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  1. Probabilities with Gaps and Gluts.Dominik Klein, Ondrej Majer & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (5):1107-1141.
    Belnap-Dunn logic, sometimes also known as First Degree Entailment, is a four-valued propositional logic that complements the classical truth values of True and False with two non-classical truth values Neither and Both. The latter two are to account for the possibility of the available information being incomplete or providing contradictory evidence. In this paper, we present a probabilistic extension of BD that permits agents to have probabilistic beliefs about the truth and falsity of a proposition. We provide a sound and (...)
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  2. Wollen und Wahrheit.Michael Schmitz - 2016 - In Neil Roughley & Julius Schälike (eds.), Wollen. Seine Bedeutung, seine Grenzen. Münster: Mentis. pp. 43-70.
    In diesem Aufsatz argumentiere ich, dass die Standardauffassung von Propositionen und propositionalen Einstellungen inadäquat ist, ein Artefakt der gegenwärtig herrschenden theorielastigen Auffassung von Intentionalität, Sprache und Rationalität, und skizziere eine alternative Auffassung. Im folgenden Abschnitt belege ich erst einmal die These der Theorielastigkeit anhand einiger Beispiele vor allem aus der gegenwärtigen analytischen Philosophie. Der dritte Abschnitt erklärt, wie diese Theorielastigkeit im Standardverständnis von Propositionen und propositionalen Einstellungen verkörpert ist. Im vierten Abschnitt argumentiere ich, dass dieses Standardverständnis der Proposition zwei unvereinbare (...)
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  3. Truth Be Told: Sense, Quantity, and Extension.John Justice - 2015 - Peter Lang.
    Truth Be Told explains how truth and falsity result from relations that sentences and their constituents have to the circumstances at which they are evaluated. It offers a precise analysis of truth and a diagnosis of the Liar paradox. Current semantic theory employs generalized quantifiers as the extensions of noun phrases. The book provides simpler extensions for noun phrases. These permit intuitive compositions of truth-values and a diagnosis of the Liar and Grelling paradoxes.
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  4. A Generalized Referential Theory of Truth-Values.Fabien Schang - 2015 - In Elena Dragalina Chernaya (ed.), Rationality in Action: Intentions, Interpretations and Interactions. Saint-Pétersbourg, Russie: pp. 157-178.
    Misunderstanding occurs between speakers when they disagree about the meaning of words in use. In the case of truth-values, Frege took these to be referents of sentences which consist of classes of accepted (i.e. “true”) or rejected (i.e. “false”) sentences. From this usual depiction of truth and falsity, a general algebraic framework is proposed to systematize the use of truth-values from a dialogical point of view of logic. A special attention will be paid to two radically opposed pseudo-speakers: Heraclites and (...)
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  5. Yaroslav Shramko and Heinrich Wansing, Truth and Falsehood - An Inquiry Into Generalized Logical Values.Jean-Yves Beziau - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (5):1079-1085.
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  6. Is Truth Valuable?Ryan Christensen - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (3):451-466.
    This paper examines a puzzle about whether truth is a valuable property: Valuable properties, like beauty and moral goodness, come in degrees; but truth does not come in degrees. Hence, the argument concludes, truth is not valuable. This result is puzzling since it seems to conflict with a deep intuition that truth is valuable. It is suggested that a roughly Platonic theory, on which truth is distinguished into two different concepts, gives a satisfying answer to the puzzle. One of these (...)
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  7. A One-Valued Logic for Non-One-Sidedness.Fabien Schang - 2013 - International Journal of Jaina Studies 9 (1):1-25.
    Does it make sense to employ modern logical tools for ancient philosophy? This well-known debate2 has been re-launched by the indologist Piotr Balcerowicz, questioning those who want to look at the Eastern school of Jainism with Western glasses. While plainly acknowledging the legitimacy of Balcerowicz's mistrust, the present paper wants to propose a formal reconstruction of one of the well-known parts of the Jaina philosophy, namely: the saptabhangi, i.e. the theory of sevenfold predication. Before arguing for this formalist approach to (...)
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  8. Valor de Verdad.John Corcoran - 2011 - In Luis Vega and Paula Olmos (ed.), Compendio de Lógica, Argumentación y Retórica. Editorial Trotta. pp. 627--629.
