T. H. Marshall, a British sociologist, gave a series of lectures in 1949 under the title “Citizenship and Social Class.” To many American intellectuals, his analysis still offers a persuasive account of the origins of the welfare state in the West. But Marshall spoke in the early postwar era, when the case for expanded social benefits seemed unassailable. Today's politics are more conservative. In every Western country the welfare state is under review. Yet Marshall's conception can still help define the (...) issues in social policy and the way forward. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to suggest that intentions are, as G. E. M. Anscombe puts it, not exclusively “private and interior” act-descriptions that agents alone determine. Rather, I argue that the true intention of an action is frequently constrained, and sometimes even determined, by the intersubjective and retrospective view of an action. I begin by offering an interpretation of Hegel’s account of intention in The Philosophy of Right—an interpretation that fits well with work by Charles Taylor and Michael (...) Quante, but not with a recent paper by Arto Laitinen. Next I offer examples that support the view—consistent with my reading of Hegel—that sometimes the intersubjective and retrospective account of an action trumps the agent’s prior subjective act-description. Finally, I suggest that the Hegelian view I sketch might be taken as a kind of externalism about intentions, on the order of externalism about epistemic justification. (shrink)

The non-financial effects (NFE) antitakeover amendment addresses the duties of company directors and management when faced with a possible takeover bid. The NFE amendment either permits or requires managers to consider the interests of the company's stakeholders during takeover bids. Other types of antitakeover devices have been viewed as protecting either stockholder or management interests. The NFE amendment would appear to protect a broad spectrum of interests including those of company employees, creditors, and the community in which the company operates. (...) Positive market returns to the adoption of NFE amendments provide some evidence that investors approve. The percent of both management and institutional ownership are positively related to the market reaction to the NFE amendment adoption. To the extent that institutional ownership proxies for the broad spectrum of stakeholder interest, NFE devices, unlike some other amendments that have been studied, appear to be in the interests of more than a single interest group. (shrink)

The non-financial effects (NFE) antitakeover amendment addresses the duties of company directors and management when faced with a possible takeover bid. The NFE amendment either permits or requires managers to consider the interests of the company's stakeholders during takeover bids. Other types of antitakeover devices have been viewed as protecting either stockholder or management interests. The NFE amendment would appear to protect a broad spectrum of interests including those of company employees, creditors, and the community in which the company operates. (...) Positive market returns to the adoption of NFE amendments provide some evidence that investors approve. The percent of both management and institutional ownership are positively related to the market reaction to the NFE amendment adoption. To the extent that institutional ownership proxies for the broad spectrum of stakeholder interest, NFE devices, unlike some other amendments that have been studied, appear to be in the interests of more than a single interest group. (shrink)

Here we use two filtered speech tasks to investigate children’s processing of slow (.

