Aristotelian ideas have in the past been applied with mixed fortunes to quantum mechanics. One of the most persistent criticisms is that Aristotle’s notions of potentiality and actuality are burdened with a teleological character long ago abandoned in the natural sciences. Recently this criticism has been met with a model of the actualization of quantum potentialities in light of Aristotle’s doctrine of ‘spontaneous events’. This presumably restores the nowadays acceptable idea of efficient causation in place of Aristotle’s original doctrine of (...) the ‘four causes’. In this article I challenge the model by arguing that when properly scrutinized Aristotle’s final cause poses no problems for an Aristotelian reading of quantum mechanics. Final causes in fact provide a better ontology for quantum mechanics than spontaneous causation. The idea of ‘spontaneity’ is unanalyzable and therefore of little use in quantum mechanics. In addition, it is ontologically sterile in the context of quantum measurement, as shown by a historical and conceptual review of the role of efficient causation in experimental physics. (shrink)

In this paper, I compare Pierre-Simon Laplace's celebrated formulation of the principle of determinism in his 1814 Essai philosophique sur les probabilités with the formulation of the same principle offered by Roger Joseph Boscovich in his Theoria philosophiae naturalis, published 56 years earlier. This comparison discloses a striking general similarity between the two formulations of determinism as well as certain important differences. Regarding their similarities, both Boscovich's and Laplace's conceptions of determinism involve two mutually interdependent components—ontological and epistemic—and they are (...) both intimately linked with the principles of causality and continuity. Regarding their differences, however, Boscovich's formulation of the principle of determinism turns out not only to be temporally prior to Laplace's but also—being founded on fewer metaphysical principles and more rooted in and elaborated by physical assumptions—to be more precise, complete and comprehensive than Laplace's somewhat parenthetical statement of the doctrine. A detailed analysis of these similarities and differences, so far missing in the literature on the history and philosophy of the concept of determinism, is the main goal of the present paper. (shrink)

From the physical, mathematical, and conceptual points of view, Roger Joseph Boscovich’s original 1758 formulation of the principle of physical determinism and Pierre-Simon Laplace’s later 1814 ren...

In this paper, I offer a detailed reconstruction and a critical analysis of Abraham Maslow’s neglected psychological reading of Thomas Kuhn’s famous dichotomy between ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ science, which Maslow briefly expounded four years after the first edition of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in his small book The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance, and which relies heavily on his extensive earlier general writing in the motivational and personality psychology. Maslow’s Kuhnian ideas, put forward as part of a larger (...) program for the psychology of science, outlined already in his 1954 magnum opus Motivation and Personality, are analyzed not only in the context of Kuhn’s original ‘psychologizing’ attitude toward understanding the nature and development of science, but also in a broader historical, intellectual and social context. (shrink)

Bošković’s distinction between two kinds of velocities – velocity in the first act, or potential velocity, and velocity in the second act, or actual velocity – is considered in respect to the concept of instantaneous velocity as defined by calculus differentialis. Contrary to the seeming inconsistency of Bošković’s duality of velocities and the concept of instantaneous velocity, due to a critical examination of logical and methodological foundations of the calculus, the article shows that the duality of velocities is consistent with (...) the interpretations of instantaneous velocity given by Oresme, Euler and Maclaurin, as with the definition of instantaneous velocity according to the rigorous Cauchyan founding of the calculus. Bošković’s duality of velocities is also shown to be consistent with Aristotelian-scholastic doctrine of potentiality and actuality, especially in its domain related to the nature of continuous motion. (shrink)

Boškovićevo razlikovanje dviju vrsta brzina – brzine u prvom ozbiljenju , odnosno, potencijalne brzine i brzine u drugom ozbiljenju , odnosno, aktualne brzine – promišlja se u odnosu na koncept trenutne brzine kako je definira calculus differentialis. Nasuprot naizglednoj nedosljednosti Boškovićeve dualnosti brzina i koncepta trenutne brzine, tragom kritičkoga promišljanja logičkih i metodoloških temelja calculusa u članku se pokazuje kako je dualnost brzina dosljedna tumačenjima trenutne brzine koje daju Oresme, Euler i Maclaurin, kao i definiciji trenutne brzine temeljem strogog cauchyjevskog (...) utemeljenja calculusa. Boškovićeva dualnost brzina također je pokazana dosljednom aristotelijansko-skolastičkom nauku o možnosti i zbiljnosti, posebno u onoj njegovoj domeni koja se odnosi na narav neprekinutoga gibanja.Bošković’s distinction between two kinds of velocities – velocity in the first act , or potential velocity , and velocity in the second act , or actual velocity – is considered in respect to the concept of instantaneous velocity as defined by calculus differentialis. Contrary to the seeming inconsistency of Bošković’s duality of velocities and the concept of instantaneous velocity, due to a critical examination of logical and methodological foundations of the calculus, the article shows that the duality of velocities is consistent with the interpretations of instantaneous velocity given by Oresme, Euler and Maclaurin, as with the definition of instantaneous velocity according to the rigorous Cauchyan founding of the calculus. Bošković’s duality of velocities is also shown to be consistent with Aristotelian-scholastic doctrine of potentiality and actuality, especially in its domain related to the nature of continuous motion. (shrink)

