What are the preferred subjects of mass photography? We will not go far wrong if we hazard this reply: the Self and the Other. The popular practice of photography does not much go in for nuance: it has taken as its watchword the distinction between gens de Soi and gens de l'Autre which Robert Jaulin once used as the title of one of his books on ethnology. The self, that is, one's own, those close to one, familial space and the (...) familiar space of identity and recognition. The other, in other words, strangers, the space of distant parts, and the space of displacement where tourism increasingly frequently leads the inhabitants of richer countries. Here, in the first space, one is among one's own kind, “among ourselves”, part of the same family through kinship or part of the same community through lifestyle and nationality; here, connivance rules, the unspoken word and the wink with the photographer who is “one of us”, and so one does not generally hesitate to expose oneself, that is, open up to their lens. There, in the second space, one is in a foreign country, amongst others, whose costumes and customs are photographed; there, the more polite rule of the smile and the presentation of the self for others holds sway, one is more engaged in the process of representation and adopts a pose for the photographer rather than exposing oneself to their lens. The most widely disseminated version of this dual polarity of popular photography is the souvenir photos of the family album, on the one hand, and the holiday photos brought back by tourists from their various excursions abroad, on the other; a version which illustrates one of the most spontaneously practised photographic montages, consisting of having oneself photographed in a distant country against a typical scenic background or emblematic monument of the country visited. (shrink)

Working at the margins of aesthetics and politics, Patrick Vauday challenges the dominant assumptions of our mediatized society and its disposition towards images. This challenge does not advocate eliminating images altogether, but rather entreats us to see them in a different light.

Résumé Si la peinture a connu une relative éclipse, du moins dans les discours et, sans doute aussi, du fait d’avoir eu partie liée avec un humanisme ébranlé par le structuralisme (Foucault), on soutient, à l’encontre de ceux qui parlent de son retour, qu’elle n’a cessé de devenir. Il y a beau temps, depuis Hegel, que la peinture a appareillé pour d’autres rivages que ceux des contrées paisibles ou dramatiques où l’homme pouvait se retrouver dans son image, soit qu’elle ait (...) continué de servir de modèle de vérité dans des migrations sur d’autres médiums (cinéma, photographie, vidéo), soit qu’elle se saisisse des forces du dedans et du dehors qui l’assaillent, la déforment et la transforment. (shrink)

There has been increasing attention in sociology and internet studies to the topic of ‘digital remains’: the artefacts users of social network services (SNS) and other online services leave behind when they die. But these artefacts also pose philosophical questions regarding what impact, if any, these artefacts have on the ontological and ethical status of the dead. One increasingly pertinent question concerns whether these artefacts should be preserved, and whether deletion counts as a harm to the deceased user and therefore (...) provides pro tanto reasons against deletion. In this paper, I build on previous work invoking a distinction between persons and selves to argue that SNS offer a particularly significant material instantiation of persons. The experiential transparency of the SNS medium allows for genuine co-presence of SNS users, and also assists in allowing persons (but not selves) to persist as ethical patients in our lifeworld after biological death. Using Blustein’s “rescue from insignificance” argument for duties of remembrance, I argue that this persistence function supplies a nontrivial (if defeasible) obligation not to delete these artefacts. Drawing on Luciano Floridi’s account of “constitutive” information, I further argue that the “digital remains” metaphor is surprisingly apt: these artefacts in fact enjoy a claim to moral regard akin to that of corpses. (shrink)

It has been argued that St. Thomas Aquinas’s anthropological views fall prey to the problem of “Too Many Thinkers.” The worry, roughly, is that his views entail that I—a human person—am able to think, but that my soul—which is not a human person—is also able to think. Hence, too many thinkers: there are too many ofus having my thoughts. In this paper, I show why this is not a problem for St. Thomas. Along the way, I also address Peter Unger’s (...) argument for substance dualism. (shrink)

Epistemic contextualism is a recent and hotly debated position. In its dominant form, EC is the view that the proposition expressed by a given knowledge sentence depends upon the context in which it is uttered. What makes this view interesting and controversial is that ‘context’ here refers, not to certain features of the putative subject of knowledge or his/her objective situation, but rather to features of the knowledge attributor' psychology and/or conversational-practical situation. As a result of such context-dependence, utterances of (...) a given such sentence, made in different contexts, may differ in truth value. (shrink)

