Réponses à Juliette Grange sur ses remises en cause peu argumentées d'une partie de la philosophie en France.

While inquiring into the acceptability of witnessing a purported miracle, Hume formulates a simple criterion: S is credible in purporting M to the extent that the probability of S’s lying is weaker than the probability of M’s not having happened. Nevertheless, applying the criterion reveals to be very uneasy. It puts Hume himself in an awkward position, as regards his own account of laws of nature. Experience, that was supposed to be open to every non-contradictory event, suddently turns out to (...) be “solid an unalterable”. Moreover, Hume is suggesting two definitions of miracle, but employs the one which precludes supernatural intervention. Hume is assessing the probability of miracle without considering the reasons a deity would have to produce them, and on which frequency. Clearly, there is a prejudicial refusal to accept. (shrink)

In this paper I intend to identify some points of disagreement between theism and atheism. I will try to point out three epistemological clashes occurring in the controversial treatment of cosmological arguments. I am not assessing the arguments pro and contra, which have been thoroughly studied and discussed, but just trying to understand the misunderstanding.

There is a strong claim that the world’s createdness, if true, cannot be known but through revelation. In this paper we try to dismiss this claim by arguing that creation cannot be merely a revealed truth (revelabile tantum), since it is on the contrary the very preamble to any genuine revelation. Ontologically, no revelation can happen in a self-existent world. No creation, no revelation. Epistemically, no revelation is to be admitted but on the assumption that the world depends, for its (...) existence and operation, on a supernatural agent. No admittance of creative power, no justified identification of any revelatory activity. (shrink)

Theories of truthmaking have been introduced quite recently in epistemology. Having little to do with truth serums, or truths drugs, their concern is to define truth in terms of a certain relation between truthbearers and truthmakers. Those theories make an attempt to remedy what is supposed to be lacking in classical theories of truth, especially in Alfred Tarski’s semantic theory.

Longtemps éclipsée, la question de la compatibilité de la (pre)science divine avec la liberté a été exhumée dans les débats de philosophie analytique. Les promoteurs de la logique temporelle ont proposé un argument d’incompatibilité qui continue d’exercer la sagacité des commentateurs. L’objet de cet article est de suggérer que la conception atemporaliste de Dieu, dont on explique pourquoi elle est si peu en vogue aujourd’hui, est à même, sinon de résoudre complètement, au moins d’atténuer considérablement ces problèmes de compatibilité, qui (...) rejoignent le problème de l’articulation de la souveraineté absolue de Dieu avec la contribution authentique des causes secondes. (shrink)

Il ne suffit pas d'écarter la confusion entre création et nouveauté du monde pour donner droit de cité en philosophie à la thèse de la création. Le dogme de la création est-il un corps étranger jadis imposé aux philosophes dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions? Tel est le préjugé schopenhauerien dont on voudrait d'abord faire justice. La création n'est-elle pas alors, à tout le moins, une marotte ethnocentrique, tributaire de la seule révélation biblique? On décrira et discutera alors la prétendue inassimilabilité (...) de la thèse de la création par la philosophie selon de nombreux historiens de la philosophie qui relancent un débat ancien mais peut-être pas périmé: la thèse de la création est-elle soluble dans la philosophie? It is not enough to dispel the confusion that might exist between the idea of creation and that of the novelty of the world to provide the creationist thesis with a legitimate place in philosophy. Is the dogma of creation a foreign body that used to be imposed on philosophers as part of their professional duties? Such is the Schopenhauerian prejudice we would like to dispose of. Yet, cannot one argue that creation is an ethnocentric fad, depending on biblical revelation alone? We will describe and discuss the claim of the alleged non-assimilability of the creationist thesis by philosophy, which is advocated by many historians of philosophy who have reopened an old but maybe not outdated debate: is the creationist thesis soluble in philosophy? (shrink)

In this paper, we criticize Hans Jonas’s analogy between God’s power and the operation of physical forces. We wonder why, if omnipotence had proved to be "a self-contradictory concept", does Jonas still need to invoke the occurrence of horrendous evils to support the view that "God is not all powerful". We suggest that "God’s retreating into himself in order to give room to the world, renouncing his being and divesting himself of his deity" are beautiful but inconsistent metaphors of creation. (...) Our central claim is that God’s alleged retirement, even if it were conceivable, would not the least diminish his responsibility in the occurrence of evil. (shrink)