L'article part du fait qui apparaît de plus en plus clairement dans la psychologie américaine moderne de la personnalité, qu’un certain type de domination de la mère dans la famille exerce une influence fâcheuse sur l’évolution psychique des garçons et des filles. L’auteur étudie les diverses interprétations, qu’on peut donner de ce fait.La première interprétation discutée est celle-ci : pour des raisons biologiques, l’amour naturel serait nécessaire à une évolution saine de l’enfant ; l’égoïsme de la mère exercerait une influence (...) nocive parce qu’elle serait en opposition avec cette nécessité biologique. L’article indique que les rapports naturels de la mère et de l’enfant sont, sous bien des rapports, remplacés par des relations culturelles (en particulier pour l’alimentation), ce qui montre l’incertitude de cette interprétation.La deuxième explication discutée est celle-ci : la tendance à dominer l’enfant, à l’élever en vue de succès conformes aux désirs maternels, serait signe du caractère „névrosé“ de la mère, la nocivité de cette conduite serait imputable à la névrose de la mère. Mais, à l’aide des faits ethnologiques, l’article montre qu’une mère agressive, ambitieuse d’autorité n’exerce pas nécessairement une action nocive sur l’évolution du caractère de l’enfant, mais tout au contraire est susceptible de conduire à l’adaptation la meilleure des enfants aux exigences futures de la société.M. Mead présente une troisième explication possible ; l’influence nocive ne tiendrait pas à la structure du caractère de la mère, mais à la contradiction entre le rôle effectif de la mère dans la famille et son rôle officiel dans la société. En Amérique, la mère a pris effectivement la direction dans la famille, cependant il serait entièrement faux de parler d’un matriarcat, puisque cette domination de fait n’a pas de caractère officiel et n’est pas reconnue par la société. Rien n’a été changé à l’organisation patriarcale de la société américaine, mais les formes patriarcales ont été partiellement privées de leur contenu et sont en contradiction avec les rapports de fait à l’intérieur de la famille. On pourrait dire que la mère exerce son autorité à la manière d’un tyran et non d’un maître légitime. Cette forme de pouvoir maternel non contrôlé par les institutions sociales offre un moyen d’expliquer l’influence nocive de ce pouvoir sur les enfants.Der Aufsatz geht von der in der modernen amerikanischen Persönlichkeitsforschung immer evidenter werdenden Tatsache aus, dass ein gewisser Typ der Vorherrschaft der Mutter in der Familie eine schädliche Wirkung auf die seelische Entwicklung von Knaben und Mädchen hat. Die Verfasserin untersucht, welche verschiedenen Interpretationen für diesen Tatbestand möglich sind.Zunächst wird eine Interpretation besprochen, die davon ausgeht, dass aus biologischen Gründen für die gesunde Entwicklung eines Kindes mütterliche Liebe notwendig ist und dass aus dem Gegensatz zu dieser biologischen Notwendigkeit heraus die egoistische Mutter einen schädlichen Einfluss darstellt. Durch den Hinweis darauf, dass die „natürliche“ Beziehung zwischen Mutter und Kind in vielen anderen Hinsichten durch kulturelle ersetzt werde, speziell in der Ernährung, wird die Fragwürdigkeit dieses Gesichtspunktes begründet.Dann wird die Erklärung diskutiert, nach der die Tendenz, das Kind zu beherrschen und gewaltsam zu im Sinne der Mutter liegenden Erfolgen anzutreiben, ein Symptom des neurotischen Charakters der Mutter und die Schädlichkeit dieses Verhaltens eben in der Neurose der Mutter zu suchen sei. Es wird an ethnologischem Material gezeigt, dass eine aggressive und herrschsüchtige Charakterstruktur der Mutter nicht notwendigerweise schädliche Wirkungen auf die Charakterentwicklung der Kinder hat, sondern ganz im Gegenteil zur optimalen Anpassung der Kinder an die sie später erwartenden gesellschaftlichen Anforderungen führen kann.M. Mead legt eine dritte Erklärungsmöglichkeit vor : dass der schädliche Einfluss nicht in der Charakterstruktur der Mutter an sich zu suchen ist, sondern in dem Widerspruch zwischen der faktischen Rolle der Mutter in der Familie und ihrer „offiziellen“ Rolle in der Gesellschaft. Während die amerikanische Mutter häufig tatsächlich die Herrschaft in der Familie an sich gerissen hat, wäre es doch ganz falsch, von einem Matriarchat in Amerika zu sprechen, da die faktische Herrschaft in der Familie in keiner Weise den Charakter einer offiziellen und gesellschaftlich anerkannten Herrschaft der Frau angenommen hat. Vielmehr hat sich an der patriarchalischen Organisation der amerikanischen Gesellschaft nichts Entscheidendes geändert, aber die patriarchalischen Formen sind zum Teil ihres Inhaltes beraubt worden und stehen im Gegensatz zu den faktischen Verhältnissen in der Familie. Die Mutter übt ihre Herrschaft gleichsam nicht als ein rechtmässiger Herrscher, sondern als ein Tyrann aus. In dieser durch gesellschaftliche Institutionen nicht kontrollierten Form mütterlicher Herrschaft wird eine Erklärungsmöglichkeit für den schädlichen Einfluss dieser Herrschaft auf die Kinder gesehen. (shrink)

