British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (3):545-568 (2015)
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This paper examines Michael Oakeshott's ideas on the relation between political philosophy and normative thought. To this end, some of the most controversial concepts of his thought are considered in the context of the philosophical debates that developed after the success of analytic philosophy and, in particular, of Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic. First, the paper argues that, in contrast to analytic and ordinary language thinkers, Oakeshott defends the legitimacy and the rationality of normative thinking. To this end, the importance of the Oakeshottian concepts of tradition and moral practice is stressed, and the controversial notion of ‘pursuit of intimations’ is considered. Through a discussion of Oakeshott's unpublished notes, the relevance of Aristotle for the development of his thought is also highlighted. Second, the paper contends that Oakeshott sees political philosophy as a critical activity aiming at universal concepts. At the same time, the paper stresses the Oakeshottian distinction betw..
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DOI | 10.1080/09608788.2015.1007117 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge, and Presuppositions.Stephen P. Turner - 1994 - University of Chicago Press.
Rationalism in Politics, and Other Essays.Dorothy Emmett - 1963 - Philosophical Quarterly 13 (52):283.
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Oakeshott’s Political Philosophy of Civil Association and Constructivism in International Relations.Davide Orsi - 2015 - Journal of International Political Theory 11 (3):331-350.
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