What we call “the evidential argument from evil” is not one argument but a family of them, originating (perhaps) in the 1979 formulation of William Rowe. Wykstra’s early versions of skeptical theism emerged in response to Rowe’s evidential arguments. But what sufficed as a response to Rowe may not suffice against later more sophisticated versions of the problem of evil—in particular, those along the lines pioneered by Paul Draper. Our chief aim here is to make an earlier version of skeptical (...) theism more responsive to the type abductive atheology pioneered by Draper. In particular, we suggest a moderate form of skeptical theism may be able to resist Draper’s abductive atheology. (shrink)

This article aims to explore the attitudes and behaviors of persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities related to their information privacy when using information technology. Six persons with IDD were recruited to participate to a series of 3 semistructured focus groups. Data were analyzed following a hybrid thematic analysis approach. Only 2 participants reported using IT every day. However, they all perceived IT use benefits, such as an increased autonomy. Participants demonstrated awareness of privacy concerns, but not in situations involving (...) the use of technology; their awareness is not transferred to the abstract context of IT use. Privacy breaches were revealed to be a major risk for persons with IDD, who did not seem to understand how their personal information was used. Most protection mechanisms and tools reported were those suggested and implemented by caregivers and close relatives who had a great influence on the participants’ attitudes and behaviors toward IT and privacy. Our findings suggest that when using IT, persons with IDD often experience the consequences of a trade-off between autonomy and privacy. Further research and action is needed to support persons with IDD to understand and balance the benefits of IT use and the inherent threats to information privacy. (shrink)

English summary: Heidegger allowed us to better hear metaphysics by passionately listening to it. In this volume we seek to better understand Heidegger by patiently listening to another metaphysician: Descartes. The meaning of Descartess thought in creating an onto-theology of the causa and cogitatio, also taken up in the work of Heidegger, faithfully reveals Heideggers directions. French description: En se mettant passionnement a son ecoute, Heidegger nous a permis d'entendre la metaphysique d'une maniere inouie. Par un juste retour des choses, (...) dans un geste inedit, il s'agira ici de mieux entendre Heidegger en se mettant patiemment a l'ecoute d'un metaphysicien precis: Descartes, ou plutot a l'ecoute de ce qu'il nous en dit. Car loin d'etre anecdotiques, les significations que la pensee de Descartes a - la premiere faisant d'elle une onto-theologie de la causa, la seconde une onto-theologie de la cogitatio - et prend dans l'oeuvre de Heidegger - la premiere etant de la provoquer, la deuxieme de l'aiguiller, la troisieme de l'instruire - revelent fidelement les orientations de celui-ci, en et hors metaphysique. Comme il sied en hermeneutique, il sera donc question de sens, celui que l'on prend n'etant pas moins indifferent a celui que l'on donne que celui que l'on donne n'est innocent de celui que l'on prend. (shrink)

This article aims to explore the attitudes and behaviors of persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD) related to their information privacy when using information technology (IT). Six persons with IDD were recruited to participate to a series of 3 semistructured focus groups. Data were analyzed following a hybrid thematic analysis approach. Only 2 participants reported using IT every day. However, they all perceived IT use benefits, such as an increased autonomy. Participants demonstrated awareness of privacy concerns, but not in (...) situations involving the use of technology; their awareness is not transferred to the abstract context of IT use. Privacy breaches were revealed to be a major risk for persons with IDD, who did not seem to understand how their personal information was used. Most protection mechanisms and tools reported were those suggested and implemented by caregivers and close relatives who had a great influence on the participants’ attitudes and behaviors toward IT and privacy. Our findings suggest that when using IT, persons with IDD often experience the consequences of a trade-off between autonomy and privacy. Further research and action is needed to support persons with IDD to understand and balance the benefits of IT use and the inherent threats to information privacy. (shrink)

