We show that several logics of common belief and common knowledge are not only complete, but also strongly complete, hence compact. These logics involve a weakened monotonicity axiom, and no other restriction on individual belief. The semantics is of the ordinary fixed-point type.

The paper surveys the currently available axiomatizations of common belief (CB) and common knowledge (CK) by means of modal propositional logics. (Throughout, knowledge- whether individual or common- is defined as true belief.) Section 1 introduces the formal method of axiomatization followed by epistemic logicians, especially the syntax-semantics distinction, and the notion of a soundness and completeness theorem. Section 2 explains the syntactical concepts, while briefly discussing their motivations. Two standard semantic constructions, Kripke structures and neighbourhood structures, are introduced in Sections (...) 3 and 4, respectively. It is recalled that Aumann's partitional model of CK is a particular case of a definition in terms of Kripke structures. The paper also restates the well-known fact that Kripke structures can be regarded as particular cases of neighbourhood structures. Section 3 reviews the soundness and completeness theorems proved w.r.t. the former structures by Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi, as well as related results by Lismont. Section 4 reviews the corresponding theorems derived w.r.t. the latter structures by Lismont and Mongin. A general conclusion of the paper is that the axiomatization of CB does not require as strong systems of individual belief as was originally thought- only monotonicity has thusfar proved indispensable. Section 5 explains another consequence of general relevance: despite the "infinitary" nature of CB, the axiom systems of this paper admit of effective decision procedures, i.e., they are decidable in the logician's sense. (shrink)

The problem of Common Knowledge will be considered in two classes of models: a class K.* of Kripke models and a class S of Scott models. Two modal logic systems will be defined. Those systems, KC and MC, include an axiomatisation of Common Knowledge. We prove determination of each system by the corresponding class of models. MSC: 03B45, 68T25.

L'oeuvre du philosophe anglais est au coeur du débat qui divise historiens et philosophes sur le thème de la sécularisation de la pensée politique moderne. Cet ouvrage ambitionne de contribuer nettement à ce débat, en montrant le rôle joué par la théologie de la toute-puissance dans la constitution de la philosophie morale et politique de Hobbes.

The universe is the result of a production that pertains not to craft, but to nature. This production does not involve either reasoning or concepts, but is the result of a power that acts on matter like an imprint. The Intellect transmits the intelligible forms it harbors, to the hypostasis Soul, where they become rational formulas. The hypostasis Soul then transmits these rational formulas to the world soul, which produces animate and inanimate beings, as if it had been ordered to (...) do so. Yet since it is the lower part of the soul of the world that is responsible for these productions, its action, which depends on reasons that do not hold the first rank and are drawn from itself, manifests inferior quality, which explains imperfection and the presence of evil in the sensible universe, despite its government by Providence. (shrink)

Alison Gopnik and her collaborators have recently proposed a bold and intriguing hypothesis about the relationship between scientific cognition and cognitive development in childhood. According to this view, the processes underlying cognitive development in infants and children and the processes underlying scientific cognition are _identical_. We argue that Gopnik’s bold hypothesis is untenable because it, along with much of cognitive science, neglects the many important ways in which human minds are designed to operate within a social environment. This leads to (...) a neglect of _norms_ and the processes of _social_ _transmission_ which have an important effect on scientific cognition and cognition more generally. (shrink)

Les etudes ici reunies rendent compte de ce que furent le contexte historique et litteraire de la redaction des dialogues platoniciens, puis de la maniere dont leur auteur a choisi de confronter sa philosophie a la mythologie, afin de mener une enquete sur le monde, l'ame et la cite. Ces lectures veulent prendre ainsi la mesure de ce qui nous eloigne aujourd'hui de Platon, mais suggerer encore qu'une histoire de la philosophie qui cherche a s'affranchir de l'anachronisme trace un chemin (...) vers la philosophie. (shrink)

Can emotions be rational or are they necessarily irrational? Are emotions universally shared states? Or are they socio-cultural constructions? Are emotions perceptions of some kind? Since the publication of Jerry Fodor’s The Modularity of Mind (1983), a new question about the philosophy of emotions has emerged: are emotions modular? A positive answer to this question would mean, minimally, that emotions are cognitive capacities that can be explained in terms of mental components that are functionally dissociable from other parts of the (...) mind. But depending on the kind of modules that are considered, be they Chomskyan, Fodorian, Darwinian, or some other kind, the answer to this question might well be different. The twelve new essays in this volume address the question of whether emotions, or at least some of them, are, in some sense of the word, modules, and explore how this could potentially influence our understanding of emotional phenomena. (shrink)

This French paper is a prelimary report on the authors' work on the logics of common knowledge and common belief. See L. Lismont and P. Mongin, "On the logic of common belief and common knowledge", Theory and Decision 37 (1): 75-106. 1994 for a more complete report.

