As the author shows, intellectual history is very different from the history of philosophy; but one wonders if the two kinds of history matter to each other. The author's complete lack of philosophical concerns may, of course, be a virtue, but it is also restrictive and self-defeating. Nevertheless, the book may well stand as the authoritative treatment of the history of Comte's positivism—an idea which, Simon declares at the outset, had little to recommend it but which did manage to (...) have a history. The book is written with great attention to detail and contains a long, well-assembled and very valuable bibliography. The chapters on Mill and other English thinkers are particularly interesting, and will probably settle some old disputes about the impact of positivism in nineteenth-century England.—C. D. (shrink)

Logical positivism is often characterized as a set of naive doctrines on meaning, method, and metaphysics. In recent decades, however, historians have dismissed this view as a gross misinterpretation. This new scholarship raises a number of questions. When did the standard reading emerge? Why did it become so popular? And how could commentators have been so wrong? This essay reconstructs the history of a “caricature” and rejects the hypothesis that it was developed by ill-informed Anglophone scholars who failed to (...) appreciate the subtleties of European scientific philosophy. It argues that the received view has a more complicated history and was frequently promoted by the European positivists themselves. The essay shows that the view has roots in both American and European scientific philosophy and emerged as a result of the complex interplay between the two communities in the years before the intellectual migration. (shrink)

Summary This article introduces a set of essays examining the state of political thought in the Western European democracies of Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and Sweden in the post-war period between 1945 and 1970. In particular, as well as simply filling a gap, they seek to demonstrate that political theory in this period was more vibrant than has traditionally been maintained. A key part of this argument is that the discipline was less adversely affected by the ascendancy of (...) positivism than historians and political theorists have normally argued, not least because ‘positivism’ was in fact a more diverse and varied phenomenon than is usually recognised. For while some positivists drew on either behaviourist social science of linguistic philosophy to justify their denial that moral and political values could be discussed rationally with reference to theoretical arguments, others argued that it was the perceived success of post-war welfare states or the alleged failure of political ideologies that had made traditional political theory irrelevant. This meant that although few political theorists in this period were able to refute all types of positivism entirely, they were able to take issue with different aspects of it, and hence, at least to some extent, to pursue their discipline normatively. However, experiences in different Western European countries nevertheless varied widely. In Britain, normative political theorists faced both versions of the positivist challenge, but their ripostes were largely couched in academic terms, whether addressing the ‘end of ideology’ thesis, behaviourism or linguistic positivism. In West Germany, by contrast, the debate over positivism was much more overtly political, since the legacy of the Weimar republic caused the issue of whether political values in general, and laws in particular, were rationally justifiable to be a peculiarly sensitive one. But even in Sweden, which had a much quieter history, and has often been seen as the epitome of a technocratic political system, it is revealed that the degree to which ‘the end of ideology’ had been reached was much more keenly contested in practical politics than has previously been thought. And in France, it is revealed that there was more interesting academic political theorising being prosecuted than has traditionally been acknowledged, by such thinkers as Jacques Maritain and Raymond Aron, even if there was admittedly less than in, for example, Britain. And lastly, in Italy, despite a badly functioning political system, which tended to encourage cynicism about politics in general, there were in fact important and sophisticated attempts at formulating coherent normative positions, at least on an ideological level. Whatever the differences, however, the conclusion is clear: normative political theory was in general in much better health during this period than has traditionally been admitted, and, as such, is worthy of considerable further exploration. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary paper identifies principles of an affluent country (im)migration policy that avoids: (1) the positivist inclusion/exclusion mechanism of liberalism and communitarianism; and (2) the idealism of most cosmopolitan (im)migration theories. First, I: (a) critique the failure of liberalism and communitarianism to consider (im)migration under distributive justice; and (b) present cosmopolitan (im)migration approaches as a promising alternative. This paper’s central claim is that cosmopolitan (im)migration theory can determine normative shortcomings in (im)migration policy by coupling elements of Frankfurt School methodology to (...) case studies of (im)migration regimes. Lastly, I apply this analytical procedure to recent special changes in Spanish and UK immigration law. (shrink)