Recent research on the cognitive abilities and emotional capacities of animals has fueled the animal rights movement and renewed debate over the differences between human and non-human animals. This debate has not been central to sociology, although George Herbert Mead drew a very hard line between humans and animals by asserting that the latter were not capable of symbolic interaction. Sociologists are now beginning to question this assumption, and this article falls within this new line of research. We begin (...) by presenting alternative interpretations of symbolic interaction that allow for the possibility of such activity in non-human animals. We review recent research on symbolic interaction between humans and dogs, and we present our own research findings on human-feline interaction. We conclude that there is growing evidence that symbolic interaction is widely distributed throughout the animal kingdom, and that it enables animals to survive more effectively in a wide variety of environments. (shrink)

George H. Mead: A Therapy for the Malaise of Modernity? In his recent volume on Mead, Filipe Carreira da Silva proposes an interpretation of the pragmatist’s thought that develops through three fundamental points of reference. According to the author, science, selfhood and democratic politics constitute “the pillars” of a new approach to the problem of modernity; an approach in which the mutual interchange between these moments projects on the theoretical level a reflection of the relational...

This essay—part of a larger project of constructing a new, historically informed philosophy of dance, built on four phenomenological constructs that I call “Moves”—concerns the second Move, “gesture,” the etymology of which reveals its close connection to the Greek word “metaphor.” More specifically, I examine the treatments of gesture by the philosophers George Herbert Mead and Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, both of whom view it as the foundation of language. I conclude by showing how gesture can be used in (...) analyzing various types of dance, which in turn suggests transformational potential for philosophy, dance, and society as a whole. (shrink)

Although a number of commentators have remarked upon the simi larities between aspects of George Herbert Mead's social psychology and Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, there has been no sys tematic attempt to document the connection. This article attempts to do precisely that. First, the legitimacy of the connection is established by showing the likelihood that Mead knew this particular work by Smith, and by bringing together the various treatments of the matter made by commentators. Since (...) class='Hi'>Mead himself does not reference Smith's theory, however, the continuity can be demonstrated only on the level of ideas. Second, then, the movement of Mead's thought is recon structed through the terms 'individual' and 'social epistemology'. An account based upon the former posits self-consciousness as the pre condition for knowledge about others, while the latter makes the development of self dependent on a concept of community. Mead's div ision of the self into the 'I' and the 'me' is central in forcing the shift from the one to the other. Smith's account of moral action, it is then argued, rests upon the same logic. His ideas of 'changing roles in the fancy', the 'impartial spectator', and division of the self, parallel Mead's 'taking the role of the other' and discussion of the self. The 'ideal' spec tator corresponds to Mead's 'generalized other'. The article concludes by drawing a parallel between Mead and Smith on the universal facts of human nature and the moral community. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is, first, to describe how Husserl’s phenomenology begins with the transcendental ego and attempts to affirm by necessary insight the alter ego and the moral community of all rational beings, and, secondly, to evaluate this argument, using the thought of Schutz, Marx, and Mead. The paper concludes that Husserl’s and Schutz’s concepts of the social nature of the self are inadequate and that Marx and Mead offer a better analysis of how the social (...) nature of the self leads to the universal moral community. (shrink)

David Miller’s book is a comprehensive treatment of Mead’s philosophy based not only on his published works but also on his unpublished manuscripts and lecture notes. Miller portrays Mead as a systematic philosopher with well-developed views on epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, aesthetics and ethics, giving separate chapter treatments of his theory of the self, language, the world, the physical thing, perception, thinking, creativity, aesthetics and ethics. Throughout these chapters, Miller’s description of Mead as (...) a "social behaviorist" is detailed. Mead is portrayed as one who holds that mind, while not reducible to overt behavior, is understood in relation to such behavior. For thinking is simply the internalization of a process in which the thinker evokes in himself by his own behavior as with a language gesture, the functionally identical behavioral response that this gesture evokes in another. Here and in his description of Mead’s theory of the self and the physical thing, the social character of Mead’s philosophy is emphasized. (shrink)

