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Warrant and proper function
New York: Oxford University Press (1993)
Abstract
In this companion volume to Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environmentAuthor's Profile
Call number
BD161.P57 1993
ISBN(s)
0195078632 0195078640 9780195078640 9780195078633 9780199872213
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My notes
Chapters
Naturalism Versus Proper Function?
The account of warrant I propose, utilizing the notion of proper function as it does, is an example of naturalistic epistemology: it invokes no kind of normativity not to be found in the natural sciences; in this chapter and the next, I argue that naturalism in epistemology can flourish on... see more
Is Naturalism Irrational?
In this chapter, I continue to argue that naturalistic epistemology flourishes best in the garden of supernaturalistic metaphysics. I do so by presenting two epistemological arguments against metaphysical naturalism; the first argument is for the falsehood of naturalism, the second, and mo... see more
Warrant: Objections and Refinements
In order to achieve a deeper understanding of warrant (and in reply to some objections), I turn in this chapter to a closer look at the idea of a design plan. I do so under the following six section headings: the max plan versus the design plan, unintended by‐products, functional multiplic... see more
Similar books and articles
On Plantinga’s Idea of Warrant in Epistemology and in Philosophy of Religion.Margherita di Stasio - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):307-325.
Plantinga's proper function account of warrant.Jonathan Kvanvig - 1996 - In J. J. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman and Littlefield, Savage, Maryland.
Warranted neo-confucian belief: Religious pluralism and the affections in the epistemologies of Wang yangming (1472–1529) and Alvin Plantinga. [REVIEW]David W. Tien - 2004 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (1):31-55.
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Citations of this work
Normativity and epistemic intuitions.Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2001 - Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
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