Evidence suggests that one reason doctors provide certain interventions in assisted reproductive technologies (ART) is because of patient demand. This is particularly the case when it comes to unproven interventions such as ‘add‐ons’ to in vitro fertilisation (IVF) cycles, or providing IVF cycles that are highly unlikely to succeed. Doctors tend to accede to demands for such interventions because patients are willing to do and pay ‘whatever it takes’ to have a baby. However, there is uncertainty as to what moral (...) weight should be placed on patient‐led demands in ART, including whether it is acceptable for such demands to be invoked as a justification for intervention. We address this issue in this paper. We start by elucidating what we mean by ‘patient‐led demand’ and synthesise some of the evidence for this phenomenon. We then argue that a doctor's professional role morality (PRM) yields special responsibilities, particularly in commercialised healthcare settings such as ART, because of the nature of professions as social institutions that are distinct from markets. We argue on this basis that, while there may be reasons (consistent with PRM) for doctors to accede to patient demand, this is not always the case. There is often a gap in justification between acceding to patient‐led demands and providing contested interventions, particularly in commercial settings. As a result, acceding to demand in such settings needs a strong justification to be consistent with PRM. (shrink)

It is an open question when procreation is justified. Antinatalists argue that bringing a new individual into the world is morally wrong, whereas pronatalists say that creating new life is morally good. In between these positions lie attempts to provide conditions for when taking an anti or pronatal stance is appropriate. This paper is concerned with developing one of these attempts, which can be called qualified pronatalism. Qualified pronatalism typically claims that while procreation can be morally permissible, there are constraints (...) on when it is justified. These constraints often concern whether an individual is motivated to procreate for the right reasons. For instance, if someone is not sufficiently concerned with the child’s future welfare, the qualified pronatalist will say that procreation is not justified. Moreover, David Wasserman says that this concern forms a role-based duty. That is, prospective parents have special duties to be concerned for the child’s future welfare by virtue of the role they occupy. In this paper, I argue that a proper examination of a prospective parent’s role-based duties entails that more is needed to justify procreation. Bringing a new person into the world leaves fewer resources for people who already need them, and the current size of the human population is unsustainable from a planetary point of view. Therefore, even if there is nothing wrong with procreation per se, the external condition of overpopulation, and its ensuing public health issues, plausibly gives rise to a role-based duty that prospective parents must account for when deciding whether to procreate. (shrink)

The world's population is a significant variable that can be altered to help decrease global emissions. Most of the discussion surrounding this variable has concentrated on the moral issues involved: to what extent is a state justified in reducing its population? Are individual procreators morally obligated to have fewer children? However, while these moral concerns are important, little attention has been given to the feasibility of a proposed solution to overpopulation. This article aims to rectify that. By understanding whether (and (...) how) feasibility impacts the truth-value of an ought claim, important progress can be made on deliberating what to do about overpopulation. In Section 2, I outline the public health crisis that overpopulation causes and present Sarah Conly's argument as the most well-thought-out account of how to ethically and rapidly reduce the population. In Section 3, I borrow from Nicholas Southwood to explore when infeasibility makes an ought claim false. In Section 4, I show that rapidly reducing the population is infeasible. Therefore, regardless of any ethical merits, it should be eliminated as an option when deliberating what to do. Instead, we must put our time and resources into finding a feasible solution to overpopulation. (shrink)

The world's population is a significant variable that can be altered to help decrease global emissions. Most of the discussion surrounding this variable has concentrated on the moral issues involved: to what extent is a state justified in reducing its population? Are individual procreators morally obligated to have fewer children? However, while these moral concerns are important, little attention has been given to the feasibility of a proposed solution to overpopulation. This article aims to rectify that. By understanding whether (and (...) how) feasibility impacts the truth-value of an ought claim, important progress can be made on deliberating what to do about overpopulation. In Section 2, I outline the public health crisis that overpopulation causes and present Sarah Conly's argument as the most well-thought-out account of how to ethically and rapidly reduce the population. In Section 3, I borrow from Nicholas Southwood to explore when infeasibility makes an ought claim false. In Section 4, I show that rapidly reducing the population is infeasible. Therefore, regardless of any ethical merits, it should be eliminated as an option when deliberating what to do. Instead, we must put our time and resources into finding a feasible solution to overpopulation. (shrink)

