44 found
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  1.  74
    Causation and Free Will.Carolina Sartorio - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.
    Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' sensitivity (...)
  2.  93
    More of a Cause?Carolina Sartorio - 2020 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 37 (3):346-363.
    Does a person's liability to attack during a war depend on the nature of their individual causal contribution to the (unjust) threat posed? If so, how? The recent literature on the ethics of war has become increasingly focused on questions of this kind. According to some views on these matters, your liability hinges on the extent of your causal contribution: the larger your contribution to an unjust threat, the larger the amount of harm that we can impose on you in (...)
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  3. Causes As Difference-Makers.Carolina Sartorio - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):71-96.
  4. Making a Difference in a Deterministic World.Carolina Sartorio - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (2):189-214.
    Some philosophers have claimed that causally determined agents are not morally responsible because they cannot make a difference in the world. A recent response by philosophers who defend the compatibility of determinism and responsibility has been to concede that causally determined agents are incapable of making a difference, but to argue that responsibility is not grounded in difference making. These compatibilists have rested such a claim on Frankfurt cases—cases where agents are intuitively responsible for acts that they couldn’t have failed (...)
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  5. Omissions and causalism.Carolina Sartorio - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):513-530.
  6. A new asymmetry between actions and omissions.Carolina Sartorio - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):460–482.
  7. How to be responsible for something without causing it.Carolina Sartorio - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):315–336.
    What is the relationship between moral responsibility and causation? Plainly, we are not morally responsible for everything that we cause. For we cause a multitude of things, including things that we couldn't possibly foresee we would cause and with respect to which we cannot be assessed morally. Thus, it is clear that causing something does not entail being morally responsible for it. But, does the converse entailment hold? Does moral responsibility require causation? Intuitively, it does: intuitively, we can only be (...)
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  8. Situations and Responsiveness to Reasons.Carolina Sartorio - 2017 - Noûs 52 (4):796-807.
    Some classical studies in social psychology suggest that we are more sensitive to situational factors, and less responsive to reasons, than we normally recognize we are. In recent years, moral responsibility theorists have examined the question whether those studies represent a serious threat to our moral responsibility. A common response to the “situationist threat” has been to defend the reasons-responsiveness of ordinary human agents by appeal to a theory of reasons-responsiveness that appeals to patterns of counterfactual scenarios or possible worlds. (...)
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  9. Causation and responsibility.Carolina Sartorio - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (5):749–765.
    In this article I examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility. I distinguish four possible views about that relation. One is the standard view: the view that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent's causal responsibility for it. I discuss several challenges to the standard view, which motivate the three remaining views. The final view – the view I argue for – is that causation is the vehicle of transmission of moral responsibility. (...)
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  10. Resultant Luck.Carolina Sartorio - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):63-86.
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  11. Flickers of Freedom and Moral Luck.Carolina Sartorio - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):93-105.
    Midwest Studies In Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  12.  43
    A good cause.Carolina Sartorio - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    I explore the question of how to ground the responsibility of agents in some tricky cases involving multiple agents who act in a non-coordinated fashion. These are scenarios where no single agent has the individual ability to make a difference to a harmful outcome, but where the outcome would have been avoided if they had all acted as they should have (thus, the agents collectively made a difference to the outcome’s occurrence). I argue that an important source of the problem (...)
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  13. Disjunctive causes.Carolina Sartorio - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):521-538.
    There is an initial presumption against disjunctive causes. First of all, for some people causation is a relation between events. But, arguably, there are no disjunctive events, since events are particulars and thus they have spatiotemporal locations, while it is unclear what the spatiotemporal location of a disjunctive event could be.1 More importantly, even if one believes that entities like facts can enter in causal relations, and even if there are disjunctive facts, it is still hard to see how disjunctive (...)
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  14. Difference‐Making in Epistemology.Juan Comesaña & Carolina Sartorio - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):368-387.
  15.  29
    The grounds of our freedom.Carolina Sartorio - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (10):1250-1268.
    ABSTRACT Frankfurt’s ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’ broke with the tradition of understanding the kind of freedom required for responsibility in terms of alternative possibilities. At the same time, it inspired and motivated a new family of views in its place: views that focus exclusively on actual sequences or the actual causes of behaviour. But, what exactly does that ‘exclusiveness’ claim amount to? At first sight, it may seem natural to interpret it as the claim that the only facts that (...)
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  16.  56
    A Partial Defense of the Actual-Sequence Model of Freedom.Carolina Sartorio - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):107-120.
    Over the years, two models of freedom have emerged as competitors: the alternative-possibilities model and the actual-sequence model. This paper is a partial defense of the actual-sequence model. My defense relies on two strategies. The first strategy consists in de-emphasizing the role of examples in arguing for a model of freedom. Imagine that, as some people think, Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine the alternative-possibilities model. What follows from this? Not much, I argue. In particular, I note that the counterparts of (...)
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  17. Kinds of Moral Luck.Carolina Sartorio - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. Routledge. pp. 206-215.
     
