This article compares the concepts of judgment of Hannah Arendt and Jacques Derrida. At first glance, there are a number of striking parallels between the two. Both draw on Immanuel Kant’s reflections on judgment but reject his transcendentalist premises and his exclusive focus on aesthetic concerns in order to turn judging into a practice at the intersection of law and justice. Beneath these parallels, however, there are significant differences. This, we argue, is nowhere clearer than in Arendt’s and Derrida’s contrasting (...) positions on the death penalty. The article is structured as follows. We begin by outlining the main features of Arendt’s theory of judgment and then turn to her thoughts on the trial against Adolf Eichmann, which we consider a radicalization of this theory. We show that although Arendt claims that it is our sense of justice that demands that Eichmann be brought to trial, she ultimately does not clarify what a just verdict might be in his case. Instead, she opts for the death penalty as a last resort for dealing with those who have committed crimes against humanity. Next, we discuss Derrida’s reflections on judgment. For him, the tension between law and justice is asymmetrical. Law should be understood as arising from the demand of the Other and must always remain responsive to it, despite its attempts at universalization. From this it follows, according to Derrida, that judgments ought to be open to criticism and revision. Since the death penalty does not meet this requirement, it must be rejected. (shrink)

Recognition and freedom function not only most prominently as a key concept in current social and political theory, notably in critical theory and in (post‐)structuralist debates as well as in pragmatic‐skeptical conceptions, but the concept also receives considerable treatment within the phenomenological and hermeneutical tradition. Charles Taylor, Paul Ricoeur, and Jean‐Paul Sartre have elaborated the concept of recognition in a significant way. However, there are seminal indications for a nuanced understanding of the intrinsic relation of recognition and (un)freedom in the (...) thinking of Hans‐Georg Gadamer, Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, and Martin Heidegger. A positive understanding of recognition takes its departure from the assumption that the subject can only achieve a practical self‐relation if she experiences affirmation and acceptance from Others. The negative understanding starts with the observation that existing orders of recognition force the subject to adopt given identity attributions in conformity with the system and with an effective apparatus of power. (shrink)