The world's population is a significant variable that can be altered to help decrease global emissions. Most of the discussion surrounding this variable has concentrated on the moral issues involved: to what extent is a state justified in reducing its population? Are individual procreators morally obligated to have fewer children? However, while these moral concerns are important, little attention has been given to the feasibility of a proposed solution to overpopulation. This article aims to rectify that. By understanding whether (and (...) how) feasibility impacts the truth-value of an ought claim, important progress can be made on deliberating what to do about overpopulation. In Section 2, I outline the public health crisis that overpopulation causes and present Sarah Conly's argument as the most well-thought-out account of how to ethically and rapidly reduce the population. In Section 3, I borrow from Nicholas Southwood to explore when infeasibility makes an ought claim false. In Section 4, I show that rapidly reducing the population is infeasible. Therefore, regardless of any ethical merits, it should be eliminated as an option when deliberating what to do. Instead, we must put our time and resources into finding a feasible solution to overpopulation. (shrink)

This article argues that most of the approaches to the foundations of statistical mechanics have severed their link with the original foundational project, the project of demonstrating how real mechanical systems can behave thermodynamically.

Throughout this century many philosophers and physicists have gone for thc ‘big ki11’ regarding tenses. They have tried to show via McTaggart’s paradox and special relativity that tcnscs arc logically and physically impossible, rcspcctivcly. Ncithcr attempt succccds, though as I argue, both lcavc their mark. In thc iirst two sections of thc paper I introduce some conceptual difficulties for the tensed theory of time. The next section then discusses the standing 0f tenses in light of special relativity, cspccially rcccnt work (...) by Stcin on thc topic. I argue that, Stcin’s possibility thcorcm notwithstanding, special relativity is inconsistent with any philosophicully interesting conception of tense. Finally, I search for help for tenses in the broader context of quantum theory, Lorcntzian interpretations 0f time dilation/length contraction, and gcncral relativistic spacctimcs. I suggest that these avenues d0 not provide tenses the home for which some have hoped. (shrink)

This article reports four subliminal perception experiments using the relationship between confidence and accuracy to assess awareness. Subjects discriminated among stimuli and indicated their confidence in each discrimination response. Subjects were classified as being aware of the stimuli if their confidence judgments predicted accuracy and as being unaware if they did not. In the first experiment, confidence predicted accuracy even at stimulus durations so brief that subjects claimed to be performing at chance. This finding indicates that subjects's claims that they (...) are ''just guessing'' should not be accepted as sufficient evidence that they are completely unaware of the stimuli. Experiments 2-4 tested directly for subliminal perception by comparing the minimum exposure duration needed for better than chance discrimination performance against the minimum needed for confidence to predict accuracy. The latter durations were slightly but significantly longer, suggesting that under certain circumstances people can make perceptual discriminations even though the information that was used to make those discriminations is not consciously available. (shrink)

The Internet is rapidly developing into an important medium of communication in modem society, and both psychological research and therapeutic interventions are being increasingly conducted using this new communication medium. As therapeutic interventions using the Internet are becoming more prevalent, it is becoming increasingly important to conduct research on psychotherapeutic Internet interventions to assist in the development of an appropriate standard of practice regarding interventions using this new medium. In this article, we examine the Internet and the current psychological uses (...) which are being initiated using this medium. Ethical concerns related to the psychological use of the Internet are discussed, and guidelines are proposed for the conduct of Internet intervention research. (shrink)

Most of us would want to say that it is true that Socrates taught Plato. According to realists about past facts,1 this is made true by the fact that there is, located in the past, i.e., earlier than now, at least one real event that is the teaching of Plato by Socrates. Presentists, however, in denying that past events and facts exist2 cannot appeal to such facts to make their past-tensed statements true. So what is a presentist to do?

