Which Groups Have Scientific Knowledge? Wray Vs. Rolin

Social Epistemology 30 (5-6):611-623 (2016)
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Kristina Rolin and Brad Wray agree with an increasing number of epistemologists that knowledge can sometimes be attributed to a group and to none of its individual members. That is, collective knowledge sometimes obtains. However, Rolin charges Wray with being too restrictive about the kinds of groups to which he attributes collective knowledge. She rejects Wray’s claim that only scientific research teams can know while the general scientific community cannot. Rolin forwards a ‘default and challenge’ account of epistemic justification toward her argument that even the general scientific community can know because it’s sometimes the general scientific community, and none of its individual members, that attains epistemic justification. I argue that Rolin faces a dilemma: either she must herself be more restrictive about the kinds of groups to which she attributes collective knowledge or she must concede the general claim that collective knowledge obtains at all.



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Citations of this work

Groups Can Know How.Chris Dragos - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (3):265-276.
Epistemic autonomy and group knowledge.Chris Dragos - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6259-6279.

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References found in this work

Epistemic cultures: how the sciences make knowledge.Karin Knorr-Cetina - 1999 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Cognition in the Wild.Edwin Hutchins - 1998 - Mind 107 (426):486-492.
Epistemic dependence.John Hardwig - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.
The role of trust in knowledge.John Hardwig - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (12):693-708.

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