In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:53. AN INDEX OF HUME'S REFERENCES IN A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE The index below of Hume's references in the Treatise te the works of other authors excludes those which are accurate and full in his text (of which there are few) and those which are so general, e.g., to Spinoza's atheism, that no passage is specifiable. Hume mentions other writings, for which this index is compiled, in several (...) different ways. Occasionally he mentions the author's name, the title of his book and gives a reference which is less specific than it could be. These have been identified. Often he mentions an author's name only, e.g., de Retz, and in such cases the fullest possible reference has been given. One of Hume's notable intellectual gifts was his ability to distil several pages of a book into one or two sentences of crisp and accurate synthesis. (This skill is most apparent in his summaries of articles in Bayle' s Dictionary in his "Notes on Philosophy", of which the manuscript is in the Royal Society of Edinburgh Library.) In these instances, page references are impossible and the closest indication one can give is a section or chapter. Some of his references are anonymous, e.g., as an 'elegant writer' says, and so are some quotations. These have been identified with one exception. One anonymous reference (number 24 below) requires explanation because it is both anachronistic and interesting. Hume refers to an observation by "a late eminent philosopher". It is anachronistic because the book to which he refers was published after the Treatise; it is interesting because it provides further evidence of Hutcheson's influence on Hume and the latter' s regard for him. The explanation, for Hutcheson was still alive when Vol.11 of the Treatise appeared in 1739, is that 'late' is here being used in the sense of 'recent' - Hutcheson himself uses the word in the same way in referring to Mandeville when the latter was 54. alive. (An enquiry concerning moral good and evil. Section 1, VI.) Further, the System circulated widely among Hutcheson's friends in Scotland and over so many years that it finally appeared posthumously. That Hume could not cite a published work also accounts for the anonymity of the reference to someone he admired. It is often impossible to determine in which language or in which edition Hume read a particular author. Where there is evidence as to which language he used, the title has been given in that language. There are now so many extant editions of the Treatise that Volume, Part, Chapter and Section references are given, as well as the pagination of Selby-Bigge' s edition, so that readers of other editions may be able to use the index. 1.Vol. 1. Title-page. Tacitus, The Histories, Bk. I. 1. 2.Part 1, Sect. 1, p. 2, n. John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk. I, Chap. I, 8. 3.Sect. VII, p. 17, n. George Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Introductixi, Sect. 7, e_t seq. 4.Part II, Sect. II, p. 30, n. Nicolas de Malezieu, Elementa Geometrica. 5.Sect. Ill, p. 35, n. John Locke, Essay, Bk. II, Chap. XIV. 6.Sect. IV, p. 43, n. Antoine Arnauld, La logique ou l'art de penser. Part I, Chap. 5. (In some editions Pierre Nicole is named as co-author. The book is also known as the Port Royal Logic). 7.Sect. IV, p. 46, n. Isaac Barrow, Mathematical Lectures. 8.Part III, Sect. Ill, p. 80, n. Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy, Part Second, Chap. 9. And Tripos : in Three Discourse. Ill, of Liberty and Necessity. 55. Sect. Ill, p. 80, n. e.g., Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, Props. I-III, et. seq. 10.Sect. Ill, p. 81, n. John Locke, Essay, Bk. IV, Chap. X. 11.Sect. VIII, p. 100 and appendix Vol. Ill, p. 630. Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, Bk. V. 1.2. 12.Sect. XIII, p. 153. Jean Francois Paul de Gondi, Cardinal de Retz, Mémoires, Bk. III. The second 'observation' is from Book... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:73. More Hume autograph marginalia in a first edition of the "Treatise". Two sets of marginalia by Hume in copies of the first edition of A Treatise of Human Nature have been published. One is a copy in the British Library. This has 1 2 been described by Connon and Nidditch and was, no doubt, one, at least, of the copies which Hume kept for himself. The marginalia are (...) so extensive as to suggest that, at the time he made them, he may have been hoping for an opportunity to publish a second edition of the Treatise. The other copy with marginalia, a presentation copy to his kinsman, Henry Home, Lord Karnes, has been described by Wallace Nethery, Librarian of the Hóose Library of Phil3 osophy and by Nidditch. There is a third copy of the Treatise with marginalia in Hume's hand which was a pre4 sentation copy to Pope. The Pope copy is inscribed on the flyleaf of Volume I in Hume's handwriting, "To Alexander* Rope Esq at Twickenham". There are 18 corrections in Volume I and 5 in Volume II. They are as follows, the first word or phrase being the error, the second the correction. The first word is usually scratched out in the text and the correction inserted in the margin but sometimes insertions are simply made within the text. 1st EditionSelby-Bigge 1.12.252.8'the' Our' 1.35.2316.1'of 'or' 1.57.428.18'these* 'those' 1.58.829.6'part' 'parts' 1.111.2860.27'defection' 'dissection' 1.126.569.14'it' deleted 1.154.486.1'worn out' "worn it out' 1.240.7136.9'as' 'when' 1.256.21145.28'evidence' 'testimony' 74. ï. 273. 20155.24'instance' 'instances' 1.280.16159.33'gave it's' 'gave it its' Ï.286.25163.22-23'upon observation' 'upon the observation' 1.287.16164.2'cause' 'case' 1.288.5164.15'results* 'result' 1.293.10167.14'exists' 'exist' 1.343.17196.22'opening I' 'opening it I' 1.402.16231.6'presses' 'press' 1.453.1260.34'what the' 'what is the' 11.108.10 336.24 "affections wheel' 'affections to wheel' II. 120. 