On Philosophy and Philosophers is a volume of unpublished philosophical papers by Richard Rorty, a central figure in late-twentieth-century intellectual debates and a primary force behind the resurgence of American pragmatism. The first collection of new work to appear since his death in 2007, these previously unseen papers advance novel views on metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, philosophical semantics and the social role of philosophy, critically engaging canonical and contemporary figures from Plato and Kant to Kripke and Brandom. This book's diverse offerings, (...) which include technical essays written for specialists and popular lectures, refine our understanding of Rorty's perspective and demonstrate the ongoing relevance of the iconoclastic American philosopher's ground-breaking thought. An introduction by the editors highlights the papers' original insights and contributions to contemporary debates. (shrink)

According to a view widely held in the media and in public discourse more generally, online hating is a social problem on a global scale. However, thus far there has been little scientific literature on the subject, and, to our best knowledge, there is even no established scholarly definition of online hating and online haters in the first place. The purpose of this manuscript is to provide a new perspective on online hating by, first, distinguishing online hating from the phenomena (...) it is often confused with, such as trolling, cyberstalking, and online hate speech, and, second, by proposing an operational definition of online hating and online haters based on ethnographic interviews and surveys of the existing scholarly literature. (shrink)

There are a growing number of publications arguing that if we had more wonder in social life, then its quality would be significantly improved, and that we therefore need an “ethics” or a “politics” of wonder. The aim of this paper is to show that that message is unfortunate, and this is for two reasons. First, wonder does not generally have the positive political and moral effects that are attributed to it, so to assume that it does may lead one (...) to adopt unrealistic social policies. Second, wonder does potentially have a number of negative moral and politicaleffects, so social policies that put a premium on wonder may bring adverse consequences. In this way, the paper makes a general case against wonder as a positive force in morality and politics. (shrink)

Given the adage “older and wiser,” it seems justified to assume that older people may be stereotyped as more moral than younger people. We aimed to study whether assessments of a person’s morality differ depending on their age. We asked 661 individuals from seven societies (Australians, Britons, Burusho of Pakistan, Canadians, Dani of Papua, New Zealanders, and Poles) whether younger (~20-year-old), middle-aged (~40-year-old), or older (~60-year-old) people were more likely to behave morally and have a sense of right and wrong. (...) We observed that older people were perceived as more moral than younger people. The effect was particularly salient when comparing 20-year-olds to either 40- or 60-year-olds and was culturally universal, as we found it in both WEIRD (i.e. Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) and non-WEIRD societies. (shrink)

This article considers the Undercover Surrealism exhibition curated at London’s Hayward Gallery and reflects on the practices of documentation, archiving and exhibition when the topic of the exhibition, as in this case, is a journal that in its most radical intention was set up to critique the practices of exhibition and documentation. The short and controversial life of Georges Bataille’s Documents unfolds as an often deliberately confusing juxtaposition of images and articles. The exhibition aims to represent both the sometimes incompatible (...) interests of the journal’s collaborators and the public dispute between Bataille and Breton over the aims of Surrealism. The article explores the intentions, risks, and possible effects of the exhibition in the context of Bataille’s own philosophy and his own peculiar part in the publication of Documents, which in its time was a contemporary review of diverse cultural phenomena interspersed with subversive dictionary entries. The article thus raises the question of what happens to the subversive intentions of a project like Documents in the scholarly historicist environment of public exhibition space. (shrink)

While more species are being identified as cultural on a regular basis, stark differences between human and animal cultures remain. Humans are more richly cultural, with group-specific practices and social norms guiding almost every element of our lives. Furthermore, human culture is seen as cumulative, cooperative, and normative, in contrast to animal cultures. One hypothesis to explain these differences is grounded in the observation that human children across cultures appear to spontaneously over-imitate silly or causally irrelevant behaviors that they observe. (...) The few studies on over-imitation in other species are largely taken as evidence that spontaneous over-imitation is not present in other species. This leads to the over-imitation hypothesis – that the differences between human culture and animal cultures can be traced to the human unique tendency to over-imitate. In this paper, we analyze the current state of the literature on animal over-imitation and challenge the adequacy of the over-imitation hypothesis for the differences between humans and animal cultures. To make this argument, we first argue that the function of human over-imitation is norm-learning and that over-imitation, like skill-learning, should be subject to selective social learning effects. Then we review the empirical evidence against animal over-imitation and argue that these studies do not take into account the relevant variables given the normative and selective nature of over-imitation. We then analyze positive empirical evidence of over-imitation in great apes and canids from the experimental literature and conclude that the current body of evidence suggests that some canids and primates may have the capacity for over-imitation. This paper offers a methodological suggestion for how to study animal over-imitation, and a theoretical suggestion that over-imitation might be much more widely found among species. The larger implication for claims about human uniqueness suggests that if we do find widespread evidence of over-imitation across species, many of the current theories of human uniqueness that focus on human hyper-cooperation or social norms may have only identified a difference of degree, not of kind, between humans and other animals. (shrink)

