Michael Oakeshott is widely recognised to be one of the most original political philosophers of the twentieth century. He also developed a very influential interpretation of the ideas of the great seventeenth century philosopher Thomas Hobbes. While many commentators have noted the importance of Hobbes for understanding Oakeshott’s thought itself, this is the first book to provide a systematic interpretation of Oakeshott’s philosophy by paying close attention to all facets of Oakeshott’s reading of Hobbes. On the (...) surface, Oakeshott, the philosophical idealist and critic of rationalism in politics, would seem to have little in common with Hobbes, who is often regarded as a classic materialist and rationalist philosopher. This work shows, however, that despite appearances, there are many basic affinities between the two thinkers and that Oakeshott brought to the surface aspects of Hobbes’s thought that had previously been overlooked by Hobbes scholars. The development of Oakeshott’s own theory is shown to mirror changes in his reading of Hobbes and many of the distinctive features of Oakeshott’s thought including the modal and sceptical conception of human knowledge, the ‘morality of individuality’, the theory of civil association, and the critique of rationalism all find a fascinating focal point in his writings on Hobbes. Some attention is also paid to Oakeshott’s religious ideas, indicating what they share with Hobbes’s philosophy of religion. The book situates Oakeshott’s reading in relation to some other important twentieth century interpretations of Hobbes and examines its significance for broader debates in political theory and the history of ideas. (shrink)

O pensamento do filósofo britânico Michael Oakeshott é frequentemente recrutado no debate entre conservadorismo e posições progressistas, no qual algumas de suas distinções e explicitações são postas a serviço da crítica a determinados aspectos dessa última. Um de seus principais movimentos argumentativos consiste em apontar que posições políticas fundamentalmente revolucionárias pressupõem certa concepção de racionalidade que, por sua vez, estaria em desacordo com uma visão clássica acerca da faculdade intelectiva humana ao mesmo tempo em que privilegia tal concepção em (...) relação a outras esferas da experiência humana. No entanto, embora usual, tal reconstrução não apenas não faz justiça aos objetivos e à argumentação de Oakeshott, como parece ignorar uma compreensão mais genuína do racionalismo nos séculos XVII e XVIII. Assim, o objetivo deste artigo é explorar a argumentação de Oakeshott tal qual exposta na seção III de seu Rationalism in Politics a fi m de, simultaneamente, precisar seus objetivos e colocá-los em perspectiva em relação à gênese histórico-temática do racionalismo. (shrink)

One of the best known aspects of Oakeshott’s philosophy is his critique of rationalism. Because it is often read in a manner that dissociates it from the larger milieu in which it subsists, namely, Oakeshotts’s philosophy of experience, Oakeshott is sometimes labeled as an enemy of politics, one who is uninterested in political affairs; or, again, as a conservative, one who is at odds with modernity. Yet it remains to be seen whether these labels do justice to the (...) complexity of Oakeshott. Indeed, if Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism is inserted into the background of his philosophy of experience as articulated in Experience and its Modes, we begin to see that Oakeshott’s concern in his critique of rationalism is to separate political activity from political theorization and ground ideology in tradition, so that with a bit of detachment from political experience, the philosopher of politics can assume philosophy’s oversight function in critically interrogating the assumption behind political activity and political theorization, with a view to underscoring the limits of ideological politics and the priority of tradition. Our contention is that this way of looking at Oakeshott’s critique of the sovereignty of reason allows for a better appreciation of the contemporary relevance of Oakeshott’s contributions to political discourse. (shrink)

This paper examines Michael Oakeshott's ideas on the relation between political philosophy and normative thought. To this end, some of the most controversial concepts of his thought are considered in the context of the philosophical debates that developed after the success of analytic philosophy and, in particular, of Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic. First, the paper argues that, in contrast to analytic and ordinary language thinkers, Oakeshott defends the legitimacy and the rationality of normative thinking. To this end, (...) the importance of the Oakeshottian concepts of tradition and moral practice is stressed, and the controversial notion of ‘pursuit of intimations’ is considered. Through a discussion of Oakeshott's unpublished notes, the relevance of Aristotle for the development of his thought is also highlighted. Second, the paper contends that Oakeshott sees political philosophy as a critical activity aiming at universal concepts. At the same time, the paper stresses the Oakeshottian distinction betw.. (shrink)

