One of the important lessons to take away from Rohit Parikh’s impressive body of work is that logicians and computer scientists have much to gain by focusing their attention on the intricacies of political campaigns. Drawing on recent work developing a theory of expressive voting, we study the dynamics of voters’ opinions during an election. In this paper, we develop a model in which the relative importance of the different issues that concern a voter may change either in response to (...) candidates’ statements during a campaign or due to unforeseen events. We study how changes in a voter?s attention to the issues influence voting behavior under voting systems such as plurality rule and approval voting. We argue that it can be worthwhile for candidates to reshape public focus, but that doing so can be a complex and risky activity. (shrink)

The emergence of economic inequality has often been linked to individual differences in mental or physical capacities. By means of an agent-based simulation this paper shows that neither of these is a necessary condition. Rather, inequality can arise from iterated interactions of fully rational agents. This bears consequences for our understanding of both inequality and rationality. In a setting of iterated bargaining games, we claim that expected utility maximizing agents perform suboptimally in comparison with other strategies. The reason for this (...) lies in complex feedback effects between an agents’ action and the quality of beliefs used to calculate expected utility. Consequentially, we argue that the standard notion of rationality as maximizing expected utility is insufficient, even for certain standard cases of economic interaction. (shrink)

How should the information that a proposition p is a mystery impact your credence in p? To answer this question, we first provide a taxonomy of mysteries; then, we develop a test to distinguish two types of mysteries. When faced with mysteries of the first type, rational epistemic agents should lower their credence in p upon learning that p is a mystery. The same information should not impact agents’ credence in p, when they face mysteries of the second type. Our (...) account of mystery complements existing explications of abduction. We illustrate its significance by examining the mystery of consciousness. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the Enkratic principle of rationality, according to which rationality requires that if an agent sincerely and with conviction believes she ought to X, then X-ing is a goal in her plan. We analyze the logical structure of Enkrasia and its implications for deontic logic. To do so, we elaborate on the distinction between basic and derived oughts, and provide a multi-modal neighborhood logic with three characteristic operators: a non-normal operator for basic oughts, a non-normal operator for (...) goals in plans, and a normal operator for derived oughts. We prove two completeness theorems for the resulting logic, and provide a dynamic extension of the logic by means of product updates. We illustrate how this setting informs deontic logic by considering issues related to the filtering of inconsistent oughts, the restricted validity of deontic closure, and the stability of oughts and goals under dynamics. (shrink)

The paper analyzes dynamic epistemic logic from a topological perspective. The main contribution consists of a framework in which dynamic epistemic logic satisfies the requirements for being a topological dynamical system thus interfacing discrete dynamic logics with continuous mappings of dynamical systems. The setting is based on a notion of logical convergence, demonstratively equivalent with convergence in Stone topology. Presented is a flexible, parametrized family of metrics inducing the latter, used as an analytical aid. We show maps induced by action (...) model transformations continuous with respect to the Stone topology and present results on the recurrent behavior of said maps. (shrink)

We study classical modal logics with pooling modalities, i.e. unary modal operators that allow one to express properties of sets obtained by the pointwise intersection of neighbourhoods. We discuss salient properties of these modalities, situate the logics in the broader area of modal logics, establish key properties concerning their expressive power, discuss dynamic extensions of these logics and provide reduction axioms for the latter.

Agent-based modeling has become a common and well-established tool in the social sciences and certain of the humanities. Here, we aim to provide an overview of the different modeling approaches in current use. Our discussion unfolds in two parts: we first classify different aspects of the model-building process and identify a number of characteristics shared by most agent-based models in the humanities and social sciences; then we map relevant differences between the various modeling approaches. We classify these into different dimensions (...) including the type of target systems addressed, the intended modeling goals, and the models’ degree of abstraction. Along the way, we provide reference to related debates in contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)

Group judgements are often – implicitly or explicitly – influenced by their members’ individual expertise. However, given that expertise is seldom recognized fully and that some distortions may occur (bias, correlation, etc.), it is not clear that differential weighting is an epistemically advantageous strategy with respect to straight averaging. Our paper characterizes a wide set of conditions under which differential weighting outperforms straight averaging and embeds the results into the multidisciplinary group decision-making literature.