In 1941 Simone Weil was introduced to Father Jean-Marie Perrin, a priest of the Dominican order whose friendship became one of the most significant influences on her spiritual development. It was for Father Perrin that she wrote her 'spiritual autobiography', contained in Waiting for God, and to him that she later wrote 'Letter to a Priest'. When Weil requested work as a field hand, Perrin sent her to Gustave Thibon, a farmer and Christian philosopher. From 1941-2, Weil (...) stayed with the Thibon family, working in the fields by day while writing by night the notebooks which posthumously became Gravity and Grace and other seminal works. Perrin and Thibon met Weil at a time when her interior life and her creative genius were at the height of their glowing maturity. During the short but deep period of their acquaintance with her, they came to know her as she actually was. Their accounts of this time reveal her to us in the bare parlour of the Dominican convent at Marseilles where, after waiting her turn among a stream of refugees, she discussed her personal problems with Father Perrin. They show her to us in the vineyards of Ardèche, and on the stone seat by the fountain overlooking the Rhone valley where she read Plato to Thibon, her host. First published in 1953, and now newly introduced by Patricia Little, this unique portrait depicts Weil through the eyes of her friends, not as a strange and unaccountable genius but as an ardent and very human young person in search of truth and knowledge. (shrink)

Humean arguments from evil are some of the most powerful arguments against Theism. They take as their data what we know about good and evil. And they argue that some rival to Theism better explains, or otherwise predicts, that data than Theism. However, this paper argues that there are many problems with various methods for defending Humean arguments. I consider Philo’s original strategy; modern strategies in terms of epistemic probability; phenomenological strategies; and strategies that appeal to scientific and metaphysical explanations. (...) None of these methods have been sufficiently developed to provide a clear and distinctive defense of Humean arguments. Defenders of Humean arguments need to spend more time on the underlying methodology of their arguments. (shrink)

Cet article a pour but de montrer comment le recours au concept de sphère, issu des travaux de la psychologie expérimentale de l’école de Würzburg, révèle une évolution remarquable du traitement de la signification par Karl Bühler dans ses recherches en psychologie puis en théorie du langage. En 1907, le concept de sphère était introduit comme le corrélat de la visée dans le but de remettre en cause la définition de la signification comme association de représentations . Mais, si le (...) concept de visée apparaît alors comme le levier de l’argumentation, il ne constitue pas l’essence de la signification – laquelle se réalise dans les trois fonctions du modèle instrumental du langage. Or, le retour du concept de sphère au rang des « auxiliaires matériels » du champ symbolique de la représentation dans la Théorie du langage, contribue à réévaluer les conditions de compréhension et de réalisation de la signification, en introduisant dans la fonction de représentation même une prise en compte des choses du monde sous la forme d’un savoir factuel. (shrink)

Cet article a pour but de montrer comment le recours au concept de sphère, issu des travaux de la psychologie expérimentale de l’école de Würzburg, révèle une évolution remarquable du traitement de la signification (Bedeutung) par Karl Bühler dans ses recherches en psychologie puis en théorie du langage. En 1907, le concept de sphère était introduit comme le corrélat de la visée (meinen) dans le but de remettre en cause la définition de la signification comme association de représentations (Vorstellungen). Mais, (...) si le concept de visée apparaît alors comme le levier de l’argumentation, il ne constitue pas l’essence de la signification – laquelle se réalise dans les trois fonctions du modèle instrumental du langage. Or, le retour du concept de sphère au rang des « auxiliaires matériels » du champ symbolique de la représentation (Darstellung) dans la Théorie du langage, contribue à réévaluer les conditions de compréhension et de réalisation de la signification, en introduisant dans la fonction de représentation même une prise en compte des choses du monde sous la forme d’un savoir factuel. (shrink)

The mind body problem in psychoanalytic theory and practice -- Philosophy and the mind-body problem, influences on psychoanalysis -- Psyche and soma in the work of Sigmund Freud : psychoanalytic foundations -- Psyche and soma in Klein and object relations : contemporary developments -- Psyche and soma in Kohutian, intersubjective, and relational theories -- Attachment theory and neuropsychoanalysis -- Conclusions.

Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong, or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false. Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese (...) and Bob Beddor defends “Modal Virtue Epistemology”: knowledge is a belief that is maximally modally robust across “normal” worlds. We'll offer new objections to these recent Modalist projects. We will then argue for a rival view, Explanationism: knowing something is believing it because it's true. We will show how Explanationism offers a better account of undermining defeaters than Modalism, and a better account of knowledge. (shrink)

The AIR Modelsm of Reflective Ethical Inquiry (Cohen et al. 2005) is a practical framework that leads toward more caring, compassionate and appreciative ethical actions in administration, teaching, research and student life. In this article, we consider a corollary of the model: AIR practitioners are prepared to effectively meet anticipated and unanticipated ethical challenges. By being present to, curious about and responsive to ethical concerns as they arise in everyday situations, AIR practitioners emerge as both ‘direct ethical leaders’ (Gardner 1995) (...) who embody an ethical tone and set an ethical direction, as well as an ‘indirect leaders’ (ibid.) who exert an impact through personal and collective works. The underlying AIR process is the foundation for individual and shared ethical leadership and leadership training, both of which reduce costly mistakes and enhance productivity. (shrink)

In this article, I describe the need for tomorrow's scientists to be tutored in a personal ethic that values ethical responsiveness as the core, organizing principle for guiding research, teaching, application, and career direction. To address this need, I describe a teaching approach that instills science students with an understanding that moral reflection and action are the core tenets of scientific thinking and practice. The approach empowers students to reflect openly and discuss ongoing, ethical concerns as they face them in (...) their research and scholarship. Out of this, students naturally see the urgency to explore ethical issues and thinking from multiple perspectives, to develop and refine their ethical thinking, and to make moral choices in their routine scientific activities. (shrink)

When Heidegger pursues his destructive interpretation of Leibniz's doctrine of judgment, he identifies a principle of abyssal ground and a concealed metaphysics of truth that undermine the priority of logic with respect to ontology. His reading turns on an account of Leibniz's methodological generation of metaphysical principles and the relation between reason and identity, which, I argue, is at once deeply flawed and extremely productive. This essay pursues the implications of Heidegger's quickly abandoned suggestion that Leibniz's principle of identity is (...) reflexively self-grounding, arguing that this claim makes possible a rigorous interpretation of Leibnizian method as an abyssal logic of repetition. I hold that the identification of such a methodology requires a modified account of the metaphysics of truth operative in Leibniz that reinvigorates Heidegger's reading even while moving beyond his now exhausted trope of a hidden presupposition of subjectivity. (shrink)

In the preface to his Theodicy, Leibniz describes the whole of his philosophical work as an attempt to follow Ariadne’s thread through “the two famous labyrinths in which our reason goes astray.” The first and best known of these—the labyrinth of freedom—concerns the relation between contingency and necessity in history. The second—and the one I want to discuss—is what Leibniz calls the labyrinth of the composition of the continuum. The problem itself is relatively simple: how can indivisible and distinct elements (...) constitute a continuum? How, that is, can singularity possibly be thought if the real is everywhere continuous, without interruption or break? Leibniz, as is well known, affirms both extremes of these questions: what really exists are simple unities or wholes, and yet the totality of these unities constitutes a single, organically complete world. While one mode of approach would be to turn immediately to Leibniz’s elaboration of monadic expression and intrinsic predication, I want to examine the effects the problem generates for the specifically Leibnizian conception of the real and the ideal, as well as the transition this entails from the metaphorics of the labyrinth to the figure of the infinite library and the problem of repetition. (shrink)

Cet article cherche à mettre en évidence qu’Anders a développé une philosophie de l’histoire plurielle et complexe, c’est-à-dire non-linéaire, dès ses premiers écrits d’anthropologie philosophique, mais aussi dans ses œuvres littéraires et théoriques des années 1930-1940, en particulier dans sa Kulturphilosophie encore inédite. Il s’agit alors de relire la célèbre thèse andersienne de l’obsolescence de l’histoire : cette dernière signe l’uniformisation, donc l’appauvrissement, de la pluralité des lignes historiques à l’heure où la technique et le conformisme ferment les possibles politiques, (...) idéologiques et artistiques. (shrink)