Summary This article introduces a set of essays examining the state of political thought in the Western European democracies of Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and Sweden in the post-war period between 1945 and 1970. In particular, as well as simply filling a gap, they seek to demonstrate that political theory in this period was more vibrant than has traditionally been maintained. A key part of this argument is that the discipline was less adversely affected by the ascendancy of (...) positivism than historians and political theorists have normally argued, not least because ?positivism? was in fact a more diverse and varied phenomenon than is usually recognised. For while some positivists drew on either behaviourist social science of linguistic philosophy to justify their denial that moral and political values could be discussed rationally with reference to theoretical arguments, others argued that it was the perceived success of post-war welfare states or the alleged failure of political ideologies that had made traditional political theory irrelevant. This meant that although few political theorists in this period were able to refute all types of positivism entirely, they were able to take issue with different aspects of it, and hence, at least to some extent, to pursue their discipline normatively. However, experiences in different Western European countries nevertheless varied widely. In Britain, normative political theorists faced both versions of the positivist challenge, but their ripostes were largely couched in academic terms, whether addressing the ?end of ideology? thesis, behaviourism or linguistic positivism. In West Germany, by contrast, the debate over positivism was much more overtly political, since the legacy of the Weimar republic caused the issue of whether political values in general, and laws in particular, were rationally justifiable to be a peculiarly sensitive one. But even in Sweden, which had a much quieter history, and has often been seen as the epitome of a technocratic political system, it is revealed that the degree to which ?the end of ideology? had been reached was much more keenly contested in practical politics than has previously been thought. And in France, it is revealed that there was more interesting academic political theorising being prosecuted than has traditionally been acknowledged, by such thinkers as Jacques Maritain and Raymond Aron, even if there was admittedly less than in, for example, Britain. And lastly, in Italy, despite a badly functioning political system, which tended to encourage cynicism about politics in general, there were in fact important and sophisticated attempts at formulating coherent normative positions, at least on an ideological level. Whatever the differences, however, the conclusion is clear: normative political theory was in general in much better health during this period than has traditionally been admitted, and, as such, is worthy of considerable further exploration. (shrink)

Legal positivists maintain that the legality of a rule is fundamentally determined by social facts. Yet for much of legal history, ordinary officials used legal terminology in ways that seem inconsistent with positivism. Judges regularly cited, analyzed, and predicated their decisions on the ‘laws of justice’ which they claimed had universal legal import. This practice, though well-documented by historians, has received surprisingly little philosophical attention; I argue that it invites explanation from positivists. After taxonomizing the positivist’s explanatory options, I (...) suggest that the most viable option appeals to conceptual change: classical Romans, early modern Europeans, founding-era Americans were not using ‘law’ (or ‘lex’ or ‘jus’) to refer to the subject matter of contemporary legal philosophy. But the strategy is costly. It renders positivism’s truth surprisingly parochial. And it supplies new reasons for doubting positivist accounts of contemporary practices, including the treatment of moral principles in modern adjudication. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: European Positivism Latin American Positivism Martí Rodó Vaz Ferreira Ingenieros References Further Reading.

