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David B. Hershenov [58]David Hershenov [22]David Beryl Hershenov [1]
  1. If Abortion, then Infanticide.David B. Hershenov & Rose J. Hershenov - 2017 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 38 (5):387-409.
    Our contention is that all of the major arguments for abortion are also arguments for permitting infanticide. One cannot distinguish the fetus from the infant in terms of a morally significant intrinsic property, nor are they morally discernible in terms of standing in different relationships to others. The logic of our position is that if such arguments justify abortion, then they also justify infanticide. If we are right that infanticide is not justified, then such arguments will fail to justify abortion. (...)
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  2.  41
    Abortion Pills: Killing or Letting Die?David Hershenov - 2024 - Christian Bioethics 30 (2):134-144.
    Christian pro-lifers often respond to Thomson’s defense of abortion that the violinist is allowed to die while the embryo is killed. Boonin and McMahan counter that this distinction does not provide an objection to extraction abortions that disconnect embryos and allow them to die. I disagree. I first argue that letting die and killing are not to be distinguished by differences between acts and omissions, moral and immoral motives, intentional or unintentional deaths, and causing or not causing a pathology. I (...)
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  3.  54
    What Must Pro‐Lifers Believe About the Moral Status of Embryos?David B. Hershenov - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):186-202.
    Embryo rescue cases and minimal miscarriage prevention research have been interpreted as showing that even pro‐lifers are not really committed to the unborn having the same moral status as the born. I will suggest instead that judgments about embryo rescues are often distorted by triage considerations that reveal nothing about differences in moral status between those saved and those not. I will present metaphysical and ethical considerations – none assuming a difference in moral status – why preventing millions of miscarriages (...)
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  4. Who Doesn't Have a Problem of Too Many Thinkers?David B. Hershenov - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):203.
    Animalists accuse the advocates of psychological approaches of identity of having to suffer a Problem of Too Many Thinkers. Eric Olson, for instance, is an animalist who maintains that if the person is spatially coincident but numerically distinct from the animal, then provided that the person can use its brain to think, so too can the physically indistinguishable animal. However, not all defenders of psychological views of identity assume the spatial coincidence of the person and the animal. Jeff McMahan and (...)
     
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  5.  28
    Pathocentric Health Care and a Minimal Internal Morality of Medicine.David B. Hershenov - 2020 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 45 (1):16-27.
    Christopher Boorse is very skeptical of there being a pathocentric internal morality of medicine. Boorse argues that doctors have always engaged in activities other than healing, and so no internal morality of medicine can provide objections to euthanasia, contraception, sterilization, and other practices not aimed at fighting pathologies. Objections to these activities have to come from outside of medicine. I first argue that Boorse fails to appreciate that such widespread practices are compatible with medicine being essentially pathocentric. Then I contend (...)
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  6. Do dead bodies pose a problem for biological approaches to personal identity?David Hershenov - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):31-59.
    One reason why the Biological Approach to personal identity is attractive is that it doesn’t make its advocates deny that they were each once a mindless fetus.[i] According to the Biological Approach, we are essentially organisms and exist as long as certain life processes continue. Since the Psychological Account of personal identity posits some mental traits as essential to our persistence, not only does it follow that we could not survive in a permanently vegetative state or irreversible coma, but it (...)
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  7.  57
    How Not to Defend the Unborn.David Hershenov & Philip A. Reed - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (4):414-430.
    It is sometimes proposed that killing or harming abortion providers is the only logically consistent position available to opponents of abortion. Since lethal violence against morally responsible attackers is normally viewed as justified in order to defend innocent parties, pro-lifers should also think so in the case of the abortion doctor and so they should act to defend the unborn. In our paper, we defend the mainstream pro-life view against killing abortion doctors. We argue that the pro-life view can, in (...)
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  8. A Hylomorphic Account of Thought Experiments Concerning Personal Identity.David B. Hershenov - 2008 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82 (3):481-502.
    Hylomorphism offers a third way between animalist approaches to personal identity, which maintain that psychology is irrelevant to our persistence, andneo-Lockean accounts, which deny that humans are animals. This paper provides a Thomistic account that explains the intuitive responses to thought experiments involving brain transplants and the transformation of organic bodies into inorganic ones. This account does not have to follow the animalist in abandoning the claim that it is our identity which matters in survival, or countenance the puzzles of (...)