Probabilistic models have much to offer to philosophy. We continually receive information from a variety of sources: from our senses, from witnesses, from scientific instruments. When considering whether we should believe this information, we assess whether the sources are independent, how reliable they are, and how plausible and coherent the information is. Bovens and Hartmann provide a systematic Bayesian account of these features of reasoning. Simple Bayesian Networks allow us to model alternative assumptions about the nature of the information sources. (...) Measurement of the coherence of information is a controversial matter: arguably, the more coherent a set of information is, the more confident we may be that its content is true, other things being equal. The authors offer a new treatment of coherence which respects this claim and shows its relevance to scientific theory choice. Bovens and Hartmann apply this methodology to a wide range of much discussed issues regarding evidence, testimony, scientific theories, and voting. Bayesian Epistemology is an essential tool for anyone working on probabilistic methods in philosophy, and has broad implications for many other disciplines. (shrink)

What happens when the meaning of life based on a divine revelation no longer makes sense? Does the quest for transcendence end in the pursuit of material success and self-absorption? Luc Ferry argues that modernity and the emergence of secular humanism in Europe since the eighteenth century have not killed the search for meaning and the sacred, or even the idea of God, but rather have transformed both through a dual process: the humanization of the divine and the divinization of (...) the human. Ferry sees evidence for the first of these in the Catholic Church's attempts to counter the growing rejection of dogmatism and to translate the religious tradition into contemporary language. The second he traces to the birth of modern love and humanitarianism, both of which demand a concern for others and even self-sacrifice in defense of values that transcend life itself. Ferry concludes with a powerful statement in favor of what he calls "transcendental humanism"--a concept that for the first time in human history gives us access to a genuine spirituality rooted in human beings instead of the divine. (shrink)

One of the strongest strands in Nancy's philosophy is an attempt to rethink community and the very idea of the social in a way that does not ground these ideas in some individual subject or subjectivity. The fundamental argument of this book is that being is always 'being with', that 'I' is not prior to 'we', that existence is essentially co-existence. He thinks this being together, not as a comfortable enclosure in a pre-existing group, but as a mutual abandonment and (...) exposure to each other, one that would preserve the 'I' and its freedom in a mode of imagining community as neither a 'society of spectacle' nor via some form of 'authenticity'. (shrink)

The word myth is commonly thought to mean a fictional story, but few know that Plato was the first to use the term muthos in that sense. He also used muthos to describe the practice of making and telling stories, the oral transmission of all that a community keeps in its collective memory. In the first part of Plato the Myth Maker , Luc Brisson reconstructs Plato's multifaceted description of muthos in light of the latter's Atlantis story. The second part (...) of the book contrasts this sense of myth with another form of speech that Plato believed was far superior: the logos of philosophy. Gerard Naddaf's substantial introduction shows the originality and importance both of Brisson's method and of Plato's analysis and places it in the context of contemporary debates over the origin and evolution of the oral tradition. "[Brisson] contrasts muthos with the logos found at the heart of the philosophical reading. [He] does an excellent job of analyzing Plato's use of the two speech forms, and the translator's introduction does considerable service in setting the tone."-- Library Journal. (shrink)

The last and most poignant of these essays is The Intruder, Nancys philosophical meditation on his heart transplant.

From the timeless wisdom of ancient Greece through to Christianity, the Enlightenment, existentialism and postmodernism, A Brief History of Thought brilliantly and accessibly explains the enduring teachings of philosophy - including its profound relevance in today's world as well as its essential role in achieving happiness and living a meaningful life. This lively journey through the great thinkers challenges every one of us to learn to think for ourselves and asks us the most important question of all: how can we (...) live better? (shrink)

La Siris de Berkeley est peu lue et souvent jugée inutilement obscure et érudite. La replacer dans le contexte de la chimie du XVIIIe siècle permet d'en montrer l'intérêt. Berkeley y propose d'accorder à la chimie une place de plein droit au sein de la philosophie naturelle. À partir de là, il développe une théologie naturelle originale. Mais il n'est pas question de fonder en métaphysique la chimie ni de développer une métaphysique à partir de la chimie.