O presente artigo mostra até que ponto a transferência psicanalítica, produto de marca da aliança terapêutica, tem por vocação ser ultrapassada mediante a progressiva tomada de consciência que a pessoa analisada faz do caráeter instrumental da transferência. A transferência, com efeito, está destinada a dissolver-se no final da cura analítica. É verdade que a psicanálise, na sua técnica, contém sérios problemas; o artigo, porém, mostra como o seu "trabalho" essencial consiste em promover a transformação que o próprio sujeito opera mediante (...) a sua palavra criativa, palavra esta que Ihe proporciona o seu próprio nascimento de si. /// This article tries to evince how the psychoanalytical transference, as a regular product of the therapeutic alliance, is meant to be overcome by a progressive consciousness that the patient acquires of its instrumental character. The transference is destined to be dissolved at the end of the analysis. It is true that psychoanalysis, in its technique, harbours serious problems; its essential « travail » , however, is to promote the transformation that a person realizes through his/her own creative word that pushes him/her to give birth to him/herself. (shrink)

Une hydrie à figures rouges offre une scène mythologique inédite : un satyre fait face à Héraclès, agenouillé. Autour d’eux, une sphinx et des oiseaux semblent observer la scène. Découvert en 1955 à Apollonia d’Illyrie, ce vase est aujourd’hui exposé au musée archéologique du site. Cet article propose une analyse détaillée de l’iconographie et des modèles qui ont pu influencer le peintre, afin d’en affiner l’analyse, mais aussi la datation et d’en déterminer l’origine, probablement locale.

Daryl Pullman’s (2023) article purports to show that the increase and relatively high number of assisted deaths in Canada argues against the Canadian approach to medical aid in dying (MAiD)—similar...

Some skeptical theists use Wykstra’s CORNEA constraint to undercut Rowe-style inductive arguments from evil. Many critics of skeptical theism accept CORNEA, but argue that Rowe-style arguments meet its constraint. But Justin McBrayer argues that CORNEA is itself mistaken. It is, he claims, akin to “sensitivity” or “truth-tracking” constraints like those of Robert Nozick; but counterexamples show that inductive evidence is often insensitive. We here defend CORNEA against McBrayer’s chief counterexample. We first clarify CORNEA, distinguishing it from a deeper underlying principle (...) that we dub “CORE.” We then give both principles a probabilistic construal, and show how, on this construal, the counterexample fails. (shrink)

Priority Theory is an increasingly popular view in metaphysics. By seeing metaphysical questions as primarily concerned with what explains what, instead of merely what exists, it promises not only an interesting approach to traditional metaphysical issues but also the resolution of some outstanding disputes. In a recent paper, Louis deRosset argues that Priority Theory isn’t up to the task: Priority Theory is committed to there being explanations that violate a formal constraint on any adequate explanation. This paper critically examines deRosset’s (...) challenge to Priority Theory. We argue that deRosset’s challenge ultimately fails: his proposed constraint on explanation is neither well-motivated nor a general constraint. Nonetheless, lurking behind his criticism is a deep problem for prominent ways of developing Priority Theory, a problem which we develop. (shrink)

The implementation of pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) as a new tool for prevention against HIV raised particular ethical concerns regarding the individuals’ and the collective's best interests in France. It was questioned whether the beneficence of taking or prescribing PrEP regarding its high efficacy to protect people from HIV is always more important than the maleficence represented by the risks involved, such as healthy people taking a pill with side effects, the growth of sexually transmitted infections or the potential generalization of (...) risk-taking sexual behaviour. The main objective of this study was to explore patients’ and health professionals’ ethical questioning on PrEP. Sixty-nine qualitative interviews were conducted with 45 users and 24 healthcare professionals. Overall, this study shows that those primarily concerned by PrEP tend to dismiss ethical questions regarding PrEP itself in the name of its efficacy and the empowerment it allows, but they would rather stress the impact PrEP can have on individuals’ sexual behaviour and how it can affect their autonomy if it is prescribed blindly without taking into consideration the specific living context and life history of each PrEP user. (shrink)

The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview. Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key assumption that we (...) find unlikely to be true. Second, we identify two features of typical natural properties that ethical properties lack. We conclude that Cornell Realism falls short of dispelling the tension between ethical conservativism and ethical naturalism. (shrink)

