Wishing it were now some other time

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):159-166 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

One of the most serious obstacles to accepting a tenseless view of time is the challenge posed by our experience of tense. A particularly striking example of such experience, pointed out by Schlesinger but largely overlooked in the literature, is the wish felt by probably all of us at some time or other that it were now some other time. Such a wish seems evidently rational to hold, and yet on a tenseless theory of time such a wish must be regarded as irrational, since it is logically impossible for the now to be located at some other time, there being no such thing as an objective now or present. In order to accommodate rationally such a belief, most protagonists of tenseless time twist the evident meaning of the wish. Oaklander, for example, misconstrues the wish in terms of my wanting to have different perceptions. Others, like Coburn, admit frankly that such a wish is rational only on a tensed theory of time but mistakenly reject that theory on grounds that at best constitute a defeater of an argument for a tensed view of time, rather than a defeater of the tensed view itself. The argument for a tensed view of time from the experience of tense remains undefeated

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,296

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Wishing It Were Now Some Other Time.William Lane Craig - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):159-166.
Language and Time.Richard Swinburne - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):486-489.
A Tenseless Account of the Presence of Experience.J. M. Mozersky - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):441-476.
Time, Tense and Causation.Quentin Smith & Michael Tooley - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):123.
La natura del tempo.Michael Tooley - 1999 - Milano: McGraw-Hill. Edited by Pierluigi Micalizzi. Translated by Michele Visentin.
Temporal Becoming and the Direction of Time.William Lane Craig - 1999 - Philosophy and Theology 11 (2):349-366.
Tenseless Time and Fatalism.Sebastián Álvarez Toledo - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 62:7-11.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
16 (#935,433)

6 months
379 (#5,012)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

William Lane Craig
Houston Baptist University

Citations of this work

The sense of temporal flow: a higher-order account.Thomas Sattig - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):3041-3059.
Be Careful What You Wish For: A Reply to Craig.L. Nathan Oaklander - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):156-163.
Agency and the A-Series.Roman Altshuler - 2009 - Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):153-161.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references