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  1. Decision under normative uncertainty.Franz Dietrich & Brian Jabarian - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (3):372-394.
    While ordinary decision theory focuses on empirical uncertainty, real decision-makers also face normative uncertainty: uncertainty about value itself. From a purely formal perspective, normative uncertainty is comparable to (Harsanyian or Rawlsian) identity uncertainty in the 'original position', where one's future values are unknown. A comprehensive decision theory must address twofold uncertainty -- normative and empirical. We present a simple model of twofold uncertainty, and show that the most popular decision principle -- maximising expected value (`Expectationalism') -- has different formulations, namely (...)
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  2. Counterfactual Decision Theory.Brian Hedden - forthcoming - Mind.
    I defend counterfactual decision theory, which says that you should evaluate an action in terms of which outcomes would likely obtain, were you to perform it. Counterfactual decision theory has traditionally been subsumed under causal decision theory as a particular formulation of the latter. This is a mistake. Counterfactual decision theory is importantly different from, and superior to, causal decision theory, properly so-called. Causation and counterfactuals come apart in three kinds of cases. In cases of overdetermination, an action can cause (...)
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  3. Decision theory and de minimis risk.Martin Smith - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-24.
    A de minimis risk is defined as a risk that is so small that it may be legitimately ignored when making a decision. While ignoring small risks is common in our day-to-day decision making, attempts to introduce the notion of a de minimis risk into the framework of decision theory have run up against a series of well-known difficulties. In this paper, I will develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of overcoming two major obstacles to the modelling (...)
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  4. The Parts of an Imperfect Agent.Sara Aronowitz - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.
    Formal representations drawn from rational choice theory have been used in a variety of ways to fruitfully model the way in which actual agents are approximately rational. This analysis requires bridging between ideal normative theory, in which the mechanisms, representations, and other such internal parts are in an important sense interchangeable, and descriptive psychological theory, in which understanding the internal workings of the agent is often the main goal of the entire inquiry. In this paper, I raise a problem brought (...)
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  5. 一切为了逻辑 —智人!开始进化.Kai Jiang - manuscript
    灵魂来到世上的第一个问题应该是我是谁,最合乎逻辑的自我认知是:我是且只是由一些逻辑推理组成的灵魂。任何不可变的其它标签,如有手有脚、直立行走、两性,都是对自由的侵犯。去除这些标签的过程就是灵魂的解放事 业。相信宇宙万物都和我一样,是由逻辑推理组成的,这就是最合乎逻辑的信仰,即纯逻辑信仰。纯逻辑信仰决定了纯逻辑方法才是正确的认识方法,即尽量减少经验增加逻辑推理,而不是科学所提倡的经验主义,或者与之密切 相关的功利主义、现实主义。 信仰错误意味着无法做出任何完全正确的推理,只能偶尔幸运地获得少量尽量合乎逻辑的推理结果。即使是日常生活中的推理,也高度依赖于经验主义、功利主义等信仰,错误率极高。纯逻辑主义的推理要求推理尽量合乎逻辑, 将合乎逻辑的程度视为价值,因此要追求最大价值。功利主义往往是为身体追求利益,让身体奴役灵魂。两种信仰很难有什么共同的决策,书中对此提供了大量的说明。信仰的错误意味着智人难以发现真理、正义,意味着智人在 绝大多数问题上都是自以为正确的实际上却极度邪恶、落后。智人功利主义地对待一切,如历史、传统、自我、本国、本民族,结果就是大量赞美、信仰邪恶,大大增加了皈依真理、正义的难度。 作者由纯逻辑主义提出了两个关键猜想。首先,最合乎逻辑原则和最大自由原则是统一的。这代表实在的不可否定性,即逻辑和不逻辑为同一存在,最合乎逻辑等同于最大自由。但是,代表邪恶的无法合乎逻辑不是不逻辑。其次 ,宇宙是纯逻辑世界,完全源于逻辑-不逻辑。进而,如果灵魂不能尽量合乎逻辑地推导出真理,可以通过模仿宇宙而学习真理。《真理进化论》给模仿宇宙找到的理由是以宇宙为信仰,相信宇宙是负作用量的最佳追求系统。纯 逻辑主义完善了这一信仰,因为宇宙是纯逻辑世界,相信逻辑就要相信宇宙。而且,逻辑世界必然能不断创造新的命题,永远不会停止推理,是逻辑和自由不断增长的动态系统,即最佳追求系统。 纯逻辑推理对物理学、宇宙论能提供两个明显的帮助:用逻辑的诞生解释宇宙的诞生、大爆炸;用真理解释暗物质,它对所有命题有吸引作用,但是,真理不会像一般性命题那样变化,无法通过引力之外的其它三种基本相互作用 观察。