This work is at once sympathetic and critical, as well as a very clear and perceptive treatment of some of the major theories of four pragmatists. The author holds pragmatism to be a significant contribution to modern thought in that it is a serious attempt to rethink philosophical problems in the light of new scientific developments, and is comprehensive in dealing with both old and contemporary problems. The separate treatments of Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey contain a biographical comment, (...) explanations of their philosophical positions, and separate sections of critical remarks. Peirce is the most extensively treated of the four. This section includes discussions of Peirce’s cosmological views, criticisms of Cartesianism, his views on inquiry, clarification of ideas, and the nature of thought. While in many ways sympathetic with Peirce’s thought, in particular his view that beliefs are in fundamental ways tied to action and expectation, Scheffler questions in the light of scientific practice, for example, whether doubt must as Peirce says, be real and unfeigned. Moreover he is critical of Peirce’s suggestion that science is a good method of fixing or stabilizing belief, and holds as insufficient his explanation of regularity on the basis of pure spontaneity alone. (shrink)

While rooted in careful study of Mead’s original writings and transcribed lectures and the historical context in which that work was carried out, the papers in this volume have brought Mead’s work to bear on contemporary issues in metaphysics, epistemology, cognitive science, and social and political philosophy.

Placing Goodenough and Deacon’s “From Biology to Consciousness to Morality” against the background of the ethical naturalism of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British moral theory, Yeager highlights the contribution the authors make to the moral sense tradition as well as indicating the limitations of such accounts of moral agency, judgment, and conduct. Yeager also identifies two strands of the essay that seem to open toward a more comprehensive account than the authors actually give. The first concerns the “interplay between self-interest and (...) pro-sociality,” and the other concerns the ethical implications of coevolution. On the latter point, the work of G. H. Mead is offered as an illuminating contrast. (shrink)

Jurgen Habermas' construction of a critical social theory of society grounded in communicative reason is one of the very few real philosophical inventions of recent times that demands and repays extended engagement. In this elaborate and sympathetic study which places Habermas' project in the context of critical theory as a whole past and future, J. M. Bernstein argues that despite its undoubted achievements, it contributes to the very problems of ethical dislocation and meaninglessness it aims to diagnose and remedy. Bernstein (...) further argues that the precise character of the failures of Habermas' program demonstrate the necessity for a return to the first generation critical theory of Adorno. Reading across nearly the whole range of Habermas' corpus, Recovering Ethical Life traces the development of the theory of communicative reason from its inception in Knowledge and Human Interests through its elaboration in The Theory of Communicative Action and into its defense against postmodernism in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity . In separate chapters Habermas' readings of Freud, Durkheim amd Mead, Adorno and Foucault, Castoriadis and Taylor are critically examined. The focus of Bernstein's analyses, however, is always problem centered and thematic rather than textual psychoanalytic theory as an account of self knowledge, the competing claims of ethical identity and moral reason, the place of judgment in practical reason, and the debate between philosophies of language based communities versus those oriented towards world-disclosure. Critical theory is unique among current philosophies in engaging with the problems of social injustice and nihilism by siding with an abstract moral reason that forfeits the processes of intersubjective recognition it intended to salvage. Even in the fine grain of Habermas' account of performative contradictions and the theory of discourses of application, Bernstein perceives a squandering of the resources of an ethical life in need of transfiguration. (shrink)

This book is a collection of essays in honor of Radoslav A. Tsanoff, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at Rice University for forty years. Besides a tribute to Tsanoff written by J. S. Fulton, there are ten essays written by distinguished philosophers, each considering a topic in his field of interest. Virgil Aldrich discusses the importance of language in an essay entitled "Self-Consciousness." An examination of the new in art and an attempt to explicate its value and rationale is (...) presented by Van Meter Ames; illustrative material is drawn from such sources as contemporary film, pop art and chance music. In "Social Science and Social Norms" Clifford Barrett discusses the relevance of facts and norms in systematic considerations of social scientists. C. P. Snow's concept of two cultures is examined by A. Cornelius Benjamin in "Philosophy and the Cultures." Other essays presented are "Philosophy and Common Sense" by George Boas, "Conscience and Conscientiousness" by A. Campbell Garnett, "Criteria for Ideas of God" by C. Hartshorne, and "Sovereignty and the Idea of Republic" by C. W. Hendel. Charles Morris examines the common themes of the pragmatic movement, discussing such fields as epistemology, axiology and cosmology, and such philosophers as Peirce, Dewey, Mead and Lewis. In the concluding essay G. R. Morrow discusses Plato's views about a God and the many gods of the Greek pantheon. This book is a loose collection of papers, lacking any single theme or determinate relation between the essays presented; each essay, however, is competently handled and is interesting in its own right.—E. M. (shrink)