Belnap-Dunn logic, sometimes also known as First Degree Entailment, is a four-valued propositional logic that complements the classical truth values of True and False with two non-classical truth values Neither and Both. The latter two are to account for the possibility of the available information being incomplete or providing contradictory evidence. In this paper, we present a probabilistic extension of BD that permits agents to have probabilistic beliefs about the truth and falsity of a proposition. We provide a sound and (...) complete axiomatization for the framework defined and also identify policies for conditionalization and aggregation. Concretely, we introduce four-valued equivalents of Bayes’ and Jeffrey updating and also suggest mechanisms for aggregating information from different sources. (shrink)

We establish completeness and the finite model property for logics featuring the pooling modalities that were introduced in Van De Putte and Klein. The definition of our canonical models combines standard techniques with a so-called “puzzle piece construction”, which we first illustrate informally. After that, we apply it to the weakest classical logics with pooling modalities and investigate the technique’s potential for the axiomatization of stronger logics, obtained by imposing well-known frame conditions on the models.

Many different approaches to describing the players’ knowledge and beliefs can be found in the literature on the epistemic foundations of game theory. We focus here on non-probabilistic approaches. The two most prominent are the so-called Kripkeor Aumann- structures and knowledge structures (non-probabilistic variants of Harsanyi type spaces). Much of the recent work on Kripke structures has focused on dynamic extensions and simple ways of incorporating these. We argue that many of these ideas can be applied to knowledge structures as (...) well. Our main result characterizes precisely when one type can be transformed into another type by a specific type of information update. Our work in this paper suggest that it would be interesting to pursue a theory of “information dynamics” for knowledge structures (and eventually Harsanyi type spaces). (shrink)

The paper investigates the way norms relate to and affect agents' intentions and actions. Current work in deontic logic dealing with agency mainly falls within two different groups: a variety of frameworks which adopt a purely external approach and represent agency in terms of possible outcomes of actions, and frameworks which instead endorse an internal approach and focus exclusively on the agents' intentions. The paper argues that neither of these models alone can produce a satisfactory analysis. An integrated model which (...) combines the internal and external approaches is therefore put forward. The model is dynamic and represents the change that accepting a goal norm triggers in an agent's intentions (especially the so-called "prior-intentions" and actions. (shrink)

Analyzing situations where information is partial, incomplete or contradictory has created a demand for quantitative belief measures that are weaker than classic probability theory. In this paper, we compare two frameworks that have been proposed for this task, Dempster-Shafer theory and non-standard probability theory based on Belnap-Dunn logic. We show the two frameworks to assume orthogonal perspectives on informational shortcomings, but also provide a partial correspondence result. Lastly, we also compare various dynamical rules of the two frameworks, all seen as (...) generalizations of classic Bayes’ conditioning. (shrink)

We study the logic of neighbourhood models with pointwise intersection, as a means to characterize multi-modal logics. Pointwise intersection takes us from a set of neighbourhood sets Ni (one for each member i of a set G used to interpret the modality □) to a new neighbourhood set NG, which in turn allows us to interpret the operator □G Here, X is in the neighbourhood for G if and only if X equals the intersection of some Y {Yi | Yi (...) ∈G}. We show that the notion of pointwise intersection has various applications in epistemic and doxastic logic, deontic logic, coalition logic, and evidence logic. We then establish sound and strongly complete axiomatizations for the weakest logic characterized by pointwise intersection and for a number of variants, using a new and generally applicable technique for canonical model construction. (shrink)

The paper introduces a broad family of metrics applicable to finite and countably infinite strings, or, by extension, to formal structures serving as semantics for countable languages. The main focus is on applications to sets of pointed Kripke models, a semantics for modal logics. For the resulting metric spaces, the paper classifies topological properties including which metrics are topologically equivalent, providing sufficient conditions for compactness, characterizing clopen sets and isolated points, and characterizing the metrical topologies by a concept of logical (...) convergence. We then apply the approach to maps from dynamic epistemic logic, showing that product updates with action models yield continuous maps, hence allowing for an interpretation of the iterated updates as discrete time dynamical systems. (shrink)

We study two logics of knowledge and belief stemming from the work of Stalnaker, omitting positive introspection for knowledge. The two systems are equivalent with positive introspection, but not without. We show that while the logic of beliefs remains unaffected by omitting introspection for knowledge in one system, it brings significant changes to the other. The resulting logic of belief is non-normal, and its complete axiomatization uses an infinite hierarchy of coherence constraints. We conclude by returning to the philosophical interpretation (...) underlying both models of belief, showing that neither is strong enough to support a probabilistic interpretation, nor an interpretation in terms of certainty or the “mental component” of knowledge. (shrink)

