For many centuries, philosophers have debated this question: “Does God exist?” Surprisingly, they have paid rather less attention to this distinct – but also very important – question: “Would God’s existence be a good thing?” The latter is an axiological question about the difference in value that God’s existence would make (or does make) in the actual world. Perhaps the most natural position to take, whether or not one believes in God, is to hold that it would be a very (...) good thing if such a being were to exist. After all, God is traditionally thought to be perfectly powerful and good, and it might seem obvious that such a being’s existence would make things better than they would otherwise be. But this judgment has been contested: some philosophers have held that God’s existence would make things worse, and that, on this basis, one can reasonably prefer God’s non-existence. We first distinguish a wide array of axiological positions concerning the value of God’s existence which might be held by theists, atheists, and agnostics alike. We next construe these positions as comparative judgments about the axiological status of various possible worlds. We then criticize an important recent attempt to show that God’s existence would make things worse, in various ways, than they would otherwise be. (shrink)

One can know how to ride a bicycle, play the cello, or collect experimental data. But who can know how to properly ride a tandem bicycle, perform a symphony, or run a high-energy physics experiment? Reductionist analyses fail to account for these cases strictly in terms of the individual know-how involved. Nevertheless, it doesn't follow from non-reductionism that groups possess this know-how. One must first show that epistemic extension cannot obtain. This is the idea that individuals can possess knowledge even (...) when others possess some of the epistemic materials generating it. I show that only knowledge-that can be epistemically extended, not knowledge-how. Appeal to epistemic extension is a viable way of avoiding group knowledge-that ascriptions but not group knowledge-how ascriptions. Therefore, groups can know how. (shrink)

I connect two increasingly popular ideas in social epistemology—group knowledge and epistemic extension—both departures from mainstream epistemological tradition. In doing so, I generate a framework for conceptualizing and organizing contemporary epistemology along several core axes. This, in turn, allows me to delineate a largely unexplored frontier in group epistemology. The bulk of extant work in group epistemology can be dubbed intra-group epistemology: the study of epistemically salient happenings within groups. I delineate and attempt to motivate what I dub inter-group epistemology: (...) the study of epistemically salient happenings between groups and other subjects and entities. (shrink)

Kristina Rolin and Brad Wray agree with an increasing number of epistemologists that knowledge can sometimes be attributed to a group and to none of its individual members. That is, collective knowledge sometimes obtains. However, Rolin charges Wray with being too restrictive about the kinds of groups to which he attributes collective knowledge. She rejects Wray’s claim that only scientific research teams can know while the general scientific community cannot. Rolin forwards a ‘default and challenge’ account of epistemic justification toward (...) her argument that even the general scientific community can know because it’s sometimes the general scientific community, and none of its individual members, that attains epistemic justification. I argue that Rolin faces a dilemma: either she must herself be more restrictive about the kinds of groups to which she attributes collective knowledge or she must concede the general claim that collective knowledge obtains at all. (shrink)

Recent years have witnessed a search for new sources for archaeological inspiration within areas which until recently have not been imagined as a source for science. Archaeology has become more â oeanthropologizedâ, and, as such, is becoming increasingly influenced by the Zeitgeist, although some European schools are yet to recognize this. The process of scientific research that archaeologists have always considered to be an objective approach has been revealed to be the result of different subjective cognitive processes, forming part of (...) the contemporary humanistic paradigm, a fact confirmed by new tendencies in contemporary archaeology. Consequently, this book considers the question: how does the archaeologist think today? Beginning with simple analogies issued from archaeological experiments or from ethnography, the structure of the contemporary archaeological thought is increasingly complex, working today with concepts that only yesterday were a subject of study. This book considers these new types of approaches, through a series of personal narratives provided by archaeologists, describing their working methods in the process of imagining the past. (shrink)

Current developments in fields such as quantum physics, fine arts, robotics, cognitive sciences or defense and security indicate the emergence of creative systems capable of producing new and innovative solutions through combinations of machine learning algorithms. These systems, called machine invention systems, challenge the established invention paradigm in promising the automation of – at least parts of – the innovation process. This paper’s main contribution is twofold. Based on the identified state-of-the-art examples in the above mentioned fields, key components for (...) machine invention systems and their relations are identified, creating a conceptual model as well as proposing a working definition for machine invention systems. The differences and delimitations to other concepts in the field of machine learning and artificial intelligence, such as machine discovery systems are discussed as well. Furthermore, the paper briefly addresses the social and societal implications and limitations that come with the adoption of the technology. Because of their revolutionizing potential, there are widespread implications to consider from ethical and moral implications to policymaking and societal changes, like changes in the job structure. The discussion part approaches some of these implications, as well as solutions to some of the proposed challenges. The paper concludes by discussing some of the systemic benefits that can be accessed through machine invention. (shrink)