4 343.19 'cause' 'causes' 11.228.23404.15 'One' Our' 11.229.19 404.32 'and proceed' 'and practice proceed' 11.271.24428. 20 'considerably' 'sensibly' In addition, someone, perhaps Hume, has marked a printer's error where a letter has slipped. (Vol. I, p. 466. 3). It is not possible to find out the date upon which Hume gave this copy to Pope from the published correspondence of either party. Pope died in 1744 and Hume may have sent him a copy of the Treatise because of the former's literary renown and because the publishers had a large number of unsold copies on their hands. From the fact, among others, that the footnote on Volume II, p. 168 (Selby-Bigge, p. 371) is missing from both the Pope1 and the Karnes copies, it is clear that Volumes I and II were, as one might expect of presentations, in each case early issues or states. It is more than likely that Hume made other presents of the Treatise to friends and people he admired such as Francis Hutcheson and Bishop Butler, and these 75. would probably have included marginalia along the same lines as the Karnes and Pope copies. For what Hume substantially did in giving these copies was to perform an act of courtesy; i.e., to incorporate items from the errata tables into the text. The Pope copy is the least important and interesting of those noticed so far, for it contains only one correction which is not included in the errata tables - the second item listed above in Volume I - and not all of them. The percentage of the changes called for in the errata tables which are made by Hume in the text diminishes markedly as between Volumes I and II. Moreover, there are no marginalia in the third volume, 'Of Morals', and this is perhaps to be explained by Hume's becoming bored with this somewhat superfluous task, even if it was a politeness and the fact... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:73. More Hume autograph marginalia in a first edition of the "Treatise". Two sets of marginalia by Hume in copies of the first edition of A Treatise of Human Nature have been published. One is a copy in the British Library. This has 1 2 been described by Connon and Nidditch and was, no doubt, one, at least, of the copies which Hume kept for himself. The marginalia are (...) so extensive as to suggest that, at the time he made them, he may have been hoping for an opportunity to publish a second edition of the Treatise. The other copy with marginalia, a presentation copy to his kinsman, Henry Home, Lord Karnes, has been described by Wallace Nethery, Librarian of the Hóose Library of Phil3 osophy and by Nidditch. There is a third copy of the Treatise with marginalia in Hume's hand which was a pre4 sentation copy to Pope. The Pope copy is inscribed on the flyleaf of Volume I in Hume's handwriting, "To Alexander* Rope Esq at Twickenham". There are 18 corrections in Volume I and 5 in Volume II. They are as follows, the first word or phrase being the error, the second the correction. The first word is usually scratched out in the text and the correction inserted in the margin but sometimes insertions are simply made within the text. 1st EditionSelby-Bigge 1.12.252.8'the' Our' 1.35.2316.1'of 'or' 1.57.428.18'these* 'those' 1.58.829.6'part' 'parts' 1.111.2860.27'defection' 'dissection' 1.126.569.14'it' deleted 1.154.486.1'worn out' "worn it out' 1.240.7136.9'as' 'when' 1.256.21145.28'evidence' 'testimony' 74. ï. 273. 20155.24'instance' 'instances' 1.280.16159.33'gave it's' 'gave it its' Ï.286.25163.22-23'upon observation' 'upon the observation' 1.287.16164.2'cause' 'case' 1.288.5164.15'results* 'result' 1.293.10167.14'exists' 'exist' 1.343.17196.22'opening I' 'opening it I' 1.402.16231.6'presses' 'press' 1.453.1260.34'what the' 'what is the' 11.108.10 336.24 "affections wheel' 'affections to wheel' II. 120. 4 343.19 'cause' 'causes' 11.228.23404.15 'One' Our' 11.229.19 404.32 'and proceed' 'and practice proceed' 11.271.24428. 20 'considerably' 'sensibly' In addition, someone, perhaps Hume, has marked a printer's error where a letter has slipped. (Vol. I, p. 466. 3). It is not possible to find out the date upon which Hume gave this copy to Pope from the published correspondence of either party. Pope died in 1744 and Hume may have sent him a copy of the Treatise because of the former's literary renown and because the publishers had a large number of unsold copies on their hands. From the fact, among others, that the footnote on Volume II, p. 168 (Selby-Bigge, p. 371) is missing from both the Pope1 and the Karnes copies, it is clear that Volumes I and II were, as one might expect of presentations, in each case early issues or states. It is more than likely that Hume made other presents of the Treatise to friends and people he admired such as Francis Hutcheson and Bishop Butler, and these 75. would probably have included marginalia along the same lines as the Karnes and Pope copies. For what Hume substantially did in giving these copies was to perform an act of courtesy; i.e., to incorporate items from the errata tables into the text. The Pope copy is the least important and interesting of those noticed so far, for it contains only one correction which is not included in the errata tables - the second item listed above in Volume I - and not all of them. The percentage of the changes called for in the errata tables which are made by Hume in the text diminishes markedly as between Volumes I and II. Moreover, there are no marginalia in the third volume, 'Of Morals', and this is perhaps to be explained by Hume's becoming bored with this somewhat superfluous task, even if it was a politeness and the fact... (shrink)