Michael Oakeshott provides the best articulation of the widespread view that the moral foundations of the modern state limit it to the defense and maintenance of a system of formal rules governing individuals and non-state enterprises. While this understanding of the proper relation between individual and state has been challenged by liberals of a more Rawlsian persuasion, these criticisms have persuaded few to change their minds, as they rest upon assumptions that are plainly incompatible with the view under consideration. (...) I argue that, rightly understood, central and attractive features of Oakeshott’s own conception of understanding, philosophy, individuality, and education lead to significantly different conclusions than those embraced by Oakeshott himself. The “morality of individuality” upon which Oakeshott rests his strict restrictions on the use of state power requires that we be open to the use of that power to guarantee that all receive the education postulated by individuality. (shrink)

I offer a critical exposition and reconstruction of Michael Oakeshott's views on natural science. The principal aim is to enrich Oakeshott's modal schema by throwing light on it in terms of its internal consistency and by bringing to bear on it recent developments in philosophy in general and the philosophy of science in particular. The discussion brings out the special place reserved for philosophy, the crucial tenet of the separateness of these modes seen as Leibnizian monads as well (...) as the special status allowed to science. It considers the possibility of combining one moment of philosophical thinking, namely ethics, with science in the midst of such modal separateness. I first offer a general introduction of how to approach Oakeshott's views on science. The next section stresses philosophy and its relation to science. This is followed by an elaboration of what the modes of experience are meant to be and how science is placed among them. An examination of Oakeshott's more particular views on science concludes the essay. (shrink)

Abstract.I offer a critical exposition and reconstruction of Michael Oakeshott's views on natural science. The principal aim is to enrich Oakeshott's modal schema by throwing light on it in terms of its internal consistency and by bringing to bear on it recent developments in philosophy in general and the philosophy of science in particular. The discussion brings out the special place reserved for philosophy, the crucial tenet of the separateness of these modes seen as Leibnizian monads as well (...) as the special status allowed to science. It considers the possibility of combining one moment of philosophical thinking, namely ethics, with science in the midst of such modal separateness. I first offer a general introduction of how to approach Oakeshott's views on science. The next section stresses philosophy and its relation to science. This is followed by an elaboration of what the modes of experience are meant to be and how science is placed among them. An examination of Oakeshott's more particular views on science concludes the essay. (shrink)

This book challenges the common view that Michael Oakeshott was mainly important as a political philosopher by offering the first comprehensive study of his ideas on history. It argues that Oakeshott's writings on the philosophy of history mark him out as the most successful of the philosophers who attempted to establish historical study as an autonomous form of thought during the twentieth century. It also contends that his work on the history of political thought is best seen in (...) the context of debates over the origins of the liberal state. For the first time, extensive use has been made of unpublished material in the collection of Oakeshott's papers at the LSE, resulting in an intellectual biography that should be of interest both to first-time students and those already familiar with his published works. (shrink)

One of the most complicated problems of political philosophy is the emerging of the individual. Questions such as when, where or in what way “individual” or “mass man” emerged; what type of character he has; whether he developed a morality understanding, political understanding, governing and being governed types suitable for himself or not; in case he developed what the basic characteristics of this morality and governing and being governed types are; whether he is the crownless king of our era or (...) not; whether he needs leaders or administrators or not ; how he finds a place for himself in human relations; what sort of effect he has on our civilization or on the new gained rights, liabilities and the whole life style are some of the basic questions which political philosophy tries to find answers. The objective of this paper is to reveal how Michael Oakeshott who asserts that the emerge of “individual” is the most important event in Modern European history and “mass man” is completely a derivation eliminates the basic fallacies in political philosophy with the answers he gave to above questions, based on his essay of “The Masses in Representative Democracy”. (shrink)

During the Cold War, political thinkers in the West debated the balance between the requirements of liberal democracy and national security. This debate is relevant to East Asia and especially to Korea, where an ideological-military standoff between a democracy and a totalitarian system persists. The thinkers often identified as "Cold War liberals"--Isaiah Berlin, Karl Popper, Raymond Aron, Friedrich Hayek, and Michael Oakeshott--are worth revisiting in this context. Of these, Oakeshott is the least well understood in East Asia and (...) therefore particularly deserving of attention. His ideas about the limits of rationalism in politics, the irrelevance of conventional views of liberalism and conservatism, how constitutional democracy should be defined, and how it can be defended against various forms of anti-liberal politics are especially valuable. In this book, leading Oakeshott scholars from around the world explore these ideas and their implications for East Asia in ten illuminating and readable essays. (shrink)

Oakeshott’s thesis is that political knowledge is essentially praetical: it is not given to propositional formulation and cannot be deliberately exercised, but rather is expressed in conduct and transmitted by example and practice. I argue that this is true primarily of physical skills which depend upon unconscious, automatic physiological processes. Political practice, by contrast, is largely a matter of rule-governed activity. It is an empirical fact that we do have introspcetive access to many of the rules whieh govern our (...) political conduct, and there is good evidence for the claim that we can deliberately and reflectively set ourselves to apply them. (shrink)

Introduction : situating oakeshott -- Language, practice, and individual agency -- Individuality between tradition and contingency -- Imagining the modern state -- Towards a conversational democratic ethos -- Conclusion : hearing voices.

