Hard Truths is an important book in its own right. It is also the latest contribution to a complex and impressive project that Elijah Milligram has been developing from his first book onwards. There he characterized practical induction as a type of reasoning that enables agents to learn from experiences of the new and the unfamiliar, agents whose inferences are from beliefs that they have formed either ‘in ways that have a suitable amount to do with [their] truth’, or, when (...) ‘the appeal to truth is unhelpful’, in ways that underwrite such inferences as they are committed to drawing . In his introduction to his anthology on practical reasoning, Millgram catalogued the presently competing theories of practical reasoning, posing the question: what kind of reasoning should we employ in deciding between the claims of rival theories? The subtitle of his third book , ‘Practical Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral Theory’, already suggests its central thesis, that we should first survey the range of theories of practical reasoning , should then identify which moral theory it is with which each theory of practical reasoning is paired , should next decide which theory of practical reasoning is correct , and, finally, should adopt the moral theory paired with that theory of practical reasoning. There are at least three clusters of problems that badly need extended attention, if the claims of these three books are to be sustained: one concerning the account of truth presupposed by Millgram, a second to do with the inferences that we need to employ, and a third concerning the unity of reasoning agents. All three provide Hard Truths with subject-matter, but Millgram’s principal focus is …. (shrink)

This classic and controversial book examines the roots of the idea of virtue, diagnoses the reasons for its absence in modern life, and proposes a path for its recovery.

The paper examines representative cases of ``dishonest'' voting. In all but one case the claim that ``strategic voting'' is ``dishonest'' is refuted. In all cases the effects of ``misrepresentation'' need never harm any majority. Indeed majorities may benefit from ``strategy'' (in non-cycle cases too). In fact democracy demands ``strategy''. Although the universal value of the choice set is disputed even in the one recalcitrant case, the result is, after all, an element in the ``honest'' choice set.

Let n be a positive integer and FAℓ be the free abelian lattice-ordered group on n generators. We prove that FAℓ and FAℓ do not satisfy the same first-order sentences in the language if m≠n. We also show that is decidable iff n{1,2}. Finally, we apply a similar analysis and get analogous results for the free finitely generated vector lattices.

Voters satisfy maximin or maximax in their choices between sets of alternatives and secure a Pareto improvement by all voting strategically under simple majority voting for particular sincere preferences. Thus the assumption that strategic voting is a bad thing is challenged and the idea that we should reject voting because of the possibility of misrepresentation dismissed.

The paper examines representative cases of ``dishonest'''' voting. In all but one case the claim that ``strategic voting'''' is ``dishonest'''' is refuted. In all cases the effects of ``misrepresentation'''' need never harm any majority. Indeed majorities may benefit from ``strategy'''' (in non-cycle cases too). In fact democracy demands ``strategy''''. Although the universal value of the choice set is disputed even in the one recalcitrant case, the result is, after all, an element in the ``honest'''' choice set.

One of us is a teacher educator (Margaret) and the other is a prospective teacher (Andrew). In our experiences within these roles, we increasingly see and hear little educative concern for the epistemological question "What counts as knowledge?" alongside the ontological question "What does it mean to be a teacher in classrooms?" Instead of grappling with these questions, curricular enactment in many classrooms proceeds through tightly controlled conditions with criteria that insist on pre-determined management modes with little time or space (...) for teachers to ask what ought to count as knowledge or what teaching for student understanding might feel and look like in practice. At the same time, many teachers are .. (shrink)

Impossibility theorems for 2-person and majority continuous games on the unit circle are presented. The emphasis is on simple methods, albeit generating new results, to offer insights into the sophisticated results of theorists in topological social choice.

This discussion begins from the dilemma, posed in some earlier writing by Alasdair MacIntyre, that education is essential but also, in current economic and cultural conditions, impossible. The potential for resolving this dilemma through appeal to ‘practice’, ‘narrative unity’, and ‘tradition’(three core concepts in After Virtue and later writings) is then examined. The discussion also explores the relationship of education to the modern state and the power of a liberal education to create an ‘educated public’ very different in character from (...) the electorates of contemporary democratic regimes. It concludes with some remarks on the role of education in combating prejudice against certain kinds of human difference. (shrink)

This edition includes a substantial new preface by the author, in which he discusses repression, determinism, transference, and practical rationality, and offers a comparison of Aristotle and Lacan on the concept of desire. MacIntyre takes the opportunity to reflect both on the reviews and criticisms of the first edition and also on his own philosophical stance.

A Short History of Ethics has over the past thirty years become a key philosophical contribution to studies on morality and ethics. Alasdair MacIntyre writes a new preface for this second edition which looks at the book 'thirty years on' and considers its impact. A Short History of Ethics guides the reader through the history of moral philosophy from the Greeks to contemporary times. MacIntyre emphasises the importance of a historical context to moral concepts and ideas showing the relevance of (...) philosophical queries on moral concepts and the importance of a historical account of ethics. A Short History of Ethics is an important contribution written by one of the most important living philosophers. Ideal for all philosophy students interested in ethics and morality. (shrink)