We study two logics of knowledge and belief stemming from the work of Stalnaker, omitting positive introspection for knowledge. The two systems are equivalent with positive introspection, but not without. We show that while the logic of beliefs remains unaffected by omitting introspection for knowledge in one system, it brings significant changes to the other. The resulting logic of belief is non-normal, and its complete axiomatization uses an infinite hierarchy of coherence constraints. We conclude by returning to the philosophical interpretation (...) underlying both models of belief, showing that neither is strong enough to support a probabilistic interpretation, nor an interpretation in terms of certainty or the “mental component” of knowledge. (shrink)

I assume that voters mark ballots exclusively to express their true preferences among parties, leaving aside any considerations about an election’s possible outcome. The paper then analyzes the resulting voting behavior. In particular, it studies how effective different voting systems such as plurality rule, approval voting, and range voting are in fostering high turnout rates of such expressive voters.

In der Literatur finden sich zahlreiche Hinweise, dass die Versorgung mit öffentlichen Gütern in demokratischen Regierungssystemen besser funktioniert als in autokratischen Alternativen. Klassischerweise wird diese Beobachtung durch Unterschiede in den Anreizstrukturen demokratischer und autokratischer Entscheidungsverfahren erklärt (vgl. de Mesquita et al. 2005; Olson 2000). Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert eine weitere Erklä- rung für Unterschiede zwischen den unterschiedlichen Regierungstypen. Aufbauend auf die Debatte zur epistemischen Rechtfertigung demokrati- scher Entscheidungsverfahren (siehe Estlund 2000, Estlund und Landemo- re 2012, 2018) analysieren wir, ob demokratische (...) Regime auch einen insti- tutionell bedingten epistemischen Vorteil haben. Wir untersuchen diese Frage mit Hilfe eines Modells, in dem Akteure vor der Aufgabe stehen, das optimale Niveau öffentlicher Gütern zu bestimmen. Es gilt für die Akteure also, den optimalen Steuersatz zu schätzen. Wir implementieren dieses Modell in eine agentenbasierte Computersimulation und analysie- ren, wie gut es Akteuren innerhalb von zwei idealtypisch verfassten, po- litischen Systemen (Demokratie und Autokratie) gelingt, diese Aufgabe zu lösen. Die resultierenden Ergebnisse erlauben uns, die epistemische Qualität von demokratischen und nicht-demokratischen, kollektiven Ent- scheidungsverfahren zu vergleichen. Wir finden erstens einen positiven Effekt der epistemischen Vielfalt großer Gruppen, die in demokratischen Entscheidungsverfahren zur Geltung kommt (für ähnliche Ergebnisse im Gebiet wissenschaftlicher Gemeinschaften siehe Zollman 2010, O'Connor und Bruner 2019). Zweitens zeigt sich überraschenderweise, dass demokra- tische Entscheidungsverfahren am besten abschneiden, wenn die Bürger auch ihre eigenen Bedürfnisse priorisieren und kommunizieren, anstatt in ihren Interaktionen mit ihren Mitbürgern lediglich das optimale Niveau des öffentlichen Nutzens aus der Sicht der Gruppe zu kommunizieren. Schließlich findet sich ein positiver Effekt von zeitlich begrenzten Deli- berationsphasen auf die epistemische Qualität kollektiver Abstimmungser- gebnisse. (shrink)

High levels of trust have been linked to a variety of benefits including the well-functioning of markets and political institutions or the ability of societies to solve public goods problems endogenously. While there is extensive literature on the macro-level determinants of trust, the micro-level processes underlying the emergence and stability of trust are not yet sufficiently understood. We address this lacuna by means of a computer model. In this paper, conditions under which trust is likely to emerge and be sustained (...) are identified. We focus our analysis mainly on the individual characteristics of agents: their social or geographical mobility, their attitude towards others or their general uncertainty about the environment. Contrary to predictions from previous literature, we show that immobile agents are detrimental to both, the emergence and robustness of trust. Additionally, we identify a hidden link between trusting others and being trustworthy. (shrink)

In this contribution we analyze how the actions of rational agents feed back on their beliefs. We present two agent-based computer simulations studying complex social interactions in which agents that follow utility maximizing strategies thereby deteriorate their own long-term quality of beliefs. We take these results as a starting point to discuss the complex relationship between rational action couched in terms of maximizing utility and the emergence of informational inequalities.

