We solve the problem of formulating Brownian motion in a relativistically covariant framework in 3+1 dimensions. We obtain covariant Fokker–Planck equations with (for the isotropic case) a differential operator of invariant d’Alembert form. Treating the spacelike and timelike fluctuations separately in order to maintain the covariance property, we show that it is essential to take into account the analytic continuation of “unphysical” fluctuations.

It has been shown by Gupta and Padmanabhan that the radiation reaction force of the Abraham–Lorentz–Dirac equation can be obtained by a coordinate transformation from the inertial frame of an accelerating charged particle to that of the laboratory. We show that the problem may be formulated in a flat space of five dimensions, with five corresponding gauge fields in the framework of the classical version of a fully gauge covariant form of the Stueckelberg–Feynman–Schwinger covariant mechanics (the zero mode fields of (...) the 0, 1, 2, 3 components correspond to the Maxwell fields). Without additional constraints, the particles and fields are not confined to their mass shells. We show that in the mass-shell limit, the generalized Lorentz force obtained by means of the retarded Green's functions for the five dimensional field equations provides the classical Abraham–Lorentz–Dirac radiation reaction terms (with renormalized mass and charge). We also obtain general coupled equations for the orbit and the off-shell dynamical mass during the evolution as well as an autonomous non-linear equation of third order for the off-shell mass. The theory does not admit radiation if the particle does not move off-shell. The structure of the equations implies that mass-shell deviation is bounded when the external field is removed. (shrink)

We review the relativistic classical and quantum mechanics of Stueckelberg, and introduce the compensation fields necessary for the gauge covariance of the Stueckelbert–Schrödinger equation. To achieve this, one must introduce a fifth, Lorentz scalar, compensation field, in addition to the four vector fields with compensate the action of the space-time derivatives. A generalized Lorentz force can be derived from the classical Hamilton equations associated with this evolution function. We show that the fifth (scalar) field can be eliminated through the introduction (...) of a conformal metric on the spacetime manifold. The geodesic equation associated with this metric coincides with the Lorentz force, and is therefore dynamically equivalent. Since the generalized Maxwell equations for the five dimensional fields provide an equation relating the fifth field with the spacetime density of events, one can derive the spacetime event density associated with the Friedmann–Robertson–Walker solution of the Einstein equations. The resulting density, in the conformal coordinate space, is isotropic and homogeneous, decreasing as the square of the Robertson–Walker scale factor. Using the Einstein equations, one see that both for the static and matter dominated models, the conformal time slice in which the events which generate the world lines are contained becomes progressively thinner as the inverse square of the scale factor, establishing a simple correspondence between the configurations predicted by the underlying Friedmann–Robertson–Walker dynamical model and the configurations in the conformal coordinates. (shrink)

We apply a method analogous to the eikonal approximation to the Maxwell wave equations in an inhomogeneous anisotropic medium and geodesic motion in a three dimensional Riemannian manifold, using a method which identifies the symplectic structure of the corresponding mechanics, to the five dimensional generalization of Maxwell theory required by the gauge invariance of Stueckelberg's covariant classical and quantum dynamics. In this way, we demonstrate, in the eikonal approximation, the existence of geodesic motion for the flow of mass in a (...) four dimensional pseudo-Riemannian manifold. These results provide a foundation for the geometrical optics of the five dimensional radiation theory and establish a model in which there is mass flow along geodesics. We then discuss the interesting case of relativistic quantum theory in an anisotropic medium as well. In this case the eikonal approximation to the relativistic quantum mechanical current coincides with the geodesic flow governed by the pseudo-Riemannian metric obtained from the eikonal approximation to solutions of the Stueckelberg–Schrödinger equation. The locally symplectic structure which emerges is that of a generally covariant form of Stueckelberg's mechanics on this manifold. (shrink)