"Par dizaines, des expressions issues de la mythologie grecque se sont inscrites dans le langage courant : une "pomme de discorde", un "dédale de rues", prendre le "taureau par les cornes", toucher le "pactole", "tomber de Charybde en Scylla", suivre un "fil d'Ariane", "jouer les Cassandre", etc. Mille références endormies aux Sirènes, à Typhon, Océan, Triton, Python, Sibylle, Stentor, Mentor, Laïus, Argus, OEdipe et à tant d'autres personnages mythiques habitent encore incognito nos conversations de tous les jours. Je vous propose (...) de les réveiller en racontant les histoires magnifiques qui en sont l'origine. Mais il y a plus. Les grands mythes ne se limitent pas à des "contes et légendes". Ils proposent des leçons de vie et de sagesse d'une profondeur abyssale. La mythologie représente ainsi une tentative grandiose pour apporter des réponses à l'antique question métaphysique de "la vie bonne pour les mortels". Son étude, passionnante en elle-même, constitue pour cette raison une excellente introduction à la philosophie." Luc Ferry. (shrink)

"Ne croyez surtout pas qu'il s'agisse de science-fiction : 18 avril 2015, une équipe de généticiens chinois entreprenait d'"améliorer" le génome de quatre-vingt-trois embryons humains. Jusqu'où ira-t-on dans cette voie? Sera-t-il possible un jour (bientôt? déjà?) d'"augmenter" à volonté tel ou tel trait de caractère de ses enfants, d'éradiquer dans l'embryon les maladies génétiques, voire d'enrayer la vieillesse et la mort en façonnant une nouvelle espèce d'humains "augmentés"? Nous n'en sommes pas (tout à fait) là, mais de nombreux centres de (...) recherche "transhumanistes" y travaillent partout dans le monde, avec des financements colossaux en provenance de géants du Web tel Google. Les progrès des technosciences sont d'une rapidité inimaginable, ils échappent encore à toute régulation. En parallèle, cette "infrastructure du monde" qu'est le Web a permis l'apparition d'une économie dite "collaborative", celle que symbolisent des applications comme Uber, Airbnb ou BlaBlaCar. Selon l'idéologue Jeremy Rifkin, elles annoncent la fin du capitalisme au profit d'un monde de gratuité et de souci de l'autre. N'est-ce pas, tout à l'inverse, vers un hyperlibéralisme, vénal et dérégulateur, que nous nous dirigeons? Certaines perspectives ouvertes par les innovations technoscientifiques sont enthousiasmantes, d'autres effrayantes. Ce livre cherche d'abord à les faire comprendre, et à réhabiliter l'idéal philosophique de la régulation, une notion désormais vitale, tant du côté de la médecine que de l'économie.". (shrink)

Along with Husserl's Ideas and Heidegger's Being and Time, Being Given is one of the classic works of phenomenology in the twentieth century. Through readings of Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, and twentieth-century French phenomenology (e.g., Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and Henry), it ventures a bold and decisive reappraisal of phenomenology and its possibilities. Its author's most original work to date, the book pushes phenomenology to its limits in an attempt to redefine and recover the phenomenological ideal, which the author argues has never (...) been realized in any of the historical phenomenologies. Against Husserl's reduction to consciousness and Heidegger's reduction to Dasein, the author proposes a third reduction to givenness, wherein phenomena appear unconditionally and show themselves from themselves at their own initiative. Being Given is the clearest, most systematic response to questions that have occupied its author for the better part of two decades. The book articulates a powerful set of concepts that should provoke new research in philosophy, religion, and art, as well as at the intersection of these disciplines. Some of the significant issues it treats include the phenomenological definition of the phenomenon, the redefinition of the gift in terms not of economy but of givenness, the nature of saturated phenomena, and the question “Who comes after the subject?” Throughout his consideration of these issues, the author carefully notes their significance for the increasingly popular fields of religious studies and philosophy of religion. Being Given is therefore indispensable reading for anyone interested in the question of the relation between the phenomenological and the theological in Marion and emergent French phenomenology. (shrink)