This collection engages the work of Michael Oakeshott predominantly on the themes of his skepticism, politics, and aesthetics. An international set of authors engages and expands the analysis of Oakeshott’s writings in often neglected areas and topics and in ways that brings Oakeshott into conversation with a surprisingly diverse set of thinkers.

Oakeshott’s thesis is that political knowledge is essentially praetical: it is not given to propositional formulation and cannot be deliberately exercised, but rather is expressed in conduct and transmitted by example and practice. I argue that this is true primarily of physical skills which depend upon unconscious, automatic physiological processes. Political practice, by contrast, is largely a matter of rule-governed activity. It is an empirical fact that we do have introspcetive access to many of the rules whieh govern our (...) political conduct, and there is good evidence for the claim that we can deliberately and reflectively set ourselves to apply them. (shrink)

Michael Oakeshott as a Critic of Hobbes's Theory of the Will - ABSTRACT: Patrick Riley asks why the post-War Oakeshott stopped speaking of the incoherence of Hobbes’s philosophy of volition, as he had in his Hobbes studies before the War. One answer is that he became more and more sensitive to the necessity of counterbalancing the determinist reading of Hobbes, which tended to be dominant in the 1970s’ Hobbes studies. He cites the example of Thomas Spragens’s The Politics (...) of Motion , according to which the human will appears only as a natural movement in a material universe. Although Jürgen Overhoff’s Theory of the Will advances the view that there is complete coherence in Hobbes’s conception of volition, Riley finds his arguments unconvincing. In the end, Riley declares himself favorable to Oakeshott’s "less satisfactory" interpretation of Hobbes, given the incoherence between the Hobbesian critique of free will, fully developed in The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance, and the requirements of a political theory of contract in terms of a theory of rational will. (shrink)

Oakeshott's tradition-centric account of rational-ity in Rationalism in Politics is usually considered in its capac-ity as a major part of his political philosophy, forming as it does so the constructive part of his critique of 'rationalism'. The present article, in contrast, considers it as a methodologi-cal notion, since it forms too the core of a theory of rational explanation that is at the same time a theory of social expla-nation. In this, Oakeshott argues that the sociologist or politi-cal (...) scientist explains human behaviour by identifying the reasons for her subjects doing what they did, with the right kind of reasons being those that concern not any expressed motivations on the original agents' part, but how they could only have acted relative to a certain 'tradition'. Seeking to both expound and analyse Oakeshott's theory, this article high-lights how it involves a not uncontroversial 'externalist' con-ception of practical reason that, nonetheless, is open to sympathetic reconstruction. Even so, the imperialistic preten-sions of Oakeshott's argument--and in particular, his claim that his tradition-centric conception of rational explanation is fundamentally superior to its more orthodox 'instrumentalist' rival--is found questionable, the sheer variety of his own examples misleading him about his theory's real scope. (shrink)

English philosopher Michael Oakeshott (1901-90) called himself a skeptic at various times, and yet his writings reveal little or no engagement with either of the major Hellenistic skeptical traditions, Pyrrhonism and Academic skepticism. Although he argued that the best way to understand ourselves is to look at the mirror of our intellectual inheritance, he did not look at this one. Furthermore, commentators on Oakeshott’s skepticism have also ignored these traditions and his possible place in them. This article explores (...) these lacunae, seeking possible reasons for such neglect in the history of the modern reception of Hellenistic skepticism. Oakeshott and his commentators may have ignored the traditions of skepticism out of ignorance, lack of respect for their intellectual acuity, or fear of their moral consequences. Finally, this article sketches some of the benefits that might have been gained if Oakeshott and his commentators had paid more attention to these traditions. (shrink)