Rather than occurring abstractly (autonomously), ethical growth occurs in interpersonal relationships (IRs). It requires optimally functioning cognitive processes [attention, working memory (WM), episodic/autobiographical memory (AM), inhibition, flexibility, among others], emotional processes (physical contact, motivation, and empathy), processes surrounding ethical, intimacy, and identity issues, and other psychological processes (self-knowledge, integration, and the capacity for agency). Without intending to be reductionist, we believe that these aspects are essential for optimally engaging in IRs and for the personal constitution. While they are all integrated (...) into our daily life, in research and academic work, it is hard to see how they are integrated. Thus, we need better theoretical frameworks for studying them. That study and integration thereof are undertaken differently depending on different views of what it means to live as a human being. We rely on neuroscientific data to support the chosen theory to offer knowledge to understand human beings and interpersonal relational growth. We should of course note that to describe what makes up the uniqueness of being, acting, and growing as a human person involves something much more profound which requires too, a methodology that opens the way for a theory of the person that responds to the concerns of philosophy and philosophical anthropology from many disciplines and methods (Orón Semper, 2015;Polo, 2015), but this is outside the scope of this study. With these in mind, this article aims to introduce a new explanatory framework, called the Interprocessual-self (IPS), for the neuroscientific findings that allow for a holistic consideration of the previously mentioned processes. Contributing to the knowledge of personal growth and avoiding a reductionist view, we first offer a general description of the research that supports the interrelation between personal virtue in IRs and relevant cognitive, emotional, and ethic-moral processes. This reveals how relationships allow people to relate ethically and grow as persons. We include conceptualizations and descriptions of their neural bases. Secondly, with the IPS model, we explore neuroscientific findings regarding self-knowledge, integration, and agency, all psychological processes that stimulate inner exploration of the self concerning the other. We find that these fundamental conditions can be understood from IPS theory. Finally, we explore situations that involve the integration of two levels, namely the interpersonal one and the social contexts of relationships. (shrink)

Invited papers from PT-AI 2011. - Vincent C. Müller: Introduction: Theory and Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence - Nick Bostrom: The Superintelligent Will: Motivation and Instrumental Rationality in Advanced Artificial Agents - Hubert L. Dreyfus: A History of First Step Fallacies - Antoni Gomila, David Travieso and Lorena Lobo: Wherein is Human Cognition Systematic - J. Kevin O'Regan: How to Build a Robot that Is Conscious and Feels - Oron Shagrir: Computation, Implementation, Cognition.

We suggest a common ground for alternative proposals In different domains of cognitive science which have previously seemed to have little in common. The underlying common theme is associated with a redefinition of the basic unit of analysis in each domain of thought. Our framework suggests a definition of unity which is based not on inherent properties of the elements constituting the unit, but rather on dynamic patterns of correlation across the elements. We introduce a set of features that characterize (...) the new dynamic units, and distinguish them from traditional units of analysis. A conceptual connection is made with the identification of elementary units in modern physics theories, as well as with concepts and structures in the study of complex dynamical systems and connectionism. The paper analyses the evolution of the concept of unit in different domains of thought in cognitive science, and examines the proposed framework of “dynamic unity” with regard to various theoretical problems within each domain. The particular cognitive science issues discussed in the paper include: (1) the binding problem in the brain; (2) the mental unit of conceptual organization; (3) defining ‘wordhood’ in linguistics; and (4) identifying the unit of cognition in the natural environment. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 525 "an awareness of its perfection in perfect sell-identity" stems from his own theological bias: if God is to be connected with the world, His thinking cannot be merely a thinking about itself; His mind must also contain the Ideas of the sensible world. The inconsistency is quite apparent in the concluding paragraph of the introductory chapter three on "SellKnowledge ": If we study chapters seven and (...) nine of Book Lambda against the background of these texts on the meaning of friendship, it becomes apparent that a fortiori God's thinking must concern his own being and that "the thinking of thinking" is the supreme form of self-knowledge. Far from being an objectless returning to oneself, this knowledge concerns the very being of the First Principle. It would also seem to fot|ow that iust as knowing a friend is a certain degree of self-knowledge because of the ontological kinship between the self and a friend, God, in knowing himself, also knows, to a certain degree, the essential principles of things in so far as he is the first being encompassing within himself the perfections which other beings possess. This would, however, not imply that the first being would know the world as distinct from himself or as dependent on himself (pp. 33-34). How can God (the Unmoved Mover) think only of Himself, and at the same time, to a certain degree (whatever this means) know also the essential principles of things, the perfections which other beings possess? And what textual justification is there for attributing this position to Aristotle? There are a number of errors in the text. Some of them are as follows: (1) On p. 21 Elders quotes from Laws 987b, in spite of the fact that the Laws ends on 969c. The passage referred to would have to be in Epinomis, but at 987b there is nothing of the text he quotes, to wit, vo~g ~v n0ooXQf3o0oa~E~0~tv 6006g 0~tv. (2) On p. 24, note 41, he correctly gives the text at 432a4 as ~ ~oggdSEo~xotg do0n~o~g x6 vo~x6 ~oxt but makes it mean: '~ere are phantasmata in which the intelligible things are contained." Evidently he confuses this with the passage at 431b1--4. (3) On p. 279, p~.~oxr should read p~i~.t~r (4) On p. 5, ~oo~v should read 6.~ao6v. K. W. Hsaa~oroN Emery University In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought. Two Volumes. By Charles Trinkaus. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970. Pp. 985. $22.50) I. Since the appearance of Burckhardt's classic essay more than a century ago, three schools of thought have grown up around the problem of the nature and extent of humanism 's relationship to Christianity. The classic position, represented by Burckhardt, Symends, Dilthey, Gentile, Cassirer, Saitta, and others, has interpreted humanism as an essentiaUy anti-Christian, anti-scholastic, rationatistic, and individualistic phenomenon caught up in an overwhelming concern for attaining to historical greatness in this world. If religion has been considered at all (and it is usually left to take care of itself), it has been so reinterpreted as to become consistent with the interests of emerging secularism, liberalism, and modern science. Opposing the Burckhardtian position, however, is one originally associated with the work of Giuseppe Toffanin and, more recently, Hiram Haydn. Here, Renaissance humanism is seen to be fundamentaUy Catholic, orthodox, and traditional---the two movements joined in perfect harmony by a common concern for antiquity and universaiism, for Latinity, faith, and corporate elitism, and by a common opposition to democratic particularism, heresy, individualism, modernity, and the vernaculars. What makes these two positions extreme, however, is the existence of the largest, most 526 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY moderate, and most diversified camp. Originating with Thode, Pastor, Olgiati, and Joachimsen, among a host of others, it has encompassed the general view that humanism and Christianity are separate yet interrelated. For some, medieval Catholicism is not the antithesis but the fountainhead of Renaissance humanism--the religious cause of a secular effect. For others, humanism is a novel intellectual movement, but one yet operating within a still... (shrink)