"The “philosophical” style specific to Montaigne’s Essays, totally devoid of demonstration and system, gives the reader the possibility of “essaying” an experience of his own reading, based on the idea that “Words belong half to the speaker, half to the hearer” (III, 13). Following Montaigne’s idea that selfishness is the basis of solidarity between men (the basis of society), we can detect two levels in this political conception: 1) on the one hand, the relationship between the individual subject and his (...) own complex state; 2) on the other hand, the relationship of the individual to otherness. For Montaigne, the first level is a priority and, as his own political experience shows, the individual subject has above all the duty to remain true to himself and to his own temperament. The duty to serve others is secondary, occasional and moderate. To complete the ideas that can constitute a “map” of Montaigne’s political philosophy, we have analyzed – quantitatively and qualitatively – the contexts in which the French philosopher used the word “conflict”. The examples confirm the predominance of the interior level of the individual subject and less of the relationship of the individual to otherness. To be active in the public sphere, the individual needs modesty and moderation in the expression of his opinions, as well as a rational evaluation when he wishes major changes; otherwise, they risk doing more harm than good to others. The individual must struggle internally with the weapons of reason, so as not to give in to irrational desires – such as revenge or carnal desires – which would affect others, which is virtue. An inner balance is necessary, and the others will gain from this. Keywords: Montaigne, Essays, political philosophy, Renaissance, map, conflict, individual, society, political system, selfishness, solidarity, opinion, public life, moderation, otherness, private life, civil war". (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the values supported by scientists can have a role in episodes of theory choice. In the first part, I characterize the value- and the rulebased accounts of theory choice. In the second part, I analyze how the thesis of underdetermination of theory by empirical data can be used to argue for a value-based account. I discuss two versions of the underdetermination thesis, arguing that the weaker version, underdetermination by the evidence available at a particular (...) time, is sufficient for establishing the role of values in theory selection. Many authors distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive values, considering that only the former ones have a legitimate role in theory choice. I defend this distinction, showing that it has both a normative and a descriptive dimension. I argue that cognitive values must not be seen as indicators of truth, but they can be characterized by their relation to the goal of science. In the end, I argue that, in spite of being justified and useful, the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive values is not clear-cut. (shrink)

Father André Scrima emphasised in his works the importance of monasticism as an inward phenomenon of the church, and he even believed that the Orthodox Church can be considered a 'monastic' church, given that monasticism is itself ecclesial. Trying to explain this ecclesial function, Father Scrima developed a unique, fresh vision regarding the role that the monk had throughout history, and this article sought to summarise some of these observations as they emerged from the writings of Father Scrima. CONTRIBUTION: The (...) article focuses on Father Scrima and argues that this remarkable Romanian theologian is often overlooked. He was gifted with an incredible memory and an outstanding capacity to bring together information from different fields of knowledge - the so-called classical culture - with universal cultural elements, patterns, traits or institutions that are common to all human cultures worldwide, presenting them in a theological interpretation. (shrink)

This article proposes a first systematic approach to the manuscript tradition of the Liber de causis. It studies both the manuscript variants and the doctrinal difficulties raised by the transliteration of the Arabic al-ʿaql preserved in the Latin translation. Some authors interpreted this transliteration as a concept forged by Arab philosophers without an equivalent in Latin. Other authors do not mention it because they probably knew a different branch of the manuscript tradition. By examining one hundred and ten Latin manuscripts (...) of the Liber de causis, the article establishes a list of the numerous variations regarding the presence of this transliteration in the text and its forms or spellings. This analysis enables a better understanding of both Albert's position and the hitherto unsuspected diversity of the transmission of the Liber de causis in the Latin West. (shrink)

Pierre Hadot famously claimed that, between Antiquity and German Idealism, Western philosophy had lost its practical role of guiding the life of the practitioner. Scholars who challenged this view focused on two medieval models. This article argues that the overlooked work Colliget principiorum iuris naturalis, divini et humani philosophice doctrinalium by Heymericus de Campo postulates a third model. On the basis of St. Paul’s teaching about the “inner man,” Heymericus reconsiders the Aristotelian doctrines of abstraction and of being as such (...) in relation to the Neoplatonic model of intellectual progression and interior conversion. In a realist conceptual framework, he holds that only metaphysics reflects the true nature of the human being inasmuch as it presupposes a way of life that assumes both the interaction with and withdrawal from the sensible world. However, Heymericus’ theory is neither limited to nor conditioned by Christian principles, but by Peripatetic philosophy. (shrink)

The contribution by De Dreu and Gross oversimplifies the complexity of the topic. I provide counterarguments that undermine the two sweeping contentions on which the article's argument depends, and I argue that asymmetric conflict is best understood at the finer-grained level of studying the sequences of strikes and counterstrikes that the rival actors have in store for one another.