Subject of this article is the Belgian citizen's oppositional behaviour taken in the largest sense and considered as an opportunity to express his preferences. Starting from the supposition that a policy decision is not perceived as being conform to the citizens' interests or beliefs, attention is focused on their propensity to engage in oppositional action and their preferences for different means of expression.Such propensity appears to be rather limited and therefore one has also examined their belief in the success of (...) an oppositional action and their insight in contemporary societal problems.Those data are compared with the actual oppositional behaviour during the last five years, which was found to be even smaller than the propensity. Further, three scales are constructed, indicating similarities and dissimilarities, as far as means of expression are concerned, between the preferences of the whole population and the behaviour of the small number of opponents.In a second approach, the degree of politica! participation, dissatisfaction and information is successively examined in relation to the oppositional behaviour. This research reveals that each of these three elements induces a more intensive oppositional activity as well as a different behaviour concerning the use of oppositional means. Political participation however is the most infiuencing factor. Oppositional behaviour is a complex phenomenon. Information on the content of the oppositional action, not included in this inquiry, would complete this approach. (shrink)

Bringing together two aspects of Thomas Aquinas's thought that have been studied separately: his theory of God's concurrence and his theory of instrumental causality, I show how he uses the latter (which I discuss first) to clarify the Proclusian principle that the first cause has a greater influence on an effect than the proximate causes. Thanks to this theory, Aquinas accounts for the fact that it is God who confers existence to every new being that is produced by natural processes, (...) without however negating the agency of secondary, created causes. (shrink)

Two approaches for defining common knowledge coexist in the literature: the infinite iteration definition and the circular or fixed point one. In particular, an original modelization of the fixed point definition was proposed by Barwise in the context of a non-well-founded set theory and the infinite iteration approach has been technically analyzed within multi-modal epistemic logic using neighbourhood semantics by Lismont. This paper exhibits a relation between these two ways of modelling common knowledge which seem at first quite different.

This study explains how the myths of Greece and Rome were transmitted from antiquity to the Renaissance. Luc Brisson argues that philosophy was ironically responsible for saving myth from historical annihilation. Although philosophy was initially critical of myth because it could not be declared true or false and because it was inferior to argumentation, mythology was progressively reincorporated into philosophy through allegorical exegesis. Brisson shows to what degree allegory was employed among philosophers and how it enabled myth to take on (...) a number of different interpretive systems throughout the centuries: moral, physical, psychological, political, and even metaphysical. How Philosophers Saved Myths also describes how, during the first years of the modern era, allegory followed a more religious path, which was to assume a larger role in Neoplatonism. Ultimately, Brisson explains how this embrace of myth was carried forward by Byzantine thinkers and artists throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance after the triumph of Chistianity, Brisson argues, myths no longer had to agree with just history and philosophy but the dogmas of the Church as well. (shrink)

Critical evaluations of the current movement of corporate social responsibility commodification have neglected an important question: How do CSR professionals manage the tensions resulting from the search for both profit and social responsibility? This article addresses this question by analyzing the discourse of CSR consultants with the aim of understanding how they deal with such tensions through identity work. Our findings suggest that people who claim, or who are ascribed, paradoxical professional identities may engage in ‘paradoxical identity mitigation’ – a (...) process whereby the concomitant and paradoxical use of linguistic strategies is aimed at simultaneously embracing and distancing oneself from contradictory identity demands. In uncovering how CSR professionals discursively manage the tensions engendered by CSR commodification, our results also advance current knowledge of CSR by shedding light on the underlying processes whereby new ‘hybrid’ identities are constituted and mobilized by actors to make sense of their professional activities. (shrink)

In the third book in the trilogy that includes Reduction and Givenness and Being Given. Marion renews his argument for a phenomenology of givenness, with penetrating analyses of the phenomena of event, idol, flesh, and icon. Turning explicitly to hermeneutical dimensions of the debate, Marion masterfully draws together issues emerging from his close reading of Descartes and Pascal, Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas and Henry. Concluding with a revised version of his response to Derrida, In the Name: How to Avoid Speaking (...) of It, Marion powerfully re-articulates the theological possibilities of phenomenology. (shrink)

A partir d'un encrage syndical révolutionnaire, le mouvement Freinet emprunte des techniques et procédés pédagogiques au mouvement international des réformes pédagogiques et s'appuie sur l'évolution des sciences humaines. Les débats et controverses qui émaillent son histoire montrent non seulement l'impact pédagogique mais aussi les enjeux politiques.