As medical technology advances and severely injured or ill people can be kept alive and functioning long beyond what was previously medically possible, the debate surrounding the ethics of end-of-life care and quality-of-life issues has grown more urgent. In this lucid and vigorous book, Craig Paterson discusses assisted suicide and euthanasia from a fully fledged but non-dogmatic secular natural law perspective. He rehabilitates and revitalises the natural law approach to moral reasoning by developing a pluralistic account of just why (...) we are required by practical rationality to respect and not violate key demands generated by the primary goods of persons, especially human life. Important issues that shape the moral quality of an action are explained and analysed: intention/foresight; action/omission; action/consequences; killing/letting die; innocence/non-innocence; person/non-person. Paterson defends the central normative proposition that ’it is always a serious moral wrong to intentionally kill an innocent human person, whether self or another, notwithstanding any further appeal to consequences or motive’. (shrink)

The hypothesis that some moods are emotions has been rejected in philosophy, and is an unpopular alternative in psychology. This is because there is wide agreement that moods have a number of features distinguishing them from emotions. These include: lack of an intentional object and the related notion of lack of a goal; being of long duration; having pervasive or widespread effects; and having causes rather than reasons. Leading theories of mood have tried to explain these purported features by describing (...) moods as global changes in the mind affecting such things as predispositions to holding certain beliefs or the thresholds for triggering a range of relevant behaviors. I show instead that our best understanding of emotions can show that basic emotions either have or can appear to have each of these features. Thus, a plausible hypothesis is that certain moods are emotions. This theory is more parsimonious than the global change theories, and for this reason is to be preferred as an explanation of some moods. (shrink)

DeLancey shows that our understanding of emotion provides essential insight on key issues in philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence. He offers us a bold new approach to the study of the mind based on the latest scientific research and provides an accessible overview of the science of emotion.

This paper searches for an explicit expression of the so-called problem of the direction of time. I argue that the traditional version of the problem is an artifact of a mistaken view in the foundations of statistical mechanics, and that to the degree it is a problem, it is really one general to all the special sciences. I then search the residue of the traditional problem for any remaining difficulty particular to time's arrow and find that there is a special (...) puzzle for some types of scientific realist. (shrink)

God is conceived in the Western theistic tradition to be both the Creator and Conservor of the universe. These two roles were typically classed as different aspects of creation, originating creation and continuing creation. On pain of incoherence, however, conservation needs to be distinguished from creation. Contrary to current analyses (such as Philip Quinn's), creation should be explicated in terms of God's bringing something into being, while conservation should be understood in terms of God's preservation of something over an interval (...) of time. The crucial difference is that while conservation presupposes an object of the divine action, creation does not. Such a construal has significant implications for a tensed theory of time. (shrink)

In order to determine whether a particular course of conduct is ethically permissible it is important to have a concept of what it means to be harmed. The dominant theory of harm is the counterfactual account, most famously proposed by Joel Feinberg. This determines whether harm is caused by comparing what actually happened in a given situation with the ‘counterfacts’ i.e. what would have occurred had the putatively harmful conduct not taken place. If a person's interests are worse off than (...) they otherwise would have been, then a person will be harmed. This definition has recently faced challenges from bioethicists such as John Harris, Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu who, believing it to be severely flawed, have proposed their own alternative theories of the concept. In this article I will demonstrate that the shortcomings Harris, Kahane and Savulescu believe are present in Feinberg's theory are illusory and that it is their own accounts of harm that are fraught with logical errors. I maintain that the arguments presented to refute Feinberg's theory not only fail to achieve this goal and can be accommodated within the counterfactual account but that they actually undermine the theories presented by their respective authors. The final conclusion will be that these challenges are misconceived and fail to displace the counterfactual theory. (shrink)

