Many current abortion regulations represent an over-medicalization of abortion or a corruption of abortion's true medical nature, with disproportionate consequences to women with lower incomes and lesser means. This article explores the effects of unnecessary and harmful abortion restrictions on women living in poverty. A brief summary of the major abortion rights cases explains how the Constitution, as currently interpreted, vests the government and sometimes the medical profession with the power to protect women's health, rather than granting this power to (...) women themselves. The article then argues for a new approach for protecting women's health and respecting their dignity by reframing reproductive rights as health rights that women themselves can assert. (shrink)

In this essay, I apply international human rights theory to the domestic discussion of criminalization. The essay takes as its starting point the “right not to be punished” that Douglas Husak posited in his recent book Overcriminalization . By reviewing international human rights norms, I take up Husak’s challenge to imbue this right with further normative content. This process reveals additional relationships between the criminal law and human rights theory, and I discuss one analogy: the derogation by states of an (...) individual’s human rights under specified conditions has certain similarities to the punishment by states of an individual who holds a right not to be punished. Along the way, I highlight the normative implications of defining a human right not to be punished under both generalist and specificationist perspectives on moral rights. Noting the similarities as well as the differences in the concepts of punishment and derogation, this essay aims to contribute to the exchange between theories of human rights and the criminal law. (shrink)

In their paper, “Helpful Lessons and Cautionary Tales: How Should COVID-19 Drug Development and Access Inform Approaches to Non-Pandemic Diseases?” Holly Fernandez Lynch and colleagues have present...

My topic is the intelligent guidance of action. In this paper I offer an empirically grounded case for four ideas: that [a] cognitive processes of practical reasoning play a key role in the intelligent guidance of action, [b] these processes could not do so without significant enabling work done by both perception and the motor system, [c] the work done by perceptual and motor systems can be characterized as the generation of information specialized for action guidance, which in turn suggests (...) that [d] the cognitive processes of practical reasoning that play a key role in the guidance of intelligent action are not the abstract, syllogistic ones philosophers often treat as the paradigm of practical reasoning. Rather, these cognitive processes are constrained by, and work well with, the specialized concepts outputted by perception and the feedback outputted by sensorimotor processes. (shrink)

: I focus on Uriah Kriegel’s account of conative phenomenology. I agree with Kriegel’s argument that some conative phenomenology is primitive in that some conative phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to another kind of property. I disagree, however, with Kriegel’s specific characterization of the properties in question. Kriegel argues that the experience of deciding-and-then-trying is the core of conative phenomenology. I argue, however, that the experiences of trying and acting better occupy this place. Further, I suggest that the attitudinal component (...) of the experiences of trying and acting is not, as Kriegel suggests, best characterized in terms of commitment to the rightness or goodness of the objects of experience. Rather, I argue that the attitudinal component is best characterized in imperatival terms. Keywords : Agentive Phenomenology; Deciding; Trying; Imperatives Kriegel e la fenomenologia dell’azione Riassunto : In questo testo mi concentrerò sulla descrizione della fenomenologia conativa di Kriegel. Mentre condivido la tesi di Kriegel, secondo cui parte della fenomenologia conativa è primitiva, nel senso che parte delle proprietà fenomeniche conative non possono essere ridotte ad altri tipi di proprietà, debbo tuttavia dissentire riguardo la specifica caratterizzazione data da Kriegel delle proprietà in questione. Kriegel ritiene che l’esperienza del decidere-e-poi-sforzarsi sia il nucleo della fenomenologia conativa. Io direi tuttavia che le esperienze dello sforzo e dell’azione occupano meglio questa posizione. Inoltre, suggerirei che la componente relativa all’atteggiamento delle esperienze dello sforzo e dell’azione non sia descrivibile al meglio, come suggerisce Kriegel, in termini di impegno legato all’adeguatezza o all’integrità dell’oggetto d’esperienza. Direi piuttosto che la componente dell’atteggiamento sia meglio descrivibile in termini imperativi.. Parole chiave : Fenomenologia dell’agentività; Atto della decisione; Atto dello sforzo; Imperativi. (shrink)