In this paper a possible interpretative value of Aristotle’s fundamental ontological doctrine of potentiality and actuality is considered in the context of operationally undoubtedly the most successful but interpretatively still controversial theory of modern physics – quantum mechanics – especially regarding understanding the nature of the world, the phenomena of which it describes and predicts so successfully. In particular, beings of the atomic world are interpreted as real potential beings actualized by the measurement process in appropriate experimental arrangement, and the (...) problem of actual beings of the atomic world is considered in the context of Aristotle’s threefold requirement for the priority of actuality over potentiality – in time, definition or knowledge, and substantiality. (shrink)

In this paper a possible interpretative value of Aristotle’s fundamental ontological doctrine of potentiality and actuality is considered in the context of operationally undoubtedly the most successful but interpretatively still controversial theory of modern physics – quantum mechanics – especially regarding understanding the nature of the world, the phenomena of which it describes and predicts so successfully. In particular, beings of the atomic world are interpreted as real potential beings actualized by the measurement process in appropriate experimental arrangement, and the (...) problem of actual beings of the atomic world is considered in the context of Aristotle’s threefold requirement for the priority of actuality over potentiality – in time , definition or knowledge , and substantiality .Dieser Artikel setzt sich mit der interpretativen Relevanz der ontologischen Theorie Aristoteles’ über die Möglichkeit und die Wirklichkeit für die Quantenmechanik auseinander, also für die auf der empirischen Ebene erfolgreichste Theorie innerhalb der modernen Physik, die jedoch noch immer kontrovers interpretiert wird. Dies gilt insbesondere im Hinblick auf das Verständnis der Natur der Atomwelt, deren Phänomene sie erfolgreich beschreibt. Die W esen der Atomwelt werden als reale Möglichkeitswesen begriffen , die in der experimentellen Situation aktualisiert werden, während das Problem der W irklichkeitswesen der Atomwelt im Kontext des von Aristoteles dreifach begründeten Vorrangs der W irklichkeit vor der Möglichkeit betrachtet wird – nämlich auf der Ebene der Zeit , auf der Ebene desBegriffs und auf der Ebene des Seins .U članku se promišlja možebitna interpretativna vrijednost Aristotelova temeljnog ontološkog nauka o možnosti i zbiljnosti  u kontekstu izračunski nesumnjivo najuspješnije, ali interpretativno još uvijek dvojbene teorije suvremene fizike – kvantne mehanike, posebno kada je riječ o razumijevanju naravi samoga atomnoga svijeta čije pojavnosti tako uspješno opisuje i predviđa. Poglavito, bića atomnoga svijeta poimaju se kao realna možna bića koja bivaju ozbiljena prema prigotku eksperimentalne situacije, a problem zbiljskih bića atomnoga svijeta promišljen je u kontekstu Aristotelova trojnog zahtjeva o prvotnosti zbiljnosti nad možnošću – prema vremenu , prema pojmu i prema bivstvu. (shrink)

