮)가 강조된다. 『논어』에서는 정이 그저 절구질을 가리키면서 1회 출현에 그치고, 『맹자』에서는 정이 아예 나오지 않는다. 신도 개인의 정신이 아니라 초월적인 귀신을 뜻하거나(특히 공자) 신묘하거나 신비스러움을 가리킨다. 한마디로 그들에게는 정신이 없는 것이다. 그렇다면 11세기 이후 유학의 교본이 된 『대학』과 『중용』에서는 공맹을 넘어서는 용법이 있을까? 『예기』 전편에서 정은 혼을 의미한다. 그러나 『대학』의 정은 정조의 정이고, 『중용』의 정은 『예기』에서처럼 정령의 뜻이 아니라 정미의 정을 뜻한다. 반면, 『예기』 전편의 신은 귀신으로 이해될 수 있는데, 『대학』에는 신이 나오지 않지만 『중용』에서는 『예기』처럼 대체로 귀신을 가리킨다. 이와 같이 『대학』과 『중용』에서도 정신은 독자적인 지위를 갖지 못한다. (shrink)

Many academics extol chaos theory and the science of complexity as significant scientific advances with application in such diverse fields as biology, anthropology, economics, and history. In this paper we focus our attention on structure‐within‐chaos and the dynamic self‐organization of complex systems in the context of social philosophy. Although the modern formulation of the science of complexity has developed out of late‐twentieth‐century physics and computational mathematics, its roots may extend much deeper into classical thinking. We argue here that the essential (...) ideas and predictions of the science of complexity are found within the social ordering principle of li (the rites) in Confucius's Analects. (shrink)

There are a number of recent attempts to introduce Confucian values to the ethical analysis of technology. These works, however, have not attended sufficiently to one central aspect of Confucianism, namely Ritual (‘Li’). Li is central to Confucian ethics, and it has been suggested that the emphasis on Li in Confucian ethics is what distinguishes it from other ethical traditions. Any discussion of Confucian ethics for technology, therefore, remains incomplete without accounting for Li. This chapter aims to elaborate on the (...) concept of Confucian Li and discuss its relevance to ethics of technology. Particularly, by referring to Li’s communicative, formative, and aesthetic function, I formulate an approach to ethics of technology with an emphasis on community, performance, and the aesthetic and demonstrate how this approach proceeds with the ethical analysis of technology. In doing so, I attempt to answer the question: why Confucianism matters in ethics of technology. (shrink)

1. Śiḥot, ʻetsot, sipurim, ṿe-hadrakhot maʻaśiyot li-veniyat ha-ḳesher ben bene ha-zug ... -- 2. Be-parashat ha-shavuʻa.

In the philosophy of Confucius, the concept _li_ is both central and elusive. While it is often translated 'ritual' or 'the rites,' I argue that there are numerous significant ways in which _li_ is as much an internal property of individuals as it is an external set of rules or norms. I discuss _li_ as deference, as developed dispositions, as embodied intelligence, and as personalized exemplary conduct. Finally, reflecting on the work of Fingarette, and Hall and Ames, as well as (...) Wilson's analysis of their work, I argue that the external _aspect_ of _li_, although reasonably understood under the rubric of 'traditional norms,' may nonetheless legitimately evolve, and that this coheres well with the notion that an internal sense-of-ritual is integral to the meaning of _li_. (shrink)

The Confucian notion of civility has for thousands of years guided all aspects of socio-ethical life in East Asia. Confucians express their central concern for civility in their notion of li, which is commonly translated ?ritual? and refers to the conventions and courtesies through which we submit to the socio-ethical order, as we do, for example, in performing sacrifices, weddings, and funerals, and various daily acts of deference. Since the rise of China and other East Asian countries as economic powers, (...) it has been suggested that we have in East Asia a ?Confucian? ritual-based culture that is opposed to the law-based culture of the West, a culture of rites opposed to a culture of rights, and that this ritual-based culture can be carried into modernity as another way to secure social harmony. I argue that the values central to Confucian ritual ? deference, repayment, and harmony ? are incompatible with the freedom enacted in modern civility. It is unlikely, therefore, that Confucian ritual can be carried into modernity and, as some suggest, remedy the fragmentation, and indeed lack of civility, characteristic of modern societies. (shrink)

This article suggests how Mengzian ideas of the way [dao], rightness [yi] and rites [li], as related to the presupposition that human nature is moral, respond to rigid notions of “truth” and “law,” which tolerate a banalization of evil. It further suggests that the Mengzian attitude is both rooted in human empathy and draws clear limits to it. This is demonstrated by responding to arguments raised by the protagonist Max Aue in Jonathan Little’s book The Kindly Ones.

