. Legal theory has so far focused exclusively on judicial activity, not on legislation. This is due to the specific legal framework of reasoning, upon which it is essential to act upon rules, wherever they come from. This form of legalism is criticized and replaced by weak legalism. Weak legalism makes it possible to detect the principles of legislation that underly the activity of the legislator. Legisprudence is the theory of these principles.

Abstract.This article focuses on a critical interpretation of the work of Unger. It is argued that Unger's view is less revolutionary than he depicts it and that American law often develops as Unger describes it, though this is absolutely no revolution. The authors further show what the possibilities and the limits of a transformative vocation at the bar can be.

.The article deals with the difference between some forms of legal positivism. It is argued that, even in continental legal systems which are typically “rule bound,” there is some space left for principles in the legal system. The author tries to explain how this space can be filled and what methods should be used by a judge to do so.

"Proceedings of the fourth Benelux-Scandinavian Symposium on Legal Theory."--T.p.

The metaphysics of legalism -- The individual in context -- Rationality in context -- Freedom in context -- Strong legalism or the absent theory of legislation -- Legitimacy and legitimation : from strong legalism to legisprudence -- From proxy to trading off : the principles of legisprudence -- Legisprudence and the duties of power : a legisprudential assessment of rational legislation.

In this contribution the author explores some aspects of the relation between sovereignty, democracy and representation. After shortly focusing on the idea of sovereignty, he then questions Rousseau's refusal to take representation into account within a democratic framework, an idea that is however latent in his general approach.

The article deals with an interpretation of the work of Ch. Perelman. The author tries to determine the meaning of reasonableness in a hermeneutical and anthropological perspective. He then places the work of Perelman in the light of the theory of symbolic interactionism of G.H. Mead.