Some tradition historical perspectives on Psalm 83 Psalm 83 forms a poetical unit and is the well constructed poem of an artist. It could be divided into two stanzas which contains a cry for help (2), lament (3-9) and several petitions (10-19). This work reflects different tradition historical allusions. The use of prophetic language is immanent, while the faces of the prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel are elusively present. Two episodes from the history of the Judges (Judges 4-5; 7-8) are (...) utilised to expose its independent function in this psalm. The occurence of a well known Canaanite tradition is further obvious, while the question into the psalm's apocalyptic relationships is negatively assessed. Single motives like the upliftment of the head (3) and the shepherd/flock image (13) fulfil a definite Junction within the psalm’s context. The poet clearly applied historical traditions, motives and images to express an independent function within its context. (shrink)

God is with us, but we often don't see Him at work because we fail to understand who He is or how He works Longtime pastor and director of Open Doors, Kurt Bruner explores knowing God as He is rather than as we wish Him to be. Doing so requires confronting some unsettling questions. We celebrate a God who is nice--who rescues, rewards, and redeems. But what about when He deserts, disciplines, and damns? Is God schizophrenic, moving in and out (...) of opposing personalities? One minute, gentle shepherd; the next, angry judge? How does that reconcile with the image of God popular in evangelical churches--loving, forgiving, and shepherding us? When we worship only part of God we worship a false God. Below the surface--on the level of reality that goes deeper than sentimental feelings--we know that if God is only love, He isn't enough. He must also be absolutely just, dreadfully mighty, and perfectly holy. He needs to reward what is right. But He also must punish what is wrong. He needs to redeem the lost. But He must also thwart the wicked. Yet we seem to prefer the partial phony to the awful reality. Why Isn't God Nice? unfolds why a God of love sometimes seems so unloving. And how a person going through hard times can learn to embrace a God who allows such difficult circumstances. (shrink)

A commentary on “Were There ‘Additional Foreseeable Risks’ in the SUPPORT Study?,” by Henry J. Silverman and Didier Dreyfuss; “SUPPORT: Risks, Harms, and Equipoise,” by Robert M. Nelson; “The Controversy over SUPPORT Continues and the Hyperbole Increases,” by Alan R. Fleischman; and “SUPPORT and Comparative Effectiveness Trials: What's at Stake?,” by Lois Shepherd, all in the January‐February 2015 issue.

Most commentators read Plato's Statesman as prescribing the best form of rule in the city; they do not read the Statesman as vindicating Socratic philosophy as the proper original and ideal form of that rule. Yet the Statesman proves that philosophy, in particular, Socratic philosophy, is true statesmanship. ;The Statesman seeks the statesman who is a knowledgeable ruler. To find him, it must investigate both what the nature of the statesman's knowledge is and how that knowledge translates into practice. ;Beginning (...) with the assumption that mathematics is the paradigm for knowledge proper, the Statesman investigates what mathematical knowledge of human beings--the statesman's subjects--would be like. It shows that, if the statesman's knowledge were mathematical, statesmanship would be herding, the statesman would be like a divine shepherd, and his subjects, like sheep. The mathematical paradigm for knowledge is inadequate because it cannot account for nature, becoming, or ends--all essential features of human beings, which the statesman needs to know. The proper paradigm for the statesman's knowledge, therefore, must be knowledge of nature--what is given by nature and what is needed to complete nature. ;To translate the knowledge of human nature and human needs into practice, the statesman must prescribe for each individual's needs. This cannot mean, however, that the statesman tell each individual what to do: this would be to treat human beings as slaves or sheep--not as potentially self-ruling individuals--and would reduce the statesman once more to a shepherd. Human beings really need "space" to rule themselves, and guidance to be able to actualize their potential to rule themselves. The "space" for self-rule is provided by good laws; the potential for self-rule is actualized through philosophy. To determine what would constitute goad laws, the statesman must cross-examine each individual. This cross-examination--or Socratic philosophizing--however, is precisely the way each individual is empowered to rule himself. The Statesman thus proves that the true statesman is the Socratic philosopher and that seeking knowledge of human nature and leading other human beings toward knowledge of their own nature is true statesmanship. (shrink)