There is a claim that the natural capacity for knowledge of God is presupposed by the acceptance of any revelation. We inquire into whether this restriction is satisfactory. There is a stronger claim that natural knowledge has to be exercised for someone to welcome revelation. There is an additional claim that natural knowledge of the preambles to the articles of faith may not obtain. We try to make sense of this doctrine of impeached preambles to faith, by considering its phrasing (...) not only in the first person singular, nor in the third person, but in the first plural person, where it may suggest a kind of social division of tasks among believers. (shrink)

Résumé Sans tomber dans le piège des débats pseudo-scientifiques sur l’entropie de l’univers ou la cosmologie de « l’atome primitif », Sartre et Sertillanges font tous les deux un sort au véritable concept métaphysique de création, c’est-à-dire le concept de dépendance ontologique. Tandis que Sartre nie que le créé puisse avoir la moindre consistance propre tant qu’il dépend d’un créateur, Sertillanges inverse la donne en affirmant que c’est parce que le créé a une consistance propre qu’il peut être dit dépendre (...) d’un créateur. Deux réponses symétriques formulées dans un schème conceptuel presque commun. (shrink)

v. 1. L'introduction en philosophie du concept de création -- v. 2. Scénarios de "sortie de la création.".

Il faut, dit-on, de tout pour faire un monde. Mais à force de tout comprendre, ce concept de monde ne recouvre plus rien de précis. Il désigne une somme de parties hétérogènes, comprenant pêle-mêle : constituants matériels, propriétés physiques, événements, personnes, actions... Ces fragments du monde, nous ne les connaissons qu'à travers le prisme de nos besoins ou de nos habitudes linguistiques et culturelles. Faudra-t-il renoncer à définir un concept de monde, au profit d'une multiplicité de perceptions du monde? Ce (...) livre propose d'examiner les principales tentatives, classiques ou contemporaines, de déterminer le concept de monde. Il évalue les grandes thèses métaphysiques sur la réalité du monde par rapport à nos représentations. Il discute les constructions esthétique, morale ou religieuse d'autres mondes possibles. Il affronte la question d'une science de l'univers. Habiter le monde pourrait nous interdire d'en être le spectateur impartial. Avons-nous, en définitive, affaire à un monde commun? (shrink)

En dépit de toutes les proclamations sur la " mort de la métaphysique ", la philosophie ne peut aujourd'hui, pas plus qu'hier, se passer de l'interrogation métaphysique. Si elle décidait d'abandonner l'enquête sur les questions au-delà de l'expérience, elle laisserait le champ libre à toutes les spéculations irrationnelles, aux charlatanismes de la quête spirituelle, aux marchands d'illusion illuminée. La question " Pourquoi y a-t-il quelque chose plutôt que rien? " semble réunir à elle seule quelques vertus et tous les péchés (...) que l'on prête à la métaphysique. Certainement insoluble, elle en montre bien le caractère ridicule, dépassé, voire inepte. Evidemment radicale, elle indique ce que la métaphysique a d'inévitable, de nécessaire, voire d'ultime. Elle est en tout cas un nœud de difficultés et de concepts dont les doctrines classiques sont loin d'avoir épuisé les possibles et sur lesquels la discussion s'avère encore féconde. La première partie de ce livre interroge donc la question elle-même : est-elle une ou multiple, a-t-elle un sens ou non, quelles raisons a-t-on pu avancer pour la disqualifier ou pour prétendre y avoir répondu? C'est à approfondir quelques réponses nouvelles, et possibles, qu'est consacrée la seconde partie qui fait surgir d'autres problèmes : la plausibilité des réponses théistes et naturalistes, la pensabilité du néant, l'impossibilité d'un monde vide, les limites du principe de raison suffisante. Francis Wolff, pour le groupe MENS. (shrink)

Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr’s computational theory of vision is not intentional, claiming that the formal scientific theory does not include description of visual content. They also argue that the theory is internalist in the sense of not describing things physically external to the perceiver. They argue that these claims hold for computational theories of vision in general. Beyond theories of vision, they argue that representational content does not figure as a topic within formal computational theories (...) in cognitive science. I demonstrate that Chomsky’s and Egan’s claims about Marr’s theory are false. Marr’s computational theory contains a mathematical theory of visual content, based on empirical psychophysical evidence. It also contains mathematical descriptions of distal physical surfaces and objects, and of their optic projection to the perceiver. Much computational research on vision contains these types of intentional and externalist components within the formal, mathematical, theories. Chomsky’s and Egan’s claims demonstrate inadequate study and understanding of Marr’s work and other research in this area. Computational theories of vision, by containing empirically based mathematical theories of visual content, to this extent present naturalizations of semantics. (shrink)

We are witnessing increasing use of the Internet, particular social media, to criticize (perceived or actual) moral failings and misdemeanors. This phenomenon of so-called ‘online public shaming’ could provide a powerful tool for reinforcing valuable social norms. But it also threatens unwarranted and severe punishments meted out by online mobs. This paper analyses the dangers associated with the informal enforcement of norms, drawing on Locke, but also highlights its promise, drawing on recent discussions of social norms. We then consider two (...) crucial conditions that online public shaming must meet in order to be justifiable: proportionality and accountability. We argue that these requirements are in fact frequently violated, rendering most cases of online public shaming unjustified. While the use of online public shaming against others’ vices has some apparent virtues, it is currently rarely justified, given its own vices. (shrink)

Reasons and reasoning were central to the work of Paul Grice, one of the most influential and admired philosophers of the late twentieth century. In the John Locke Lectures that Grice delivered in Oxford at the end of the 1970s, he set out his fundamental thoughts about these topics; Aspects of Reason is the long-awaited publication of those lectures. This immensely rich work, powerfully evocative of the mind of its author, will refresh and illuminate discussions in many areas of (...) contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Les recueils de Vies de femmes illustres, genre littéraire à succès à la Renaissance, utilisent l’exemplarité à des fins didactiques tout autant que polémiques. L’étude de la figure particulière de Didon permet d’envisager les enjeux et modalités de la construction de l’exemplarité féminine. Entre l’amoureuse éplorée de Virgile et l’intransigeante uniuira de Justin, la balance n’est pas égale. Seule Christine de Pizan entreprend de louer l’héroïne virgilienne, tandis que Champier mélange les sources pour en faire une digne épouse. De nombreux (...) auteurs dont Boccace, retiennent l’exemple de cellequi se sacrifia pour garder sa chasteté et sauver sa cité, indiquant par là les cadres fixés à l’héroïsme au féminin. (shrink)

La thèse dont l’ouvrage de Laetitia Dion est issu examine l’influence de l’actualité politico-religieuse et des traditions narratives françaises et étrangères sur la transformation de la matière narrative autour du mariage. Nouvelles-fabliaux, nouvelles plus longues aux tonalités variées, avec ou sans histoire-cadre, récits longs ou formes encore hybrides de romans, des Cent Nouvelles nouvelles de P. de Vigneulles (v. 1515) aux Histoires tragiques de Pierre Boaistuau (1559), treize fictions n...

This is a collection in translation of essays by Paul Ricoeur which presents a comprehensive view of his philosophical hermeneutics, its relation to the views of his predecessors in the tradition and its consequences for the social sciences. The volume has three parts. The studies in the first part examine the history of hermeneutics, its central themes and the outstanding issues it has to confront. In Part II, Ricoeur's own current, constructive position is developed. A concept of the text (...) is formulated as the implications of the theory are pursued into the domains of sociology, psychoanalysis and history. Many of the essays appear here in English for the first time; the editor's introduction brings out their background in Ricoeur's thought and the continuity of his concerns. The volume will be of great importance for those interested in hermeneutics and Ricoeur's contribution to it, and will demonstrate how much his approach offers to a number of disciplines. (shrink)

In this chapter a new problem about rule-following is outlined, one that is distinct both from Kripke’s and Wright’s versions of the problem. This new problem cannot be correctly responsed to, as Kripke’s can, by invoking Wright’s Intentional Account of rule-following. The upshot might be called, following Kant, an antinomy of pure reason: we both must — and cannot — make sense of someone’s following a rule. The chapter explores various ways out of this antinomy without here endorsing any of (...) them. (shrink)