Nearly thirty years ago, Robert Alexy in his book The Concept and Validity of Law as well as in other early articles raised non-positivistic arguments in the Continental European tradition against legal positivism in general, which was assumed to be held by, among others, John Austin, Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart. The core thesis of legal positivism that was being discussed among contemporary German jurists, just as with their Anglo- American counterparts, is the claim that there is (...) no necessary connection between law and morality. Robert Alexy has argued, however, that the law, besides consisting conceptually of elements of authoritative issuance and social efficacy, necessarily lays a claim to substantial correctness, which is derived from analytical arguments. Furthermore, if this claim to substantial correctness necessarily requires the incorporation of moral elements into law, then the ‘necessary connection thesis’, as defended by non-positivism, can be justified. Some of the most significant objections to this sort of claim, stemming from the Anglo-American world, are those introduced by Joseph Raz. In his ‘Reply’ to Robert Alexy, Raz raises at least three interesting criticisms, including, first, the ambiguity of ‘legal theory in the positivistic tradition’, second, the indeterminate formulations of the ‘separation thesis’, and, third, the necessary claim of law to legitimate authority as a moral claim. As a point of departure, I will argue that Raz’s three criticisms are misleading. For they do not enhance our understanding of the genuine compatibility or incompatibility between legal positivism and non-positivism. Despite the frequently reformulated theses of legal positivism and the various kinds of opponents responding thereto, the essential divergence between legal positivism and non-positivism was and remains the answer to the question of the relation between law and morality. Furthermore, I will clarify that in the strictest sense there can be three and only three logically possible positions concerning the relation between law and morality: the connection between them is either necessary, or impossible (i. e. they are necessarily separate), or contingent (i. e. they are neither necessarily connected nor necessarily separate). The first position is non-positivistic, while the latter two positions are, indeed, both positivistic, but in different forms: one may be called ‘exclusive’ legal positivism, the other ‘inclusive’ legal positivism. I will continue by showing that these three positions stand to one another in the relation of contraries, not contradictories, and that, taken together, they exhaust the logically possible positions concerning the relation between law and morality, never mind the tradition or authority from which these positions are derived. Raz mentions, however, many changeable formulations of the separation thesis, which even leads him to acknowledge ‘necessary connections between law and morality’. One who is trying to understand legal positivism would no doubt be puzzled by this claim. Nevertheless, I will argue that this is an alternative strategy of legal positivism, and it points to naturalistically oriented view. Although this necessary separation between law and morality, understood naturalistically, strikes one as strengthening the separation, in the end it leads to a weakened notion of necessity. This weakened necessary separation thesis, however, cannot be justified through the so-called claim of the law to legitimate authority, defended by Raz, for it is difficult to answer the question of whether a normally justified but factual authority can gain legitimate authority. Finally, the necessary connection between law and morality in a strong sense can still be justified by the claim of law to correctness, as per Alexy’s argument. (shrink)

A general consensus has emerged in the scholarship on Latin American thought dating from the latter half of the nineteenth century through the first quarter of the twentieth. Latin American intellectuals widely adapted the European philosophy of positivism in keeping with the demands of their own social and political contexts, effectively making positivism the second most important philosophical tradition in the history of Latin America, after scholasticism. However, as thinkers across Latin America faced the challenges of the (...) twentieth century, they grew increasingly disappointed with positivism, so that “anti-positivism” stands out as a defining feature of Latin American philosophy in the early twentieth century. In this essay, I challenge or at least add nuance to this widely accepted narrative by demonstrating considerable continuity rather than simple rupture between positivism and “anti-positivism” in Latin America. I focus on Mexico, where both positivism and the reaction against it are generally taken to have been strongest, or at least most politically significant. After tracing the history of positivism’s transformations in Mexico from Auguste Comte (1798-1857) to Gabino Barreda (1818-1881) to Justo Sierra (1848-1912), I show how Mexico’s leading “anti-positivist” philosophers—José Vasconcelos (1882-1959) and Antonio Caso (1883-1946)—draw substantially upon their positivist predecessors. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: European Positivism through a Latin American Lens Latin American Positivism Latin American Positivism Compared The Legacy of Nineteenth‐Century Positivism in Latin America References Further Reading.

ABSTRACTThis article offers a re-contextualization of the Positivism Dispute between the Frankfurt School and advocates of empirical sociology in the German sociological profession between 1954 and 1970. Investigating the reasons why the German Sociological Association convened in Tübingen in October 1961, it assigns a more peripheral role to Karl Popper and this now famous seminar. Focusing instead on the debate among German sociologists from the mid-1950s which prompted the convention of the seminar and the invitation for Popper to speak, (...) the article maintains that philosophy of history was the central concern of the Positivism Dispute. In this debate, members of the Frankfurt School emphasized contingency in history and society, while sociologists such as René König, Helmut Schelsky, Ralf Dahrendorf, and Arnold Gehlen advocated sociology as the empirical study of ‘given’ social facts. By doing so the article questions the narrative of the Positivism Dispute advanced by Karl Popper and some of his followers, as well as interpretations which have focused on debates during the aftermath of the Tübingen seminar in the 1960s. (shrink)