Incompatibilism about responsibility and determinism is sometimes directly construed as the thesis that if we found out that determinism is true, we would have to give up the reactive attitudes. Call this "the consequence". I argue that this is a mistake: the strict modal thesis does not entail the consequence. First, some incompatibilists (who are also libertarians) may be what we might call *resolute responsibility theorists* (or "flip-floppers"). On this view, if we found out that determinism is true, this would (...) not be to find out that no one is responsible; instead, what this would suggest is that incompatibilism is after all false. Second, some incompatibilists may instead deny the claim that if we found out that no one deserves the reactiveattitudes, we would have to give up the reactive attitudes. Call this position *innocent incompatibilism*. I explore several different reasons why the fact that no one deserves the reactive attitudes likely does not translate into a requirement for us to give up the reactive attitudes. The upshot: incompatibilism may be practically irrelevant, even if true. (shrink)

Abstract: There is no such thing as ‘the’ hylemorphic account of personal identity. There are several views that count as hylemorphic, and these views can be grouped into two main families—the corruptionist view, and the survivalist view. The differentiating factor is that the corruptionist view holds that the persistence of the soul is not sufficient for the persistence of the person, while the survivalist view holds that the persistence of the soul is sufficient for the persistence of the person. In (...) this paper, I argue that hylemorphists should prefer the corruptionist view. This project ought to be of interest to anyone working on issues of personal identity, not only because hylemorphic views are historically important, but also because they are currently receiving significant attention in the personal identity literature. (shrink)

At the most general level, "manipulation" refers one of many ways of influencing behavior, along with (but to be distinguished from) other such ways, such as coercion and rational persuasion. Like these other ways of influencing behavior, manipulation is of crucial importance in various ethical contexts. First, there are important questions concerning the moral status of manipulation itself; manipulation seems to be mor- ally problematic in ways in which (say) rational persuasion does not. Why is this so? Furthermore, the notion (...) of manipulation has played an increasingly central role in debates about free will and moral responsibility. Despite its significance in these (and other) contexts, however, the notion of manipulation itself remains deeply vexed. I would say notoriously vexed, but in fact direct philosophical treatments of the notion of manipulation are few and far between, and those that do exist are nota- ble for the sometimes widely divergent conclusions they reach concerning what it is. I begin by addressing (though certainly not resolving) the conceptual issue of how to distinguish manipulation from other ways of influencing behavior. Along the way, I also briefly address the (intimately related) question of the moral status of manipulation: what, if anything, makes it morally problematic? Then I discuss the controversial ways in which the notion of manipulation has been employed in contemporary debates about free will and moral responsibility. (shrink)

Veltman’s test semantics and developments thereof reject the canon about semantic contents and attitude ascriptions in favor of dynamic alternatives. According to these theories the semantic content of a sentence is not a proposition, but a context change potential (CCP). Similarly, beliefs are not taken to be relations between agents and propositions, but agents and CCPs. These deviations from the canon come at the cost of an elegant explanation about the correctness of belief. Standardly, it is taken that the content (...) of a belief is correct just in case the content of that belief is true. The proponent of the test semantics cannot appeal to this explanation since they hold that certain contents, namely epistemically modalized contents, do not express propositions, and are neither true nor false. After motivating the need for an account of the correctness of belief within the dynamic framework, I argue that the few extant accounts in the literature are unsatisfactory. A novel account is proposed that avoids the problems of competing views. (shrink)

Since St. Thomas Aquinas holds that death is a substantial change, a popular current interpretation of his anthropology must be mistaken. According to that interpretation – the ‘survivalist’ view – St. Thomas holds that we human beings survive our deaths, constituted solely by our souls in the interim between death and resurrection. This paper argues that St. Thomas must have held the ‘corruptionist’ view: the view that human beings cease to exist at their deaths. Certain objections to the corruptionist view (...) are also met. (shrink)

This chapter analyses the views of Soren Kierkegaard about the concept of death. It examines the historical reasons why death might have featured with especial prominence in the work of a writer concerned with the parlous state of post-Hegelian Christianity and explains that Kierkegaard saw more of death before his thirtieth birthday than most people see in a lifetime. The chapter also explains the meaning of death in the mention of death in some of his works, including Either/Or, For Self-Examination, (...) and The Sickness Unto Death. (shrink)

Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral - Bonn) under the title: Perfektionistischer Liberalismus - Analyse, Kritik und Verteidigung einer Alternative zu einem Politischen Liberalismus.