Polska powieść kryminalna, szczególnie powstająca po roku 1989, wywołuje co najmniej dwa pytania badawcze. Pierwsze o chronologię literatury polskiej, a zarazem o uzależnienie jej rozwoju od przemian politycznych. Drugie o to, czy faktycznie zmiany takie miały (bądź mają) wpływ na kwestie np. formalne związane z kształtem tejże literatury. Zmiany polityczne mogły zapewne wpłynąć na podejmowanie tematów dotąd niemożliwych do opisu. Niniejsze studium ma na celu opis oraz analizę polskiej powieści kryminalnej z nieco innej perspektywy, a mianowicie opisu jej jako pewnego (...) obiektu w znaczeniu, jaki nadał temu pojęciu Nicolai Hartmann. Stąd kwestie chronologiczne nie odegrają tu większej roli; będą traktowane jako pewien parametr pomocniczy. Natomiast artykuł podkreśla znaczenie tezy, że powieść kryminalna staje się, właśnie po roku 1989, powieścią o charakterze obyczajowo-psychologicznym. Także coraz silniej przejawia się w niej tendencja do czegoś, co sami autorzy określają jako „komedia kryminalna”. Artykuł zawiera zatem zarysowanie problemu badawczego (dzieło literackie jako obiekt), zaś główna teza to niezależność kwestii formalnych od problematyki przemian politycznych. Przyjęte w artykule metody badawcze to przede wszystkim opis obiektu, resp. dzieła literackiego i takich jego cech, jak: miejsce akcji (konkretne i opisane precyzyjnie bądź schematycznie), język protagonistów/antagonistów/narratora (konwencjonalny lub zindywidualizowany, z aluzjami intertekstowymi), postacie konwencjonalne lub zindywidualizowane, zagadka (najważniejsza, lub pretekstowa, czasem odkrywa drugie dno). Staram się wykazać, że zmiany polityczne wpłynęły na podejmowanie tematów dotąd niemożliwych do opisu. Natomiast same kwestie przemian politycznych na sferę kompozycji mają tylko wpływ głównie w warstwie językowej utworów. (shrink)

Many have claimed that epistemic rationality sometimes requires us to have imprecise credal states (i.e. credal states representable only by sets of credence functions) rather than precise ones (i.e. credal states representable by single credence functions). Some writers have recently argued that this claim conflicts with accuracy-centered epistemology, i.e., the project of justifying epistemic norms by appealing solely to the overall accuracy of the doxastic states they recommend. But these arguments are far from decisive. In this essay, we prove some (...) new results, which show that there is little hope for reconciling the rationality of credal imprecision with accuracy-centered epistemology. (shrink)

This paper addresses the ongoing debate over the relation between belief and credence. A proposal is made to reverse the currently predominant order of analysis, by taking belief as conceptually basic and credence as the phenomenon to be clarified. In brief, the proposal is to explicate an agent’s credence in a proposition P as the agent’s tendency toward believing P. Platitudinous as this reduction may seem, it runs counter to all of the major positions in the debate, including the Threshold (...) View, the Certainty View as conventionally understood, Dualism, Eliminativism, as well as Credence Primitivism. Section 1 gives an overview on the current state of the debate. Section 2 considers unsuccessful predecessors of the proposed belief-first approach to credence. Section 3 motivates and lays out the basics of a conceptual framework for thinking about doxastic states that characterizes such states in terms of two formally independent dimensions, one pertaining to the agent’s tendency toward believing P, the other to the level of resilience with which the agent manifests that tendency. Against this backdrop, it is argued in Sect. 4 that the present reduction satisfies a set of standard, theoretically neutral criteria of adequacy for theories of credence, at least once they are purged of a quite common conflation of tendency and resilience. Section 5 argues against all of the above competing accounts. (shrink)

Student relativism is a widespread phenomenon in philosophy classes. While the exact nature of student relativism is controversially discussed, many authors agree on two points: First, it is widely agreed that SR is a rather problematic phenomenon, because it potentially undermines the very purpose of doing philosophy—if there is no objective truth, arguing seems to be pointless. Second, it is widely agreed that there will be some close connection between SR and a tolerant attitude towards conflicting opinions. In this paper, (...) I will argue that if these two assumptions are true, then discussing some basic philosophical insights about the concept of tolerance with students will be a promising new strategy of dealing with SR. (shrink)