In the inter-war period Italian philosophical culture was dominated by idealistic, spiritualistic and religious brands of philosophies, among which Benedetto Croce’s and Giovanni Gentile’s kinds of idealism were the prevailing ones. These idealistic philosophies were characterized by a strong aversion for positivistic, pragmatist and scientific philosophies which, in the first decades of our century, were represented in Italy above all by Giovanni Vailati, Mario Calderoni , Giuseppe Peano and Federigo Enriques. Italian ‘scientific philosophy’ lost in the battle with Croce’s and (...) Gentile’s idealistic philosophies. On the political level, the hegemony of Croce and Gentile coincided with the years of Fascist dictatorship . On the cultural level, this hegemony caused the suppression of scientific culture and philosophy in comparison with humanistic culture, and the subsequent philosophical isolation of Italy from the majority of the movements of scientific philosophy working in those years in the other European countries and in the United States of America. (shrink)

Hans-Joachim Dahms’s long-awaited book on the so-called “positivism dispute” is a most timely and important study of a particularly puzzling episode in the history of 20th century Central European philosophy.1 Transcending the distinction between internal and external historiography, it tells a story that may be read not only as a well-situated philosophical critique of the positions at issue in that dispute, but also as a political history of mid-20th century Central European philosophy of science. Read either way, (...) Dahms’s study is of great contemporary relevance despite its historical orientation. (shrink)

Robert Musil's unfinished novel The Man Without Qualities is testimony that Arthur Schopenhauer's legacy in early-twentieth-century European culture cuts across the familiar opposition between neo-romantic irrationalism and scientific positivism. I adduce evidence in Musil's unfinished novel and contemporaneous essays and journal entries that his utopian vision of an integration of ethical inwardness and scientific objectivity, an integration productive of an existence without qualities, is symptomatic of a Schopenhauerian outlook that prevailed in Europe êntre deux guerres and yielded a (...) crisis of narratives and consequent moral ambivalence. Musil's literary style achieves a vivid rendering of the causes and conditions of the ethical paralysis afflicting the modern self committed to the exploration of inwardness. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s favourable comments about science and the senses have recently been taken as evidence of naturalism. Others focus on his falsification thesis: our beliefs are falsifying interpretations of reality. Clark argues that Nietzsche eventually rejects this thesis. This article utilizes the multiple ways of being science friendly in Nietzsche’s context by focussing on Mach’s neutral monism. Mach’s positivism is a natural development of neo-Kantian positions Nietzsche was reacting to. Section 15 of Beyond Good and Evil is crucial to Clark’s (...) interpretation. The presented interpretation makes better sense of this passage and shows that Nietzsche can accept both falsification and empiricism. (shrink)

The article analyzes Petro Kudriavtsev’s historical philosophical conception in the context of basic tendencies and reference points of development of historical philosophical science in Europe in 19th – the beginning of 20th cent. For this purpose, the place and significance of reception of European philosophy in the P. Kudriavtsev’s historic philosophical works are identified. Furthermore, the article discusses the complex of philosophical and historical ideas that appeared to be productive for development of Kudriavtsev’s original historical philosophical conception. The latter (...) is proved to be formulated in the process of deep creative interpretation of European historical philosophical studies achievements (Hegel, Wilhelm Windelband, Kuno Fisсher), such as ethics and philosophical constructions of the European thought (Kant, Theodor Lipps, Friedrih Paulsen, Joseph Petzold, Ernst Mach, Herbert Spencer, Auguste Comte). The author finds out the particularity of the P. Kudriavtsev’s original approach to understanding of historical philosophical process, based on comprehension of rationalism and empiricism (positivism), two opposite models of historical philosophical knowledge. Besides, the author argues for the similarity in approach to the history of philosophy between P. Kudriavtsev and the representatives of historical-philosophical tradition after Hegel (Wilhelm Windelband, Kuno Fisсher). Reconstruction of P. Kudriavtsev’s historical philosophical conception allows the author to conclude, on the one hand, that conception reflected one of the central problems in Western European philosophy on the edge of 19 th – 20 th centuries – the problem of values. On the other hand, the conception was aimed to oppose the relativistic and nihilistic tendencies, which dominated in Modern European philosophy. (shrink)