Martin Heidegger is, perhaps, the most controversial philosopher of the twentieth-century. Little has been written on him or about his work and its significance for educational thought. This unique collection by a group of international scholars reexamines Heidegger's work and its legacy for educational thought.

In her latest writing on the trolley problem, 'Turning the Trolley,' Judith Jarvis Thomson defends the following counter-intuitive position: if confronted with a choice of allowing a trolley to hit and kill five innocent people on the track straight ahead, or turning it onto one innocent person on a side-track, a bystander must allow it to hit the five straight ahead. In contrast, Thomson claims, the driver of the trolley has a duty to turn it from the five onto the (...) one. Thomson’s argument is fundamentally flawed in several important ways. We explain her argument and identify its major flaws. Our aims are: (a) to show that Thomson has not provided reason to think such an act is not permissible, and (b) to use the process of exposing the weaknesses in different parts of her argument to demonstrate the importance of undertaking what we call a Hohfeldian analysis of the 'mechanics' of the rights in play. A Hohfeldian 'mechanics' of rights extends the distinctions that Hohfeld first introduced to take into account the pro tanto normative 'forces' at work on an agent, the balance of which determines who in the end has what kind of right. (shrink)

I argue that Judith Jarvis Thomson's attack on consequentialism, premised on the semantic claim that all goodness is goodness-in-a-way, is less powerful and less precisely targeted than she supposes. For we can develop an argument against pure obligation or categorical imperatives that is largely parallel to Thomson's argument against pure goodness. The right response to both arguments is that the existence of pure goodness or pure obligation is neither semantically rule out nor semantically guaranteed.