The English philosopher Michael Oakeshott is known as a conservative who rejected philosophically ambitious rationalism and the grand political ideologies of the twentieth century on the grounds that no human ideas have ultimately reliable foundations. Instead, he embraced tradition and habit as the guides to moral and political life. In this book, Aryeh Botwinick presents an original account of Oakeshott's skepticism about foundations, an account that newly reveals the unity of his thought. Botwinick argues that, despite Oakeshott's (...) pragmatic conservatism, his rejection of all-embracing intellectual projects made him a friend to liberal individualism and an ally of what would become postmodern antifoundationalism. Oakeshott's skepticism even extended paradoxically to skepticism about skepticism itself and is better described as a "generalized agnosticism." Properly conceived and translated, this agnosticism ultimately evolves into mysticism, which becomes a bridge linking philosophy and religion. Botwinick explains and develops this strategy of interpretation and then shows how it illuminates and unifies the diverse strands of Oakeshott's thought in the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, epistemology, political theory, philosophy of personal identity, philosophy of law, and philosophy of history. (shrink)

For much of his career, British political philosopher Michael Oakeshott was identified with Margaret Thatcher’s conservative policies. He has been called by some a guru to the Tories, while others have considered him one of the last proponents of British Idealism. Best known for such books as _Experience and Its Modes_ and _Rationalism in Politics_, Oakeshott has been the subject of numerous studies, but always with an emphasis on his political thought. Elizabeth Campbell Corey now makes the case (...) that Oakeshott’s moral and political philosophies are more informed by religious and aesthetic considerations than has previously been supposed. Hers is the first book-length study of this premise, arguing that Oakeshott’s views on aesthetics, religion, and morality are intimately linked in a creative moral personality that underlies his political theorizing. Corey focuses on a wealth of early material from Oakeshott’s career that has only recently been published, as well as his acclaimed “Tower of Babel” essays, to show that these works illuminate his thinking in ways that could not have been realized prior to their publication. She places Oakeshott squarely in the Augustinian tradition, citing his 1929 essay “Religion and the World,” and then identifies his departure from it. She explores Oakeshott’s recurring theme of “living one’s life in the present”; examines his explicit discussions of religion, aesthetics, and morality; and then considers his political thought in light of this moral vision. She finally compares his idea of Rationalism to Eric Voegelin’s concept of Gnosticism and considers both thinkers’ treatment of Hobbes to delineate their philosophical differences. Through this insightful analysis, Corey shows Oakeshott to be not merely a political philosopher but a thinker with humanistic interests—one who throughout his life was deeply interested in the question of what it means to be human and was moved by art, poetry, and religion while recognizing the necessary evil of political arrangements in order for those activities to flourish. Her work is a major step in a reevaluation of Oakeshott, showing that his conservatism has been greatly misunderstood and that he is more properly regarded as a philosopher whose vision of the human condition, while oftentimes detached and skeptical, is also romantic and inspired. (shrink)

Michael Oakeshott is widely recognised to be one of the most original political philosophers of the twentieth century. He also developed a very influential interpretation of the ideas of the great seventeenth century philosopher Thomas Hobbes. While many commentators have noted the importance of Hobbes for understanding Oakeshott’s thought itself, this is the first book to provide a systematic interpretation of Oakeshott’s philosophy by paying close attention to all facets of Oakeshott’s reading of Hobbes.On the surface, (...) Oakeshott, the philosophical idealist and critic of rationalism in politics, would seem to have little in common with Hobbes, who is often regarded as a classic materialist and rationalist philosopher. This work shows, however, that despite appearances, there are many basic affinities between the two thinkers and that Oakeshott brought to the surface aspects of Hobbes’s thought that had previously been overlooked by Hobbes scholars.The development of Oakeshott’s own theory is shown to mirror changes in his reading of Hobbes and many of the distinctive features of Oakeshott’s thought including the modal and sceptical conception of human knowledge, the ‘morality of individuality’, the theory of civil association, and the critique of rationalism all find a fascinating focal point in his writings on Hobbes. Some attention is also paid to Oakeshott’s religious ideas, indicating what they share with Hobbes’s philosophy of religion. The book situates Oakeshott’s reading in relation to some other important twentieth century interpretations of Hobbes and examines its significance for broader debates in political theory and the history of ideas. (shrink)

El filósofo británico Michael Oakeshott es muy conocido por su crítica del idealismo moral racionalista. El ha sido acusado en ocasiones de conservadurismo porque alguno de los moralismos racionales que critica son socialistas o izquierdistas. Sin embargo, la pensadora Wendy Brown que se autodefine como progresista también critica el moralismo en la política a veces con las mismas razones. Interlocutores recientes en debates sobre moralismo racionalista han intentado aconsejar cómo evitar el moralismo racionalista, pero es uno de los vicios (...) que uno identifica en otros, mucho antes que en uno mismo. Volver a alguno de los aspectos de la filosofía de Oakeshott nos ayuda a aclarar los problemas y proporcionar algunas orientaciones para proseguir el debate. (shrink)