The present article revisits the issue of messianism, particularly as it finds its expression in the Davidic kingship tradition, that is, the belief concerning a Davidic Messiah. Since Old Testament messianic hope is inseparably associatied with the dynasty of David a study that traces the various perspectives concerning the Davidic Messiah chronologically and canonically can bring a contribution to this important Old Testament theme, too often neglected. Thus, the study shows that the belief in the coming of a Davidic Messiah (...) is a prominent eschatological theme in the Old Testament. Its roots can be traced back to the historical covenant made by Yahweh with David, which receives hyperbolic and symbolical dimensions in the royal Psalms, and a full-fledged eschatological orientation in prophetic writings. The monarchic prophets: Isaiah, Micah, Amos, and Hosea draw on the covenant promises to David to ground their message regarding the coming of a ‘new David’, who would destroy the wicked, protect the poor and oppressed, and institute an eternal era of peace, justice, and righteousness. In the context of the Babylonian exile, Jeremiah and Ezekiel foresee that God will bring forth a righteous ‘shoot’ of Davidic line to reunite the nation and shepherd God’s people. In the post-exilic period, Zechariah underscores the promise that David’s son will build a house for Yahweh, moving from the initial historical focus on Zerubbabel and his role, to the eschatological expectation of the one and only messianic figure that will bring the final restoration. (shrink)

Pastoral care is a biblical mandate to the Church to be involved in the lives of God's peop A key metaphor used by Jesus to describe his pastoral role was that of a shepherd. Thi to be God's shepherds and instruments of healing and transformation in God's world is imperative to all people, clergy and laity alike. The brokenness in South African society strikingly apparent, exacerbated by the effects of exceptionally high criminal behaviour statistics show. The demand for pastoral care (...) and assistance with various personal proble is on the increase, with many non-church goers turning to churches for help. Also appare in South Africa is the acute shortage of trained individuals to offer care and counselling. T task of offering care is not the sole responsibility of clergy, as all are called to be shepherds a caregivers. The importance and urgency in training church-based counselling teams cannot overstated. More so in that we are becoming increasingly aware that not only are individu in need of care, but whole communities are struggling with trauma and life's challenges, a often do not know whom to turn to. In pursuance of the realisation that pastoral care is t function and duty of all Christians, this article will delineate in particular an explanation lay counselling, reasons for its importance including biblical foundations, where and ho ordinary South Africans can get involved, and will propose certain models and approach for getting started. These models will not be discussed in depth, but present an opportun for the next. Teams for these models consist of professional counsellors, but ought not to restricted to a select few, as all are called to this special ministry and can be trained for t task, which will include on-going supervision and mentoring. The overall purpose of t article is to highlight the urgency of training lay counsellors and some recommendations w be made how to apply it, in an attempt to be faithful to the biblical mandate and examples by Jesus Christ. (shrink)

L'article retrace l'histoire de l'image du peuple de Dieu comme brebis et pasteur dans l'Ecriture, dans deux figures représentatives de l'époque patristique, Augustin d'Hyppone et Grégoire de Nazianze, ainsi que dans la Constitution Dogmatique sur l'Eglise dans le Second Concile du Vatican. L'article fait une application précise de cette image au phénomène contemporain d'un changement culturel rapide dans le monde et dans l'Eglise. L'article soutient que l'image biblique des brebis et du pasteur ne doit pas être abandonnée comme un pûr (...) artifice culturel qui reflète une structure sociale primitive désormais entièrement désuète. Plutôt, cette image est une affirmation vitale et importante, tant anthropologique que ecclésiologique, sur la nature humaine, le besoin humain de communauté, d'autorité, de direction et d'attention. (shrink)