Even though Pietraszewski acknowledges the tentative nature of the theory and the multiple lines of adjacent research needed to flesh it out, he insists that the finite set of primitives he identified is necessary and sufficient for defining social groups in the context of conflict. In this commentary I expose three interrelated conundrums that cast doubt on this simplistic presumption.

According to the transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of pure reason there are two properties of time that cannot be intellectualised: passage and infinitude. This study tries to show that these essential properties of time come to light in Kant’s Critique of Judgement. The contemplation of beauty will be understood as a non-succesive time and the wonder which we experience in seeing the sublime will be understood through Kant’s concept of infinite moment. These two aesthetic concepts of time will be (...) integrated in Kant’s broader view of time as developed in the first Critique. (shrink)

Recent clinical trials show that psychedelics such as LSD and psilocybin can be given safely in controlled conditions, and can cause lasting psychological benefits with one or two administrations. Supervised psychedelic sessions can reduce symptoms of anxiety, depression, and addiction, and improve well-being in healthy volunteers, for months or even years. But these benefits seem to be mediated by "mystical" experiences of cosmic consciousness, which prompts a philosophical concern: do psychedelics cause psychological benefits by inducing false or implausible beliefs about (...) the metaphysical nature of reality? This book is the first scholarly monograph in English devoted to the philosophical analysis of psychedelic drugs. Its central focus is the apparent conflict between the growing use of psychedelics in psychiatry and the philosophical worldview of naturalism. Within the book, Letheby integrates empirical evidence and philosophical considerations in the service of a simple conclusion: this "Comforting Delusion Objection" to psychedelic therapy fails. While exotic metaphysical ideas do sometimes come up, they are not, on closer inspection, the central driver of change in psychedelic therapy. Psychedelics lead to lasting benefits by altering the sense of self, and changing how people relate to their own minds and lives-not by changing their beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality. The upshot is that a traditional conception of psychedelics as agents of insight and spirituality can be reconciled with naturalism (the philosophical position that the natural world is all there is). Controlled psychedelic use can lead to genuine forms of knowledge gain and spiritual growth-even if no Cosmic Consciousness or transcendent divine Reality exists. Philosophy of Psychedelics is an indispensable guide to the literature for researchers already engaged in the field of psychedelic psychiatry, and for researchers-especially philosophers-who want to become acquainted with this increasingly topical field. (shrink)

Using a vague predicate can make commitments about the appropriate use of that predicate in the remaining part of the discourse. For instance, if I assert that some particular pig is fat, I am committed to judging any fatter pig to be fat as well. We can model this update effect by recognizing that truth depends both on the state of the world and on the state of the discourse: the truth conditions of ‘This pig is fat’ rule out evaluation (...) points for which the pig in question in world w is thinner than the cutoff for fatness in the discourse d. Then disagreements about taste are disagreements about the discourse. Unlike disagreements about the world, disagreements about the discourse can be faultless, given that none of the discourse participants has privileged authority to make pronouncements about conventions for appropriate use of a predicate. Thus on the dynamic view developed here, whether or not a dispute about taste turns out to be faultless depends in part on predictable features of the previous discourse. On this account, faultless disagreement involving predicates of personal taste does not force relativizing truth to a judge or assessor. (shrink)

_Reading Proclus and the_ Book of Causes: _Western Scholarly Networks and Debates, Volume 1_ provides a fresh account, based on previously unknown documents, of the diffusion of Hellenic and Islamic thought in the Latin West.