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  9.  95
    A More Palatable Epicureanism.David B. Hershenov - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):171 - 180.
  10.  42
    A naturalist response to Kingma’s critique of naturalist accounts of disease.David B. Hershenov - 2020 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 41 (2):83-97.
    Elselijn Kingma maintains that Christopher Boorse and other naturalists in the philosophy of medicine cannot deliver the value-free account of disease that they promise. Even if disease is understood as dysfunction and that notion can be applied in a value-free manner, values still manifest themselves in the justification for picking one particular operationalization of dysfunction over a number of competing alternatives. Disease determinations depend upon comparisons within a reference class vis-à-vis reaching organism goals. Boorse considers reference classes for a species (...)
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  11. Why Consent May Not Be Needed For Organ Procurement.James Delaney & David B. Hershenov - 2009 - American Journal of Bioethics 9 (8):3-10.
    Most people think it is wrong to take organs from the dead if the potential donors had previously expressed a wish not to donate. Yet people respond differently to a thought experiment that seems analogous in terms of moral relevance to taking organs without consent. We argue that our reaction to the thought experiment is most representative of our deepest moral convictions. We realize not everyone will be convinced by the conclusions we draw from our thought experiment. Therefore, we point (...)
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  12.  53
    Can There be Spatially Coincident Entities of the Same Kind?David B. Hershenov - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):1-22.
    The majority of philosophers believe that the existence of spatially coincident entities is not only a coherent idea but that there are millions of such entities. What such philosophers do not countenance are spatially coincident entities of the same kind. We will call this ‘Locke's Thesis’ since the denial goes back to An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. It is there that Locke wrote, ‘For we never finding, nor conceiving it possible that two things of the same kind should exist in (...)
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  13.  30
    Restitution and Revenge.David B. Hershenov - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):79.
    The aim of this paper is to provide a broad sketch of the advantages of the debt/atonement approach to punishment. Such an approach is appealing for it can benefit both the victim and the remorseful victimizer. Compared to other theories, it gives a fuller and more unified account of our intuitions about paying debts, doing penance, alleviating guilt, granting forgiveness, and offsetting privileges, pleasures and burdens. The theory also allows us to avoid justifying punishment on the basis of using some (...)
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  14. Persons as proper parts of organisms.David B. Hershenov - 2005 - Theoria 71 (1):29-37.
    Defenders of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity (PAPI) insist that the possession of some kind of mind is essential to us. We are essentially thinking beings, not living creatures. We would cease to exist if our capacity for thought was irreversibly lost due to a coma or permanent vegetative state. However, the onset of such conditions would not mean the death of an organism. It would survive in a mindless state. But this would appear to mean that before the (...)
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  15.  56
    Health, Moral Status, and a Minimal Speciesism.David Hershenov & Rose Hershenov - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (4):693-718.
    The potential for healthy development is the key to determining the moral status of mindless and minimally minded organisms. It even provides the basis for a defense of speciesism. Mindless and minimally minded human beings have interests in the healthy development of sophisticated mental capacities, which explains why they are greatly harmed when death, disease, and other events frustrate those interests. Since the healthy development of members of non-human species doesn’t produce the same sophisticated mental capacities, mindless and minimally minded (...)
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  16. Soulless Organisms?David B. Hershenov - 2011 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85 (3):465-482.
    It is worthwhile comparing Hylomorphic and Animalistic accounts of personal identity since they both identify the human animal and the human person.The topics of comparison will be three: The first is accounting for our intuitions in cerebrum transplant and irreversible coma cases. Hylomorphism, unlike animalism, appears to capture “commonsense” beliefs here, preserves the maxim that identity matters, and does not run afoul of the Only x and y rule. The next topic of comparison reveals how the rival explanations of transplants (...)
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  17.  87
    Morally relevant potential.David B. Hershenov & Rose J. Hershenov - 2015 - Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (3):268-271.
  18.  34
    Conscientious Objection or an Internal Morality of Medicine?David Hershenov - 2021 - Christian Bioethics 27 (1):104-121.