The received view in the history of the philosophy of psychology is that the logical positivists—Carnap and Hempel in particular—endorsed the position commonly known as “logical” or “analytical” behaviourism, according to which the relations between psychological statements and the physical-behavioural statements intended to give their meaning are analytic and knowable a priori. This chapter argues that this is sheer legend: most, if not all, such relations were viewed by the logical positivists as synthetic and knowable only a posteriori. It then (...) traces the origins of the legend to the logical positivists’ idiosyncratic extensional or at best weakly intensional use of what are now considered crucially strongly intensional semantic notions, such as “translation,” “meaning” and their cognates, focussing on a particular instance of this latter phenomenon, arguing that a conflation of explicit definition and analyticity may be the chief source of the legend. (shrink)

In her paper “Neo-positivist metaphysics” (Philosophical Studies, 160(1), 53–78, 2012), Alyssa Ney promises a naturalized metaphysics that is acceptable even by positivists’ – and specifically Carnap’s – standards. This neo-positivist metaphysics takes its outset in the findings of our best science and relies on them to inform a metaphysics that can avoid the dependence on linguistic frameworks that is inherent to Carnapian deflationism. Neo-positivist metaphysics attempts to sidestep these problems by inheriting its semantic credentials directly from science itself. This paper (...) argues that such attempts are unsuccessful since science contains no resources with which to answer Carnap’s challenge either, and a science-based metaphysics is therefore just as vulnerable to Carnapian deflationism as traditional metaphysics. Consequently, neo-positivist metaphysics does not provide the promised metaphysics that can avoid Carnapian deflationism. While this conclusion focuses on Ney’s neo-positivist metaphysics, its scope includes any attempt to avoid Carnapian deflationism by a naturalized metaphysics that relies on strict deference to the findings of science. Substantial metaphysics – naturalized or not – is impossible unless or until Carnapian deflationism is refuted, and the resources for such a refutation cannot be found in naturalized metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs the American reception of logical positivism in the early 1930s. I argue that Moritz Schlick (who had visiting positions at Stanford and Berkeley between 1929 and 1932) and Herbert Feigl (who visited Harvard in the 1930-31 academic year) played a crucial role in promoting the *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung*, years before members of the Vienna Circle, the Berlin Group, and the Lvov-Warsaw school would seek refuge in the United States. Building on archive material from the Wiener Kreis Archiv, (...) the Harvard University Archives, and the Herbert Feigl Papers, as well as a large number of publications in American philosophy journals from the early 1930s, I reconstruct the subtle transformation of the American philosophical landscape in the years immediately preceding the European exodus. I argue that (1) American philosophical discussions about meaning and significance and (2) internal dynamics in the Vienna Circle between 1929 and 1931 significantly impacted the way in which US philosophers came to perceive logical positivism. (shrink)

This essay examines two dominant traditions in legal philosophy, the natural law theory and legal positivism, in terms of how they account for the normativity of law. I argue that, although these two traditions generally take the question of the normativity of law seriously and try to account for it, they are not successful in doing so. This failure in the prevailing literature on the philosophy of law, I suggest, nevertheless has an implicit reconstructive impact: the insights into the (...) failure of natural law theory and legal positivism imply an alternative philosophical framework that may provide a positive answer to the question of the normativity of law. (shrink)

The main idea of this article is to present various perspectives in order to analyze the recent crisis concerning the agriculture-based rural societies in the developed capitalist communities. In all of these countries there is a production crisis, resulting in too much food. But this is also an ideological crisis, because the consumer thinks that the food is produced at too high a price. And it is a political crisis as well because a major part of the voters think subsidies (...) and trade barriers are too high. The paper argues that beneath the present agricultural and rural policy crisis lies the failure of three great projects of our time: 1) The project of natural science; 2) The project of liberal capitalism; and 3) The project of scientific socialism. The failure of these three projects has to do with the breakdown of the positivist idea of modernization. Modernization theory was partly wrong because it overlooked the persistence of locally based life modes. Those life modes must be understood before a sustainable rural development is found. The article reviews some contemporary social science perspectives that have recently been developed to grasp the fundamental changes of today's rural societies. Based on those perspectives and primarily the life mode perspective, five key elements that are essential to analyze if we want to understand future development are isolated: food production, resources, space, social diversity, and culture. (shrink)