Se comparan críticamente las teorías del condicionamiento y la expectativa. Luego se retoma la propuesta de Oron Frenkel (2008) a fin de juzgar si la noción de intencionalidad motriz permite establecer un marco teórico superador de las deficiencias de dichas teorías. Finalmente se analiza la noción de forma y los órdenes físico, vital y humano, propuestos en La Estructura del Comportamiento (1976), como abordajes alternativos. Como conclusión se destaca el valor de la experiencia del paciente en los ensayos y (...) se plantea la posibilidad de redefinir la noción tradicional de conciencia entendida como formación de representaciones y juicios. (shrink)

How is it that we think and refer in the first-person way? For most philosophers in the analytic tradition, the problem is essentially this: how two apparently conflicting kinds of properties can be reconciled and united as properties of the same entity. What is special about the first person has to be reconciled with what is ordinary about it. The range of responses reduces to four basic options. The orthodox view is optimistic: there really is a way of reconciling these (...) apparently contradictory properties as contained within the same thing. The heretical views are pessimistic and content to be so: there is no such way, and that is because there is simply nothing to reconcile – because there is really nothing special about what is in question; or there is really nothing ordinary about it; or there is really nothing …. (shrink)

Appeals to nature are ubiquitous in Epicurean ethics and politics. The foundation of Epicurean ethics is its claim that pleasure is the sole intrinsic good and pain the sole intrinsic evil, and this is supposedly shown by the behavior of infants who have not yet been corrupted, "when nature's judgement is pure and whole." Central to their recommendations about how to attain pleasure is their division between types of desires: the natural and necessary ones, the natural but non-necessary ones, and (...) the vain and empty ones. Elsewhere, the Epicureans talk about the "natural goods" of political power and fame, and they contrast "natural wealth" with wealth as "defined by empty opinion." Finally, in their politics, Epicurus claims that the "the justice of nature is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, [i.e.,] neither to harm one another nor to be harmed." This paper explores two questions regarding these various appeals to nature. The first is: what is it for these things to be natural, i.e., what notion of "natural" or "nature" is at play here? (Furthermore, is there a single notion being used across these appeals, and if not, how are they related?) The second is: what normative work does a thing's being natural do? That is, what reason, if any, does a desire's being natural give me for pursuing the object of that desire and trying to fulfill that desire, as opposed to not doing so and trying to eliminate it, and similarly for the other appeals to nature? (shrink)