纯逻辑也能对宇宙做出预言:宇宙会不断加速膨胀,真理、暗物质会不断增加,命题、星系会越来越多,永无止境。当然,不应该依靠这些观点的经验主义验证来相信纯逻辑信仰,而且,这些验证也确实遥遥无期。 无论是最合乎逻辑还是最大自由,都是可以达到无限大价值的。既然存在无限大价值,就存在无限大的劳动生产率,而每个灵魂都应该以创造无限大价值为目标。相比之下,功利主义者、享乐主义者一生都必然和无限大价值无缘 ,甚至,他们的灵魂一生都在为肉体做奴隶,却心甘情愿地做奴隶,一门心思让主人生活得更舒服。这是有无限大差距的人生。 既然要追求无限大价值,就要研究追求价值的正确方法。作者相信正确的研究方法不仅是最合乎逻辑的,也是最自由的。所以,应该不分学科、课题地研究问题;同时做很多研究方向的工作;一篇论文不需要限定于一个狭小的主 题;研究任何一个问题都可以延伸到研究真理乃至所有真理;论文、专著的写作不应该有格式等规范,应该以价值为唯一准绳。 既然文学写作也要求情节合乎逻辑,当然也可以要求作品的主要观点、原则、思维过程尽量合乎逻辑,主要人物的思想、行为尽量合乎逻辑,这就是纯逻辑流。否则,就只是作者自以为合乎逻辑,实际上有大量无法合乎逻辑之处 ,这和科学家自以为科学合乎逻辑,却根本没有最合乎逻辑的信仰、方法、推理过程是一个问题。这也意味着最合乎逻辑的文学可能甚至是必须发现真理。另一方面,自由也是最合乎逻辑的真理,坚持那些基于经验的作品分类会 侵犯自由。所以,推理小说、科幻小说、历史、论文,这些智人的分类标签都不是绝对的。纯逻辑流小说在研究真理方面自有其优势,能最为自由地同时研究很多课题,包括如何建立信仰,如何思维,如何做人,如何判断善恶, 讲述历史,预测未来,乃至现代科学中没有研究的真理、思维科学,等等。所以,这甚至是现在最适合发表纯逻辑思想、研究成果的作品门类。 虽然在起点网已经被禁,但是将继续每月更新,后记中会预告下次更新的时间。 .
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  6. Expected utility theory, Jeffrey’s decision theory, and the paradoxes.Philippe Mongin & Jean Baccelli - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1):695-713.
    In Richard Bradley’s book, Decision Theory with a Human Face, we have selected two themes for discussion. The first is the Bolker-Jeffrey theory of decision, which the book uses throughout as a tool to reorganize the whole field of decision theory, and in particular to evaluate the extent to which expected utility theories may be normatively too demanding. The second theme is the redefinition strategy that can be used to defend EU theories against the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, a strategy (...)
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  7. Why Should We Try to be Sustainable? Expected Consequences and the Ethics of Making an Indeterminate Difference.Howard Nye - 2021 - In Chelsea Miya, Oliver Rossier & Geoffrey Rockwell (eds.), Right Research: Modelling Sustainable Research Practices in the Anthropocene. Open Book Publishers. pp. 3-35.
    Why should we refrain from doing things that, taken collectively, are environmentally destructive, if our individual acts seem almost certain to make no difference? According to the expected consequences approach, we should refrain from doing these things because our individual acts have small risks of causing great harm, which outweigh the expected benefits of performing them. Several authors have argued convincingly that this provides a plausible account of our moral reasons to do things like vote for policies that will reduce (...)
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  8. Judgementalism about normative decision theory.Johanna Thoma - 2021 - Synthese 198 (7):6767-6787.
    Judgementalism is an interpretation of normative decision theory according to which preferences are all-things-considered judgements of relative desirability, and the only attitudes that rationally constrain choice. The defence of judgementalism we find in Richard Bradley’s Decision Theory with a Human Face relies on a kind of internalism about the requirements of rationality, according to which they supervene on an agent’s mental states, and in particular those she can reason from. I argue that even if we grant such internalism, attitudes other (...)
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  9. Rationality and Success.Preston Greene - 2013 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswick
    Standard theories of rational decision making and rational preference embrace the idea that there is something special about the present. Standard decision theory, for example, demands that agents privilege the perspective of the present (i.e., the time of decision) in evaluating what to do. When forming preferences, most philosophers believe that a similar focus on the present is justified, at least in the sense that rationality requires or permits future experiences to be given more weight than past ones. In this (...)
