_ Source: _Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 149 - 172 Even among sympathetic readers, there abides a sense that Proclus’ attachment to his authorities at least partially blinds him to Socratic irony. This has serious implications for his conciliation of Homer and Plato in the Sixth Essay of his _Commentary on the Republic_. A significant number of the passages in Plato’s dialogues, which Proclus takes as necessitating their agreement, appear to be examples of Socrates’ ironic mode. If this apparent necessity (...) exists only through a failure to recognize the ironic character of these statements, it would seem to indicate the truth of E.R. Dodds’ famous judgement of Proclus, that he is properly philosophical only insofar as his thought is not subject to the irrationalisms of his pagan piety. The contention of this essay is that Proclus’ project of conciliation is not, in fact, driven by a refusal to recognize Socratic irony, but by his nuanced interpretation of it, an interpretation that is clarified through a consideration of the striking parallels it has with his understanding of poetic symbol. In following this path of inquiry, it will become evident that Proclus’ position on Socratic irony, and the theological conciliation it necessitates, is not an irrational interruption of his otherwise rational system, but an integral feature of its philosophical coherence. (shrink)

At the core of Plotinus’ exploration of human selfhood, lies a reference to the myth of Dionysus-Zagreus and his mirror, one of the toys the Titans used to seduce the young Dionysus. In interpreting the myth within this context, the mirror has been invariably regarded by scholars as a symbol for matter, an external surface on which the soul is projected and becomes embodied as a human individual by dispersing in the material depths. This paper challenges this established view and (...) advances a new interpretation of Plotinus’ allusion to the myth and its philosophical significance. It argues that the mirror is not a symbol for matter, but rather a symbol for the soul itself, for its power to transform itself and retain its identity in the process of becoming a human individual. The function of the mirror is thus both deceptive and protective. While the desire that the soul, deceived by the mirror, feels for its own image guides it to leave behind its original condition and unity, it is this same desire that keeps the soul within itself: protected by the Dionysian mirror, even the most dispersed soul cannot desire anything other than what it takes to be itself, hence rather than disappearing in the radical alterity of matter, soul reaffirms its identity as an individual human self. (shrink)

Cet article est une étude sur la lysis, la « libération » dionysiaque. On commence avec la suggestion que dans la description de la mania telestike dans le Phèdre 244d-245a, le meilleur candidat parmi les pratiques cultuelles dionysiaques à l’opération de soustraction résultante de la rhétorique socratique c’est la transe ménadique. Les références ménadiques accompagnent également les témoins sur Dionysos Lysios à Corinthe, Sicyone et Thèbes, mais ici les sources nous invitent à élargir l’horizon des pratiques cultuelles dionysiaques pour regarder (...) les cultes à mystère en l’honneur du dieu, notamment aux renseignements des lamelles d’or trouvées dans des sépultures des initiés. Puis, on entreprend de proposer une lecture exclusivement dionysiaque de la lamelle de Pélinna. Cette lecture prend appui sur: une analyse du texte de la lamelle ; une critique des interprétations qui mettent la lysis en rapport avec l’expiation du crime des Titans ; un examen du rôle de Perséphone ; la signification de lysis dans l’OF 350 Bernabé ; l’articulation des célèbres passages de la République où il est question des initiations avec les dynamiques de la punition différée dans les représentations grecques anciennes de la justice divine. Puis, l’article suggère que la lysis dionysiaque porte sur une délivrance non seulement après la mort, mais aussi pendant la vie des initiés. En conclusion, l’étude revient au Phèdre 245a pour mettre en contraste les transes ménadique et mystique. (shrink)

One of the hardest questions to answer for a (Neo)platonist is to what extent and how the changing and unreliable world of sense perception can itself be an object of scientific knowledge. My dissertation is a study of the answer given to that question by the Neoplatonist Proclus (Athens, 411-485) in his Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. I present a new explanation of Proclus’ concept of nature and show that philosophy of nature consists of several related subdisciplines matching the ontological stratification (...) of nature. Moreover, I demonstrate that for Proclus philosophy of nature is a science, albeit a hypothetical one, which takes geometry as its methodological paradigm. I also offer an explanation of Proclus’ view of what is later called the mathematization of physics, i.e. the role of the substance of mathematics, as opposed to its method, in explaining the natural world. Finally, I discuss Proclus’ views of the discourse of philosophy of nature and its iconic character. (shrink)