A good and useful book with over 100 pages of appendices, bibliography and index, its utility perhaps will be due more to its qualities as a reference than as critique. The first of five parts sketches the background of pragmatism, concentrating on the problems of scientific knowledge. Part II gives a chapter each to Peirce, James, Dewey, Lewis, and G. H. Mead, emphasizing their answers to the problems of Part I. Part III treats pragmatism in Europe. Part IV is (...) called "Consequences." Here Thayer includes the attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction, a discussion of instrumentalism in philosophy of science, and he gives an exposition of Dewey's ethics. In Part V, "Speculations," the author lists attitudes and topics of renewed interest in contemporary philosophy which are characteristically pragmatic. This "Pragmatism" is a revolutionary shift in methodology and criticism. It finds that non-philosophical contexts are the initiating and terminating points of philosophical analysis, and it is tolerant of pluralism. The ethics of Dewey and Lewis, which stress the necessity for communication between philosophic valuation theory and the empirical sciences, are one expression of this "Pragmatism." The successes of an empirical philosophy which aims to account for originative thinking and valuing in either science or morals support Thayer's speculation that "the future may well be with Dewey, Lewis, and Mead."--M. B. M. (shrink)

Dance receives relatively little attention in the history of philosophy. My strategy for connecting that history to dance consists in tracing a genealogy of its dance-relevant moments. In preparation, I perform a phenomenological analysis of my own eighteen years of dance experience, in order to generate a small cluster of central concepts or “Moves” for elucidating dance. At this genealogical-phenomenological intersection, I find what I term “positure” most helpfully treated in Plato, Aristotle and Nietzsche; “gesture” similarly in Condillac, Mead (...) and Kristeva; “grace” in Avicenna, Schiller and Dewey; and “resilience” in Fanon, (Judith) Butler and Deleuze. With these analyses in place, I apply the four Moves in analyzing various forms of dancing (including salsa dancing and the pollen dance of the honeybee) and coordinate them to outline a comprehensive philosophy of dance. This philosophy points to certain conditions for an ideally flourishing, dancing society. And these conditions create the possibility for a coalition of sympathetic discourses (including critical race theory, queer theory, disability studies and democratic theory) united in pursuit of political virtue. The development of a philosophy of dance offers a deeper understanding of the intellectual values of a practice often identified with bodily immediacy and therefore judged uninteresting. It also reinvigorates philosophy with the dynamism and bodily relevance of the practice of dancing. Most important, it demonstrates the meaningful intersection of aesthetics and political ethics, by exploring how aesthetic practices underlie and inspire human flourishing. (shrink)

A critical and aware return to pragmatism entails a preliminary focus upon the possibility of productive communication and a possible exchange among fields of research often far apart in terms of methods and spheres of application. This difficulty is felt all the more strongly if we refer to the contested intellectual legacy of George H. Mead, one often divided between opposing and conflicting fields of investigation. In this paper, I propose a reinterpretation of his thought that I believe could (...) operate transversally. To do so, I interpret Mead’s idea of human creativity in a more radical way compared with some previous interpretations. This way, it is possible to see the constructive role of the relation between inter-subjective and intra-subjective communication as constitutive moments in an ethical self-construction of human beings. Finally, the peculiarity of human creativity, in all its complexity, shows itself as the starting point for responsible, normatively oriented conduct. Moreover, a new anthropological paradigm, also emerging from Mead’s suggestions, could become a source of inspiration for a renewed pattern of civic life and democratic citizenship. (shrink)