Visual forms of episodic memory and anticipatory imagination involve images that, by virtue of their perspectival organization, imply a notional subject of experience. But they contain no inbuilt reference to the actual subject, the person actually doing the remembering or imagining. This poses the problem of what (if anything) connects these two perspectival subjects and what differentiates cases of genuine memory and anticipation from mere imagined seeing. I consider two approaches to this problem. The first, exemplified by Wollheim and Velleman, (...) claims that genuinely reflexive memories and anticipations are phenomenally unselfconscious, with the co-identity of the notional and actual subjects secured by a determinate causal history. The second approach posits some distinctive phenomenal property that attaches to genuinely reflexive memories and anticipations and serves to experientially conflate the notional and actual subject. I consider a version of the second approach, derived from Kierkegaard’s discussions of phenomenal contemporaneity, and argue that this approach can better account for the possibility of affective alienation from the selves we were and will be: the way in which our sense of self and awareness of our causal history can sometimes come apart. (shrink)

Social media is full of dead people. What should we do with all these digital souls? Can we delete them, or do they have a right to persist? Patrick Stokes claims that we have a moral duty towards the digital dead. Modern technology helps them to persist in various ways, but - with such developments as AI-driven chatbots simulating the dead - it also makes them vulnerable to new forms of exploitation and abuse. This provocative book explores a range (...) of questions about the nature of death, identity, grief, and the moral status of digital remains. (shrink)

The details of St. Thomas Aquinas’s anthropological view are subject to debate. Some philosophers believe he held that human persons survive their deaths. Other philosophers think he held that human persons cease to exist at their death, but come back into being at the general resurrection. In this paper, I defend the latter view against one of the most significant objections it faces, namely, that it entails that God punishes and rewards separated souls for the sins or merits of something (...) else: the (non-existent) persons to whom those souls once belonged. The objector takes this entailment to be problematic. I argue that it fits in well with St. Thomas’s views about punishment and about persons. (shrink)

Ausgehend von einer Kritik an der Kultur der Aufklärung entwickelt Friedrich Schiller eine Anthropologie echter idealistischer Denkungsart. In seiner ästhetischen Lehre vom Menschen spürt er den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit von Freiheit und Humanität nach und entdeckt in der Schönheit die Voraussetzung einer jeden Bildung. Mittels einer transzendentalen Explikation wird in der vorgelegten Studie Schillers anthropologischer Entwurf kritisch geprüft und der Zusammenhang von Schönheit, Freiheit und Bildung philosophisch entfaltet. Auf diese Weise kann die ungebrochene Bedeutung ästhetischen Denkens für die Pädagogik der (...) Gegenwart aufgezeigt werden"--Back cover. (shrink)

L'ambition de cet ouvrage est d'éclairer la figure du philosophe telle que Nietzsche la redéfinit à travers dix études, chacune articulée autour d'une notion clé de la réflexion nietzschéenne. Ce que Nietzsche appelle la "philosophie de l'avenir" ne désigne pas un genre ni une variante de la philosophie, mais explicite la notion même de philosophie, une fois celle-ci mise en accord avec son exigence de radicalité en matière de questionnement - ambition que, selon Nietzsche, les philosophes ne sont jamais parvenus (...) à réaliser véritablement. Habitée par cette exigence, la philosophie se doit de prendre pour objet de réflexion ce qu'il y a de plus radical, ce qui conditionne toute pensée et plus largement toute activité humaine - c'est-à-dire le mode de conditionnement lui-même, ce que Nietzsche désigne par le terme de "valeurs". A titre de conséquence, on découvre alors que c'est le façonnement de l'homme et l'élaboration d'une nouvelle forme de vie qui est au coeur de son entreprise. (shrink)