Christian pro-lifers often respond to Thomson’s defense of abortion that the violinist is allowed to die while the embryo is killed. Boonin and McMahan counter that this distinction does not provide an objection to extraction abortions that disconnect embryos and allow them to die. I disagree. I first argue that letting die and killing are not to be distinguished by differences between acts and omissions, moral and immoral motives, intentional or unintentional deaths, and causing or not causing a pathology. I (...) offer a taxonomy in which hysterotomies turn out to be killings. I then argue that if either the placenta is considered an organ of the embryo or the embryo is construed as a part of the pregnant woman, then abortion pills kill rather than allow death. So, assuming that killing people is morally worse than letting them die, extraction abortions can be condemned to the same degree as other abortions. (shrink)

In June 1849 William Thomson wrote to Michael Faraday suggesting that the concept of a uniform magnetic field could be used to predict the motions of small magnetic and diamagnetic bodies. In his letter Thomson showed how Faraday's lines of magnetic force could represent the effect of the ‘conducting power’ for magnetic force of matter in the region of magnets. This was Thomson's extension to magnetism of an analogy between the mathematical descriptions of the distribution of static electricity and of (...) the diffusion of heat through uniform bodies. In 1850 Faraday published his first comprehensive theory of the magnetic properties of matter. He explained the behaviour of matter in the field by four assumptions: that matter has a specific disturbing effect on the normal distribution of lines of magnetic force; that this effect depends on its ability to conduct or transmit the magnetic action; and that material bodies tend to move so as to cause the least possible disturbance of the lines from their normal distribution. Faraday also assumed that diamagnetics transmit magnetic action less well than empty space, while paramagnetics transmit it more readily than space. This implied that space must have a specific conductivity between that of paramagnetic and diamagnetic materials. In order to preserve a distinction between matter and space Faraday defined ‘matter’ as either the source of action or as a conductor which is able to influence the lines of action; space was the absence of such powers. While space could conduct, it differed from matter in that it could neither originale lines of force nor influence their course and distribution. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Many philosophers who wish to defend abortion, but who have become frustrated by the resistance of the personhood question to yield to any nonarbitrary solution welcomed Judith Thomson's ‘A defense of abortion.’Thomson argues that abortion is sometimes justifiable even if the foetus is a person. In this paper I argue that Thomson's argument is a defense of abortion, rather than merely extraction without death, only because of the current state of medical technology. Once the technology is in place to (...) extract foetuses while preserving their lives and to allow them to develop to full term outside the uterus, Thomson cannot defend the killing of the foetus. If she is right, however, a woman will still have the right to have a foetus extracted from her body. Finally, it is pointed out that the source of the problem with Thomson's argument is the major premise in most arguments for the permissibility of abortion: a woman's right to control her own body. If the defence of abortion is to entail a defence of the termination of the foetus, then this premise, understood as the right to remove an unwanted entity from one's body or the right to alter one's body as one wishes, simply will not do the trick. (shrink)

Judith Jarvis Thomson recently argued that it is impermissible for a bystander to turn a runaway trolley from five onto one. But she also argues that a trolley driver is required to do just that. We believe that her argument is flawed in three important ways. She fails to give proper weight to (a) an agent¹s claims not to be required to act in ways he does not want to, (b) impartiality in the weighing of competing patient-claims, and (c) the (...) role of patient-claims in determining agent-duties. All three of these failures can be understood in terms of what we call the Mechanics of Claims, an approach we develop for identifying and balancing competing claims in determining rights. Using that framework, one can see both why Thomson's most recent argument is mistaken, and how to think more clearly about deontological choices generally. (shrink)

Throughout his life J. J. Thomson was committed to a mechanical interpretation of nature. This work proceeded in several stages. Early in his career he attempted a Lagrangian formulation of mechanics. But due to certain epistemological difficulties with this approach, he began exploring various analogies and models, particularly those involving vortex motion. After his discovery of the electron in 1897, he commenced a synthesis of the electron with his previous physical conceptions. The result was a hypothesis of the ether as (...) being composed of particles even smaller than electrons. (shrink)

Disagreements about abortion are often assumed to reduce to disagreements about fetal personhood (and mindedness). If one believes a fetus is a person (or has a mind), then they are “pro-life.” If one believes a fetus is not a person (or is not minded), they are “pro-choice.” The issue, however, is much more complicated. Not only is it not dichotomous—most everyone believes that abortion is permissible in some circumstances (e.g. to save the mother’s life) and not others (e.g. at nine (...) months of a planned pregnancy)—but scholars on both sides of the issue (e.g. Don Marquis and Judith Thomson) have convincingly argued that fetal personhood (and mindedness) are irrelevant to the debate. To determine the extent to which they are right, this article will define “personhood,” its relationship to mindedness, and explore what science has revealed about the mind before exploring the relevance of both to questions of abortion’s morality and legality. In general, this article does not endorse a particular answer to these questions, but the article should enhance the reader’s ability to develop their own answers in a much more informed way. (shrink)