Christopher Arciszewski (1592–1656), Arian mercenary and man of many facets, conducted a journal in which, it is suspected, he described military campaigns, the state of the colony and other interesting phenomena he was able to observe during his time of service in Brazil. In 1641, Gerard Vossius was completing his magnum opus De theologia. In Chapter 8 of the first volume, Vossius discusses the “cult of the demon” among various peoples. As an example the Netherlander erudite provides a colorful description (...) of such a cult among the Brazilian Tapuya tribe. Since the author never traveled to Brazil, he makes use of the observations of Christopher Arciszewski. How does an Arian, brought up in an atmosphere of intense pluralism and far-reaching tolerance towards other belief systems (or at least imbued with a strong relativism), react when he encounters, first-hand, a culture utterly different, and completely alien to him? His presentation of a hierarchically constructed morality existent among various cannibalistic tribes is, in a sense, an intellectual breakthrough. Instead of treating the nativescollectively as one homogenous culture, as simply “savages”, Arciszewski distinguishes between various cultural units, and treats them individually. The nobleman attempts to convey their own views of morality not on the basis of European ethical systems, but on the local ones in place. In his day, such ideas were nearly unthinkable for most educated Europeans. Cannibalism of any kind was perceived as godless behavior, a sort of devilry, which would eventually be abolished with coming of the “light of Christianity” to the New World and the inevitable Europeanization of the natives. The reader can marvel at the extent to which Arciszewski is willing go in his relativism, to the point of sympathizing with the Tapuya. He allows them to explain to the reader the functioning of theirendo-cannibalistic culture. Arciszewski adds to the rationalization of cannibalism a detailed description of the death-rite among the Tapuya, presenting these ceremonial customs in accordance with their own beliefs, as something potentially interesting for humanistic intellectuals back in the Old World. Vossius’ book also discusses the question of the tribe’s spiritual beliefs: their conceptions of good and evil, deities, etc. The reader once again witnesses Arciszewski’s readiness to accept beliefs and deities completely unknown to European religion. The author does not prima facie discount the possibility that the “universal laws” operating in the Old World have no place in the Brazilian wilderness. His philosophical outlook, demonstrated by his rationalization of what had before been considered “magical” or “irrational”, is surely a foreshadowing of the rationalism of Enlightenment, whose modes of thinking constitute the core-foundation for alllater philosophical and scientific inquiry. Arciszewski, as an Arian brother par excellence, essentially operated with such conceptual tools as relativism, toleration and universalism, and his intellectual arsenal did not altogether differ from our own. As such, Arciszewski, and Europeans like him, helped free the Western worldview of its mediaeval philosophically limited conceptions of the cosmos, and propelled it in new directions of inquiry. This led eventually to a decided shifting of the European worldview away from superstition towards reason: the most definitively crucial moment in European intellectual history. (shrink)

It appears that there is a conflict of values running through business ethics between profits accruing to shareholders and the cost of entrepreneurial activities on wider stakeholders. In the ethics research literature, the multiplicity of normative ethical stances has resulted in much debate but little in the way of consistent policy proposals. There is, by comparison, an extensive literature in positive economics that attempts to resolve value conflicts similar to those faced by business ethicists. In this paper the adoption of (...) positive welfare statements are advocated and the value judgements implicit in economics are used as the starting point. It is argued that there is merit in expressly stating a set of value judgements to demonstrate the intractable nature of finding a social consensus without a positive social welfare function that explicitly weights the values. This paper reviews the arguments surrounding corporate objectives, particularly with regard to ethical considerations and the profit maximisation orthodoxy. This is discussed within the stakeholder‐stockholder narrative. A range of ethical positions in the management strategy literature are analysed and discussed. It is argued that the values underpinning business ethics research can be conceived of via a function of social welfare (including an ethical ‘auctioneering’ model). The paper concludes by suggesting that all ethical positions can be captured by a Bergson‐type welfare function. (shrink)