Until quite recently Michael Oakeshott has been widely regarded as a political thinker. So clearly has he been taken to express his political views that there is often little question as to where he lies in the political spectrum. He has been perceived by both �friend� and �foe� as one of the most eloquent twentieth- century exponents of the conservative cause. His best known work is a collection of essays first published together in 1962 as Rationalism in Politics and (...) Other Essays. The title, which is drawn from the first essay in the volume, belies a much broader agenda than one might at first expect. These �other essays� broach a diverse selection of subjects ranging from the idea of the university and what it is to be a historian to the part played by poetry in human experience. This might reveal something about the way in which Oakeshott works as well as what his project might be. He is not only interested in politics (this, if anything, is peripheral): he has a more general concern about a way of thinking which is encroaching upon how we understand ourselves. Oakeshott calls this way of thinking rationalism, and he identifies in rationalism an intellectual disposition to view the world as a series of problems to be solved by appeal to Reason. The rationalist reduces experience to instrumental relations, that is, he views all other objects in this world as means to his ends. Oakeshott identifies other hallmarks of rationalist thought but my present purpose leads me to concentrate on this particular aspect of rationalism. I mention rationalism only to give an indication of the type of thinking that Oakeshott has in his sights. (shrink)

In this book Paul Franco provides an authoritative introduction to the life and thought of Michael Oakeshott, one of the most important philosophical voices of the twentieth century. After sketching a brief biography of Oakeshott, Franco then examines his most distinctive ideas, including his early idealist theory of knowledge, his influential critique of rationalism and central social planning, and his liberal theory of civil association. Though best known as a political philosopher, Oakeshott also made significant contributions to (...) the philosophy of history, aesthetics, the philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of education. Franco highlights Oakeshott’s impressive achievements in each of these areas. His book is an essential introduction to the whole range of Oakeshott’s thought, and it sets the philosopher’s work in historical context while also demonstrating its relevance to contemporary debates in political philosophy. (shrink)

This book addresses a question fundamental for Oakeshott throughout his life, which is what we are doing when we read and discuss some memorable work in the history of political thought. The approach the book takes to Oakeshott’s response to this question is of particular interest in that it explores in detail extensive notes he made on the beginnings of political philosophy in ancient Greece in an unpublished set of notebooks in which he recorded his thoughts on many (...) different subjects throughout his life.In addition, the book gives contemporary significance to Oakeshott’s interpretation of the history of political thought by using it to confront a series of contemporary challenges to the study of the history of political thought and to the study of the ‘great books.’ In particular, Oakeshott’s distinction between ‘various kinds or levels of political thought’ is carefully analyzed, as is also the extent of his agreement and disagreement with Quentin Skinner. In the concluding chapter, the author relates Oakeshott’s view of the nature of the history of political thought to his well-known description of philosophy as ‘conversation’, describing it as an introduction to that conversation. (shrink)

The political systems of the Roman Republic were based almost entirely on tradition, “the way of the ancestors”, rather than on a written constitution. While the founders of the American Republic looked to ancient Rome as a primary model for their enterprise, nevertheless, in line with the rationalist spirit of their age, the American founders attempted to create a rational set of rules that would guide the conduct of American politics, namely, the US Constitution.These two examples offer a striking case (...) of the ideal types, famously delineated by Michael Oakeshott in “Rationalism in Politics” and elsewhere, between politics as a practice grounded in tradition and politics as a system based on principles flowing from abstract reasoning.This book explores how the histories of the two republics can help us to understand Oakeshott’s claims about rational versus traditional politics. Through examining such issues we may come to understand better not only Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism, but also modern constitutional theory, issues in the design of the European Union, and aspects of the revival of republicanism. (shrink)

Oakeshott and His Contemporaries is an exploration of the ideas of one of the most important twentieth-century English political philosophers vis-a-vis related ...

Michael Oakeshott , après des études à Cambridge et à Tübingen , enseigna l’histoire à Cambridge puis à Oxford , si l’on décompte trois années passées dans l’armée, de 1942 à 1945. Il fut ensuite professeur de science politique à la London School of Economics et donna des conférences à Harvard en 1958 (Morality..