In ”Skepticism,” Peter Klein distinguishes between the “Academic Skeptic” who proposes that we cannot have knowledge of a certain set of propositions and the “Pyrrhonian Skeptic” who refrains from opining about whether we can have knowledge. Klein argues that Academic Skepticism is plausibly supported by a “Closure Principle‐style” argument based on the claim that if x entails y and S has justification for x, then S has justification for y. He turns to contextualism to see if it can (...) contribute to the discussion between one who claims that we can have knowledge about some epistemically interesting class of propositions and the Academic Skeptic. He outlines the background of Pyrrhonian Skepticism, pointing out that the Pyrrhonist withholds assent concerning our knowledge‐bearing status because reason cannot provide an adequate basis for assent. He assesses three possible patterns of reasoning, and concludes that the Pyrrhonist view, that reason cannot resolve matters concerning the nonevident, is vindicated. (shrink)

Dass das Verständnis von und die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit argumentativen Zusammenhängen für den Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht von besonderer Bedeutung ist, ist unumstritten. Ebenso unumstritten ist es, dass es sich bei der schulischen Vermittlung von Argumentationskompetenzen um keinen Selbstzweck handelt, sondern dass Lernende vor dem Hintergrund der erworbenen Fähigkeiten und Kenntnisse zu einer fundierten Meinungsbildung befähigt werden sollen. In diesem Artikel argumentiere ich vor dem Hintergrund neuerer Ergebnisse der erkenntnistheoretischen Forschung dafür, dass das soeben skizzierte Bild jedoch einer grundlegenden Ergänzung bedarf, (...) da im spezifischen Kontext des Philosophie- und Ethikunterrichts nicht die Bildung, sondern vielmehr die Aufgabe eines eigenen Urteils das epistemisch wünschenswerte Ergebnis darstellt. (shrink)

This study illuminates how a cross-sector social partnership legitimizes itself toward multiple internal and external stakeholders. Within a single-case study design, we collected retrospective and real time data on the partnership between Deutsche Post DHL and The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Within this partnership, Deutsche Post DHL provides corporate volunteers that support disaster response after natural disasters on a pro bono basis. The main objects that needed legitimacy as well as the audiences from which legitimacy (...) was mainly sought changed over time. In addition, we identified legitimation work as occurring across objects, audiences, and time. Thus, we introduce legitimation work as the purposeful effort of the legitimacy seeker to avoid certain issues while ensuring other issues that are of importance to the conferrer of legitimacy. These findings contribute to micro-level considerations within institutional theory which view legitimacy as socially constructed between legitimacy seeker and conferrer. Hence, we add another perspective on legitimation to the previously existing conceptualizations of legitimacy as a deterministic consequence of institutionalization. (shrink)

This paper discusses a scenario borrowed from Williamson (2000) and repurposes it to argue for the possibility of conflict between two prima facie categorical norms of epistemic rationality: the norm to respect one’s evidence and the norm to be coherent. It is argued, pace Williamson, that in the conflict defining the scenario, the evidence norm overrides the coherence norm; that a rational agent with our evidence would lack evidence about some of their own credences; and that for agents whose evidence (...) is limited in this way, incoherence fails to entail irrationality. The above possibility claim has also been defended by Worsnip (2018), albeit on a quite different premise set and in conjunction with a coherence-centered account of epistemic rationality that issues predictions incompatible with those licensed by the evidence-centered account recommended here, as illustrated towards the end of the paper. (shrink)

Consider where κ is an uncountable regular cardinal. By a result of Shelah's we have for almost all witnessing this. Here we consider the question if there could be a similar result for. We will discuss some basic facts implying that this cannot hold in general. We will use these facts to construct an interesting example of a pseudo Prikry forcing, answering a question of Sinapova.

In the past several years, observational entropy has been developed as both a quantum generalization of Boltzmann entropy, and as a rather general framework to encompass classical and quantum equilibrium and non-equilibrium coarse-grained entropy. In this paper we review the construction, interpretation, most important properties, and some applications of this framework. The treatment is self-contained and relatively pedagogical, aimed at a broad class of researchers.