Les recherches consacrées à l’histoire des femmes et du genre dans les espaces colonisés se multiplient en français depuis une dizaine d’années. En 2008, la revue Sextant a consacré un numéro à ces problématiques en réunissant une douzaine d’enquêtes menées par des littéraires, des historiens et des politistes dans les contextes impériaux britannique, français, belge, néerlandais et portugais, de la fin du siècle aux années 1960/1970 voire au-delà. Les études interrogent autant les mondes col...

Municipal elections are not the only channel of participation in the municipal policy nor are they the only participation-problem. But it is nevertheless useful to make research into them because they are the unique institutionalized possibility of participation.This participation-research deals with the different aspects of the municipal elections.The first thing to note is that a number of council-members are pointed out by elections without competition. This phenomenon is not very extended: 373 out of some 2,600 municipalities, 12 % of the (...) council members, 200,000 voters. There is no notable change of size since 1920 in this phenomenon.Compared to the legislative elections, candidatures are very stable and limited : an average of 2,3 candidates per seat. These limited candidatures also mean that in practically half of the cases municipal elections have a two-parties system, by which the electoral corps chose directly the Court of Mayor and Aldermen. But even in municipalities with more than two parties, this «direct choice of the government» is made in 75 % of the cases. In respect of these facts, participation is qualitatively much better than in the case of the parliamentary elections.Forsaking of choice is notably lower at municipal than at parliamentary elections. As to the use of preference-votes, the choice of the municipal electorate is richer than that of the national electorate not only because municipal electors more aften express their preference for individuals, but also and not in the least because, by this more frequent use of preference-votes, they have real participation in the choice of the councilmembers themselves.The possibilities of choice at municipal elections offer an original alternative : to vote beyond party-frontiers with the «mixed vote». This multi-party vote is but seldom used : by 2,5 % of the electorate.And even then those who tlus mixed way lose half of their votingcapacity. Generally seen however, the municipal elections show a more favorable participation-pattern than the legislative ones. This leads to the question if it can be imputed to the voters when something is wrong with municipal politics. Is this problem not-situated on a higher level of the participation-pyramid? (shrink)

The government-opposition scheme of a two-party system does not function that clearly in a multiparty system which is the case in Belgium. To examine to what extent the opposition parties in a multi-partysystem are functional for policymaking, the period 1965-1971 was chosen for Belgium, providing a complete scale of government and opposition parties.A content analysis of all political parties' platforms in 1965 permits to determine the policy objectives, classified in policy areas, so that at the end of the six years (...) a survey could be made about the completely andpartly realised planks of the platforms according to government and opposition parties, according to the party-strength which was congruent with the duration of government participation. In Belgium a distinctioncan also be made between the traditional opposition parties and the nonelitist opposition parties, which during the given period were not accepted as possible government parties by the political elite.To obtain a correct evaluation of the realisations, the approach took successively into account the absolute number of platform-planks, the number of specific items of a party and the degree of importance andsocial repercussion of the distinct planks that could be realised.Although respectively for 6, 4 and 2 years in the government the CVP, the BSP and the PVV realise approximately the same number of planks. The non-elitist opposition party Volksunie realised a smaller butstill considerable number of objectives. So did also, but to a smaller extent the RW, KP and FDP. The interpretation of these results could be the loss of distinctiveness of the government-opposition scheme in amultiparty system, the elite-consensus in Belgium, the function of the «zweeppartij» strategy and the definition of the opposition in terms of action. (shrink)

In their recently published book Nudge (2008) Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein (T&S) defend a position labelled as ‘libertarian paternalism’. Their thinking appeals to both the right and the left of the political spectrum, as evidenced by the bedfellows they keep on either side of the Atlantic. In the US, they have advised Barack Obama, while, in the UK, they were welcomed with open arms by the David Cameron's camp (Chakrabortty 2008). I will consider the following questions. What (...) is Nudge? How is it different from social advertisement? Does Nudge induce genuine preference change? Does Nudge build moral character? Is there a moral difference between the use of Nudge as opposed to subliminal images to reach policy objectives? And what are the moral constraints on Nudge? (shrink)