This paper is addressed to a specific question: why did Oakeshott fail to follow his own methodological prescriptions when he wrote and delivered his lectures on the history of political thought? In that respect it is about the manner of his studying the history of political thought rather than about its substantive content. I will briefly characterise the architecture of his characterisation, and contend that his view of the history of political thought, at least at the philosophical level,is shared (...) by many historians and philosophers alike, including John Rawls. It is contended, however, that the subject matter of Oakeshott's lectures encompassed much more than his triadic conception of political thought was meant to capture. His ideal characters of Enterprise Association and Civil Association o not supersede or replace the triadic conception. The triadic conception is meant to encompass purely philosophical reflection, whereas his ideal associative characters may encompass reflection at all three of the levels he discusses. Had the subject-matter of the lectures been more restricted, would he have employed his recommended methodology? I suggest that he would not have done, and go on to ask whether we too should abandon the idea of conceiving the history of political thought in terms of the three master traditions he recommended. (shrink)

In the debate about Michael Oakeshott’s philosophy there is very little agreement on the theoretical and historical meaning of his skepticism. Starting from the assumption that skepticism is not a fixed theory but a tradition of ideas, this article draws on both published texts and archival materials to contend that Oakeshott developed his thought by confronting himself with, and even merging, different strands of skepticism: the ancient, the modern, as represented by Hobbes and Montaigne, and the idealist, as (...) conceived by F. H. Bradley. The article firstly shows Oakeshott’s awareness of ancient skepticism, even though its impact on his thought is contested and controversial. With regard to modern skepticism, it looks at how Oakeshott defines Hobbes’s skepticism in his “Introduction to Leviathan.” It also examines the relevance of Montaigne to Oakeshott’s image of conversation, his idea of human agency and conception of politics. Finally, the article illustrates the influence of Bradley’s skepticism on Oakeshott’s conception of philosophy and reveals the consistency between Oakeshott’s skepticism and idealism. What emerges is a complex picture, in which Oakeshott’s skepticism is a constellation of elements taken from a variety of sources. (shrink)

This essay attempts to provide a historical account of Michael Oakeshott’s famous distinction between civil and enterprise association. As such, it demonstrates that Oakeshott’s political skepticism and his concomitant view of civil association can in part be explained by his reliance on Augustinian theology. In a similar vein, Oakeshott’s linkage of enterprise association with the rationalism of Bacon must be considered in terms of Oakeshott’s understanding of Pelagianism and Gnosticism. Unsurprisingly, it will be demonstrated that despite (...) Oakeshott’s disagreements with the political philosopher Eric Voegelin, he was very impressed by Voegelin’s work on the Gnostic origins of modernity. Consequently, a major claim of this essay is that Oakeshott’s speculative understanding of modern political thought constitutes a theological genealogy of political modernity in all but name. (shrink)

When Michael Oakeshott died in 1990, there were only a handful of scholarly monographs about his thought. Twenty years later, in contrast, the burgeoning number of studies of his thought prompted o...

Michael Oakeshott reflected on the character of religious experience in various writings throughout his life. In Experience and Its Modes (1933) he analyzed science as a distinctive "mode," or account of experience as a whole, identifying those assumptions necessary for science to achieve its coherent account of experience in contrast to other modes of experience whose quests for coherence depend on different assumptions. Religious experience, he thought, was integral to the practical mode. The latter experiences the world as interminable (...) tension between what is and what ought to be. The question, Is there a conflict between science and religion? is, in Oakeshott's approach, the question, Is there a conflict between the scientific mode of experience and the practical mode? Insofar as we tend to treat every question as a practical one, these questions seem to make sense. But Oakeshott's analysis leads to the view that scientific experience and religious experience are categorically different accounts of experience abstracted from the whole of experience. They are voices of experience that may speak to each other, but they are not ordered hierarchically. Nor can either absorb the other without insoluble contradictions. (shrink)

Oakeshott sets out philosophical and historical views of the state. They are distinct, and their distinctiveness harmonizes with his notion of the exclusivity of philosophical and historical perspectives. The modal distinctness of philosophy, history, and practice is established in Experience and Its Modes and is then rehearsed in subsequent publications, notably in essays in Rationalism and Politics. History is a way of seeing the past that is at odds with practical thought and philosophy. It is the sign of ideology, (...) and its misperceptions of the relations between philosophy and practice that ideologists such as Lenin and Thatcher invoke abstractions of communism and the market to frame practical political decision-making. However, in considering art in the essay “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind,” Oakeshott imagines art to be independent of other activities and yet to maintain a conversational relationship between the modes of experience. What is meant by a conversation? For Oakeshott, a conversation does not preclude the independence of modes of experience from one another. The closeness between philosophy, practice, and history is also assumed and yet underplayed by the argument of On Human Conduct, which imagines theory to be separate from history and practice. In this paper, it is argued that the connections between practical, historical, and philosophical modes of understanding the state in Oakeshott’s work are closer than is suggested by the metaphor of conversation and at odds with the separation that is maintained in Experience and its Modes. (shrink)