Richard Cartwright's impact on other philosophers has been as much a product of his own personal contact with students and colleagues as the result of his written work. The essays in this book demonstrate the deep influence he has had, not only by his thinking but equally by his style and manner and, above all, by his clarity and purity of intention. All of the essays are concerned with the questions of logic, language, and metaphysics that have been at the (...) core of Cartwright's own work. The chapters and their authors are: The Consistency of Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic, George Boolos. Russell's "No-Classes" Theory of Classes, Leonard Linsky. Quine's Indeterminacy, Charles S. Chihara. Justifying Symbolizations, Harold Levin. Substitutivity, Scott Soames. Moore-Paradox, Sincerity Conditions, and Epistemic Qualification, Charles E. Caton. Matching Illocutionary Act Types, William P. Alston. Scattered Objects, Roderick M. Chisholm. Parts and Places, Helen Morris Cartwright. Ruminations on an Account of Personal Identity, Judith Jarvis Thomson. G_del's Ontological Proof, Jordan Howard Sobel. "The Concept of the Subject Contains the Concept of the Predicate," David Wiggins. Judith Jarvis Thomson is Professor of Philosophy at MIT. Philosophical Essays, the first collection of Richard Cartwright's work, is being published simultaneously by The MIT Press. (shrink)

Theories of rights seem well equipped to explain widely accepted claims about the morality of harming. But can they explain popular claims about the morality of imposing risks of harm? Many think not. But a plausible theory of rights can explain those claims if it says we have the right that others not impose risks of harm upon us. That is a good reason to believe we have that right. There are many objections to the claim that we have that (...) right, but none of them are sound. Among the topics covered are: the permissibility of rights infringements, trivial rights infringements, the permissibility of risk impositions, the aggregation of rights, consent, self-defense, punishment, and compensation. (shrink)

The central text of this article is Thomas Reid’s response to Berkeley’s argument for distinguishing tangible from visual shape. Reid is right to hold that shape words do not have different visual and tangible meanings. We might also perceive shape, moreover, with senses other than touch and sight. As Reid also suggests, the visual perception of shape does not require perception of hue or brightness. Contrary to treatments of the Molyneux problem by H. P. Grice and Judith Jarvis Thomson, I (...) argue that breakdowns of a certain kind between tangible and visible shape are conceivable. (shrink)

On the agent-relativity thesis, what an agent ought to do is a function of the evidence available to her about the consequences of her potential actions. On the objectivity thesis, what an agent ought to do is a function of what the consequences of her potential actions would be, regardless of the evidence available to her. This article argues for the agent-relativity thesis. The main opposing argument, due to Thomson, points to cases where a bystander can see that an agent (...) is about to do something which, unknown to the agent, would have terrible consequences, and says to the agent: "You ought not to do that!" The bystander's utterance seems true, but it is argued that this is consistent with the agent-relativity thesis, which also enjoys support from other directions. (shrink)

What's Wrong?: Applied Ethicists and Their Critics is a thorough and engaging introduction to applied ethics that covers virtually all of the issues in the field. Featuring more than ninety-five articles, it addresses standard topics--such as abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, world hunger, and animal rights--and also delves into cutting-edge areas like cloning, racial profiling, same-sex marriage, prostitution, and slave reparations. The volume includes seminal essays by prominent philosophers (Robert Nozick, James Rachels, Peter Singer, and Judith Jarvis Thomson) alongside work by (...) newer voices in the field. Employing a unique approach to teaching argumentation, editors David Boonin and Graham Oddie unify the wealth of material presented in this collection. Each chapter opens with a featured article that takes a strong stand on a particular issue; the essays that immediately follow offer objections and critical responses to the arguments put forth in the featured selection. This format helps students learn how to better engage in debates because it illustrates how philosophers argue with each other. In addition, a general introduction describes strategies for understanding and evaluating the different types of arguments contained in the readings, while detailed chapter introductions enable students to see precisely how the arguments presented in the various writings are related to one another. Discussion questions and suggestions for further reading are included for each chapter. Ideal for courses in introduction to ethics and applied ethics/contemporary moral problems, What's Wrong? can also be used in critical thinking courses that emphasize philosophical argumentation. (shrink)

