- Why There Are No Frankfurt‐Style Omission Cases.Joseph Metz - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: Responsibility and Overdetermination.Carolina Sartorio - 2012 - Legal Theory 18 (4):473-490.details
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Explaining coincidences.Julio De Rizzo - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14843-14864.details
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Explanatory Rivals and the Ultimate Argument.Finnur Dellsén - 2015 - Theoria 82 (3):217-237.details
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Relational Holism and Humean Supervenience.George Darby - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):773-788.details
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Salience and metaphysical explanation.Phil Corkum - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10771-10792.details
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Nomic dependence and causation.F. John Clendinnen - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (3):341-360.details
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The Correlation Argument for Reductionism.Christopher Clarke - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (1):76-97.details
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Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required.David Christensen - 2022 - Noûs 1 (online first):1-22.details
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Epistemic akrasia: No apology required.David Christensen - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):54-76.details
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Emergence for Nihilists.Richard L. J. Caves - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):2-28.details
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Only Imagine.Emily Caddick Bourne - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):174-177.details
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Does IBE Require a ‘Model’ of Explanation?Frank Cabrera - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):727-750.details
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David Lewis meets John bell.Jeremy Butterfield - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):26-43.details
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A Humean Non-Humeanism.David Builes - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (3):1031-1048.details
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Epidemiological evidence in proof of specific causation.Alex Broadbent - 2011 - Legal Theory 17 (4):237-278.details
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Should Explanations Omit the Details?Darren Bradley - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3):827-853.details
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A priori causal laws.Darren Bradley - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):358-370.details
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The causal efficacy of composites: a dilemma for interventionism.Thomas Blanchard - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2685-2706.details
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Explanatory Abstraction and the Goldilocks Problem: Interventionism Gets Things Just Right.Thomas Blanchard - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):633-663.details
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Justified judging.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.details
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On Unexplained (Modal) Patterns.Harjit Bhogal - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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Humeanism about laws of nature.Harjit Bhogal - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (8):1-10.details
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Difference-making and deterministic chance.Harjit Bhogal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2215-2235.details
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On de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability.Joseph Berkovitz - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):1-48.details
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Moral Luck and Deviant Causation.Sara Bernstein - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):151-161.details
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Coincidence Avoidance and Formulating the Access Problem.Sharon Berry - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):687-701.details
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Coincidence Avoidance and Formulating the Access Problem.Sharon E. Berry - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):687 - 701.details
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Philosophy of science at sea: Clarifying the interpretability of machine learning.Claus Beisbart & Tim Räz - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (6):e12830.details
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Boolean Difference-Making: A Modern Regularity Theory of Causation.Michael Baumgartner & Christoph Falk - unknown - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axz047.details
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Whither internalism? How internalists should respond to the extended mind hypothesis.Gary Bartlett - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (2):163–184.details
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New Psychological Paradigm for Conditionals and General de Finetti Tables.J. Baratgin, D. Over & G. Politzer - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (1):73-84.details
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Review of The Emergent Multiverse - David Wallace, The Emergent Multiverse: Quantum Theory according to the Everett Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012), xvi+530 pp., $75.00. [REVIEW]Guido Bacciagaluppi & Jenann Ismael - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (1):129-148.details
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The question of realism for powers.Lorenzo Azzano - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):329-354.details
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Proportionality, Abstract Causation, and the Exclusion Problem.Alexey Aliyev - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (2):127-143.details
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Paraphrasability and the Causal Status of Types.Alexey Aliyev - 2022 - Theoria 88 (4):812-828.details
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Preemptive Omissions.Joseph Metz - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1117-1138.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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Mathematical impossibilities.Ulrich Meyer - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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1. Really Statistical Explanations and Genetic Drift Really Statistical Explanations and Genetic Drift (pp. 169-188).Marc Lange, Peter Vickers, John Michael, Miles MacLeod, Alexander R. Pruss, David John Baker, Clark Glymour & Simon Fitzpatrick - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (2):169-188.details
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Measure theoretic analysis of consistency of the Principal Principle.Miklós Rédei & Zalán Gyenis - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):972-987.details
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Normative Appeals to the Natural.Pekka Väyrynen - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):279 - 314.details
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Causalism Without Causation.Carolina Sartorio - 2023 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 18 (1):185-199.details
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Must the Fundamental Laws of Physics be Complete?Marc Lange - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):312-345.details
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Must the fundamental laws of physics be complete?Marc Lange - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):312-345.details
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A puzzle about laws and explanation.Siegfried Jaag - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6085-6102.details
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Counterfactual Decision Theory Is Causal Decision Theory.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2024 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (1):115-156.details
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Retrospective necessity and the first person.Yujian Zheng - 2021 - Philosophical Forum 52 (3):245-261.details
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Data, phenomena, and reliability.James Woodward - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):179.details
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A Functional Account of Causation; or, A Defense of the Legitimacy of Causal Thinking by Reference to the Only Standard That Matters—Usefulness.James Woodward - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):691-713.details
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