    Down through the ages, logic has adopted many strange and awkward technical terms: assertoric, prove, proof, model, constant, variable, particular, major, minor, and so on. But truth-value is a not a typical example. Every proposition, even if false, no matter how worthless, has a truth-value:even “one plus two equals four” and “one is not one”. In fact, every two false propositions have the same truth-value—no matter how different they might be, even if one is self-contradictory and one is consistent. It (...)
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  9. MacColl’s Modes of Modalities.Fabien Schang - 2011 - Philosophia Scientiae 15:149-188.
    Hugh MacColl is commonly seen as a pioneer of modal and many-valued logic, given his introduction of modalities that go beyond plain truth and falsehood. But a closer examination shows that such a legacy is debatable and should take into account the way in which these modalities proceeded. We argue that, while MacColl devised a modal logic in the broad sense of the word, he did not give rise to a many-valued logic in the strict sense. Rather, his logic is (...)
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  10. The Principle of Bivalence in De Interpretatione 4.Francesco Ademollo - 2010 - In Brad Inwood (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 38. Oxford University Press.
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  11. Halbglatzen statt Halbwahrheiten. Über Vagheit, Wahrheits- und Auflösungsgrade.Geert Keil - 2010 - In Martin Grajner & Adolf Rami (eds.), Wahrheit, Bedeutung, Existenz. Ontos. pp. 57-86.
    1. Semantische Vagheit 2. Bivalenz und Wahrheitsgrade 3. Zutreffen und Wahrsein 4. Mehrwertigkeit und andere Holzwege 5. Wahrheit und Genauigkeit: Einige Beispiele 6. Die Platon-Herberger-Kontroverse 7. Der Parameter der Auflösung 8. Auflösungsgrade statt Wahrheitsgrade 9. Ein der Annahme von Wahrheitsgraden komplementärer Fehler 10. Wahrheitsrelativismus, Kontextualismus, Supervaluationismus 11. Noch einmal: Wahrheit und Vagheit -/- .
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  12. Die Wahrheit verträgt kein Mehr oder Minder.Geert Keil - 2010 - In Holm Tetens & Stefan Tolksdorf (eds.), In Sprachspiele verstrickt. Festschrift für Hans Julius Schneider. de Gruyter. pp. 81-100.
    1. Einleitung 2. Herausforderungen für das Nichtgraduierbarkeits- und das Bivalenzprinzip 3. Freges Einwand gegen graduale Wahrheit 4. Warum semantische Vagheit keine Wahrheitsgrade erfordert 5. Grenzen ziehen, wo noch keine gezogen sind.
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  13. Truth Values.Yaroslav Shramko - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  14. New Waves in Truth.Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.) - 2010 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
  15. Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity?Dan López de Sa - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 273-282.
    Timothy Williamson famously offered an argument from these Tarskian principles in favor of bivalence. I show, dwelling on (Andjelkovic & Williamson, 2000), that the argument depends on a contentious formulation of the Tarskian principles about truth (and falsity), which the supervaluationist can reject without jeopardizing the Tarskian insight. In the mentioned paper, Adjelkovic and Williamson argue that, even if the appropriate formulation seems to make room for failure of bivalence in borderline cases, this appearance is illusory, once one grants an (...)
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  16. Truth Values and Proof Theory.Greg Restall - 2009 - Studia Logica 92 (2):241-264.
    I present an account of truth values for classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and the modal logic S5, in which truth values are not a fundamental category from which the logic is defined, but rather, an idealisation of more fundamental logical features in the proof theory for each system. The result is not a new set of semantic structures, but a new understanding of how the existing semantic structures may be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion of logical consequence.
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  17. A Plea for Epistemic Truth: Jaina Logic From a Many-Valued Perspective.Fabien Schang - 2009 - In A. Schuman (ed.), Logic in Religious Discourse. Ontos Verlag. pp. 54--83.