Though P. G. Tait was in a seemingly perfect position to teach both William Thomson's thermodynamics and James Clerk Maxwell's electromagnetic theory of light, he did not. Tait probably first encountered the new thermodynamics in the 1850s at Queen's College, Belfast, and presented the ideas in his inaugural lecture at Edinburgh in 1860, soon making energy theory the centre-piece of his course there. The comprehensiveness of energy theory plus Thomson's opposition to Maxwell's electromagnetic theory evidently combined in causing Tait to (...) de-emphasize Maxwell's theory. Ironically, Tait, the loyal Scot, thus inadvertently contributed to what might be termed the Anglicization of Scottish natural philosophy. (shrink)

The efficiency of engineering applied to civilian projects sometimes threatens to run away with the social agenda, but in military applications, engineering often adds a devastating sleekness to the inevitable destruction of life. The relative crudeness of terrorism (e.g., 9/11) leaves a stark after-image, which belies the comparative insignificance of random (as opposed to orchestrated) belligerence. Just as engineering dwarfs the bricolage of vernacular design—moving us past the appreciation of brush-strokes, so to speak—the scale of engineered destruction makes it difficult (...) to focus on the charred remains of individual lives. Engineers need to guard against the inappropriate military subsumption of their effort. Fortunately, the ethics of warfare has been an ongoing topic of discussion for millennia. This paper will examine the university core class I’ve developed (The Moral Dimensions of Technology) to meet accreditation requirements in engineering ethics, and the discussion with engineering and non-engineering students focused by the life of electrical engineer Vannevar Bush, with selected readings in moral philosophy from the Dao de Jing, Lao Tze, Cicero, Aurelius Augustinus, Kant, Annette Baier, Peter Singer, Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, and Judith Thomson. (shrink)

Only women can bear the burdens of gestating fetuses. That fact, I suggest, bears on the morality of abortion. To illustrate and explain this point, I frame my discussion around Judith Jarvis Thomson's classic defense of abortion and Gina Schouten's recent feminist challenge to Thomson's defense. Thomson argued that, even assuming that fetuses are morally equivalent to persons, abortions are typically morally permissible. According to Schouten's feminist challenge to Thomson, however, if fetuses are morally equivalent to persons, then abortions are (...) typically morally impermissible because there is a collective moral obligation to care for the vulnerable. The consideration that is my topic, however, poses a problem for that feminist challenge to Thomson. There is reason to believe, I argue, that it is unfair that only women can bear the burdens of gestating fetuses. And, if that is unfair, it would undermine that feminist challenge to Thomson. I show, in other words, that there is a plausible and well‐motivated basis for believing that, even if fetuses are morally equivalent to persons and there is a collective obligation to care for the vulnerable, then abortions are nevertheless typically morally permissible. That is how fairness bears on the morality of abortion. (shrink)

Review: David Jeneman, Adorno in America, ; Alex Thomson, Adorno: A Guide for the Perplexed.

This article is a critical review of David Boonin's book, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge University Press, 2002), a significant contribution to the literature on this subject and arguably the most important monograph on abortion published in the past twenty years. Boonin's defense of abortion consists almost exclusively of sophisticated critiques of a wide variety of pro-life arguments, including ones that are rarely defended by pro-life advocates. This article offers a brief presentation of the book's contents with extended assessments (...) of those arguments of Boonin's that are his unique contributions to the abortion debate and with which the author disagrees: (1) Boonin's critique of the conception criterion and his defense of organized cortical brain activity as the acquired property that imparts to the fetus a right to life: (2) Boonin's defense of J. J. Thomson's violinist argument and his distinction between responsibility for existence and responsibility for neediness and its application to pregnancy. (shrink)

Judith Thomson, David Lewis, and Ted Sider have each formulated different arguments that apparently pose problems for our ordinary claims of diachronic sameness, i.e., claims in which we assert that familiar, concrete objects survive (or persist) through time by enduring as numerically the same entity despite minor changes in their intrinsic or relational properties. In this paper, I show that all three arguments fail in a rather obvious way--they beg the question--and so even though there may be arguments that (...) provide grounds to fuss about whether our ordinary claims of diachronic sameness are defective, Thomson, Lewis, and Sider's arguments are not among them. (shrink)