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Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.details
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Review Essay: Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric EpistemologyWorking Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Marian David & Richard Foley - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):943.details
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Is it a crime to belong to a reference class.Mark Colyvan, Helen M. Regan & Scott Ferson - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (2):168–181.details
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The Probable and the Provable.Laurence Jonathan Cohen - 1977 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Putting logic in its place: formal constraints on rational belief.David Phiroze Christensen - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizations.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2415-2431.details
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Normalcy, justification, and the easy-defeat problem.Marvin Backes - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2877-2895.details
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Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.details
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The nature of doubt and a new puzzle about belief, doubt, and confidence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1827-1848.details
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Beliefs do not come in degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.details
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Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.details
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Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Richard Foley - 1998 - Noûs 32 (2):265-275.details
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Common ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.details
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Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment.Bruno de Finetti - 1970 - New York: John Wiley.details
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Probability and the logic of rational belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press.details
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Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press.details
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Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.R. Foley - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):718-726.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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A probabilistic epistemology of perceptual belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):1-25.details
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Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.details
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Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
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Fitting attitudes de dicto and de se.Jason Turner - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):1-9.details
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Belief and cognitive limitations.Weng Hong Tang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):249-260.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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What is "real" in Probabilism?H. Orri Stefánsson - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):573-587.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):39-48.details
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When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?Martin Smith - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1193-1218.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
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From contextualism to contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.details
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Belief in a Fallen World.Robert Pasnau - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):531-559.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis.Dustin Troy Locke - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):28-54.details
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Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):957-981.details
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Foundations of Everyday Practical Reasoning.Hanti Lin - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (6):831-862.details
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Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Peter Krauss - 1961 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):127.details
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The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing: Changing Beliefs through Inquiry by Isaac Levi. [REVIEW]Philip Kitcher - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (8):425-432.details
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Lotteries and justification.Christoph Kelp - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1233-1244.details
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