Non-Classical Probabilities for Decision Making in Situations of Uncertainty

Roczniki Filozoficzne 68 (4):315-343 (2020)
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Abstract

Analyzing situations where information is partial, incomplete or contradictory has created a demand for quantitative belief measures that are weaker than classic probability theory. In this paper, we compare two frameworks that have been proposed for this task, Dempster-Shafer theory and non-standard probability theory based on Belnap-Dunn logic. We show the two frameworks to assume orthogonal perspectives on informational shortcomings, but also provide a partial correspondence result. Lastly, we also compare various dynamical rules of the two frameworks, all seen as generalizations of classic Bayes’ conditioning.

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Author Profiles

Ondrej Majer
Charles University, Prague
Soroush Rafiee Rad
Tilburg University
Dominik Klein
Utrecht University

Citations of this work

Probabilities with Gaps and Gluts.Dominik Klein, Ondrej Majer & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (5):1107-1141.

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References found in this work

In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
A Mathematical Theory of Evidence.Glenn Shafer - 1976 - Princeton University Press.
Logical Dynamics of Information and Interaction.Johan van Benthem - 2011 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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