Dynamic "Might" and Correct Belief

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Veltman’s test semantics and developments thereof reject the canon about semantic contents and attitude ascriptions in favor of dynamic alternatives. According to these theories the semantic content of a sentence is not a proposition, but a context change potential (CCP). Similarly, beliefs are not taken to be relations between agents and propositions, but agents and CCPs. These deviations from the canon come at the cost of an elegant explanation about the correctness of belief. Standardly, it is taken that the content of a belief is correct just in case the content of that belief is true. The proponent of the test semantics cannot appeal to this explanation since they hold that certain contents, namely epistemically modalized contents, do not express propositions, and are neither true nor false. After motivating the need for an account of the correctness of belief within the dynamic framework, I argue that the few extant accounts in the literature are unsatisfactory. A novel account is proposed that avoids the problems of competing views.

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Patrick Skeels
University of California, Davis

Citations of this work

Context, Consistency, and Non-Contradiction.Patrick Skeels - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
Assertion.Robert Stalnaker - 1978 - Syntax and Semantics (New York Academic Press) 9:315-332.

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