English continues to rise as the lingua franca of academic philosophy. Philosophers from all types of linguistic backgrounds use it to communicate with each other across the globe. In this paper, we identify how the rise of English leads to linguistic injustices. We argue that these injustices are similar in an important regard: they are all instances of distributive epistemic injustice. We then present six proposals for addressing unjust linguistic discrimination and evaluate them on how well they can mitigate the (...) specific types of distributive epistemic injustice that we identify. We accept that there is much more to be said. But we hope that what we say will motivate other philosophers to take these types of injustices more seriously and encourage them to make academic philosophy a more inclusive global community. (shrink)

In the recent literature on the nature of knowledge, a rivalry has emerged between modalism and explanationism. According to modalism, knowledge requires that our beliefs track the truth across some appropriate set of possible worlds. Modalists tend to focus on two modal conditions: sensitivity and safety. According to explanationism, knowledge requires only that beliefs bear the right sort of explanatory relation to the truth. In slogan form: knowledge is believing something because it’s true. In this paper, we aim to vindicate (...) explanationism from some recent objections offered by Gualtiero Piccinini, Dario Mortini, and Kenneth Boyce and Andrew Moon. Together, these authors present five purported counterexamples to the sufficiency of the explanationist analysis for knowledge. In addition, Mortini devises a clever argument that explanationism entails the violation of a plausible closure principle on knowledge. We will argue that explanationism is innocent of all these charges against it, and we hope that the strength of the defense we offer of explanationism is evidence in its favor, and a reason to investigate explanationism further as the long-elusive truth about the nature of knowledge. (shrink)

Que dire des épreuves de la vie? Nous ne savons quelles elles sont qu'à les traverser et ignorons ce qu'elles sont en les endurant. Quand surviennent-elles? Comment? Et pourquoi? Aveugles lorsqu'elles frappent, hagards lorsqu'elles cessent, comment pourrions-nous porter sur elles nos regards? Dans l'obscure nuit qu'elles répandent sur nos vies, tout n'est cependant pas que ténèbres. Car les épreuves révèlent, elles phénoménalisent. Sous leur sombre lumière, tout se montre sous son vrai jour. Condamnés par le pire à donner le meilleur, (...) nous qui les essuyons faisons alors nos preuves. Dans l'épreuve, l'ego apparaît donc comme jamais il ne le fait, non pas comme il le doit, mais toujours comme il est. Faudrait-il ajouter que d'épreuves comme de phénoménologie, il n'en est que de la vie pour que l'idée d'une phénoménologie des épreuves de la vie s'impose en philosophie? Inutile : l'irrésistible réalité de ces épreuves impose à qui les subit un inextinguible besoin de philosophie. Or qui mieux que la phénoménologie peut, en philosophie, mettre à l'épreuve les épreuves de la vie. (shrink)

Pendant des décennies, l’objectif de concevoir une « philosophie concrète » a orienté les travaux philosophiques de Günther Anders. Pourtant, il nous faut encore fournir une contextualisation historique et un examen critique de cet aspect crucial de sa pensée. Dans cet essai, j’examine les textes publiés et non publiés (de son vivant) qu’Anders a écrits contre Martin Heidegger à partir de la fin des années 1940. C’est bien dans ces textes qu’Anders explicite et détaille ce qu’est pour lui une philosophie (...) de la « concrétude ». Cet article nous permettra, du moins je l’espère, de faire apparaître la philosophie d’Anders et de mieux discerner comment s’est formé le système d’idées qui sous-tend l’ opus magnum d’Anders, L’Obsolescence de l’homme. (shrink)

Dans le cadre du programme « Eikon : la vie des portraits grecs » financé par l’Agence nationale de la recherche, ont été poursuivis les travaux entamés à Délos en 2013 au cours de deux campagnes d’étude sur le site et au Musée. Études des supports de statues-portraits conservés sur le site (Fr. Herbin) Sur le site, l’objectif de la mission était de terminer l’inventaire des supports de statues-portraits. Seuls les blocs portant une dédicace ainsi que des semelles pour statue(s) (...) en bronze ou... (shrink)