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  18.  49
    The concept of responsibility in the ethics of self-defense and war.Carolina Sartorio - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3561-3577.
    The focus of this paper is an influential family of views in the ethics of self-defense and war: views that ground the agent’s liability to be attacked in self-defense in the agent’s moral responsibility for the threat posed. I critically examine the concept of responsibility employed by such views, by looking at potential connections with the contemporary literature on moral responsibility. I start by uncovering some of the key assumptions that Responsibility Views make about the relevant concept of responsibility, and (...)
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  19. The Prince of wales problem for counterfactual theories of causation.Carolina Sartorio - manuscript
    In 1992, as part of a larger charitable campaign, the Prince of Wales (Prince Charles, Queen Elizabeth’s older son and heir) launched a line of organic food products called “Prince’s Duchy Originals”.1 The first product that went on sale was an oat cookie: “the oaten biscuit.” Since then the oaten biscuit has been joined by hundreds of other products and Duchy Originals has become one of the leading organic food brands in the UK. Presumably, the Prince of Wales is very (...)
     
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  20. On Causing Something to Happen in a Certain Way Without Causing it to Happen.Carolina Sartorio - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (1):119-136.
  21. Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: Responsibility and Overdetermination.Carolina Sartorio - 2012 - Legal Theory 18 (4):473-490.
    In this paper I critically examine Michael Moore's views about responsibility in overdetermination cases. Moore argues for an asymmetrical view concerning actions and omissions: whereas our actions can make us responsible in overdetermination cases, our omissions cannot. Moore argues for this view on the basis of a causal claim: actions can be causes but omissions cannot. I suggest that we should reject Moore's views about responsibility and overdetermination. I argue, in particular, that our omissions (just like our actions) can make (...)
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  22.  62
    Replies to critics.Carolina Sartorio - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1545-1556.
    I respond to the critical comments by Randolph Clarke, Alfred Mele, and Derk Pereboom on my book Causation and Free Will. I discuss some features of the view that our freedom is exclusively based on actual causes, including the role played in it by absences of reasons, absence causation, modal facts, and finally some additional thoughts on how a compatibilist can respond to the manipulation argument for incompatibilism.
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  23.  46
    Do We Have Free Will?: A Debate.Robert Kane & Carolina Sartorio - 2021 - New York, NY,: Routledge. Edited by Carolina Sartorio.
    In this little but profound volume, Robert Kane and Carolina Sartorio debate a perennial question: Do We Have Free Will? Short, lively and accessible, the debate showcases diverse and cutting-edge work on free will.
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  24.  86
    Actual Causes and Free Will.Carolina Sartorio - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):147-165.
    In this paper I reexamine the debate between two contrasting conceptions of free will: the classical model, which understands freedom in terms of alternative possibilities, and a more recent family of views that focus only on actual causes, and that were inspired by Frankfurt’s famous attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. I offer a novel argument in support of the actual-causes model, one that bypasses the popular debate about Frankfurt-style cases.
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  25.  63
    Failures to act and failures of additivity.Carolina Sartorio - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):373–385.
    On the face of it, causal responsibility seems to be “additive” in the following sense: if I cause some effects, then it seems that I also cause the sum (aggregate, conjunction, etc.) of those effects. Let’s call the claim that causation behaves in this way, Additivity.
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  26.  67
    Causation and Freedom.Carolina Sartorio - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (11):629-651.
    What do the words ceteris paribus add to a causal hypothesis, that is, to a generalization that is intended to articulate the consequences of a causal mechanism? One answer, that looks almost too good to be true, is that a ceteris paribus hedge restricts the scope of the hypothesis to those cases where nothing undermines, interferes with, or undoes the effect of the mechanism in question, even if the hypothesis’s own formulator is otherwise unable to specify fully what might constitute (...)
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  27. Moral inertia.Carolina Sartorio - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):117 - 133.
    I argue that, according to ordinary morality, there is moral inertia, that is, moral pressure to fail to intervene in certain circumstances. Moral inertia is manifested in scenarios with a particular causal structure: deflection scenarios, where a threatening or benefiting process is diverted from a group of people to another. I explain why the deflection structure is essential for moral inertia to be manifested. I argue that there are two different manifestations of moral inertia: strict prohibitions on interventions, and constraints (...)
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  28.  76
    PAP-Style Cases.Carolina Sartorio - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (11):533-549.
    Over the years, two models of freedom have emerged as competitors: the alternative-possibilities model, which states that acting freely consists in being able to do otherwise, and, more recently, the actual-sequence model, which states that acting freely is exclusively a function of the actual sequence of events issuing in our behavior. In general, a natural strategy when trying to decide between two models of a certain concept is to look for examples that support one model and undermine the other. Frankfurt-style (...)
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  29.  59
    Vihvelin on Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Actual-Sequence View.Carolina Sartorio - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):875-888.
    This is a critical discussion of Vihvelin’s recent book Causes, Laws, and Free Will. I discuss Vihvelin’s ideas on Frankfurt-style cases and the actual-sequence view of freedom that is inspired by them.
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  30. Causation and Ethics.Carolina Sartorio - 2009 - In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press.
     