The author explains Michael Oakeshott's distinctive theory of law through an explanation of its notion of authority. He explains the view that modern states are ambiguous, consisting partly of civil associations and partly of enterprise associations. Authority is not a function of people's attitudes to those in power, but exists when a government's action is itself accepted as sufficient reason for unconditional obedience. Authority in this sense cannot exist in enterprise association, commitment to which must be contingent on the (...) fulfillment of purposes common to all participants. But modern states are compulsory associations, different from each. Furthermore, authority could never be justified on a rational choice model, which must always be teleological in character. Because this means there can be no solution to the problem of political obligation, all philosophy can do is describe abstractly the Rule of Law state which does reconcile authority and liberty. (shrink)

This article attempts to make sense of Oakeshott's enigmatic comment in 'On Human Conduct' that it was perhaps injudicious of Hegel to use the word state in the Philosophy of Right for his conception of a bounded association. But the article does not confine itself to making sense of Oakeshott's meaning: it compares Oakeshott's conception of societas to Hegel's conception of der Staat, Oakeshott's conception of philosophy as an unconditional consideration of conditional objects with Hegel's conception (...) of philosophy as a reflexive consideration of the rationality immanent within unconditional objects, and Oakeshott's avoidance of divinity with Hegel's involvement in it. It is part of the purpose of this article to illustrate the suggestion that conceptions of God and conceptions of the state are closely related in the thought of both philosophers -- and possibly in all philosophy: and that the problem of the state is therefore a problem as much religious as secular. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Oakeshott's account of civility by drawing on the porcupine metaphor that Oakeshott borrows from Schopenhauer. I explain why Oakeshott thinks that civility is best understood as a moral practice, one which has a special significance for politics. I outline the conceptual differences between civility understood as a small virtue and as an attribute of the civil condition. Three major difficulties in Oakeshott's treatment are raised. The first concerns his view that 'civil' (...) is an adverbial qualifier; the second concerns the relation between civility in its moral and its political senses, and the third is about the relation between civility and justice. While recognizing what is distinctive about Oakeshott's account, I indicate reservations about his discussion through a series of comparisons with Schopenhauer, and I conclude that, on their own terms, neither philosopher is able to solve the problem the porcupines set for them. (shrink)

This book argues that Michael Oakeshott's political philosophy contributes to current debates in normative international theory and international political theory on the historical, social, and moral dimension of international society. Davide Orsi contends that the theory of civil association may be the ground for an understanding of international society as a rule-based form of moral association constituted by customary international law. The book also considers the role of evolving practices of morality in debates on international justice. Orsi grounds this (...) work on a study of Oakeshott's philosophical arguments and compares the Oakeshottian perspective to recent constructivist literature in International Relations. (shrink)

This book is a critique of Cambridge School Historical Contextualism as the currently dominant mode of history of political thought, drawing upon Michael Oakeshott's analysis of the logic of historical enquiry.

The Skeptic’s Oakeshott poses the thesis that Michael Oakeshott’s political philosophy is best understood from the vantage point of his skepticism and his intellectual affinity to Hobbes. Margaret Thatcher based much of her political philosophy on Oakeshott’s theories, but Gerencser shows how she widely misinterpreted his work. He argues persuasively against those who understand Oakeshott in terms of the influence of British idealism. Instead, Gerencser argues that Oakeshott adopts and softens Hobbes' idea of consent as (...) the basis of political authority. By insisting that political authority has its source in acknowledgement and recognition, Oakeshott’s philosophy opens the doors to democratic politics. The book ends with persuasive criticisms of Oakeshott. (shrink)

This essay examines the relationship between Oakeshott's political thought and a seemingly distinct realm of discourse -- history -- a ‘mode’ of experience that intrigued Oakeshott throughout his life.