When a patient lacks sufficient capacity to make a certain treatment decision, whether because of deficits in their ability to make a judgement that reflects their values or to make a decision that reflects their judgement or both, the decision must be made by a surrogate. Often the best way to respect the patient’s autonomy, in such cases, is for the surrogate to make a ‘substituted’ judgement on behalf of the patient, which is the decision that best reflects the patient’s (...) values and identity-infused beliefs as they were when the patient last possessed capacity. It is by now well-known that there is troubling evidence that surrogates do only slightly better than chance at making accurate substituted judgements. The use of a patient preference predictor, an algorithm that predicts patient preferences based on characteristics like the patient’s age, gender, socioeconomic status and education level, could help. Rid and Wendler have done important work making a moral case for using the PPP.1 If it were shown to enhance accuracy, it is not at all obvious what objections there could be to its use. Yet several subtle criticisms of the PPP have emerged in the literature. In their feature article, Jardas, Wasserman and Wendler select six of the most prominent objections to the PPP in the literature and defend the PPP against them.2 Along the way they make significant contributions to broader issues concerning the proper uses of statistical evidence and limits on the kinds of preferences there can be reasons of autonomy to respect. Since I found the authors’ answers to the final two objections—that the PPP relies on naked statistical evidence and that it uses non-endorsed reasons—to be especially interesting and provocative, I will examine those answers and raise a few questions about …. (shrink)

A review of deVries' and O'Shea's books, both titled "Wilfrid Sellars". By Jaroslav Peregrin.

Thomas Kuhn had little to say about scientific change in biological science, and biologists are ambivalent about how applicable his framework is for their disciplines. We apply Kuhn’s account of paradigm change to evolutionary microbiology, where key Darwinian tenets are being challenged by two decades of findings from molecular phylogenetics. The chief culprit is lateral gene transfer, which undermines the role of vertical descent and the representation of evolutionary history as a tree of life. To assess Kuhn’s relevance to this (...) controversy, we add a social analysis of the scientists involved to the historical and philosophical debates. We conclude that while Kuhn’s account may capture aspects of the pattern of an episode of scientific change, he has little to say about how the process of generating new understandings is occurring in evolutionary microbiology. Once Kuhn’s application is limited to that of an initial investigative probe into how scientific problem-solving occurs, his disciplinary scope becomes broader. (shrink)

This study explores consumer expectations and attitudes related to gender-based price discrimination. Although much research has focused on pay inequalities and gender diversity, considerably less attention has been focused on situations in which men and women are charged different prices based on gender. In two studies, expectations and attitudes toward gender-based price discrimination are examined. In Study 1, two scenarios related to prices at hair salon and dry cleaning services were manipulated to measure expectations and attitudes toward gender-based price discrimination. (...) We found that the nature of the service results in expectations of price differences between men and women. We also found men expect gender-based pricing more than women. In Study 2, qualitative research was conducted to reveal the cognitions that men and women experience when exposed to gender-based price discrimination. (shrink)

Using the symbiotic sustainability model as a framework, this research investigates how many and with which businesses top nonprofit organizations report partnerships. We examined the websites of the 122 largest, most recognizable U.S. nonprofits. These websites included information about 2,418 business–nonprofit partnerships with 1,707 unique businesses. The results suggest key differences with previous research on how U.S. Fortune 500 companies report B2N partnerships. Leading nonprofits report more B2N partnerships than U.S. Fortune 500 companies do. Furthermore, nonprofits do not maintain industry (...) exclusivity in reporting B2N partnerships, like their business counterparts do. Finally, social issue industries do not exert the same isomorphic pressures on B2N partnerships that economic industries do. New propositions that extend the symbiotic sustainability model are presented to account for nonprofits’ unique goals for capital accumulation in B2N partnering and the industry characteristics. (shrink)

Here we prove the existence of sheaf cohomology theory in arbitrary o-minimal structures.

Recent discoveries of geographical patterns in microbial distribution are undermining microbiology’s exclusively ecological explanations of biogeography and their fundamental assumption that ‘everything is everywhere: but the environment selects’. This statement was generally promulgated by Dutch microbiologist Martinus Wilhelm Beijerinck early in the twentieth century and specifically articulated in 1934 by his compatriot, Lourens G. M. Baas Becking. The persistence of this precept throughout twentieth-century microbiology raises a number of issues in relation to its formulation and widespread acceptance. This paper will (...) trace the conceptual history of Beijerinck’s claim that ‘everything is everywhere’ in relation to a more general account of its theoretical, experimental and institutional context. His principle also needs to be situated in relationship to plant and animal biogeography, which, this paper will argue, forms a continuum of thought with microbial biogeography. Finally, a brief overview of the contemporary microbiological research challenging ‘everything is everywhere’ reveals that philosophical issues from Beijerinck’s era of microbiology still provoke intense discussion in twenty-first century investigations of microbial biogeography. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to clarify the role of ‘wonder’ in education. Most of us who work in education want to provide valuable experiences for our students, and we want them to be driven by intrinsic values such as truth and recognition of the dignity of human existence. However, whilst I echo many of the sentiments espoused by advocates of the utility and ethical significance of wonder, I contend that some recent developments—and in particular, Schinkel’s argument that ‘deep’ (‘contemplative’ (...) or ‘cosmic’) wonder has a ‘fundamental’ role in education—are misconceived. This is, I argue, because any concept deployable within educational spaces (whether formal or informal) must pay due regard to the conceptual constraints of the concept of ‘education’; that is, attention must be paid to the role of ‘learning’. Schinkel’s proposals are, I suggest, vulnerable to a critique of sentimentalism and excessive romanticism. As such, they offer little in terms of practical import for educators. As I will propose, if we are to take ‘wonder’ seriously in educational contexts, we must pay attention to the purpose of wonder as an epistemic emotion; namely, aiming for knowledge and understanding, and getting there requires sensitivity to practical know-how and conceptual competence. (shrink)