Contemporary science presents us with the remarkable theory that the universe began to exist about fifteen billion years ago with a cataclysmic explosion called "the Big Bang." The question of whether Big Bang cosmology supports theism or atheism has long been a matter of discussion among the general public and in popular science books, but has received scant attention from philosophers. This book sets out to fill this gap by means of a sustained debate between two philosophers, William Lane (...) class='Hi'>Craig and Quentin Smith, who defend opposing positions. Craig argues that the Big Bang that began the universe was created by God, while Smith argues that the Big Bang has no cause. Alternating chapters by the two philosophers criticize and attempt to refute preceding arguments. Their arguments are based on Einstein's theory of relativity and include a discussion of the new quantum cosmology recently developed by Stephen Hawking and popularized in A Brief History of Time. (shrink)

Virtue Beyond Morality is unique in being a study of Nietzsche’s ethics, that is both well-grounded in Nietzsche studies and draws on a broad knowledge of ethical theory, both historical and contemporary. The book makes Nietzsche’s thought accessible to Anglo-American moral philosophers, and draws on historical and contemporary ethics in a way that illuminates Nietzsche’s concerns.

Is there any difference between playing video games in which the player’s character commits murder and video games in which the player’s character commits pedophilic acts? Morgan Luck’s “Gamer’s Dilemma” has established this question as a puzzle concerning notions of permissibility and harm. We propose that a fruitful alternative way to approach the question is through an account of aesthetic engagement. We develop an alternative to the dominant account of the relationship between players and the actions of their characters, and (...) argue that the ethical difference between so-called “virtual murder” and “virtual pedophilia” is to be understood in terms of the fiction-making resources available to players. We propose that the relevant considerations for potential players to navigate concern (1) attempting to make certain characters intelligible, and (2) using aspects of oneself as resources for homomorphic representation. (shrink)

Barrow and Tipler’s contention that the Anthropic Principle is obviously true and removes the need for an explanation of fine-tuning fails because the Principle is trivially true, and only within the context of a World Ensemble, whose existence is not obvious, does a selection effect become significant. Their objections to divine design as an explanation of fine-tuning are seen to be misconceived.

It is difficult to exaggerate Alasdair MacIntyre's influence on contemporary Christian ethics. Under his influence, many have sought to show the distinctive features of a Christian account of the virtues, even while discovering that they have needed to go further than MacIntyre himself does. In an attempt to illustrate why some Christian ethicists and theologians have noted MacIntyre's reluctance to follow through on some of his own projects’ most salient aspects, this article examines his 1994 lectures on truthfulness and lying. (...) In particular, I ask why he unexpectedly proposes a rule that suffers from Kantian abstraction. Even though articulating rules can be a crucial task, Christian ethics can often do better. Rather than search for a rule or even practices that require truthfulness, I suggest instead that Christian witness be explored as itself a truth-telling practice. (shrink)

The Marcusean concept of one-dimensionality is used to explore contradictions of organized labor. Since the original 1964 publication of One-Dimensional Man, the labor movement has suffered significant losses in membership and power. This essay examines the current relevance of Marcuse’s description of the increasing integration and collusion of organized labor with business, the loss of the union’s role as radical/revolutionary subject, and the containment of organized labor as an oppositional force. The specific mechanisms found in the structure, culture, logic, and (...) legal constraints that characterize the deradicalization of organized labor are critically reviewed. (shrink)