In this paper I argue that Michael Oakeshott’s metaphysics of experience shares significant features with the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce and John Dewey and that these similarities highlight methodological norms guiding inquiry into philosophy’s value fields. Oakeshott, Peirce, and Dewey agree on (1) the primacy of experience in philosophical inquiry, (2) the dismissal of the capacity of intuition as a valid mode of experience contributing to a reliable epistemology, (3) a refusal of metaphysical dualism and a resulting continuity (...) principle, and (4) consonant notions of the conditions and pattern of inquiry. This comparative analysis opens up new possibilities for prudently advancing the value fields in philosophy. Inquiry into legal, moral, and political philosophies, given the insights of Oakeshott, Peirce, and Dewey, can proceed prudently upon these shared premises and the skepticism of rationalism in politics, ethics, and law which ensues from them. (shrink)

The intent of the exploration is not an attempt to uncover Oakeshott's intellectual influences, but rather to show the importance and coherence of Oakeshott's various themes by showing how they modify, amplify, and contrast with similar and related themes in the thought of seven better known thinkers - Montaigne, St. Augustine, Hegel, Hobbes, Benjamin Constant, Rousseau, and Hume."--BOOK JACKET.

The book explores Oakeshott's thought on the key role human imagination plays in relation to the political. It addresses four main themes: imagination, foundational narratives, the question of political societies' identities as well as that of human living-together, to use Hannah Arendt's expression. The book's main objective is to show that Oakeshott may be rightfully understood to be a philosopher of the imagination as well as a foundationalist thinker in the Arendtian narrative constructivist tradition.

This paper explores the relationship between religion and history in the writings of R.G. Collingwood, Michael Oakeshott, and Clement C. J. Webb. Focussing principally on the early work of Collingwood and of Oakeshott and the later work of Webb, the paper shows that for all three philosophers the development of historical understanding in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had important religious implications. While many of their British Idealist predecessors and contemporaries had responded to the 'higher criticism' (...) of the Bible by constructing speculative philosophies of history, Collingwood, Oakeshott and Webb understood history to be a genuine form of understanding that could not be so easily translated into other terms. Where Collingwood and Webb sought to integrate history with other expressions of mind, Oakeshott insisted on separating the various 'modes of experience'. The effect of this is to insulate religion from historical criticism but also, from the perspective of Collingwood and Webb, potentially undermine it by isolating it from ultimate truth. (shrink)

Michael Oakeshott criticises rationalism in politics because it excludes everything that is not grounded in and justified by theory. Theoretical knowledge, according to Oakeshott, isn’t capable of absorbing the given diversity because it operates in different categories than the reality it seeks to grasp. As a consequence, rationalism reduces politics to problem- solving activity. Oakeshott’s formula for the return to autonomous politics is its emancipation in civil association, a framework constituted in terms of common recognition of general (...) rules within which politics in the form of conversation is to be exercised. Corrective to Oakeshott’s utopian project is given by Michel Foucault’s thought where it is best shown how common institutions, norms and laws are a result of very complex power relations. (shrink)

Michael Oakeshott kritisiert den Rationalismus in der Politik, da er im Vorhinein alles ausschließe, das einer theoretischen Grundlage bzw. Rechtfertigung entbehre. Theoretisches Wissen könne jedoch nicht, so Oakeshott, alle Mannigfaltigkeit der Welt in sich aufnehmen, denn es operiere mit anderen Kategorien, als in der realen Welt vorzufinden seien. Folglich werde nach rationalistischen Gesichtspunkten die Politik auf das L ösen von Problemen reduziert. Oakeshotts Formel für eine Rückkehr zur Autonomie politischen Handelns ist dessen Emanzipierung innerhalb der bürgerlichen Vereinigung als (...) eines Rahmens, dessen Grundlage die Anerkennung allgemein verbindlicher Regeln bildet und in dem das politische Handeln in Form von Unterhandlungen vor sich geht. Ein Korrektiv zu Oakeshotts utopischem Projekt ist das Denken Michel Foucaults, das am besten demonstriert, inwiefern gesellschaftliche Institutionen, Normen und Gesetze von äußerst komplexen Machtverhältnissen abhängig sind. (shrink)

Michael Oakeshott’s account of political economy is claimed to have found its ‘apotheosis under Thatcherism’. Against critics who align him with a preference for small government, this article points to Oakeshott’s stress on the indispensability of an infrastructure of government-provided public goods, in which individual agency and associative freedom can flourish. I argue that Oakeshott’s account of political economy invites a contestatory politics over three types of public goods, which epitomize the unresolvable tension he diagnosed between nomocratic (...) and teleocratic conceptions of the modern state. These three types are the system of civil law, the by-products of the operation of civil law and public goods which result from policies. The article concludes that Oakeshott offers an important corrective to political theories which favour either market mediation or radical democratic governance of the commons as self-sustaining modes of providing and enjoying goods. (shrink)