This volume publishes the papers which were offered and discussed by a group of philosophers and psychologists during a conference "designed to explore the interrelations between philosophical analyses of the family of concepts relating to the self... and empirical studies in psychology of the development and manifestations of self-control, self-knowledge, and the like," held in Chicago in 1975. The late editor arranged the papers "in terms of four topics" indicating the major themes they address. After his introduction, "Conceptual Issues in (...) the Psychology of the Self", written after the conference and intended as an harmonization of opposing views expressed in the discussions, he presents three papers concerned with psychological and philosophical aspects of "Self-Control and the Concept of Agency." In "Self-Control and the Self," Walter and Harriet N. Mischel start with "an overview of some of the main types of self-control that psychologists have researched". Such psychological studies reveal the human being as "an active, self-aware problem-solver, capable of changing himself and achieving substantial self-control through the application of rational principles to a much greater degree than has usually been supposed in psychology". William P. Alston intends to determine in what ways the self has to be taken into account in the psychology of motivation in "Self-Intervention and the Structure of Motivation". That "there is an agent that does the integrating... and so on," is to be recognized as a fact. The understanding of this self-intervention, however, demands the admission of at least two motivational systems of higher-level-wants and of lower-level-wants, differing in structure and in the mode of acquisition. Charles Taylor explores "what is involved in the notion of self, of a responsible human agent" in his paper, "What is Human Agency". A person is found to be essentially characterized by the capacity for reflective self-evaluation. "Self-Knowledge" is discussed in the following two articles. Kenneth J. Gergen defends "The Social Construction of Self-Knowledge" in line with ideas of George Herbert Mead. Self-knowledge is "primarily a socially mediated and essentially arbitrary construction of experience". In its case "there is virtually nothing to know". This socio-cognitive conception of the self is emphatically rejected by David W. Hamlyn in his "Self-Knowledge". Knowledge about oneself as studied in psychology and sociology is essentially different from self-knowledge in the full sense, "connected with some kind of commitment to oneself". Different scientific views of certain aspects of human existence are presented in "Self-Development and Its Failures". Freud’s conception of the human person finds a realistic correction in the theoretical and practical work of contemporary psychoanalysts insisting upon the need of the concept of a "cohesive self," as described in Ernest S. Wolf’s "'Irrationality’ in a Psychoanalytic Psychology of the Self". This need is denied in behavioristic psychology, as Willard F. Day, Jr. shows in "On the Behavioral Analysis of Self-Deception and Self-Development". "To a behaviorist, there is no such thing" as the self. Consequently, there cannot be a genuine self-development as distinguished from a progress toward creating a desirable environment. Self-deception means fighting the environment. "A Critique of the Behavioral Paradigm and an Alternative Conceptualization" is offered by Paul F. Secord in an analysis of "Making Oneself Behave". Meaning and deficiencies of the understanding of the self in sociological social psychology are outlined by George J. McCall in "The Social Looking-Glass: A Sociological Perspective on Self-Development". The self is seen as essentially a social self or looking-glass self. Problems with regard to an explanation of the personal choice of behavior of a determined social role, however, seem to demand impulses as well as institutions as a locus of self-appraisal. "The Meaning of ’self’ and the Multiplicity of Selves" is the title of the last section of the book. Various uses of the term ’self’ are distinguished by Stephen E. Toulmin in "Self-Knowledge of the Self". The author is primarily concerned with establishing the relations of even the sophisticated psychological and psychiatric uses of the term to the everyday experience and language of reflective conduct. Rom Harré finally hopes to interpret "the syntax of much of the talk of ‘I’ and ‘me', ‘thou’ and ‘we'... as monodramatic performances" in "The Self in Monodrama". (shrink)

The basic tenets of “classical” naturalism (exemplified in the work of Mead, Buchler, and Randall, among others) are delineated and distinguished from other versions of naturalism. Classical naturalism is also distinguished from reductive materialism and idealism. Nature is asserted to be indefinitely plural and not amenable to monistic or dualistic categorial schemes; that is, the principle of “ontological parity” is maintained. The method of inquiry of naturalism is outlined, along with the notion of truth as perspectivally objective. The metaphysical (...) hypotheses are then used to examine culture. Culture is found to be the specific environment of human being, arising out of, but irreducible to, other natural processes. Culture is described as the cumulative gestures of the human social organism as it discovers and creates itself in mutual constitution with other natural processes and products. (shrink)