Archaeology for Today and Tomorrow explores how cutting-edge archaeological theories have implications not only for how we study the past, but also how we think about and prepare for the future. Ranging from how we understand migration or political leadership to how we think about violence or ecological crisis, the book argues that archaeology should embrace a "future-oriented" attitude. Behind the traditional archaeological gaze on the past are a unique and useful collection of skills, tools, and orientations for rethinking the (...) present and future. Further, it asserts that archaeological theory is not only vital for how we conduct our work as archaeologists, and how we create narratives about the past, but also for how we think about the broader world in the present and, crucially, how we envision and shape the future. Each of the chapters in the book links specific theoretical approaches and global archaeological case studies to a specific contemporary issue. It examines such issues as human movement, violence, human and non-human relations, the Anthropocene, and fake news to showcase the critical contributions that archaeology, and archaeological theory, can make to shaping the world of tomorrow. An ideal book for courses on archaeology in the modern world and public archaeology, it will also appeal to archaeology students and researchers in general and all those in related disciplines interested in areas of critical contemporary concern. (shrink)

Against a thinker like Martin Heidegger who takes restraints on individual freedom and the promotion of authoritarianism as implicit features in the ongoing development of technology, Andrew Feenberg argues for a “democratic rationalization” of modern technology whereby people effectively choose their own futures, not in spite of their tools, but increasingly because of them. Acknowledging the Web’s democratic potential, I believe that a new threat—far different from authoritarian regimes or structures—has emerged: a rampant and multifarious narcissism that threatens to drown (...) democratic ideals in a wave of self-obsession and self-promotion. (shrink)

The doctrine of the Father’s begetting the Son in his divine nature, despite its credal affirmation, enjoys no clear scriptural support and threatens to introduce an objectionable ontological subordinationism into the doctrine of the Trinity. We should therefore think of Christ’s sonship as a function of his incarnation, even if that role is assumed beginninglessly.

Faced with a minimally participatory democracy, a variety of populists have sought to revitalize popular political participation by strengthening local community mobilizations. Others have called for reliance on frequent referenda. Assessing the limits of these proposals requires theoretical attention to two key issues. The first is the growing importance of very large scale patterns of societal integration which depend on indirect social relationships achieved through communications media, markets and bureaucracies. This split of system world from lifeworld, in Habermas's terms, poses (...) a challenge to democratic theories which assume that the lessons of local social life and political participation are directly translatable into the necessary knowledge for state level (let alone international) activity. Secondly, changes in patterns of community formation and communications media have transformed the basis for democracy. In particular, socio-spatial segmentation by life-style choice, market position and other factors limits direct relationships increasingly to similar individuals. Mass media become increasingly predominant sources of information about people different from oneself, and indirect social relationships form the structural basis for the social integration of most politics. The present paper revised and adapts Habermas's conceptualization of system world and lifeworld in order to address the transformation of patterns of societal integration. This forms the basis for a critical analysis of the implications of changing community form and especially communications media for populist political proposals. (shrink)

Although therapist sexual attraction to clients is common, and therapist self-disclosure is an often-used intervention, therapist self-disclosure of sexual feelings to clients is an understudied phenomenon. In this article, I critically review the small base of literature on therapist self-disclosure of sexual feelings, including information on prevalence rates, empirical research, and case studies. By incorporating these findings with information from relevant sections of the American Psychological Association (2002) Ethics Code, my intent is to evaluate different aspects of therapist self-disclosure of (...) sexual feelings and arrive at conclusions regarding therapists' use of these disclosures. It appears that direct, explicit disclosures of sexual feelings can run the risk of harming clients and may therefore be unethical. Therefore, the use of this technique is discouraged. I discuss the issue of using less explicit interventions. (shrink)