The need to address our question arises from two sources, one in Kant and the other in a certain type of response to so-called Reformed epistemology. The first source consists in a tendency to distinguish theoretical beliefs from practical beliefs , and to treat theistic belief as mere practical belief. We trace this tendency in Kant's corpus, and compare and contrast it with Aquinas's view and a more conservative Kantian view. We reject the theistic-belief-as-mere-practical-belief view: it is bad descriptive anthropology, (...) it embraces a misguided ideal of a fragmented self unattainable by human beings, and it will deter people from the most desirable sort of faith. The second source consists in the idea that since theistic beliefs function as answers to why-questions, their epistemic status hangs on whether they meet certain distinctively explanatory standards, whatever support they might receive from other sources. We argue that this is a non-sequitur and suggest questions for further research. (shrink)

What is computer-science about? CS is obviously the science of computers. But what exactly are computers? We know that there are physical computers, and, perhaps, also abstract computers. Let us limit the discussion here to physical entities and ask: What are physical computers? What does it mean for a physical entity to be a computer? The answer, it seems, is that physical computers are physical dynamical systems that implement formal entities such as Turing-machines. I do not think that this answer (...) is false. But it invites another, and troubling, question: What distinguishes computers from other physical dynamical systems? The difficulty is that, on the one hand, every physical system im-plements abstract formal entities such as sets of differential equations, while on the other hand we certainly do not want to count every dynamical system as a computer. After all, if CS is somehow distinctive, then there must be a difference between computers and other systems such as solar systems, stomachs, and carburetors. But what is the difference? (shrink)

What is computer-science about? CS is obviously the science of computers. But what exactly are computers? We know that there are physical computers, and, perhaps, also abstract computers. Let us limit the discussion here to physical entities and ask: What are physical computers? What does it mean for a physical entity to be a computer? The answer, it seems, is that physical computers are physical dynamical systems that implement formal entities such as Turing-machines. I do not think that this answer (...) is false. But it invites another, and troubling, question: What distinguishes computers from other physical dynamical systems? The difficulty is that, on the one hand, every physical system im-plements abstract formal entities such as sets of differential equations, while on the other hand we certainly do not want to count every dynamical system as a computer. After all, if CS is somehow distinctive, then there must be a difference between computers and other systems such as solar systems, stomachs, and carburetors. But what is the difference? (shrink)

According to familiar accounts, Rousseau held that humans are actuated by two distinct kinds of self love: amour de soi, a benign concern for one's self-preservation and well-being; and amour-propre, a malign concern to stand above other people, delighting in their despite. I argue that although amour-propre can (and often does) assume this malign form, this is not intrinsic to its character. The first and best rank among men that amour-propre directs us to claim for ourselves is that of occupying (...) 'man's estate'. This does not require, indeed it precludes, subjection of others. Amour-propre does not need suppression or circumscription if we are to live good lives; it rather requires direction to its proper end, not a delusive one. (shrink)

The relation between the digital and the collective has become an urgent contemporary question. These collected essays explore the implications of this relation, around the theme of #NousSommes. This hashtag marks the point where the «personal» modalities of social media have become embroiled in collective expressions of unity, solidarity and resistance. As this volume demonstrates, the impact of this cannot be isolated to the internet, but affect philosophy, literature, cinema, politics and the public space itself. The contributors approach the issue (...) of #NousSommes from a diverse range of disciplines and methodologies, bringing out both the continuity and discontinuity with other forms of collective expression. Important contemporary philosophers such as Nancy, Derrida and Deleuze are engaged here, as are issues of ecology, community, automation, postcolonial identity and addiction. Featuring eight academic essays and an interview, this volume testifies to the importance of French philosophy and culture in understanding the digital and the collective today. (shrink)