Le matérialisme que ce livre interroge et construit n'est pas une « philosophie », mais la condition de possibilité et l'outil de la connaissance objective. Historiquement, il se confond, de fait, avec l'élaboration de la science moderne s'affranchissant graduellement des contrats de parole qui l'asservirent longtemps à la métaphysique et à la théologie. Comment cette émancipation s'est-elle effectuée en des temps où une croyance instituée dictait sa loi théologico-politique aux efforts de la connaissance en leur imposant a priori la limite (...) de l'Inconnaissable? Comment d'autre part, face à cet affranchissement toujours inachevé, une métaphysique résiduelle impose-t-elle encore aux artisans de la connaissance objective, sans qu'ils s'en doutent, des cadres, des frontières, des démarches et des représentations? Ce livre montre qu'une analyse savante des complexes de discours dans l'histoire, à travers ce qu'elle explique du passé, peut permettre de comprendre et d'améliorer ce qui constitue proprement aujourd'hui l'acte de connaître. De redéfinir la « conscience ». De sortir des leitmotivs exténués sur le « hasard ». De penser plus authentiquement la singularité émergente du vivant. De s'éloigner d'un modèle strictement nécessitariste du « déterminisme ». De sortir des impasses avérées du réductionnisme. De résoudre les contradictions tacitement acceptées entre matérialisme et morale, ou entre déterminisme et conduites autonomes. D'entrevoir l'origine du symbolisme. De comprendre la nature originellement et fondamentalement politique de la religion. De penser l'articulation évolutive entre « nature » et « civilisation », et un lien cohérent et critique entre sciences de la nature et sciences de la société. D'identifier les comportements discursifs récurrents de ce que l'on nomme l'« idéologie ». Et d'édifier sur de nouvelles bases une histoire naturelle et sociale de la liberté. Revenant sur une part essentielle de son oeuvre, Patrick Tort invite ici à une véritable réforme logique de l'initiative de connaissance, et, simultanément, à instruire la méthode capable d'éclairer les mécanismes qui la favorisent et la combattent dans l'univers infini des discours. (shrink)

Complexe, énigmatique car radicalement novatrice, la pensée nietzschéenne donne le sentiment d'être trop dispersée pour pouvoir être saisissable. Du reste, y a-t-il un ou plusieurs Nietzsche? Celui de L'Antéchris et d'Ecce Homo est-il le même que celui de La Naissance de la tragédie? Mais complexe ne signifie pas chaotique, et l'incertitude se dissipe si l'on repère les moments où se constituent ses positions fondamentales: quand la notion de pulsion se met-elle en place? Avec quel ouvrage la théorie des valeurs apparaît-elle? (...) À quel moment la logique du sentiment de puissance est-elle identifiée? Quand la philosophie est-elle comprise comme un dire-oui? Dans quel livre la tentative de lire la réalité tout entière comme volonté de puissance se fait-elle jour? Cet ouvrage apporte une réponse à ces questions. Il caractérise l'apport des principaux textes de Nietzsche, et montre que l'évolution de sa réflexion n'est pas faite de revirements ni d'abandons de thèses au profit de thèses nouvelles, mais d'un affinement progressif au sein d'une problématique invariante: conquête d'un mode de pensée réformé dont les grandes lignes sont dessinées dès son premier livre, La Naissance de la tragédie"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

La question Qu'est-ce que la littérature? ne saurait être première ; il faut d'abord résoudre celle des critères de l'évaluation. Mener une réflexion théorique entre pôle artistique et pôle esthétique ou questionner les genres ainsi que le lien entre littérature et politique semble aisé pour définir la valeur de l'oeuvre littéraire, mais une réponse globale reste un horizon fuyant. Dans sa quête pour trancher la tête intelligente de l'hydre, cet ouvrage continue de couper des têtes qui se régénèrent doublement!

When elements join together in a mixture, those elements remain in the mixture, but only virtually. They are present with their powers, but without their substantial forms. When the mixture corrupts, the elements come to be actually present. And so my question: according to St. Thomas, are the elements that come to be actually present as a result of the corruption of the mixed body numerically identical with the elements that came together to create the mixture? I answer yes. This (...) answer entails not only that St. Thomas believes in the doctrine of “gappy existence”, but that he believes gappy existence can occur purely naturally, with no Divine intervention required. Both entailments are controversial. The second will be widely viewed as entirely indefensible: this paper provides a defense. (shrink)

The moral dilemma Mando faces as he struggles to return the Child to the Jedi Order is illuminated by Soren Kierkegaard, one of the central figures of existentialism, a philosophy centered on the belief that individuals define themselves through their actions. Kierkegaard's Christian existentialism was critical of the social dynamics and religious models that were supposed to represent authentic religiosity but were actually hypocritical and naive. Religious leaders spoke of virtue but rarely modeled it. Kierkegaard, by contrast, upheld the central (...) tenets of the faith but was humble about what he could claim as objectively true or real. The persona of Din Djarin evolves in complexity: from enigma, to soldier, to father. He believes in the Mandalorian creed and its rules, but he experiences a personal attachment to Grogu. The final stage of life according to Kierkegaard is the religious, in which one makes a leap of faith. (shrink)