Users of psychedelic drugs often report that their sense of being a self or ‘I’ distinct from the rest of the world has diminished or altogether dissolved. Neuroscientific study of such ‘ego dissolution’ experiences offers a window onto the nature of self-awareness. We argue that ego dissolution is best explained by an account that explains self-awareness as resulting from the integrated functioning of hierarchical predictive models which posit the existence of a stable and unchanging entity to which representations are bound. (...) Combining recent work on the ‘integrative self' and the phenomenon of self-binding with predictive processing principles yields an explanation of ego dissolution according to which self-representation is a useful Cartesian fiction: an ultimately false representation of a simple and enduring substance to which attributes are bound which serves to integrate and unify cognitive processing across levels and domains. The self-model is not a mere narrative posit, as some have suggested; it has a more robust and ubiquitous cognitive function than that. But this does not mean, as others have claimed, that the self-model has the right attributes to qualify as a self. It performs some of the right kinds of functions, but it is not the right kind of entity. Ego dissolution experiences reveal that the self-model plays an important binding function in cognitive processing, but the self does not exist. (shrink)

What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly rival answers to this question: the Wittgensteinian theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge propositions, and the fundamental epistemic principle theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles. I assess these theories against a set of desiderata for a satisfactory theory of deep disagreement, and argue that while the fundamental epistemic principle theory does better than the Wittgensteinian (...) theory on this score, the fundamental epistemic principle theory nevertheless struggles to explain the variety of deep disagreement. (shrink)

If dangerous climate change is to be avoided, it is vital that carbon sinks such as tropical rainforests are protected. But protecting them has costs. These include opportunity costs: the potential economic benefits which those who currently control rainforests have to give up when they are protected. But who should bear those costs? Should countries which happen to have rainforests within their territories sacrifice their own economic development, because of our broader global interests in protecting key carbon sinks? This essay (...) develops an argument from the “principle of fairness,” which seeks to establish that outsiders should pay states with rainforests so as to share the costs of protection. If they do not, they can be condemned for free-riding on forest states. The argument is, I suggest, compelling and also capable of enjoying support from adherents of a wide variety of positions on global justice. (shrink)

Struggles over precious resources such as oil, water, and land are increasingly evident in the contemporary world. States, indigenous groups, and corporations vie to control access to those resources, and the benefits they provide. These conflicts are rapidly spilling over into new arenas, such as the deep oceans and the Polar regions. How should these precious resources be governed, and how should the benefits and burdens they generate be shared? Justice and Natural Resources provides a systematic theory of natural resource (...) justice. It argues that we should use the benefits and burdens flowing from these resources to promote greater equality across the world, and share governance over many important resources. At the same time, the book takes seriously the ways in which particular resources can matter in peoples lives. It provides invaluable guidance on a series of pressing issues, including the scope of state resource rights, the claims of indigenous communities, rights over ocean resources, the burdens of conservation, and the challenges of climate change and transnational resource governance. It will be required reading for anyone interested in natural resource governance, climate politics, and global justice. (shrink)

This book takes concepts developed by researchers in theoretical computer science and adapts and applies them to the study of natural language meaning. Summarizing over a decade of research, Chris Barker and Chung-chieh Shan put forward the Continuation Hypothesis: that the meaning of a natural language expression can depend on its own continuation.

L?intention de cet article est de présenter la critique et le remaniement de l?intentionnalité qu?implique l?élaboration d?une phénoménologie asub­jective chez Jan Pato?ka. À cette fin, nous exposerons d?abord les raisons qui amènent Pato?ka à prendre ses distances par rapport au subjectivisme de la phénoménologie husserlienne, et les conséquences de ce dépassement de l?horizon transcendantal de la subjectivité. Et dans un deuxième temps nous tâcherons de suivre les implications de cette destitution du subjectivisme relativement au statut et au sens de l?intentionnalité. (...) La nécessité d?élaborer une phénoménologie asubjective et de propo­ser par là une alternative au subjectivisme et à l?idéalisme implicite de la phénoménologie husserlienne découle chez Pato?ka d?une volonté de rendre compte plus authentiquement, c'est-à-dire plus phénoménologi­quement, de la structure et de la modalité de l?apparaître. En effet, c?est en s?interrogeant sur le comment de l?apparaître que Pato?ka est conduit à affirmer que celui-ci ne peut pas être expliqué à partir d?un sujet qui, avant tout, est lui-même quelque chose d?apparaissant. S?il apparaît à son tour, c?est qu?il est soumis lui-même à la légalité de l?apparaître, au lieu d?en être le principe. À partir de ces considérations, il devient possible de formuler une alternative tranchée entre deux types de phénoménologie, comme le. (shrink)

L’article suit dans un premier moment les deux grands fils conducteurs du projet de phénoménologie asubjective qui se constitue à la fin des années soixante et au début des années soixante-dix comme geste critique envers la phénoménologie transcendantale husserlienne, pour ensuite tenter d’identifier les traces de ce que le projet de phénoménologie asubjective (y compris dans ses conséquences métaphysiques) doit à la pensée aristotélicienne, telle qu’elle est reprise par Jan Patočka au début des années soixante.