    Doctors, nurses, and pharmacists who refuse on grounds of conscience to participate in certain legal, expected, and standard practices have been accused of unprofessionally introducing their personal views into medicine. My first response is that they often are not engaging in conscientious objection because that involves invoking convictions external to those of the medical community. I contend that medicine, properly construed, is pathocentric, and so refusing to induce a pathology via abortion, contraception, euthanasia, etc., is actually being loyal to the (...)
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  19.  32
    Do Division Puzzles Provide a Reason to Doubt That Your Organism Was Ever a Zygote?David Hershenov & Rose Hershenov - 2020 - Public Affairs Quarterly 34 (4):368-388.
    A number of philosophers maintain that the destruction of an embryo in the first 2 weeks after fertilization is not morally problematic as it is metaphysically impossible for any human organism to then have existed. We contend that the typical adult human organism was once a zygote so there is no metaphysical shortcut to justify early abortion. We show that five arguments against human organisms ever having been zygotes fail. All of the arguments have to do with one variant or (...)
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  20. The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of Resurrection.David B. Hershenov - 2003 - Faith and Philosophy 20 (1):24-36.
    If one does not possess an immaterial and immortal soul, then the prospect of conscious experience after death would appear to depend upon the metaphysical possibility of the resurrection of one’s biological life.[i] By “resurrection,” I don’t mean just the possibility that a dead but still existing and well preserved individual could be brought back to life. My contention is that the human organism can even cease to exist, perhaps as a result of cremation or extensive decay, and yet still (...)
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  21.  28
    Protecting Persons from Animal Bites: the Case for the Ontological Significance of Persons.David B. Hershenov - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1437-1446.
    Eric Olson criticizes Lynne Baker’s constitution account of persons on the grounds that personhood couldn’t be ontologically significant as nothing new comes into existence with the acquisition of thought. He claims that for something coming to function as a thinker is no more ontologically significant than something coming to function as a locomotor when a motor is added to it. He levels two related charges that there’s no principled answer about when and where constitution takes place rather than an already (...)
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  22. Mandatory Autopsies and Organ Conscription.David Hershenov - 2009 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 19 (4):367-391.
    The State may require an autopsy when foul play is suspected in the death of one of its citizens.[1] This is so regardless of any objections to such invasive procedures expressed by the deceased before their deaths or afterward by their families. There is not even a religious exemption. The most obvious explanation for why consent is not needed is that apprehending a murderer with information obtained from the autopsy can save lives. However, taking organs without consent from the deceased (...)
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  23.  78
    Countering the appeal of the psychological approach to personal identity.David Hershenov - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (3):447-474.
    Brain transplants and the dicephalus (an organism just like us except that it has two cerebrums) are thought to support the position that we are essentially thinking creatures, not living organisms. I try to offset the first of these intuitions by responding to thought experiments Peter Unger devised to show that identity is what matters. I then try to motivate an interpretation of the alleged conjoined twins as really just one person cut off from himself by relying upon what I (...)
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  24.  99
    Split brains: no headache for the soul theorist.David B. Hershenov & Adam P. Taylor - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (4):487-503.
    Split brains that result in two simultaneous streams of consciousness cut off from each other are wrongly held to be grounds for doubting the existence of the divinely created soul. The mistake is based on two related errors: first, a failure to appreciate the soul's dependence upon neurological functioning; second, a fallacious belief that if the soul is simple, i.e. without parts, then there must be a unity to its thought, all of its thoughts being potentially accessible to reflection or (...)
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  25.  54
    Organisms and their bodies: Response to LaPorte.David B. Hershenov - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):803-809.
    I argue that a corpse cannot be identified with an earlier living body, because it acquires and retains parts in different ways. Contrary to what Joseph LaPorte maintains, there can be neither one principle of part-assimilation nor a non-disjunctive account of persistence conditions that can establish the identity of a living body and a later corpse.
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  26. Van Inwagen, Zimmerman, and the materialist conception of resurrection.David B. Hershenov - 2002 - Religious Studies 38 (4):451-469.
    Peter van Inwagen's brand of materialism leads him to speculate that God actually removes the deceased at the moment of death and replaces the corpse with a simulacrum that decays or is cremated. Dean Zimmerman offers an account of resurrection that is loyal to Peter van Inwagen's commitment to a materialist metaphysics, with its stress on the earlier life processes of an organism immanently causing its later ones, while maintaining that resurrection is possible without involving God in any ‘body snatching’. (...)