The New Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan once compared the ethics of Mengzi to that of Kant, claiming that Mengzi’s ethics shares the same fundamental features with Kant’s and can therefore be better understood through a Kantian lens. This paper aims to argue against Mou by elaborating on two important but hitherto insufficiently addressed differences between Kant’s and Mengzi’s ethics. First, the paper shows that, as opposed to what Mou suggests, passages 6A1 to 6A3 of the Mengzi demonstrate Mengzi’s adoption of (...) an a posteriori approach to ethics that stands in direct contrast to Kant’s a priori approach. Second, the paper argues that even if we read Kant’s ethics in a non-rigorous way that works in favor of Mou’s interpretation, ren (humaneness), yi (optimal appropriateness), li (observance of rites), and zhi (wisdom), as the core concepts of Mengzi’s ethics, can still hardly be regarded as Kantian moral laws. (shrink)

Jules Janssens a construit une œuvre importante, qui, pour de nombreux chercheurs, a ouvert des perspectives de recherches nouvelles et fécondes. Ses travaux ont fait date. Ils portent principalement sur la philosophie d'Avicenne, ses sources, ses rapports avec la pensée musulmane, son influence sur la théologie ash'arite (al-Ghazālī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī) et sa réception dans le monde latin. Pour lui rendre hommage, quatorze collègues et amis de renommée internationale se sont réunis pour poursuivre ses réflexions sur ces thèmes. L'ouvrage qui (...) en est issu offre un état des lieux de la recherche contemporaine sur Avicenne et sa postérité arabo-latine. (shrink)

Introduction: Confucianism as humanism. Confucianism as a religion. The spirit of Confucianism.--Confucius.--Mencius.--Hsün Tzu.--Ta hsüeh (The great learning)--Chung yung (The doctrine of the mean)--Hsiao ching (The classic of filial piety)--Li chi (The book of rites)--Tung chung-shu.

Yung Sik Kim's new book is a welcome addition to the large number of studies of the thought of Chu Hsi, arguably the most important literati thinker in China since the Southern Song dynasty . Chu's ideas became orthodox empire‐wide during the early Ming dynasty , and during the Ming and Qing dynasties millions of candidates for the imperial civil service examinations mastered the “Learning of the Way” associated with Chu and his followers. With the exception of the pioneering study (...) by Yamada Keiji in 1978, nearly all previous accounts of Chu's ideas written by students of Chinese philosophy have emphasized the metaphysical, moral, and epistemological concerns in Chu's writings. Those more concerned with imperial dogma and state power in China since 1400 have tended to paint Chu Hsi's “Learning of the Way” as a monolithic, authoritarian ideology that legitimated the Ming and Qing dynasty rulers politically, socially, and culturally among gentry elites.Kim acknowledges that the core of Chu Hsi's grand intellectual synthesis was focused on moral and social philosophy, but in this book Kim provides compelling information that Chu was also concerned with natural knowledge about the three levels of reality: heaven and earth, the myriad things in the world, and the human realm. Humans thus formed a triad with heaven and earth as the most numinous living thing because they were endowed with the psycho‐physical stuff of ch'i that was most clear and complete. Recognizing no boundary between the physical and the spiritual, Chu Hsi equated human nature with the universe. The basic concepts that informed Chu's natural world were yin‐yang, the five evolutive phases, and the dualism of li and ch'i .Chu Hsi advocated a scholarly agenda that would explain why things and events were as they were. Through the “investigation of things,” the heavenly principle that inscribed the ch'i of each object and event could be discovered. Normally historians of Chinese philosophy stress the place of universal heavenly li in Chu's thought, but Kim makes a concerted effort not to overlook the important place of ch'i as the aggregated collection of stuff in the universe, some dense and falling like the earth, some airy and rising like heaven. Indeed, as important as li was for Chu Hsi's moral philosophy, ch'i was the most important concept he employed to explain natural phenomena, material changes, and earthly events. With no discontinuity between matter and life, or between materiality and mind, Chu's philosophy made no allowance for the Western distinctions between the material and spiritual spheres or between the physical and mental realms.It was precisely such views that troubled the Jesuits such as Matteo Ricci who came to China in the late sixteenth century. Ricci and his European cohort would be condemned in the early eighteenth century by French Jansenists and Spanish Franciscans for their overly accommodational compromises with traditional Chinese religious practices such as ancestor worship, which Ricci interpreted as a civil rite. Nonetheless, when Ricci studied Chu Hsi's moral philosophy and natural thought, he was appalled at its materialism and atheism, which he considered the fault of Buddhism and its impact on Song literati such as Chu Hsi.The “noninertness” of ch'i carried over from the dynamic materiality of all things, including the human mind, to the formless and unfathomable spirits and ghosts that existed in a border area outside the natural realm between heaven and human beings. The dispersion of ch'i upon death could take many forms but, according to Chu Hsi, in the end all such ch'i disaggregated, leaving no ongoing or abiding spiritual form for humans, plants, or animals. The ch'i of the ancestors could be prayed to because the materiality of their descendants was the same ch'i, but even this continuity could not survive more than a few generations. Again, the Jesuits were shocked at this atheistic view of the human soul and its eventual demise materially with no possible eternal life after death.Accordingly, Kim's careful study of what Chu Hsi thought about the natural world makes it evident that most modern studies have elided an essential aspect of traditional Chinese thought, particularly the centrality of ch'i in the dynamic processes of collection and dispersion that produce all things, whether living or inanimate. Students of Chinese philosophy have tended to prioritize those aspects of Chu Hsi's views on universal li and its instantiated forms that are more amenable to a Western, Judeo‐Christian‐Islamic reading drawn ultimately from the debate between Plato and Aristotle over the universal forms of particular things.Modern presentations, in other words, have failed to grasp why a generation of Jesuit scholars who spent their adulthood in China during the seventeenth century found Chu Hsi's views alien and dangerous. Kim deserves credit for going against the tide of twentieth‐century scholarly interpretation and restoring to Chu Hsi those aspects of his natural philosophy that have been conveniently repressed to make his views more palatable. Rather than just the builder of the orthodox brick wall of traditional Chinese moralism, we can see that Chu Hsi's natural philosphy challenged any view of the world that assumed theological differences between life and death, mind and body, or the spiritual and physical. (shrink)