The Shape of Agency offers interlinked explanations of the basic building blocks of agency, as well as its exemplary instances. The first part offers accounts of a collection of related phenomena that have long troubled philosophers of action: control over behaviour, non-deviant causation, and intentional action. These accounts build on earlier work in the causalist tradition, and undermine the claims made by many that causalism cannot offer a satisfying account of non-deviant causation, and therefore fails as an account of intentional (...) action. The second part turns to modes of agentive excellence—ways that agents display quality of form—providing a novel account of skill, including an account of the ways that agents display more or less skill. Shepherd discusses the role of knowledge in skill, and concludes that while knowledge is often important, it is inessential. This leads to a discussion of the way that knowledge of action and knowledge of how to act informs action execution. Knowledgeable action includes a unique epistemic underpinning: in knowledgeable action, the agent has authoritative knowledge of what she is doing and how she is doing it when and because she is poised to control her action by way of practical reasoning. (shrink)

The rise of experimental philosophy has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conceptual content remains unclear. We show how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap’s underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. This clarifies and extends x-phi’s positive philosophical import, and also exhibits explication’s broad appeal. But there is a potential problem: Carnap’s account of explication was limited to empirical and (...) logical concepts, but many concepts of interest to philosophers are essentially normative. With formal epistemology as a case study, we show how x-phi assisted explication can apply to normative domains. (shrink)

It seems obvious that phenomenally conscious experience is something of great value, and that this value maps onto a range of important ethical issues. For example, claims about the value of life for those in a permanent vegetative state, debates about treatment and study of disorders of consciousness, controversies about end-of-life care for those with advanced dementia, and arguments about the moral status of embryos, fetuses, and non-human animals arguably turn on the moral significance of various facts about consciousness. However, (...) though work has been done on the moral significance of elements of consciousness, such as pain and pleasure, little explicit attention has been devoted to the ethical significance of consciousness. In this book Joshua Shepherd presents a systematic account of the value present within conscious experience. This account emphasizes not only the nature of consciousness, but the importance of items within experience such as affect, valence, and the complex overall shape of particular valuable experiences. Shepherd also relates this account to difficult cases involving non-humans and those with disorders of consciousness, arguing that the value of consciousness influences and partially explains the degree of moral status a being possesses, without fully determining it. The upshot is a deeper understanding of both the moral importance of phenomenal consciousness and its relations to moral status. This book will be of great interest to philosophers and students of ethics, bioethics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and cognitive science. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer evidence that folk views of free will and moral responsibility accord a central place to consciousness. In sections 2 and 3, I contrast action production via conscious states and processes with action in concordance with an agent's long-standing and endorsed motivations, values, and character traits. Results indicate that conscious action production is considered much more important for free will than is concordance with motivations, values, and character traits. In section 4, I contrast the absence of (...) consciousness with the presence of consciousness in behaviorally identical agents. Most participants attribute free will to conscious agents, but not to nonconscious agents. Focusing in particular on two leading views of free will and moral responsibility, namely, Deep Self and Reasons-Responsive Views, I argue that these results present philosophers of mind and action with the following explanatory burden: develop a substantive theory of the connection between consciousness on the on.. (shrink)

Recent work in cognitive science suggests that conscious thought plays a much less central role in the production of human behavior than most think. Partially on the basis of this work, Peter Carruthers has advanced the claim that humans never consciously decide to act. This claim is of independent interest for action theory, and its potential truth poses a problem for theories of free will and autonomy, which often take our capacity to consciously decide to be of central importance. In (...) this article, I examine the nature of conscious deciding and I argue that Carruthers fails to establish the claim that humans never consciously decide to act. (shrink)