Professor Lee presents us with a thoroughly worked out and clear epistemology from a pragmatic-naturalist standpoint; his acknowledged intellectual mentors have been C. I. Lewis, G. H. Mead, and H. Bergson. A neo-Kantian without Kant’s fixed structures, Lee holds that the categories by which we interpret the "intuitive flux" need not be rigid because the flux itself is not of this character. "The concepts are derived from experience; thus there is no mystery or miracle involved in their application to (...) experience." Where does the necessary or apodictic element in knowledge come from? There is none; Lee holds it to be the distinctive advance of twentieth-century science to have recognized the hypothetical-deductive nature of all knowledge. It is to critically underscore this open-ended dimension to knowledge that Lee introduces his concept of the "continuum." Lee attempts to find an epistemic locus in an experience of continuity or "passage," "the vaguely felt wholeness that contains no gaps or separateness," but argues his case chiefly by exploiting the discoveries in mathematics of the discrepancy between our "intuition" of continuity on the one hand, and our ability to express this intuition in a formal system or work our way back to it from discrete parts. The fallacy of "misplaced discreteness" consists in taking a selection from the continuous flux as an adequate representation or definitive characterization of the entire flux. But "a continuum is not to be obtained from discrete parts, no matter how tightly they are jammed up against each other." Lee attacks the view that "one and only one analysis of the situation is correct. Such a demonstration is impossible if events are cut from a continuum; the assumption of a single analysis is unjustified.". (shrink)

Josiah Royce (1855-1916), philosopher of community, taught that social consciousness arises from ego-alter contrasts and is guided by taboos and, before George H. Mead, by reciprocal gestures. A major Roycean contribution was his five conditions for coexperiencing consciousness of genuine community. Related to Freud (via Putnam), Royce did early work on “identification theory” and helped midwife psychotherapy’s birth in America. Contrasting with William James’s basic differentiation of consciousness according to the quality of its contents (feeling, thought, and conduct), Royce (...) preferred a norm of increasing self-agency (shown in sensitivity, docility, and initiative). The temperaments of James as artist and of Royce as rational interpreter differentiated their approaches to psychology. (shrink)

For several decades, Dr. Morris has worked primarily with two problems: the development of a general theory of signs, and the development of a general theory of value. He approached both problems in terms of George Mead's theory of action or behavior. This book brings together these two lines of development.In many languages there is a term like the English "meaning" which has two poles: that which something signifies and the value or significance of what is signified. The nature (...) of signification and significance, as well as their relations within human behavior, is the subject matter of this book.This book is addressed to philosophers and to students of the behavioral sciences, but it will also appeal to anyone seriously interested in the study of human communication. (shrink)

Moje zainteresowanie pracami i dziełem Michaiła Bachtina oraz Eugena Rosenstocka-Huessy bierze swój początek z odkrycia, ze obaj myśliciele zgodnie twierdzili, iż religijna moc języka oraz mowy wyrasta z różnorodnych kryzysów życiowych. Theoria przez nich stworzona zbudowana jest na gruncie praxis i czerpie swą siłę ze zderzenia doświadczeń duchowych i intelektualnych obu filozofów z rewolucyjnym wrzeniem otaczającej ich współczesności. Wykład niniejszy to próba nawiązania dialogu z osobami podzielającymi podobne zainteresowania i troski. Pisząc go kierowałem się także pragnieniem zaabsorbowania uwagi moich słuchaczy (...) przedstawione w nim istoty metalingwistyki głoszonej przez „nieortodoksyjnego" prawosławnego teoretyka literatury i filozofa języka, Michaiła Bachtina, oraz znaczeniem metanomiki opracowanej przez „rewolucyjnie konserwatywnego" chrześcijańskiego myśliciela mowy i filozofa społecznego, Eugena Rosenstocka-Huessy. Zamiarem moim jest przedstawienie roli, jaką społeczno-religijne modele filozofii i socjologii oparte na mowie i języku mogą^ odegrać w dążeniach do zaprowadzenia pokojowego współistnienia na całej naszej planecie. Ten właśnie obszar zainteresowań został określony przez Williama Jamesa, amerykańskiego filozofa pragmatyzmu, mianem „moralnego równoważnika wojny”. Przywołując na pamięć ogromną rzeszę myślicieli, których prace odnoszą się bezpośrednio do wyznaczonego tu obszaru – a w pewnych przypadkach noszą znamiona dzieła prekursorskiego – nie możemy poprzestać na wymienieniu tylko nazwiska Williama Jamesa. Inne wielkie postaci to: Charles Sanders Pierce, George Herbert Mead, a także myśliciele podejmujący zagadnienia, które później stały się treścią filozofii Rosenstocka-Huessy, tj. Giovanni Battista Vico, J. G. Hamann, Comte de Saint-Simon oraz Giuseppe Ferrari. (shrink)