In dem vorliegenden Beitrag möchte ich an aktuelle argumentationsdidaktische Überlegungen anknüpfen und einen spezifischen Aspekt genauer untersuchen, der von der philosophiedidaktischen Forschung bisher ein Stück weit vernachlässigt worden ist. Dieser Aspekt betrifft die Vermittlung sogenannter argumentativer Metakompetenzen, worunter ich grob gesprochen Fähigkeiten des angemessenen Gebrauchs bzw. der verantwortungsvollen Regulation von argumentativen Kompetenzen verstehe. Die grundlegende Idee ist in diesem Zusammenhang, dass die Ausbildung basaler argumentativer Fähigkeiten zwar grundsätzlich durchaus wichtig und wünschenswert ist, dass aber gleichzeitig ein Einsatz dieser Fähigkeiten in (...) unterschiedlichen Situationen ganz unterschiedliche Funktionen erfüllt. Dementsprechend müssen Lernende nicht nur mit argumentativen Kompetenzen ausgestattet, sondern darüber hinaus auch zu einem reflektierten und situativ angemessenen Gebrauch dieser Kompetenzen befähigt werden. (shrink)

The files that have just recently been made available from Roman archives make it possible to shed new light on and relativize the often asserted,,Pope's silence." It can be seen, that there was no agreement within the Vatican on how to deal with National Socialism. Recent publications have constructed an antagonism between Cardinal Secretary Eugenio Pacelli and Alois Hudal, the politically active principal of the Collegio Santa Maria dell'Anima and supposedly a representative of,appeasement'. However, it can be shown that both (...) men initially agreed in principle with their assessment of National Socialism, even though they pursued different strategies. Hudal insisted on the public denunciation of National Socialism, on a clear positioning of the school, yet without success. Pacelli, a diplomat by training, was the one who thwarted nearly all of the Vatican's public proclamations against National Socialism. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there are significant instances of educational injustice in the context of philosophy teaching that can be effectively reduced by an increased implementation of digital technologies. More specifically, I show that there are good reasons to believe that testimonial injustices constitute serious instances of educational injustice that will frequently occur in philosophy classes. Using digital tools to anonymize student contributions opens up a promising way of dealing with these injustices. If convincing, my arguments give reason (...) to perceive epistemic injustices in educational settings as a serious threat to educational justice and to reconsider the implications of increased digitalization for issues of educational justice. (shrink)

Toleranz – eine Haltung, die in westlichen Gesellschaften wie kaum eine andere mit Nachdruck gefordert und mit Vehemenz verteidigt wird. Insbesondere eine tolerante Haltung gegenüber fremden Ansichten, Standpunkten und Überzeugungen wird von vielen als unverzichtbare Bedingung für das Gelingen eines demokratischen Miteinanders angesehen. Gleichzeitig wird kontrovers diskutiert, wo eigentlich die Grenzen einer toleranten Pluralität verschiedener Meinungen gezogen werden sollen. Welche Ansichten sind noch tolerabel, und welche nicht? Mit Blick auf aktuelle gesellschaftliche Diskurse und vor dem Hintergrund umfassender Kenntnisse der philosophischen (...) Toleranzforschung überprüft Dominik Balg kontrovers diskutierte Minderheitenpositionen auf ihre Tolerierbarkeit und entwickelt vor diesem Hintergrund einen klaren Kriterienkatalog, mit Hilfe dessen sich die Grenzen einer toleranten Haltung sinnvoll ziehen lassen. Darüber hinaus widmet er sich der Frage, was eigentlich jenseits unserer Toleranzgrenzen liegen sollte und wie man verantwortungsvoll mit Positionen umgehen kann, die nicht mehr tolerabel sind. (shrink)

The practice of early modern natural history depended on the collective collecting activities of a great variety of people. Among them, artisans played a major role in acquiring and distributing knowledge about the natural world and they contributed significantly to the scholarly labour in natural history. This distributed labour was both acknowledged by contemporaries as well as hidden from sight, reflecting the period′s dominant norms for class and gender. By combining an interpretation of the visual representation of labour in European (...) insect studies with an examination of written sources about natural history practices from about 1680 to 1810, this article decodes the often‐codified frontispieces and other more symbolic illustrations to offer new insights into the labour of natural history. Those who identified as scholars and artisans (or both) conceptualised their own intellectual and practical engagement with natural history within the semantic field of work. Some seemed to have even envisioned a new social role for academics as well as artisans. This article analyses the diversity of the “productive forces” in insect studies as they changed over time and it reconstructs what I will call the social imaginaries of participation. (shrink)