L’objet de cet article est de montrer comment au cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, du côté de la France libre et de la Résistance, s’est réalisée la mobilisation des femmes, ce qui a conduit des milliers de Françaises à investir la sphère combattante. Même si ce phénomène est resté minoritaire, et a été perçu par beaucoup comme une transgression, il est significatif des brouillages du genre favorisés par les guerres totales, et témoigne d’une étape significative, pour la France, de (...) la construction de la citoyenneté féminine. (shrink)

Luc Dardenne focuses on his work with his brother lean-Pierre, and in particular on their last film Le fils, and on the path which has led them to the mastery of new cinematographic practices. Dardenne touches on, in turn, the importance of the history and memory of struggles, changes in forms of engagement and of resistance, in the ethics of filming a body, the imbrication of technology in the search for the limits of their art.

Suppose that we acquire various items of information from various sources and that our degree of confidence in the content of the information set is sufficiently high to believe the information. Now a new item of information is being presented by a new information source. Are we justified to add this new item of information to what we already believe? Consider the following parable: “I go to a lecture about wildlife in Greenland which was supposed to be delivered by an (...) expert in the field. When I arrive I notice that the expert has excused himself and that the biology department has sent a newcomer to fill in for him. I have no beliefs about wildlife in Greenland, but I do have some beliefs about Greenland’s climate and about the kinds of climate conditions that various types of wildlife favor. Suppose that our newcomer proclaims that large colonies of elk roam in a particular valley on the southern tip of Greenland. Then I would certainly be willing to accept this item of information. But suppose that he proclaims that large colonies of armadillos roam in the same valley. Then I would not be willing to accept this item of information. Why do I accept the former but not the latter item of information? Let us suppose that neither item of information is logically inconsistent with what I already believe. Clearly, the former item of information is not inconsistent. But also the latter item is not: after all, there may be small pockets of Greenland with special climatological conditions and some Texan sailors may have set loose a pair of armadillos as a practical joke. But whereas the former item of information is quite plausible given my previous beliefs, the latter item of information is not. And this is what makes for the difference. Now suppose that our newcomer proclaims that large colonies of wild boars roam this valley in Greenland. I am not that sure anymore. Given everything I believe, I find wild boars in Greenland more plausible than armadillos in Greenland, but certainly less plausible than elk in Greenland. Had our expert presented the lecture and provided precisely the 2 same information, then I would have been willing to adopt the belief that there are wild boars in Greenland, but, with our newcomer delivering the lecture, I am not willing to do so. It is not that I would believe anything out of the expert’s mouth: also he could not have convinced me that there are armadillos in Greenland. But when it comes to wild boars, the difference between the expert’s and the newcomer’s credentials simply makes for the difference.” What we learn from this story is that the question of belief expansion has something to do with the reliability of the information source as well as with the plausibility of the new information, given what I already believe. The more reliable the information source is, the less plausible the new information needs to be given what I already believe, for me to be justified to add the belief to our belief set. The more plausible the new information is given what I already believe, the less reliable the information source needs to be given what I already believe, for me to be justified to add the belief to my belief set. The challenge is: can a precise account of this relationship be provided? (shrink)

Marked sharply by its time and place (Paris in the 1970s), this early theological text by Jean-Luc Marion nevertheless maintains a strikingly deep resonance with his most recent, groundbreaking, and ever more widely discussed phenomenology. And while Marion will want to insist on a clear distinction between the theological and phenomenological projects, to read each in light of the other can prove illuminating for both the theological and the philosophical reader - and perhaps above all for the reader who wants (...) to read in both directions at once, the reader concerned with those points of interplay and undecidability where theology and philosophy inform, provoke, and challenge one another in endlessly complex ways." "In both his theological and his phenomenological projects Marion's central effort to free the absolute or unconditional (be it theology's God or phenomenology's phenomenon) from the various limits and preconditions of human thought and language will imply a thoroughgoing critique of all metaphysics, and above all of the modern metaphysics centered on the active, spontaneous subject who occupies modern philosophy from Descartes through Hegel and Nietzsche. (shrink)