Some of the things we do intentionally we do halfheartedly. I develop and defend an account of halfheartedness with respect to action on which one is halfhearted with respect to an action A if one’s overall motivation to A is weak. This requires getting clear on what it is to have some level of overall motivation with respect to an action, and on what it means to say one’s overall motivation is weak or strong. After developing this account, I defend (...) the claim that one key functional expression of halfhearted action is the possession of impaired control over the action in question. Finally, I elucidate a puzzle that sometimes arises with respect to halfhearted action. The puzzle arises when an agent’s commitment in acting conflicts with an agent’s acceptance of poor performance. (shrink)

It is natural to think that at root, agents are beings that act. Agents do more than this, however – agents omit to act. Sometimes agents do so intentionally. How should we understand intentional omission? Recent accounts of intentional omission have given causation a central theoretical role. The move is well-motivated. If some form of causalism about intentional omission can successfully exploit similarities between action and omission, it might inherit the broad support causalism about intentional action enjoys. In this paper (...) I consider the prospects for causalism about intentional omission. I examine two recent proposals: one Carolina Sartorio (2009) defends, and one Randolph Clarke (2010a) defends. I argue these versions fail, and for a similar reason. Reflection on the function of intention for agency brings this reason to light, and motivates a novel causalism about intentional omission. On the account I go on to defend necessarily, an agent J intentionally omits to A only if an intention of J’s with relevant content (or the intention’s acquisition) causes in J a disposition not to A. Though the causal work done by intentions to omit differs in some cases from the causal work done by intentions to act, it turns out that causalism about intentional behavior (i.e., about action and omission) is viable. (shrink)

: The shepherd embodies a strange and disturbing society. Isolated, marginal, it forms a world apart and evolves in a wild space where mountains, valleys, meadows or forests make up the framework of its activity. In this non-domesticated nature the human presence is suspect. This confusing being is very often represented with an animalized, almost monstrous or deformed body which becomes a metaphor for social order. This grotesque body translates the prejudices of urbanites and elites. It fuels sexual fantasies and (...) symbolizes the disturbances of the natural and social order: freed from the laws of the city, it can try to seduce the young ladies and be insolent in front of the knights. It is a threat to the established order. But the shepherd also carries virtues. It is a model of Christian life: humility and holiness. It belongs to an original humanity, the form closest to divine creation. Two styles of representation of the shepherd therefore oppose the extremes. From texts from the end of the Middle Ages, we will see how the shepherd is an imaginary in opposition to an organized society but that his image has evolved positively until becoming the guardian of traditions and a being who lives in harmony with nature. Key words: stereotypes, shepherd, savagery, holiness, littérature, Middle Ages. Résumé: Le berger incarne une société étrange et inquiétante. Isolé, marginal, il forme un monde à part et évolue dans un espace sauvage où les montagnes, vallées, prés ou forêts composent le cadre de son activité. Dans cette nature non domestiquée la présence humaine est suspecte. Cet être déroutant est bien souvent représenté avec un corps animalisé, quasi monstrueux ou déformé qui devient une métaphore de l’ordre social. Ce corps grotesque traduit les préjugés des urbains et des élites. Il alimente les fantasmes sexuels et symbolise les dérèglements de l’ordre naturel et social : affranchi des lois de la cité, il peut tenter de séduire les demoiselles et se montrer insolent face aux chevaliers. C’est une menace contre l’ordre établi. Mais le berger est également porteur de vertus. C’est un modèle de vie chrétienne : humilité et sainteté. Il appartient à une humanité originelle, forme la plus proche de la création divine. Deux styles de représentation du berger opposent donc les extrêmes. A partir de textes de la fin du Moyen Age, nous verrons comment le berger est un imaginaire en opposition avec une société organisée mais que son image a évolué positivement jusqu’à devenir le gardien des traditions et un être qui vit en harmonie avec la nature. Mots clés : stéréotypes, berger, sauvagerie, sainteté, littérature, Moyen Age. Resumen. El pastor encarna una sociedad extraña y perturbadora. Aislado, marginal, forma un mundo aparte y evoluciona en un espacio salvaje donde montañas, valles, praderas o bosques conforman el marco de su actividad. En esta naturaleza no domesticada, la presencia humana es sospechosa. Este ser confuso a menudo se representa con un cuerpo animalizado, casi monstruoso o deformado que se convierte en una metáfora del orden social. Este cuerpo grotesco traduce los prejuicios de los urbanitas y las élites. Alimenta las fantasías sexuales y simboliza las perturbaciones del orden natural y social: liberado de las leyes de la ciudad, puede tratar de seducir a las jóvenes y ser insolente frente a los caballeros. Es una amenaza para el orden establecido. Pero el pastor también posee virtudes. Es un modelo de vida cristiana, de humildad y santidad. Pertenece a una humanidad original, la forma más cercana a la creación divina. Dos estilos de representación del pastor, por lo tanto, se oponen. A partir de los textos del final de la Edad Media, analizamos la imagen del pastor en oposición a toda sociedad organizada y la evolución positiva de su figura hasta convertirse en guardián de las tradiciones y en un ser que vive en armonía con la naturaleza. Palabras clave: estereotipos, pastor, salvajismo, santitad, literatura, Edad Media. (shrink)