Positivism, the predominant philosophy of Latin America’s elites at the end of the nineteenth century, found its exemplary expression in Brazil’s castilhismo and Mexico’s porfiriato. Argentina, in contrast, seemed to have deviated from the norm of ‘enlightened dictatorships’. After the end of the Rosas tyranny in 1852, authoritarianism had been discredited. Early positivism, as embodied by Teacher-President Sarmiento, could barely be distinguished from liberalism and no single political philosophy was able to exert hegemony. However, the significance of ‘scientific (...) politics’ should not be downplayed. As this article argues, the merger, in the 1880s, of Comtean positivism and teacher training revolutionised education policies that aimed at erasing frontier backwardness and inserting future generations into an export-led economy, oligarchic polity, and homogenous national organism. Normal schools, especially Sarmiento’s Escuela de Parana´, acted as laboratories for the assimilation, merger, and contestation of European, North American, and autochthonous scientific, philosophical, and pedagogical traditions. (shrink)

The nrst of the people to be thanked for their help during the composition of this work is Professor I.M. Bochenski, under whom I had the good fortune to study for an extended period of time. Without his help, it is doubtful that this work would have been writt"l1 at all. Among the other professors who helped along the way, I would like to cite in particular Professors A.F. Utz, M.D. Philippe and N. Luyten of the University of Fribourg. Many (...) friends were present at the birth of the ideas contained in this book. By naming K.G. Ballestrem, T.l. Blakeley and M.F. Gagern, I do not want to slight any of the rest. It was A. Spiekermann in Hollinghofen who saw to it that other preoccupations did not rob me of all the time needed for the study of the subject-matter and to the composition of this treatise. Of particular help in getting sources from the libraries of the world were Miss Lifschitz of the Institute of East-European Studies and Mr. Uldry of the Cantonal Library in Fribourg, Switzerland. Finally, my patient typist, Mrs. Frey in Munster, deserves special mention for her beautiful work. (shrink)

The article discusses Masaryk’s work The Spirit of Russia. In terms of methodology, The Spirit of Russia is based in Positivism, in a faith in progress and a forward-looking orientation of European development. At the same time, however, it also displays certain axiological positions that condemn conservative, monarchist or religious ideas present in Russian thought. Masaryk is critical of Russian spirituality and traditional elements of Orthodox devotion. The Orthodox faith in his view represents an antipode to progress, being (...) non-European in character. Russia itself is presented as split internally into a progressive, European tendency, and a stagnant traditionalist segment. Masaryk’s view of Russia bears some traits of Orientalism, in particular the notion of the superiority of the European West over traditionalist Russia and the negative aspects of its traditional cultural and religious forms. He also anticipates the notion of internal colonialism within Russia itself. (shrink)

ABSTRACT As the most famous critic of John Stuart Mill, James Fitzjames Stephen has often been assumed to have been a religious conservative or even reactionary. In contrast to these assessments, this article shows that Stephen's most consistent enemies were what he took to be the two most significant religious forces of the modern world: Ultramontane Catholicism and Comtean Positivism. The article explores his objections to these two religious ideologies, which he saw as sharing certain harmful features. It then (...) shows that his famous critiques of John Stuart Mill and liberalism had much in common with his attacks on Ultramontanism and Positivism; for example, he charged that they rested on an implausible philosophical anthropology and that they degraded the state. (shrink)