Concerning the differences between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger with reference to Descartes one must point out their different ideological-historical and phenomenological approach on the one hand and on the other hand their diverging understanding of history, science and subjectivity. Cassirer and Heidegger agree that Cartesian thought is fundamental to both the contemporary understanding of the self in which man features as an autonomous subject and the contemporary understanding of reality in which being is analysed with the help of modern (...) science. Nevertheless, differences are manifest in the diverging representation of the new image of man and the world. While Heidegger in the revolt of man as subject seeks to get at the root of the existing dominant power relations and the implicit scientific discourse that ultimately excludes from that scope all that cannot be mathematically verified, Cassirer emphasises the nurturing of individuality and autonomy of the human mind. In man‘s successive self-liberation he sees the fundamental principle of anthropological ideal. From Descartes onward, and in particular from the Age of Enlightenment, man has been considered as an end in himself; he may maturely decide on his action, but he must also assume responsibility for it. According to Cassirer, these epistemological and ethical principles constitute the real foundation of our culture. According to him, modern-day progress does not necessarily flow into dominating subjectivism, since responsibility for the wrongful developments of the 20th century does not lie with the inherited models of man and reality, but rather with the disregard of the modern principles such as individuality, freedom and rationality.Anhand der unterschiedlichen Bezugnahmen Ernst Cassirers und Martin Heideggers auf Descartes sollen einerseits die Differenzen zwischen einem ideengeschichtlichen und einem phänomenologischen Zugang und andererseits ein divergierendes Verständnis von Geschichte, Wissenschaft und Subjektivität aufgezeigt werden. Cassirer und Heidegger stimmen darin überein, dass das cartesianische Denken sowohl für unser heutiges Selbstverständnis, in dem der Mensch als autonomes Subjekt fungiert, als auch für die gegenwärtige Wirklichkeitsauffassung, in der das Seiende mittels der modernen Naturwissenschaften analysiert wird, grundlegend wirkte. Die Unterschiede manifestieren sich jedoch in den voneinander abweichenden Auslegungen dieses neuen Menschenund Weltbildes. Während Heidegger im Aufstand des Menschen als Subjekt die Wurzel für die bestehenden Herrschaftsverhältnisse und den darin implizierten Wissenschaftsdiskurs, der letztlich alles mathematisch nicht Verifizierbare aus diesem Bereich ausschließt, festzumachen sucht, legt Cassirer den Akzent auf die Ausbildung der Individualität und Autonomie menschlicher Vernunft. In der sukzessiven Selbstbefreiung des Subjekts erblickt er das Grundprinzip der anthropologischen Ideale. Seit Descartes und insbesondere seit der Aufklärung gilt der Mensch als Selbstzweck, der mündig über sein Tun bestimmen kann, aber für dieses auch Verantwortung übernehmen muss. Diese epistemologischen und ethischen Grundsätze bilden für Cassirer das eigentliche Fundament unserer Kultur. Für ihn mündet der moderne Fortschritt nicht zwangsläufig in einen herrschaftlichen Subjektivismus, denn für die Fehlentwicklungen im 20. Jahrhundert sind nicht die überkommenen Modelle von Mensch und Wirklichkeit zur Verantwortung zu ziehen, sondern die Missachtung moderner Grundsätze wie Individualität, Freiheit und Rationalität.Temeljem različitih pozivanja Ernsta Cassirera i Martina Heideggera na Descartesa treba ukazati s jedne strane na razlike između idejno-povijesnog i fenomenološkog pristupa a s druge na divergentno razumijevanje povijesti, znanosti i subjektiviteta. Cassirer i Heidegger suglasni su da je kartezijansko mišljenje temeljno za naše današnje samorazumijevanje, u kojemu čovjek fungira kao autonomni subjekt, jednako kao i sadašnje shvaćanje stvarnosti, u kojem se biće analizira pomoću modernih prirodnih znanosti. Ipak, razlike se manifestiraju u izlaganjima te nove slike čovjeka i svijeta, koja odstupaju jedna od drugih. Dok Heidegger u uspostavljanju čovjeka kao subjekta pokušava ustvrditi korijen postojećih odnosa moći i implicitni znanstveni diskurs, koji naposljetku iz tog područja isključuje sve što se ne može matematički verificirati, Cassirer polaže akcent na izobrazbu individualnosti i autonomije ljudskoga uma. U sukcesivnom samooslobođenju čovjeka uočava on temeljni princip antropološkog ideala. Od Descartesa, a poglavito od prosvjetiteljstva, čovjeka se smatra samosvrhom; on može zrelo određivati svoje djelovanje, no mora na sebe preuzeti i odgovornost za njega. Ta epistemološka i etička načela tvore za Cassirera pravi fundament naše kulture. Za njega se moderni napredak ne ulijeva neizbježno u vladajući subjektivizam, budući da za pogrešan razvoj u 20. st. nisu odgovorni naslijeđeni modeli čovjeka i stvarnosti, nego prezir modernih načela poput individualnosti, slobode i racionalnosti. (shrink)

Das Denken Martin Heideggers ist von der Auseinandersetzung mit der antiken Philosophie geprägt. Die klassischen Texte werden jedoch nicht bloß als historische Dokumente aus einer fernen Zeit verstanden, sondern vielmehr als Grundtexte, die dem heutigen Philosophieren etwas zu sagen haben. Gerade dem Anfang der Geschichte gilt es laut Heidegger nachzuspüren, um die Ausprägung der ontologischen Grundbegriffe deutlich zu machen und sich von dort her Alternativen für ein zukünftiges Denken aufgeben zu lassen. Dieser Band versammelt unterschiedliche Bezugnahmen auf Heideggers Lektüre der (...) Antike von Heraklit über Platon und Aristoteles bis hin zu Augustinus, die den Verlauf seiner Gespräche durchleuchten und hinterfragen, ja im besten Fall in eigenständiger Weise fortzuführen im Stande sind. (shrink)