This article focuses on the interpretative complexities encountered in the work of Lidwien van de Ven. First, it aims to map out the always porous nature of the relationships between aesthetics, politics and religion that make up her palimpsest-like images. Second, it aims to tease out a three-part analytics of photography. Third, it attempts to flesh out a difficult notion of spectacle that is inherent to her wide-ranging practice, and which distinguishes her project from liberal photojournalism with its obeisance to (...) identity politics and its weak notion of ethics. Finally, it aims to isolate, within the dialectical machinery of spectacle that is so often put to work by western democracies, a pragmatic moment in our encounter with her photographs that has real political purchase. With a variable notion of close reading at the crux of the operation, the article probes the efficacy of this moment so akin to philosophical aesthetics. (shrink)

The article focuses on the work of Ian Wallace, Jeff Wall and Rodney Graham, in particular, a notion of the studio that provides both an anchor and departure for the work of all three. This genealogy turns primarily on Wallace’s photo-conceptual work from the 1970s, which establishes the space of the studio as an allegory of painting or the modernist tradition, and as the topological equivalent of the museum and street. Using Wallace’s model of post-studio practice as an analytic, the (...) article unpacks the tensions of Wall’s notion of cinematography, highlighting his mounting hesitations with photography understood on the model of the studio system, as an inside/outside relationship and as the mimesis of painting. Finally, the article puts the notions of studio as genealogy and dispositif to work in order to understand the logic of Graham’s emphasis on the durational art of film. (shrink)

This article proposes a methodological schema for engaging in a productive discussion of ethical issues regarding human brain organoids, which are three-dimensional cortical neural tissues created using human pluripotent stem cells. Although moral consideration of HBOs significantly involves the possibility that they have consciousness, there is no widely accepted procedure to determine whether HBOs are conscious. Given that this is the case, it has been argued that we should adopt a precautionary principle about consciousness according to which, if we are (...) not certain whether HBOs have consciousness—and where treating HBOs as not having consciousness may cause harm to them—we should proceed as if they do have consciousness. This article emphasizes a methodological advantage of adopting the precautionary principle: it enables us to sidestep the question of whether HBOs have consciousness and, instead, directly address the question of what kinds of conscious experiences HBOs can have, where the what-kind-question is more tractable than the whether-question. By addressing the what-kind-question, we will be able to examine how much moral consideration HBOs deserve. With this in mind, this article confronts the what-kind-question with the assistance of experimental studies of consciousness and suggests an ethical framework which supports restricting the creation and use of HBOs in bioscience. (shrink)