In this collection of essays, Feinberg gathers together a number of articles which he has written over the past few years, most of which have appeared in print elsewhere. The few changes made for the present edition do not alter the fundamental content of any of the articles. In the introduction, Feinberg suggests that just as there are general areas of philosophical interest called "theory of value," "theory of knowledge," etc., so there should similarly be a general rubric for the (...) area dealing with questions which are applicable both to the philosophy of law and moral philosophy. For this purpose, Feinberg chooses "theory of responsibility." Both the title of the book and the name for this area of philosophical concern reflect the difficulties inherent in this general area. "Doing" can be applied to an individual who performs actions. Does "deserving" have an equivalent extension? "Responsibility" is a concept which covers both the moral notion of "culpability" and the legal notion of "liability." But is the same criterion for application of the concept of responsibility operative in both the legal and moral domains? Is the concept of "at fault" used univocally in moral and legal contexts? These are just a few of the many questions which arise when discussing a "theory of responsibility." Feinberg has answers for some. He points readers in a direction from which other answers might be found. If nothing else this book is a good launching pad into an area of philosophical concern which is just beginning to be explored.--W. P. G. (shrink)

In all of the writings of Martin Buber there is one major theme which serves as a peg upon which he hangs most of his further thoughts. Nahum Glatzer uses this underlying theme, interpreting it as a "way of response," and brings together selections from many of Buber's works. Thus not only does the reader see the centrality of the "way of response" for this great Jewish thinker, but he captures a feeling for the man himself as well. The "way (...) of response" is not a concept expounded but a life lived, and the selections Glatzer employs in his book brings this out very well.—W. P. G. (shrink)

Some experiments are risky in that they cannot repeatedly produce certain phenomenon at will for study because the scientific knowledge of the process generating the uncertain phenomenon is poorly understood or may directly contradict with existing scientific knowledge. These experiments may have great impact not just to the scientific community but to mankind in general. Banning them from study may incur societies a great opportunity cost but accepting them runs the risk that scientists are doing junk science. How to make (...) an informed decision to accept/reject such study scientifically for the mainstream scientific community is of great importance to mankind. Here, we propose a statistical methodology to handle the situation. Specifically, we consider the likelihood of not observing the phenomenon after n trails so that it is statistically significant to have nil result. Consequently, we reject the hypothesis that there is some probability that we observe the phenomenon. (shrink)

St. Thomas Aquinas envisaged theology to be a kind of scientia which was considered as a kind of first cause science. However, science of that time is different from “modern” science. Recently, a theory of scientific study is developed, which outlines science by a theory and some models similar to knowledge in physics. According to this theory, sciences organize their knowledge consisting of theories, models and experiments interacting with physical situations. Perhaps, it is possible to organize knowledge of Christian theology (...) in a similar way as science (from the perspective of Christian belief). Doing this requires extensive and deep knowledge of both science and Christian theology. This paper only attempts to sketch such a theology, which is coined scientia theology to distinguish it from the existing scientific theology of McGrath. Our theology consists of a theory that is outlined here, several historical event models as well as various experiments that provide us with observations supporting the related models and principles. The theory of our theology interacts with the models which may retrodict or are supported by observations from the experiments that interact with the physical situations. (shrink)

This essay attempts to answer the question of how one commemorates the event of thinking by raising it in relation to some commemorative texts. Derrida’s Demeure, Athènes provides an exemplary point of departure, but the seminars concerned with the death penalty raise the stakes in readings that deeply trouble an inheritance fixated on the determination of death, with Socrates and Oedipus as ancient figures of an enduring culture. The essay touches on Freud and Heidegger as dissenting figures and concludes by (...) commemorating three distinctive thinkers: Lauren Berlant, Jean-Luc Nancy and Bernard Stiegler. (shrink)

Originally published in 1977, this volume analyzes aspects of elementary schooling in the nineteenth century and the ways in which it prepared working-class children for life in industrial Britain. The book examines: The procedures and practices of different types of schools. The ideologies guiding elementary education The social implications of curriculum content and pupils’ and parents’ attitudes to the education provided by the church and state.