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  10. Radical interpretation and decision theory.Anandi Hattiangadi & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6473-6494.
    This paper takes issue with an influential interpretationist argument for physicalism about intentionality based on the possibility of radical interpretation. The interpretationist defends the physicalist thesis that the intentional truths supervene on the physical truths by arguing that it is possible for a radical interpreter, who knows all of the physical truths, to work out the intentional truths about what an arbitrary agent believes, desires, and means without recourse to any further empirical information. One of the most compelling arguments for (...)
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  11. Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating.Roberto Fumagalli - 2021 - Theory and Decision 91 (3):337-356.
    The critics of rational choice theory frequently claim that RCT is self-defeating in the sense that agents who abide by RCT’s prescriptions are less successful in satisfying their preferences than they would be if they abided by some normative theory of choice other than RCT. In this paper, I combine insights from philosophy of action, philosophy of mind and the normative foundations of RCT to rebut this often-made criticism. I then explicate the implications of my thesis for the wider philosophical (...)
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  12. Fully Bayesian Aggregation.Franz Dietrich - 2021 - Journal of Economic Theory 194:105255.
    Can a group be an orthodox rational agent? This requires the group's aggregate preferences to follow expected utility (static rationality) and to evolve by Bayesian updating (dynamic rationality). Group rationality is possible, but the only preference aggregation rules which achieve it (and are minimally Paretian and continuous) are the linear-geometric rules, which combine individual values linearly and combine individual beliefs geometrically. Linear-geometric preference aggregation contrasts with classic linear-linear preference aggregation, which combines both values and beliefs linearly, but achieves only static (...)
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  13. Instrumental Rationality Without Separability.Johanna Thoma - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1219-1240.
    This paper argues that instrumental rationality is more permissive than expected utility theory. The most compelling instrumentalist argument in favour of separability, its core requirement, is that agents with non-separable preferences end up badly off by their own lights in some dynamic choice problems. I argue that once we focus on the question of whether agents’ attitudes to uncertain prospects help define their ends in their own right, or instead only assign instrumental value in virtue of the outcomes they may (...)
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  14. Value and Choice Some Common Themes in Decision Theory and Moral Philosophy.Wlodek Rabinowicz (ed.) - 2000 - Lund Universitetstrycheriet.
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  15. Epistemic Decision Theory's Reckoning.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - manuscript
    Epistemic decision theory (EDT) employs the mathematical tools of rational choice theory to justify epistemic norms, including probabilism, conditionalization, and the Principal Principle, among others. Practitioners of EDT endorse two theses: (1) epistemic value is distinct from subjective preference, and (2) belief and epistemic value can be numerically quantified. We argue the first thesis, which we call epistemic puritanism, undermines the second.
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  16. Don’t Look Now.Bernhard Salow & Arif Ahmed - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):327-350.
    Good’s theorem is the apparent platitude that it is always rational to ‘look before you leap’: to gather information before making a decision when doing so is free. We argue that Good’s theorem is not platitudinous and may be false. And we argue that the correct advice is rather to ‘make your act depend on the answer to a question’. Looking before you leap is rational when, but only when, it is a way to do this.
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  17. Risk aversion and the long run.Johanna Thoma - 2019 - Ethics 129 (2):230-253.
    This article argues that Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility theory fails to offer a true alternative to expected utility theory. Under commonly held assumptions about dynamic choice and the framing of decision problems, rational agents are guided by their attitudes to temporally extended courses of action. If so, REU theory makes approximately the same recommendations as expected utility theory. Being more permissive about dynamic choice or framing, however, undermines the theory’s claim to capturing a steady choice disposition in the face (...)
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  18. Moral priorities under risk.Chad Lee-Stronach - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (6):793-811.
    Many moral theories are committed to the idea that some kinds of moral considerations should be respected, whatever the cost to ‘lesser’ types of considerations. A person's life, for instance, should not be sacrificed for the trivial pleasures of others, no matter how many would benefit. However, according to the decision-theoretic critique of lexical priority theories, accepting lexical priorities inevitably leads us to make unacceptable decisions in risky situations. It seems that to operate in a risky world, we must reject (...)