    We present the Jaina theory of sevenfold predication as a 7-valued logic, in which every logical value consists in a 3-tuple of opinions. A question-answer semantics is used in order to give an intuitive characterization of these logical values in terms of opinion polls. Two different interpretations are plausible for the latest sort of opinion, depending upon whether "non-assertability" refers to incompleteness or inconsistency. It is shown hat the incomplete version of JL_{G} is equivalent to Kleene's logic K3, whereas the (...)
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  18. Depicting Negation in Diagrammatic Logic: Legacy and Prospects.Fabien Schang & Amirouche Moktefi - 2008 - Diagrammatic Representation and Inference: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference Diagrams 2008 5223:236-241.
    Here are considered the conditions under which the method of diagrams is liable to include non-classical logics, among which the spatial representation of non-bivalent negation. This will be done with two intended purposes, namely: a review of the main concepts involved in the definition of logical negation; an explanation of the epistemological obstacles against the introduction of non-classical negations within diagrammatic logic.
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  19. Wholistic Reference, Truth-Values, Universes of Discourse, and Formal Ontology: Tréplica to Oswaldo Chateaubriand.John Corcoran - 2005 - Manuscrito 28 (1):143-167.
    ABSTRACT: In its strongest unqualified form, the principle of wholistic reference is that in any given discourse, each proposition refers to the whole universe of that discourse, regardless of how limited the referents of its non-logical or content terms. According to this principle every proposition of number theory, even an equation such as "5 + 7 = 12", refers not only to the individual numbers that it happens to mention but to the whole universe of numbers. This principle, its history, (...)
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  20. Aristotle's Four Truth Values.M. V. Dougherty - 2004 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (4):585-609.
  21. 语言分类系统、真值间隔和不可通约性 — 对库恩关于不可通约性的分类学解释之重建.Xinli Wang & 王 新力 - 2004 - World Philosophy 世界哲学 2004 (5).
    摘要:通常所接受对库恩有关不可通约性的分类学解释的理解建立在不可译性概念之上,因而是相当不完善的。为了弥补此不足,本文在分类之逻辑语义理论 (a logical-semantic theory of taxonomy)、真值语义理论 (a semantic theory of truth-value),以及跨语言交流的真值条件理论 (a truth-value conditional theory of cross-language communication) 之基础上,对库恩有关不可通约性的分类学解释进行了重建。根据这种重建,如果两个科学语言具有不相匹配的分类结构,则当一科学语言的核心语句在其所属语境中具有真值、而在另一科学语言之语境中考虑缺乏真值时,这两 种科学语言乃不可通约。通过这种重建,库恩对于不可通约性的成熟解释并非基于保真 (truth-preserving) 可译性或不可译性的概念,而是基于保留真值状态 (truth-value-preserving) 的跨语言交流概念之上。这种重建使得库恩有关不可通约性的解释更具坚实的理论基础、也在概念上更加完整。.
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  22. Proposizioni.Andrea Iacona - 2002 - Rivista di Filosofia 93 (1):3-34.
  23. 语言预设概念空泛无物吗?(A Defense of the Notion of Semantic Presupposition).Xinli Wang & 王 新力 - 2002 - In Bo Mou & 博 牟 (eds.), 留美哲学博士文选:当代基础理论研究 (Contemporary Inquiries into the Foundational Issues of Philosophy). 商务印书馆 (the Commercial Press, China). pp. 190-224.
    斯特劳逊 (Strawson)的语义预设概念在语义学和语言哲学研究上颇有建树。尽管如此,语义预设概念一直遭受来自各方面的批判。概要说来,对语义预设概念之批判主要来自两个方面:其一,试图抽去语义预设概念的逻辑基础 ,即非真值概念 (the notion of truthvaluelessness),从而达到间接地拒斥语义预设概念之目的。其二,直接批判语义预设概念本身。他们或者论证此概念在理论上不自恰或微不足道,或者断定即使此概念本身在理论上自恰,但实为一空 洞无物之概念。因为我们根本找任何一个语义预设的具体例证。所以,语义预设概念不具任何真正的哲学意义。它只是一个当代神话,理应拒斥。 -/- 玻尔(S. Ber)和莱肯(W. Lycan)对语义预设概念的批判集中代表了以上两个方面。据我所知,迄今不曾有人对他们的批判予以全面和公正的反驳,以致于许多人人云亦云,使得他们的论点至今颇有影响。给予玻尔和莱恩的批判以全面反驳乃本文初 衷。于此相关,我以为很有必要澄清对语义预设概念的诸多误解,从而确立一个理论上自恰,实际上可行,和确有实质性内容的语义预设概念。基于以上考虑,我对语义预设概念批判之反驳包括正 反两个方面。在第二节,我试图建立一个自恰,完备,非庸俗的语义预设概念。基于这一概念,第三节对玻尔和莱恩反对语义预设的两个核心批判予以全面反驳。第四节着重辩护非真值概念。本文的最后结论是:各种批判并未损 伤斯特劳逊的语义预设概念的精髓。语 义预设概念非但不是一个当代神话,而且具有重大哲学意义。 .
