Abstract

In this collection of essays, Feinberg gathers together a number of articles which he has written over the past few years, most of which have appeared in print elsewhere. The few changes made for the present edition do not alter the fundamental content of any of the articles. In the introduction, Feinberg suggests that just as there are general areas of philosophical interest called "theory of value," "theory of knowledge," etc., so there should similarly be a general rubric for the area dealing with questions which are applicable both to the philosophy of law and moral philosophy. For this purpose, Feinberg chooses "theory of responsibility." Both the title of the book and the name for this area of philosophical concern reflect the difficulties inherent in this general area. "Doing" can be applied to an individual who performs actions. Does "deserving" have an equivalent extension? "Responsibility" is a concept which covers both the moral notion of "culpability" and the legal notion of "liability." But is the same criterion for application of the concept of responsibility operative in both the legal and moral domains? Is the concept of "at fault" used univocally in moral and legal contexts? These are just a few of the many questions which arise when discussing a "theory of responsibility." Feinberg has answers for some. He points readers in a direction from which other answers might be found. If nothing else this book is a good launching pad into an area of philosophical concern which is just beginning to be explored.--W. P. G.