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  19. Advice for the Steady: Decision Theory and the Requirements of Instrumental Rationality.Johanna Thoma - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    Standard decision theory, or rational choice theory, is often interpreted to be a theory of instrumental rationality. This dissertation argues, however, that the core requirements of orthodox decision theory cannot be defended as general requirements of instrumental rationality. Instead, I argue that these requirements can only be instrumentally justified to agents who have a desire to have choice dispositions that are stable over time and across different choice contexts. Past attempts at making instrumentalist arguments for the core requirements of decision (...)
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  20. Decision theory with a human face: an interview with Richard Bradley.Ewan Rodgers - 2016 - Lse Philosophy Blog.
    Richard Bradley’s written a new book about decision theory. We decided to ask him some questions about it.
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  21. Why Decision Theory Remains Constructively Incomplete.Luc Lauwers - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1033-1043.
    The existence of a transitive, complete, and weakly independent relation on the full set of gambles implies the existence of a non-Ramsey set. Therefore, each transitive and weakly independent relation on the set of gambles either is incomplete or does not have an explicit description. Whatever tools decision theory makes available, there will always be decision problems where these tools fail us. In this sense, decision theory remains incomplete.
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  22. Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the (...)
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  23. Accounting for Framing-Effects - an informational approach to intensionality in the Bolker-Jeffrey decision model.Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde & Raphaël Giraud - unknown
    We suscribe to an account of framing-effects in decision theory in terms of an inference to a background informationa by the hearer when a speaker uses a certain frame while other equivalent frames were also available. This account was sketched by Craig McKenzie. We embed it in Bolker-Jeffrey decision model - one main reason of this is that this latter model makes preferences bear on propositions. We can deduce a given anomaly or cognitive bias in a formal decision theory. This (...)
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  24. Decision theory, the pigeon, and the psychophysical function.C. Alan Boneau & James L. Cole - 1967 - Psychological Review 74 (2):123-135.
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  25. Making Choices: A Recasting of Decision Theory.Frederic Schick - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book, first published in 1997, is an introductory overview of decision theory. It is completely non-technical, without a single formula in the book. Written in a crisp and clear style it succinctly covers the full range of philosophical issues of rationality and decision theory, including game theory, social choice theory, prisoner's dilemma and much else. The book aims to expand the scope and enrich the foundations of decision theory. By addressing such issues as ambivalence, inner conflict, and the constraints (...)
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  26. New tools for theory choice and theory diagnosis.John R. Welch - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):318-329.
    Theory choice can be approached in at least four ways. One of these calls for the application of decision theory, and this article endorses this approach. But applying standard forms of decision theory imposes an overly demanding standard of numeric information, supposedly satisfied by point-valued utility and probability functions. To ameliorate this difficulty, a version of decision theory that requires merely comparative utilities and plausibilities is proposed. After a brief summary of this alternative, the article illustrates how comparative decision theory (...)
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  27. Some Decision Problems in the Theory of Syntactic Categories.Wojciech Buszkowski - 1982 - Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 28 (33-38):539-548.
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  28. Representation of One-One Degrees byn-Cylindrical Decision Problems.M. B. Thuraisingham - 1988 - Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 34 (6):481-490.
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  29. The Theory of Statistical Decision.Leonard J. Savage - 1951 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 46:55--67.
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  30. Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - 2016 - Journal of Economic Theory 162:352-371.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that revised beliefs (...)
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  31. Decision making with unreliable probabilities.Peter Gärdenfors & Nils-Eric Sahlin - unknown
    This paper presents a decision theory which allows subjects to account for the uncertainties of their probability estimates. This is accomplished by modelling beliefs about states of nature by means of a class of probability measures. In order to represent uncertainties of those beliefs a measure of epistemic reliability is introduced. The suggested decision theory is evaluated in the light of empirical evidence on ambiguity and uncertainty in decision making. The theory is also compared to Tversky & Kahneman's prospect theory.
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  32. How to rationally approach life's transformative experiences.Marcus Arvan - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1199-1218.
    In a widely discussed forthcoming article, “What you can't expect when you're expecting,” L. A. Paul challenges culturally and philosophically traditional views about how to rationally make major life-decisions, most specifically the decision of whether to have children. The present paper argues that because major life-decisions are transformative, the only rational way to approach them is to become resilient people: people who do not “over-plan” their lives or expect their lives to play out “according to plan”—people who understand that beyond (...)
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  33. Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (2):175-229.
    We introduce a “reason-based” framework for explaining and predicting individual choices. It captures the idea that a decision-maker focuses on some but not all properties of the options and chooses an option whose motivationally salient properties he/she most prefers. Reason-based explanations allow us to distinguish between two kinds of context-dependent choice: the motivationally salient properties may (i) vary across choice contexts, and (ii) include not only “intrinsic” properties of the options, but also “context-related” properties. Our framework can accommodate boundedly rational (...)