The ethical issues raised by cybersecurity practices and technologies are of critical importance. However, there is disagreement about what is the best ethical framework for understanding those issues. In this paper we seek to address this shortcoming through the introduction of a principlist ethical framework for cybersecurity that builds on existing work in adjacent fields of applied ethics, bioethics, and AI ethics. By redeploying the AI4People framework, we develop a domain-relevant specification of five ethical principles in cybersecurity: beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, (...) justice, and explicability. We then illustrate the advantages of this principlist framework by examining the ethical issues raised by four common cybersecurity contexts: penetration testing, distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), ransomware, and system administration. These case analyses demonstrate the utility of this principlist framework as a basis for understanding cybersecurity ethics and for cultivating the ethical expertise and ethical sensitivity of cybersecurity professionals and other stakeholders. (shrink)

Foreword William Schweiker Paul Tillich, one of the great Protestant theologians of the twentieth century, addresses in Morality and Beyond a basic problem ...

Feyerabrend argues that intellectual progress relies on the creativity of the scientist, against the authority of science.

In this study of space and power and knowledge in France from the 1830s through the 1930s, Rabinow uses the tools of anthropology, philosophy, and cultural criticism to examine how social environment was perceived and described. Ranging from epidemiology to the layout of colonial cities, he shows how modernity was revealed in urban planning, architecture, health and welfare administration, and social legislation.

Paul Thom's book presents Kilwardby's science of logic as a body of demonstrative knowledge about inferences and their validity, about the semantics of non-modal and modal propositions, and about the logic of genus and species. This science is thoroughly intensional. It grounds the logic of inference on "that in virtue of which" the inference holds. It bases the truth conditions of propositions on relations between conceptual entities. It explains the logic of genus and species through the notion of essence. (...) Thom interprets this science as a formal logic of intensions with its own proof theory and semantics. This comprehensive reconstruction of Kilwardby's logic shows the medieval master to be one of the most interesting logicians of the thirteenth century. (shrink)

Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience. Our mutual understanding and even our introspection may then be reconstituted within the conceptual framework of completed neuroscience, a theory we may expect to be more powerful by far than the common-sense psychology it displaces, and more substantially (...) integrated within physical science generally. My purpose in this paper is to explore these projections, especially as they bear on (1) the principal elements of common-sense psychology: the propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc.), and (2) the conception of rationality in which these elements figure. (shrink)

De milieuproblematiek staat pas sinds kort op de agenda als een fenomeen dat de mensheid bedreigt. Toch blijkt het negentiende-eeuwse gedachtegoed van Karl Marx verrassende inzichten te bieden om deze actuele problemen te duiden. Marx laat zien dat het menselijk ingrijpen in de natuur leidt tot zelfvervreemding: de mens ondermijnt zijn bestaan als een wezen dat zelf deel uitmaakt van de natuur. Deze zelfvervreemding cumuleert in de kapitalistische samenleving. Marx lezend zien we dat de milieuproblematiek geen historische vergissing is, maar (...) fundamenteel samenhangt met de mens als redelijk wezen. Onze beheersingsrede heeft geleid tot de vervreemding van de natuur. Toch geeft dezelfde rede die de mens de vrijheid biedt zich boven het ecologische evenwicht te verheffen, hem de mogelijkheid zich te verzoenen met de natuur. Marx verwijst naar dit dubbele gezicht van de rede als hij stelt dat het 'rijk van de vrijheid' in de schoot van het kapitalisme wordt geboren. In dit boek onderzoekt Paul Cobben welke aanzetten de huidige samenleving biedt om vorm te geven aan de verzoening met de natuur. Paul Cobben is emeritus hoogleraar geschiedenis van de moderne filosofie aan Tilburg University. Momenteel is hij gastonderzoeker aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam en redacteur van de serie 'Critical Studies in German Idealism'. Van zijn hand verscheen o.a. 'Value in Capitalist Society. Rethinking Marx's Criticism of Capitalism' (2015)."-- Publisher information. (shrink)

"First published in this translation 1955; second edition (revised) 1974; reprinted with additional revisions 1987; reissued with new Further Reading 2003; reissued with new introduction 2007"--T.p. verso.