Ann Margaret Sharp, American philosopher of education, believed that friends could, in fact, be quite critical of one another. Writing in her essay, “What is a Community of Inquiry,” she states,... but children know that the group has taken on a great significance for them: each one’s happiness means as much to each of them as their own. They truly care for each other as persons, and this care enables them to converse in ways they never have before. They can (...) engage in inquiry without fear of rebuff or humiliation. They can try out ideas that they never would have thought of expressing before just to see what happens.I am grateful to the friends of Sharp who spent time in pursuit of understanding her work and its... (shrink)

This paper is concerned with an enquiry into male sex offenders' understanding of masculinity to establish whether there exists a link between their view of masculinity and their sexual offending behaviour. The enquiry concerned twenty-five sexual offenders serving prison sentences. A short discussion follows and it is suggested that a sexuality and spirituality support group could be piloted within the prison context in order to give sex offenders a new perspective on how to be male in an evolving and flexible (...) way by meaningful relationship. (shrink)

The Russian philosopher and cultural theorist Mikhail Bakhtin has traditionally been seen as the leading figure in the group of intellectuals known as the Bakhtin Circle. The writings of other members of the Circle are considered much less important than his work, while Bakhtin's achievement has been exaggerated in proportion to the downgrading of the thinkers with whom he associated in the 1920s. This volume, which includes new translations and studies of the work of the most important members of the (...) Circle, sets out to correct the distortions in the established representations of its activity. The original contributions to literary and linguistic theory made by Valentin Voloshinov and Pavel Medvedev (but frequently credited to Bakhtin) are assessed, and the distinctiveness of their approaches is highlighted. (shrink)

The studies we report indicate that it is possible to manipulate explicit ascriptions of consciousness by manipulating whether an agent’s behavior is deterministically caused. In addition, we explore whether this impact of determinism on consciousness is direct, or mediated by notions linked to agency – notions like moral responsibility, free will, deliberate choice, and sensitivity to moral reasons. We provide evidence of mediation. This result extends work on attributions of consciousness and their connection to attributions of agency by Adam Arico, (...) Brian Fiala, and Shaun Nichols (Arico et al. 2011, Fiala et al. 2014) and supports it against recent criticisms (e.g., Sytsma 2014). (shrink)

Intentional action is, in some sense, non-accidental, and one common way action theorists have attempted to explain this is with reference to control. The idea, in short, is that intentional action implicates control, and control precludes accidentality. But in virtue of what, exactly, would exercising control over an action suffice to make it non-accidental in whatever sense is required for the action to be intentional? One interesting and prima facie plausible idea that we wish to explore in this paper is (...) that control is non-accidental in virtue of requiring knowledge—either knowledge-that or knowledge-how (e.g., Beddor and Pavese 2021; cf., Setiya 2008; 2012 and Habgood-Coote 2018). We review in detail some key recent work defending such knowledge-centric theories of control, and we show that none of these accounts holds water. We conclude with some discussion about how control opposes the sort of luck intentional action excludes without doing so by requiring knowledge (that- or how). (shrink)

This article recasts the biblical theme of the Good Shepherd by suggesting an analogy between shepherding and kingship in the Ancient Near East, and by comparing the use of the theme in that context to its use in the Indian world where the god Kṛṣṇa is known to have spent his childhood as a cowherd. The author arrives at three conclusions : 1) the term “shepherd” necessarily implies a relationship with grazing animals which are considered to be a major source (...) of wealth in both the Near East and India ; 2) the practice of herding creates a link between an interior space and an exterior space, that is, the herder protects the animals living inside the fold from enemies that threaten them from without (wild animals, thieves) ; and 3) the activity of the shepherd changes over time, that is, the herder moves from one grazing land to another according to the seasons and the quality of the grazing lands ; more importantly, the different shape which the activity of the herder takes at night (as he rests with his wife while the animals return to the fold) can be interpreted in an eschatological sense. (shrink)