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  24. Is the Notion of Semantic Presupposition Empty?Wang Xinli - 1999 - Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 34 (73):61-93.
    This paper is an attempt to clarify the notion of semantic presupposition and to refute Böer and Lycan's critique of that notion. The author presents a feasible and coherent formal definition of semantic presupposition after examining several popular definitions of the notion. In terms of this definition, two central arguments against semantic presupposition presented by Böer and Lycan are analyzed and responded to with care. It is concluded that the notion of semantic presupposition is not empty but rather is philosophically (...)
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  25. Which Undecidable Sentences Have Truth Values?H. Field - 1998 - In H. G. Dales & Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.), Truth in Mathematics. Oxford University Press, Usa.
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  26. Truth-Value Gaps, Ontological Commitments, and Incommensurability (Doctoral Dissertation).Xinli Wang - 1998 - Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    According to the accepted translation-failure interpretation, the problem of incommensurability involves the nature of the meaning-referential relation between scientific languages. The incommensurability thesis is that some competing scientific languages are mutually untranslatable due to the radical variance of meaning or/and reference of the terms they employ. I argue that this interpretation faces many difficulties and cannot give us a tenable, coherent, and integrated notion of incommensurability. It has to be rejected. ;On the basis of two case studies, I find that (...)
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  27. The Sense of `a Name of a Truth-Value'.Peter M. Sullivan - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177):476-481.
  28. Asking Questions of Nature.Donald Mark Bauder - 1991 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    I begin with one way of making a distinction between something that can be called Realism, and its alternatives. It is a semantic distinction--about whether sentences of the relevant part of language have truth conditions, where truth is correctness of representation. This kind of truth is not warranted assertibility, and is not guaranteed by acceptance or agreement. The issue to be addressed comes from the combination of two things. The first is the naturalness of the view that sentences have truth (...)
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  29. Elements of a Realist Conception of Truth.Frederic Lewis Backfield - 1983 - Dissertation, University of Virginia
    The major assumption in my thesis is that truth is objective. This I characterize as the invariance of a claim's truth-value among people. The objectivity thesis is grounded in the correspondence 'theory' of truth, which in regard to the physical world is essentially the idea that truth is dependent upon the existence of mind-independent objects. Obviously ontological realism must incorporate this position. Various philosophers, including Putnam and Rorty, have suggested the idea of objects logically independent of experience leads to scepticism (...)
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  30. Truth-Tables and Truth.Michael Cohen - 1974 - Analysis 35 (1):1 - 7.
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  31. Truth and Value.O. M. Bakuradze - 1967 - Russian Studies in Philosophy 5 (4):25-28.
    Truth exists in the form of true propositions. Therefore identification of the nature of truth means identification of the conditions in which a proposition is true. A proposition is true if its content is not dependent upon the knower, and it constitutes a reflection of objective reality. Such a proposition yields knowledge. We shall call it a cognitive proposition.
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  32. Non Truth-Functional Many-Valuedness.Buchsbaum Arthur & Jean-Yves Béziau - unknown
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  33. False Truths.Isidora Stojanovic - unknown
    One of the most interesting and fruitful applications of logics, classical or other, has been in supplying formal frameworks for the semantics of natural language. In this paper, I discuss the following puzzle: there seem to be arguments that are logically valid - more precisely, that are instances of the rule of universal instantiation, and yet, the utterance of the premise is intuitively true while the conclusion is false. I will discuss two strategies, developed in response to different sorts of (...)
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