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  27. The death of a person.David B. Hershenov - 2006 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (2):107 – 120.
    Drawing upon Lynne Baker's idea of the person derivatively possessing the properties of a constituting organism, I argue that even if persons aren't identical to living organisms, they can each literally die a biological death. Thus we can accept that we're not essentially organisms and can still die without having to admit that there are two concepts and criteria of death as Jeff McMahan and Robert Veatch do. Furthermore, we can accept James Bernat's definition of "death" without having to insist, (...)
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  28. Four-Dimensional Animalism.David B. Hershenov - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Paul F. Snowdon (eds.), Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 208-228.
    The typical Four-Dimensionalist metaphysics will posit the existence of many entities with thinking temporal parts. To determine which of these entities are persons, Hud Hudson relies upon an exclusion principle that withholds the label “person” from objects possessing any parts that don’t contribute to thought. Thus the human animal can’t be identified with the human person because it initially consists of mindless embryonic temporal parts. Since even normal adult human animals have parts such as hair and nails that don’t appear (...)
     
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  29.  40
    Health, Harm and Potential.David B. Hershenov & Rose J. Hershenov - 2016 - Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1):189-196.
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  30. Abortions and Distortions: An Analysis of Morally Irrelevant Factors in Thomson’s Violinist Thought Experiment.David B. Hershenov - 2001 - Social Theory and Practice 27 (1):129-148.
  31. Personal Identity.David B. Hershenov - 2012 - In Robert Barnard & Neil Manson (eds.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. Continuum Publishing. pp. 198.
     
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  32.  82
    Lowe's defence of constitution and the principle of weak extensionality.David B. Hershenov - 2008 - Ratio 21 (2):168–181.
    E.J. Lowe is one of the few philosophers who defend both the existence of spatially coincident entities and the Principle of Weak Extensionality that no two objects which have proper parts have exactly the same proper parts at the same time. Lowe maintains that when spatially coincident things like the statue and the lump of bronze are in a constitution relation, the constituted entity (the statue) has parts that the constituting entity (the lump) doesn’t, hence the compatibility with Weak Extensionality. (...)
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  33. Olson's embryo problem.David B. Hershenov - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):502-511.
  34.  38
    The problematic role of 'irreversibility' in the definition of death.David Hershenov - 2003 - Bioethics 17 (1):89–100.
    Most definitions of death – whether cardiopulmonary, whole brain and brain stem, or just upper brain – include an irreversibility condition. Cessation of function is not enough to declare death. Irreversibility should be limited to an organism's ability to ‘restart’ itself after vital organs have ceased to function. However, this would mean that every hour people who cannot be revived without the intervention of medical personnel and their technology are coming back from the dead. However, the alternative of irreversibility being (...)
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  35.  53
    Personal Identity and the Possibility of Autonomy.David B. Hershenov & Adam P. Taylor - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):155-179.
    We argue that animalism is the only materialist account of personal identity that can account for the autonomy that we typically think of ourselves as possessing. All the rival materialist theories suffer from a moral version of the problem of too many thinkers when they posit a human person that overlaps a numerically distinct human animal. The different persistence conditions of overlapping thinkers will lead them to have interests that conflict, which in many cases prevents them both from autonomously forming (...)
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  36.  43
    Problems with a Constitution Account of Persons.David B. Hershenov - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (2):291.
    ABSTRACT: There are some problems with Lynne Baker’s constitution account of personal identity that become evident when we consider brain transplant thought experiments and two kinds of rare cases of conjoined twins — the first appears to be one organism but two persons and the second seems to involve two organisms associated with one person. To handle the problems arising from brain transplants, the constitution theorist must admit an additional level of constitution between the organism and the person. To resolve (...)
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  37.  54
    How a Hylomorphic Metaphysics Constrains the Abortion Debate.David B. Hershenov & Rose J. Koch - 2005 - The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 5 (4):751-764.
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  38.  39
    Evaluating Hylomorphism as a Hybrid Account of Personal Identity.David B. Hershenov - 2020 - Quaestiones Disputatae 10 (2):86-105.
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  39.  95
    Fission and Confusion.David Hershenov & Rose J. Koch-Hershenov - 2006 - Christian Bioethics 12 (3):237-254.