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  31.  31
    From responsibility to causation: The intransitivity of causation as a case study.Carolina Sartorio - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):211-222.
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  32.  73
    Précis of Causation and free will.Carolina Sartorio - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1513-1516.
    This is a precis of my book Causation and Free Will. I go over the main features of my compatibilist account of free will, which is based on the actual causes of our behavior.
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  33.  26
    Causalism Without Causation.Carolina Sartorio - 2023 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 18 (1):185-199.
    Moore’s Mechanical Choices is ripe with interesting ideas. Here I’ll focus on a particularly intriguing one that intersects with some aspects of my own work. It’s the suggestion that causalism should be amended in a way that doesn’t require causation. At first, this suggestion may sound absurd: How can causalism survive without causation, of all things? But I think that Moore is actually right about the main suggestion. I don’t think he’s right for the right reasons, but he’s still right (...)
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  34. Easy Knowledge Makes No Difference: Reply to Wielenberg.Juan Comesaña & Carolina Sartorio - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (2):221–224.
    We have recently proposed a diagnosis of what goes wrong in cases of ‘easy-knowledge.’ Erik Wielenberg argues that there are cases of easy knowledge thatour proposal cannot handle. In this note we reply to Wielenberg, arguing that our proposal does indeed handle his cases.
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  35. A simple but powerful idea : actual sequences and free will.Carolina Sartorio - 2023 - In Taylor W. Cyr, Andrew Law & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Freedom, Responsibility, and Value: Essays in Honor of John Martin Fischer. New York: Routledge.
  36. Causation and properties.Carolina Sartorio - 2024 - In A. R. J. Fisher & Anna-Sofia Maurin (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Properties. London: Routledge.
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  37. Chapter 26: Causation and ethics.Carolina Sartorio - manuscript
    My main aim is to examine the extent to which an appeal to the concept of cause contributes to elucidating moral notions or to increasing the plausibility of moral views. Something that makes this task interestingly complex is the fact that the notion of causation itself is controversial and difficult to pin down. As a result, in some cases the success of its use in moral theory hinges on how certain debates about causation are resolved. I will point to examples (...)
     
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  38. Comments on Clarke's 'Intentional Omissions's.Carolina Sartorio - 2010 - In J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Bradford. pp. 157--160.
     
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  39. Failing to do the impossible.Carolina Sartorio - manuscript
    A billionaire tells you: “That chair is in my way; I don’t feel like moving it myself, but if you push it out of my way I’ll give you a hundred dollars.” You decide you don’t want the billionaire’s money and you’d actually prefer that the chair stay in the billionaire’s way, so you graciously turn down the offer and go home. As it turns out, the billionaire is also a stingy old miser; he was never willing to let go (...)
     
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  40.  19
    Indeterministic Compatibilism.Carolina Sartorio - 2021 - In Marco Hausmann & Jörg Noller (eds.), Free Will: Historical and Analytic Perspectives. Springer Verlag. pp. 205-227.
    Although free will compatibilists are typically focused on arguing that determinism is compatible with free will, most compatibilists also think that indeterminism is compatible with free will too—and I am one of those compatibilists. In this chapter, I will look at this issue from the perspective of a compatibilist view I have defended elsewhere : a view that takes our freedom to be a function of the actual causal histories of our behavior. In the first part of the chapter I (...)
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  41.  28
    On Pettit's ‘Three Mistakes about Doing Good ’.Carolina Sartorio - 2018 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (1):41-46.
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  42.  5
    Sobre los distintos alcances del argumento de la teoría de modelos.Carolina Sartorio - 1998 - Análisis Filosófico 18 (2):173-179.
    I criticize what seems to be a common assumption of the precedent papers, namely, that the model-theoretic argument has similar consequences for the different realms of language. In particular, I argue that while the argument does not have serious consequences for natural languages, this is not the case with the language of mathematics.
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  43. Causation and Responsibility, by Michael S. Moore.: Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Carolina Sartorio - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):830-838.
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  44.  37
    Vihvelin, Kadri., Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter. [REVIEW]Carolina Sartorio - 2014 - Review of Metaphysics 68 (1):211-213.
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