Some decades before Umberto Eco refounded semiotics in the sixties, Alfred Schutz had already elaborated a theory on signs and symbols. Moreover, as Schutz himself affirms, neither was he the first to do so. The thoughts of Charles Sanders Peirce had already clearly influenced American pragmatism, and thinkers like George Herbert Mead and Ernst Cassirer had developed a theory of symbols, both referred to by Schutz in his later works. Nonetheless, sign theory was already present in his first book, (...) Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt, and can be traced to the influence of Edmund Husserl. Schutz’s focus on the analysis of the relationship between individual and society fomented his perception of the importance of intermediary communication and sign processes as the setting and interpretation of signs, “Zeichensetzung und Zeichendeutung”, reflections that in his later working phase resulted in a proper sign theory, which is analyzed in the following article. Based on Husserl’s concept of pairing, Schutz here develops his theory of appresentational references, comprising a subdivision of: marks, indications, signs and symbols. This involves the concept of representation, a relationship between the signifier and the signified, and a subjective as well as constructive interpretation by actors. Consequently, this concept involves an objective sign system, a social situation and, as inserted into a process of communication, complementary producers and receptors of signs and symbols. In the final comments the question is addressed whether, and in what sense, given the preceding theory of appresentational references, Schutz would hold that reality is a symbolic construction, as proposes the title of the 2016 conference on Schutz in Tokyo, The Symbolic Construction of Reality. (shrink)

This dissertation examines Edmund Husserl's call for a "science of the life-world." It is argued that the most appropriate response is to develop such a science in specifically sociological terms. This argument is made by exploring particular themes in sociological theory and the philosophy of the social sciences. The dissertation begins by explicating Husserl's aspiration to understand the "life-world" and ends with the fulfillment of this aspiration in a "sociology of the life-world." ;The initial focus is upon Husserl's ambiguous concepts (...) of "life-world" and "intersubjectivity." These gain coherence when "intersubjectivity" is understood as the content of "life-world" and subject matter of philosophy. Husserl's argument implies that intersubjectivity should supersede subjectivity as the focus of study. Schutz contends that Husserl's conception of the life-world is artificial and that his philosophy is beset by an insurmountable solipsism. Schutz's alternative is to approach intersubjectivity as an empirical fact. This opens up everyday life to sociological investigation. Although Schutz follows Husserl's recommendations, it is argued that he misconstrues the scope of Husserl's philosophy and, subsequently, his own thought terminates in a reification of method and failure to achieve a science of the life-world. Mead provides a way to remedy this failure by beginning with the relationship between individual and society. Yet Mead's conception of intersubjectivity also fails, as it is undermined by an account of meaning premised on the individual alone. ;By introducing the idea of "universal symbol," however, Mead suggests the study of language as the central topic for a sociology of the life-world. In the final chapters this dissertation draws upon the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michael Oakeshott, and Harold Garfinkel to discuss how language can be conceived and studied as a set of practices shared within a society. While realizing Husserl's call, the solution of focusing on language raises the question of the scope and nature of sociological inquiry. The dissertation concludes by arguing that sociology, since its procedures are governed by the everyday character of phenomena it studies, should be understood as a descriptive mode of inquiry. In this way, Husserl's recommendations may be enacted in a sociology of the life-world. (shrink)