In The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl expands his philosophical horizon to include the question about the genuine meaning of human existence. Understanding the crisis of the European sciences as a symptom of the crisis of European philosophy and as an expression of the life-crisis of European humanity, and interpreting European science, philosophy, and humanity as representative of their global-historical counterparts, Husserl argues that the life-crisis of European humanity is reflective (...) of the critical condition of global-historical humanity. The crisis of “European” life emerges as a crisis of human existence, and Husserl’s phenomenology unfolds as a search for an answer to the question not only about the sense of the life-world but also about the meaning of human life. Thus phenomenology, as care for humanity, shares with existentialism, as a humanism in the broadest sense, the conviction that human beings live in a world not in which life makes sense, but in which they must make sense of life. Accordingly, the genuine essence of human existence is not passively “given” but actively “taken,” since it involves an entelechy that constitutes itself in an evolutionary achievement, and it is the evidentiary result of an existential struggle for meaning against annihilating forms of meaninglessness, namely, irrationalism, positivism, and skepticism. This paper examines Husserl’s hermeneutical-historical approach to the question about the meaning of human existence and suggests an understanding of phenomenology as a form of humanism, and perhaps even as a unique kind of “existentialism,” that is, an ethical philosophy that takes absolute moral responsibility for the presuppositionless application of reason to life.En La crisis e las ciencias europeas y la fenomenología trascendental, Husserl expande su horizonte filosófico a fin de incluir en él la pregunta por el auténtico sentido de la existencia humana. Al entender la crisis de las ciencias europeas como un síntoma de la crisis de la filosofía europea y como una expresión de la crisis vital de la humanidad europea, y al interpretar la ciencia, la filosofía y la humanidad europeas como representativas de sus contrapartes históricas y globales, Husserl argumenta que la crisis vital de la humanidad europea refleja la condición crítica en que se encuentra la humanidad en perspectiva histórica global. La crisis de la vida “europea” emerge como una crisis de la existencia humana, y la fenomenología de Husserl se despliega como la búsqueda de una respuesta a la cuestión no sólo del sentido del mundo de la vida, sino también del significado de la vida humana. La fe-nomenología, como cuidado de la humanidad, comparte con el existencialismo, entendido como un humanismo en el sentido más amplio, la convicción de que los seres humanos viven en un mundo en el cual no es que la vida tenga sentido sino que ellos deben dar sentido a la vida. En consonancia, la auténtica esencia de la existencia humana no está pasivamente “dada” sino que es activamente “tomada”, ya que ella envuelve una entelequia que se constituye en una realización evolutiva, y que es el resultado evidenciador de un combate existencial por el significado contra las formas de sinsentido que son aniquiladoras, a saber: irracionalismo, positivismo y escepticismo. Este ensayo examina la aproximación histórico-hermenéutica de Husserl a la cuestión del significado de la existencia humana, y sugiere una comprensión de la fenomenología como una forma de humanismo, y quizá incluso como un tipo único de existencialismo; esto es, como una filosofía ética que asume una responsabilidad moral absoluta en la aplicación sin presupuestos de la razón a la vida. (shrink)

This four-volume set presents an unrivalled collection of the key literature in European sociology. The prestigious texts range across the European tradition from enlightenment to contemporary theory. The collection explodes the myth that the European tradition in sociology is a debate with the ghosts of Karl Marx and Max Weber, demonstrating that the tradition is far more deeply rooted and broadly based. Volume 1 is devoted to the emergence of European sociology. The contribution of classical political (...) economy and the Enlightenment is examined. Commentaries on the work of Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Taine, Rousseau, de Tocqueville, Comte and St. Simon are included. The volume creates a vivid and compelling picture of the origins of European sociology. Volume 2 covers the rise of the classical period in social theory. It includes commentaries on the contribution of Marx, Spencer, Dilthey, Weber, Durkheim and Simmel. An overview of the main contributions of the founding fathers is also included. Volume 3 moves on to explore the main developments in the first half of the twentieth century. The contributions of the Durkheimian Tradition, Mauss, Mannheim, Lukacs, Gramsci and British sociology are presented. The volume provides a synoptic view of the diversity and emerging complexity of European sociology. Volume 4 identifies the main developments from post-industrial theory to the present day. The volume includes commentaries on the work of Aron, Foucault, Habermas, Giddens, Bourdieu, Boudon and Gellner. Selections on structuralism, polysemy, the positivist dispute and the neo-liberal tradition widen out the picture. The collection is the benchmark work for understanding the history, contribution and dilemmas of the European tradition. Full account is taken of the reference needs of students as well as of academics. Each hardcover volume of 416 pages is bound to the highest standards. The lettering on the cover is gold embossed. The slip case for the four volumes is also embossed. The volumes are not available separately. (shrink)

By analysing the policies and ideas of German social democracy, the British Labour Party and the Italian Communist Party, this article explores their attitude towards science and their imagination of the future in the 1950s. Deeply different, social democrats and communists shared a positivist attitude in favour of scientific progress and high modernity. This painted their attitude towards the space race, peaceful nuclear power and automation. Science was conceived as a neutral power to be supported, but it required political guidance (...) to harness it and turned it into social progress. Thus, their disagreement was over the political implications for capitalist societies experiencing growing prosperity. Science was also a powerful rhetorical argument to castigate the conservatives for failing the nation and allowing it to decline and fall behind its competitors. The article combines comparison and transnational history, innovating the latter by introducing the concepts of horizontal, vertical and antagonistic transnationalism. (shrink)