A scholarly edition of a work by Adam Smith. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

Die Kritik des späten Wittgenstein am logizistischen Programm zur Begründung der Mathematik, vor allem im Blick auf die Definition der Zahl als Klasse von Klassen, und die darauf gegründete Explikation des Sinnes arithmetischer Sätze wird systematisch rekonstruiert. Entgegen einer verbreiteten Auffassung zeigen die Analysen Wittgensteins, daß Frege und Russell den Zahlbegriff nicht auf den „grundlegenderen" Begriff der eineindeutigen Zuordnung „reduzieren". Entsprechend sind Zahlen nicht mehr als durch Abstraktion erreichbare, echte Eigenschaften von Klassen zu verstehen, sondern als Formen oder Möglicfikeiten, die (...) die Beschreibung der Erfahrungswelt a priori bestimmen. Femer wird die wesentliche Selbständigkeit mathematischer Techniken gegenüber Techniken der Logistik durch einige Betrachtungen deutlich, welche die für den Fall größerer Zahlen unvermeidbare Benutzung vertrauter Bündelungssysteme, etwa der Dezimalnotation, bei Beweisen im Russellschen System zum Thema haben. (shrink)

Heidegger affirmed traditional technology, but was opposed to science-based modern technology, in which everything (including man) is considered to be a mere “resource”. This opposition was expressed in the form of deep questioning and a suspicion of superficial evaluation, because the true nature of things was often concealed, though disclosed at times. Ways in which engineers should question technology are proposed, highlighting some of the hazards and injustices associated with technology and also its subtle sociological and psychological influences. The demands (...) of engineering ethics and the use of metaphor in design are other ways in which a narrowly rationalistic technological outlook can be confronted. (shrink)

In this article we outline the ways in which questions of language have both revealed problems with conceptions of knowledge and suggested constructive ways of addressing those problems. Having examined the limitations of instrumental notions of language, we outline some alternatives, especially those developed from the middle of the 19th and throughout the 20th century. We locate forceful and influential philosophical interventions in the writings of Nietzsche and Heidegger and foundational revisions in the linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure and his (...) structuralist inheritors. We also chart the parallel path of literary theory from Mallarmé through Blanchot and poststructuralism to deconstruction. We conclude, after making some observations about the politicization of language in the works of feminist and postcolonial theorists, with some remarks about how the question of language helps to problematize global knowledge. (shrink)

In this article we outline the ways in which questions of language have both revealed problems with conceptions of knowledge and suggested constructive ways of addressing those problems. Having examined the limitations of instrumental notions of language, we outline some alternatives, especially those developed from the middle of the 19th and throughout the 20th century. We locate forceful and influential philosophical interventions in the writings of Nietzsche and Heidegger and foundational revisions in the linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure and his (...) structuralist inheritors. We also chart the parallel path of literary theory from Mallarmé through Blanchot and poststructuralism to deconstruction. We conclude, after making some observations about the politicization of language in the works of feminist and postcolonial theorists, with some remarks about how the question of language helps to problematize global knowledge. (shrink)

A crucial aspect of scientific realism is what do we mean by true. In Luk’s theory and model of scientific study, a theory can be believed to be “true” but a model is only accurate. Therefore, what do we mean by a “true” theory in scientific realism? Here, we focus on exploring the notion of truth by some thought experiments and we come up with the idea that truth is related to what we mean by the same. This has repercussion (...) to the repeatability of the experiments and the predictive power of scientific knowledge. Apart from sameness, we also found that truth is related to the granularity of the observation, the limit of detection, the distinguishability of the objects in theory, the simultaneous measurements of objects/processes, the consistencies of the theory and the one-to-one correspondence between terms/events and objects/processes, respectively. While there is no guarantee that we can arrive at the final “true” theory, we have a process/procedure with more and more experiments together with our own ingenuity, to direct us towards such a “true” theory. For quantum mechanics, since a particle is also regarded as a wave, quantum mechanics cannot be considered as a true theory based on the correspondence theory of truth. Failing this, truth may be defined by the coherence theory of truth which is similar to the coherence of beliefs. However, quantum mechanics may not be believed to be a true theory based on the coherence theory of truth because wave properties and particle properties may contradict. Further research is needed to address this problem if we want to regard quantum mechanics as a “true” theory. (shrink)