One of the most serious obstacles to accepting a tenseless view of time is the challenge posed by our experience of tense. A particularly striking example of such experience, pointed out by Schlesinger but largely overlooked in the literature, is the wish felt by probably all of us at some time or other that it were now some other time. Such a wish seems evidently rational to hold, and yet on a tenseless theory of time such a wish must be (...) regarded as irrational, since it is logically impossible for the now to be located at some other time, there being no such thing as an objective now or present. In order to accommodate rationally such a belief, most protagonists of tenseless time twist the evident meaning of the wish. Oaklander, for example, misconstrues the wish in terms of my wanting to have different perceptions. Others, like Coburn, admit frankly that such a wish is rational only on a tensed theory of time but mistakenly reject that theory on grounds that at best constitute a defeater of an argument for a tensed view of time, rather than a defeater of the tensed view itself. The argument for a tensed view of time from the experience of tense remains undefeated. (shrink)

Leibniz's conceptual containment theory says that singular propositions of the form a is F are true when the complete concept of being a contains the concept of being F. In this paper, I provide a new semantics for first-order logic built around this idea. The semantics resolves longstanding problems for Leibniz's theory and can represent, without possible worlds, both hyperintensional distinctions among properties and a certain kind of presumably impossible situation that standard approaches cannot represent. The semantics also captures the (...) strong soundness and completeness of classical first-order logic. (shrink)

John Taylor complains that the "Kalam" cosmological argument gives the appearance of being a swift and simple demonstration of the existence of a Creator of the universe, whereas in fact a convincing argument involving the premiss that the universe began to exist is very difficult to achieve. But Taylor's proffered defeaters of the premisses of the philosophical arguments for the beginning of the universe are themselves typically undercut due to Taylor's inadvertence to alternatives open to the defender of the "Kalam" (...) arguments. With respect to empirical confirmation of the universe's beginning Taylor is forced into an anti-realist position on the Big Bang theory, but without sufficient warrant for singling out the theory as non-realistic. Therefore, despite the virtue of simplicity of form, the "Kalam" cosmological argument has not been defeated by Taylor's all too swift refutation. (shrink)

I defend the hypothesis that organisms that produce and recognize meaningful utterances tend to use simpler procedures, and should use the simplest procedures, to produce and recognize those utterances. This should be a basic principle of any naturalist theory of meaning, which must begin with the recognition that the production and understanding of meanings is work. One measure of such work is the minimal amount of space resources that must go into storing a procedure to produce or recognize a meaningful (...) utterance. This cost has an objective measure, called Kolmogorov Complexity. I illustrate the use of this measure for a naturalist theory of meaning by showing how it offers a straight solution to one of the most influential arguments for meaning irrealism: the skeptical challenge posed by Kripke. (shrink)

Three of the classic "founding fathers" of sociology (Comte, Marx and Tocqueville) were contemporary observers of the French Revolution of 1848. In addition, another important theoretical tradition was represented in contemporary observations of 1848 by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. The present paper summarizes aspects of the views of these theoretically minded observers, notes some points at which more recent historical research suggests revisions to these classical views, and poses three arguments: (1) The revolution of 1848 exerted a direct shaping influence on classical (...) social theory through lessons (some now subject to revision) learned from observation of the revolutionary struggles. (2) The 1848 revolution influenced classical social theory indirectly by contributing to the submergence of the radical French revolutionary tradition (along with utopian socialism) after the defeat of the June insurrectionaires and Bonaparte's coup. (3) Both writers in the classical tradition and current researchers have failed to thematize adequately a basic transformation in effectiveness of national integration, communication and administration which made 1848 in crucial ways much more akin to 1789 than it was direct evidence for the growth of class struggle and the likelihood of further revolution in advanced capitalist countries. (shrink)

A promising argument for divine timelessness is that temporal life is possessed only moment by moment, which is incompatible with the existence of a perfect being.Since the argument is based on the experience of time’s passage, it cannot be circumvented by appeal to a tenseless theory of time.Neither can the argument be subverted by appeals to a temporal deity’s possession of a specious present of infinite duration.Nonetheless, because the argument concerns one’s experience of time’s passage rather than the objective reality (...) of temporal becoming itself, it is considerably weakened by the fact that an omniscient being possessing perfect memory and foreknowledge, need not find such experience to be an imperfection. (shrink)