A probabilistic epistemology of perceptual belief

Philosophical Issues 28 (1):1-25 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There are three well-known models of how to account for perceptual belief within a probabilistic framework: (a) a Cartesian model; (b) a model advocated by Timothy Williamson; and (c) a model advocated by Richard Jeffrey. Each of these models faces a problem—in effect, the problem of accounting for the defeasibility of perceptual justification and perceptual knowledge. It is argued here that the best way of responding to this the best way of responding to this problem effectively vindicates the Cartesian model. Finally, it is argued that, given the best interpretation of the probabilistic framework, that the Cartesian model is not vulnerable to the main criticisms that have been raised against it.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,998

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Perceptual belief and nonexperiential looks.Jack Lyons - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):237-256.
Fixing perceptual belief.Gerald Vision - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):292-314.
Perceptual knowledge derailed.Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (1):31-45.
If perception is probabilistic, why doesn't it seem probabilistic?Ned Block - 2018 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 373 (1755).
Perceptual belief and psychological explanation.Keith Quillen - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (July):276-293.
The mystery of direct perceptual justification.Peter Markie - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):347-373.
Rational Relations Between Perception and Belief: The Case of Color.Peter Brössel - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (4):721-741.
Perceptual entitlement.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-09-06

Downloads
88 (#193,187)

6 months
9 (#309,427)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ralph Wedgwood
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.
Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
The Positive Argument Against Scientific Realism.Florian J. Boge - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (4):535-566.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.

View all 22 references / Add more references