    Catholic opponents of abortion and embryonic stem cell research usually base their position on a hylomorphic account of ensoulment at fertilization. They maintain that we each started out as one-cell ensouled organisms. Critics of this position argue that it is plagued by a number of intractable problems due to fission (twinning) and fusion. We're unconvinced that such objections to early ensoulment provide any reason to doubt the coherence of the hylomorphic account. However, we do maintain that a defense of ensoulment (...)
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  40.  18
    (2 other versions)Intelligence and the Philosophy of Mind.David B. Hershenov - 2006 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:225-236.
  41.  57
    An Alternative to the Rational Substance Pro-life View.David B. Hershenov - 2023 - Res Philosophica 100 (4):515-538.
    The Rational Substance View is a pro-life position which maintains that all humans are moral equals and have a right to life in virtue of their kind membership. Healthy embryos, newborns, children, adults, and as the cognitively impaired all essentially have a root or radical capacity for rationality, though it may not be developed or have its operations blocked. Their being substances with a rational nature is the basis of their moral status and what makes it wrong to kill them. (...)
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  42.  74
    The fairness of Hell.David B. Hershenov - 2019 - Ratio 32 (3):215-223.
    The Christian conception of Hell as everlasting punishment for past sins is confronted with two charges of unfairness. The first is the inequity of an eternal punishment. The never‐ending punishment seems disproportionate to the finite sin (Kershnar, Lewis, Adams). A second and related problem is that the boundary between sins that send one for all eternity to Hell and those sins that are slightly less bad that are compatible with an eternity in Heaven is arbitrary and thus it is unfair (...)
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  43. The metaphysical basis of a liberal organ procurement policy.David B. Hershenov & James J. Delaney - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):303-315.
    There remains a need to properly analyze the metaphysical assumptions underlying two organ procurement policies: presumed consent and organ sales. Our contention is that if one correctly understands the metaphysics of both the human body and material property, then it will turn out that while organ sales are illiberal, presumed consent is not. What we mean by illiberal includes violating rights of bodily integrity, property, or autonomy, as well as arguing for or against a policy in a manner that runs (...)
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  44.  44
    Why psychological accounts of personal identity can accept a brain death criterion and biological definition of death.David B. Hershenov - 2019 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (5):403-418.
    Psychological accounts of personal identity claim that the human person is not identical to the human animal. Advocates of such accounts maintain that the definition and criterion of death for a human person should differ from the definition and criterion of death for a human animal. My contention is instead that psychological accounts of personal identity should have human persons dying deaths that are defined biologically, just like the deaths of human animals. Moreover, if brain death is the correct criterion (...)
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  45. The Thesis of Vague Objects and Unger's Problem of the Many.David B. Hershenov - 2001 - Philosophical Papers 30 (1):57-67.
    Although the predominant view is that vagueness is due to our language being imprecise, the alternative idea that objects themselves do not have determinate borders has received an occasional hearing. But what has failed to be appreciated is how this idea can avoid a puzzle Peter Unger named “The Problem of the Many.”[i].
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  46.  36
    Health, interests, and equality.David Hershenov & Rose Joanna Hershenov - 2017 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 38 (5):417-419.
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  47.  27
    Death, Dignity, and Degradation.David B. Hershenov - 2007 - Public Affairs Quarterly 21 (1):21-36.
  48.  18
    The problem of potentiality.David B. Hershenov - 1999 - Public Affairs Quarterly 13 (3):255-271.
  49.  34
    An Argument for Limited Human Cloning.David B. Hershenov - 2000 - Public Affairs Quarterly 14 (3):245-258.
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  50.  22
    A Divine Alternative to Zimmerman’s Emergent Dualism.David B. Hershenov - 2022 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 8 (2).
    Dean Zimmerman argues for the existence of souls as they enable us to avoid certain vagueness-inspired, metaphysical puzzles that plague materialist accounts of the person. There are far too many overlapping material thinking candidates for being the referent of “I”. Zimmerman suggests that an emergent soul whose creation is overdetermined by overlapping material entities will avoid the unwelcome overpopulation of physical thinkers. I will argue that parallel problems plague Zimmerman’s emergent dualism, there are too many souls produced where we want (...)
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