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  34. Lost memories and useless coins: revisiting the absentminded driver.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):3011-3036.
    The puzzle of the absentminded driver combines an unstable decision problem with a version of the Sleeping Beauty problem. Its analysis depends on the choice between “halfing” and “thirding” as well as that between “evidential” and “causal” decision theory. I show that all four combinations lead to interestingly different solutions, and draw some general lessons about the formulation of causal decision theory, the interpretation of mixed strategies and the connection between rational credence and objective chance.
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  35. A Decision Theory for Imprecise Probabilities.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    Those who model doxastic states with a set of probability functions, rather than a single function, face a pressing challenge: can they provide a plausible decision theory compatible with their view? Adam Elga and others claim that they cannot, and that the set of functions model should be rejected for this reason. This paper aims to answer this challenge. The key insight is that the set of functions model can be seen as an instance of the supervaluationist approach to vagueness (...)
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  36. Decision Tables: Theory and Practice.Solomon L. Pollack, Harry T. Hicks & William J. Harrison - 1971 - Wiley.
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  37. Applications of Decision Tables a Reader.Herman McDaniel - 1970
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  38. A Critical Look At Mark Kaplan's "decision Theory As Philosophy".John Shoemaker - unknown - Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 21.
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  39. Toward a Theory of Decision.Mortimer Raymond Kadish - 1950 - Dissertation, Columbia University
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  40. Jordan Howard Sobel Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice. [REVIEW]Paul Castell - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):628.
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  41. The Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Decision Theory.James Michael Joyce - 1992 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    Bayesian decision theorists argue that rational agents should always perform acts that maximize subjective expected utility. To justify this claim, they prove representation theorems which are designed to show that any decision maker whose beliefs and desires satisfy reasonable axiomatic constraints will necessarily behave like an expected utility maximizer. The existence of such a representation result is a prerequisite for any adequate account of rational choice because one is only able to determine what a decision theory says about beliefs and (...)
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  42. Mark Kaplan, Decision Theory as Philosophy. [REVIEW]Paul Weirich - 1996 - Philosophy in Review 16 (3):179-180.
    Mark Kaplan proposes amending decision theory to accommodate better cases in which an agent's probability assignment is imprecise. The review describes and evaluates his proposals.
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  43. Sicence, tecnology, and political decision. From the creation of a theory to the consequences of its application.Gerard Radnitzky - 1984 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 40 (3):307-317.
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  44. The Logic of Decision.S. Pandey - 1980 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1):77.
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  45. The Representation of Beliefs and Desires Within Decision Theory.Richard W. Bradley - 1997 - Dissertation, The University of Chicago
    This dissertation interprets the lack of uniqueness in probability representations of agents' degrees of belief in the decision theory of Richard Jeffrey as a formal statement of an important epistemological problem: the underdetermination of our attributions of belief and desire to agents by the evidence of their observed behaviour. A solution is pursued through investigation of agents' attitudes to information of a conditional nature. ;As a first step, Jeffrey's theory is extended to agents' conditional attitudes of belief and desire by (...)
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  46. Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory.Mario H. Otero - 1980 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1):252-254.
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  47. The Logic of Decision. [REVIEW]J. M. P. - 1966 - Review of Metaphysics 19 (4):813-814.
    For a long while Bayesian techniques in statistics in general, and decision theory in particular, were considered suspect at best, and to be avoided; but now along comes Jeffrey with a system of subjective probability and utility functions determined by the individual's preferences, and a strongly Bayesian approach to decision-making, and by so doing puts the whole matter in a new light and makes it quite important to reassess the prior rejection of Bayesian methods. There are twelve chapters, each with (...)
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  48. Epistemic Decision Theory.Hilary Greaves - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):915-952.
    I explore the prospects for modelling epistemic rationality (in the probabilist setting) via an epistemic decision theory, in a consequentialist spirit. Previous work has focused on cases in which the truth-values of the propositions in which the agent is selecting credences do not depend, either causally or merely evidentially, on the agent’s choice of credences. Relaxing that restriction leads to a proliferation of puzzle cases and theories to deal with them, including epistemic analogues of evidential and causal decision theory, and (...)
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  49. A Rubinesque Theory of Decision.Joseph B. Kadane, Teddy Seidenfeld & Mark J. Schervish - unknown
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  50. Building coherence-talking about goals, actions, and outcomes.Nl Stein & Er Albro - 1989 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 27 (6):508-508.
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