The paper analyses Patočka’s phenomenological treatment of the concept of space and of personal spatiality. Patočka’s solution is used to assess Heidegger’s approach to the concept of space. Patočka’s phenomenological advancements in regards to his teacher’s developments are considered first through a comparison of their respective concepts of “Earth”, and second, through an evaluation of the reasons of the impossibility of the Heideggerian attempt, in Sein und Zeit, to reduce spatiality to temporality.

This article examines how Merleau-Ponty and Patočka confront the two major difficulties of every phenomenological thinking of temporality, corresponding to the two Aristotelian aporias of time: the unity of time and the permanence of the now . Our goal is to show that only a radical account of movement and the structure of appearing, such as that provided by Patočka following his phenomenological renewal of Aristotle, can clarify the true status of the unity of time and of the temporal present, (...) without falling into an excessive subjectivising thereof or an exacerbation of the transcendent pole . As an alternative to the Merleau-Pontian chiasm, Patočka offers a rigorous thinking of the phenomenological correlation, making time appear as a sediment of movement. (shrink)

Le projet phenomenologique de Jan Pato ka peut etre lu comme une tentative de recuperer ce qui, de la Physique d'Aristote (que Heidegger appellait le livre cache de la philosophie occidentale ), a ete oublie par l'histoire de la philosophie. Notre ouvrage se concentre sur un des resultats les plus aristoteliciens de Pato ka, que l'on pourrait resumer ainsi: le mouvement est phenomenologiquement et ontologiquement premier. Mais si le mouvement est premier, cela veut dire que les extases et les determinations (...) du mouvement ne sont, elles, que secondaires, c'est a dire phenomenologiquement et ontologiquement derivees. La matiere et la forme (du monde), l'acte et le possible, le temps et l'espace, l'hypokeimenon (le corps et le sujet) sont secondaires, car sedimentes, deposes par le mouvement, et ne s'eclairent donc fondamentalement que par leur reconduction au mouvement. C'est une telle reconduction que nous avons tache d'accomplir a chaque etape de notre analyse. (shrink)

States claim the right to choose who can come to their country. They put up barriers and expose migrants to deadly journeys. Those who survive are labelled ‘illegal’ and find themselves vulnerable and unrepresented. The international state system advantages the lucky few born in rich countries and locks others into poor and often repressive ones. In this book, Christopher Bertram skilfully weaves a lucid exposition of the debates in political philosophy with original insights to argue that migration controls must be (...) justifiable to everyone, including would-be and actual immigrants. Until justice prevails, states have no credible right to exclude and no-one is obliged to obey their immigration rules. Bertram’s analysis powerfully cuts through the fog of political rhetoric that obscures this controversial topic. It will be essential reading for anyone interested in the politics and ethics of migration. (shrink)

This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis (...) that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that the answer to this question depends on what hinge commitments are and what our epistemic relation to them is supposed to be. I argue for two core claims. First, that non-epistemic theories of hinge commitments provide adequate support for pessimism. Nevertheless, such theories have highly implausible consequences in the context of deep disagreement. Secondly, at least one epistemic theory of hinge commitments, the entitlement theory, permits optimism about such disagreements. As such, while hinge epistemology is mainly pessimistic about deep disagreement, it doesn’t have to be. (shrink)

An Introduction to Philosophical Methods is the first book to survey the various methods that philosophers use to support their views. Rigorous yet accessible, the book introduces and illustrates the methodological considerations that are involved in current philosophical debates. Where there is controversy, the book presents the case for each side, but highlights where the key difficulties with them lie. While eminently student-friendly, the book makes an important contribution to the debate regarding the acceptability of the various philosophical methods, and (...) so it will also be of interest to more experienced philosophers. (shrink)

This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis (...) that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that the answer to this question depends on what hinge commitments are and what our epistemic relation to them is supposed to be. I argue for two core claims. First, that non-epistemic theories of hinge commitments provide adequate support for pessimism. Nevertheless, such theories have highly implausible consequences in the context of deep disagreement. Secondly, at least one epistemic theory of hinge commitments, the entitlement theory, permits optimism about such disagreements. As such, while hinge epistemology is mainly pessimistic about deep disagreement, it doesn’t have to be. (shrink)