Bošković’s distinction between two kinds of velocities – velocity in the first act, or potential velocity, and velocity in the second act, or actual velocity – is considered in respect to the concept of instantaneous velocity as defined by calculus differentialis. Contrary to the seeming inconsistency of Bošković’s duality of velocities and the concept of instantaneous velocity, due to a critical examination of logical and methodological foundations of the calculus, the article shows that the duality of velocities is consistent with (...) the interpretations of instantaneous velocity given by Oresme, Euler and Maclaurin, as with the definition of instantaneous velocity according to the rigorous Cauchyan founding of the calculus. Bošković’s duality of velocities is also shown to be consistent with Aristotelian-scholastic doctrine of potentiality and actuality, especially in its domain related to the nature of continuous motion. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyse the hitherto largely ignored social and psychological roots of the philosophy of wholeness in David Bohm and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel was Bohm’s strongest philosophical influence throughout his mature intellectual life, however, as demonstrated in the paper, Bohm’s abhorrence of fragmentation and his affection for wholeness, which is prominently reflected in both his physics and his philosophy of science, was actually the realisation of specific social propensities and psychological determinants of his early emotional and (...) intellectual development for which Hegel’s philosophy was a crucial rational catalyst later in his life. These social propensities and psychological determinants of Bohm’s early development are further demonstrated to be strikingly similar to those that also led the young Hegel to engage with the concept of wholeness throughout his life. The article also brings the biographical evidence of Bohm’s lifelong interest in Hegel and analyses the state of scholarship regarding his Hegelianism, the nature of Hegel’s philosophy as reflected in Bohm’s work, and the reasons for the somehow unexpected disciplinary neglect of the crucial influence of Hegel’s philosophy on Bohm. (shrink)

In this brief note, a concept of the ‘scientific worldview’ is examined. In particular, contrary to some of the most often misconceptions regarding the concept, it will be argued (1) that there cannot be a ‘scientific worldview’ in the traditional sense of a Weltanschauung if science is taken in its strictest sense, (2) that the remaining ontological and epistemic skeleton cannot be a single unified picture of the world (Weltbild), and (3) that the supposed ‘truth’ of these remaining pictures cannot (...) be unambiguously grounded either in the methodology of science, although the methodology itself can be explanatory and predictively adequate and successful, or in the technological success that is associated with science. (shrink)

Im 2009 erschienenen Buch "Philosophie des Leidens" versucht Boris Wandruszka, jene immanente Lebensstruktur und Lebensdynamik aufzudecken, die zu den einfachsten und fundamentalen Strukturmomenten des Leidens vorstosst; diese erste "Wissenschaft vom Leiden" transzendierte daher nicht die Grenzen der Anschaubarkeit, sondern verblieb in der "Immanenz des 'inneren Lebens' bzw. des Erlebens". Im aktuellen Buch "Metaphysik des Leidens" werden die "realen Bedingungen der Moglichkeit von Leiden" ermittelt: Wie muss eine Welt beschaffen sein, damit darin ein leidendes Wesen erscheinen konne? Welche Rolle hat (...) das Leiden in Bezug zum fundamentalen Widerfahrnis-, Resonanz- und Responsivitatscharakter des Lebens? Es wird gezeigt, dass menschliches Leben, das einer plural-agonalen Welt ausgesetzt ist, nicht leidfrei moglich ist, dass aber andererseits das Leid nicht das letzte Wort sein kann, sondern notwendig auf Ganzheit, Reifung, Erlosung und Harmonie bezogen ist. Nur auf dem Hintergrund der Spannung zwischen absoluter Seins-, Sinn- und Lebensfulle und der stets problematischen und fragilen Teilhabe von Menschen am "absoluten und leiduberwindenden Urleben" kann Leiden entstehen, durchlitten, verstanden, aber auch uberwunden werden. Hier erreicht der "Opfergedanke", in dem das unvermeidliche Leid frei angenommen und dadurch transformiert wird, seine reinste und hochste Ausformung. Erst nach Klarung dieser Verhaltnisse wird die "Theodizeefrage" als "das Problem der Probleme" angegangen und am Leitfaden der Hiob-Erzahlung diskutiert. Letztlich erweist sich, dass trotz allem Schmerz, Mangel, Unrecht und Unsinn ein "Potential des Unendlichen" im Leiden verborgen liegt, das auf seine Uberwindung durch Sein-, Sinn- und Werterfullung, durch Tat, Erkenntnis und Liebe verweist und dass diese drei "Machte" der Leidensherausforderung bedurfen, um ihre Weite, Tiefe und Hohe auszuloten. (shrink)

The discovery of a small collection of Darwin manuscripts at the Whipple Museum of the History of Science has allowed a reconsideration of Darwin’s interest in and knowledge of microscopy. Concentrating on the years between his return from the Beagle voyage and the publication of the major taxonomic work on barnacles, this paper recovers a number of important aspects of Darwin’s intellectual and practical development: on returning from the Beagle voyage he acquainted himself with the work of C. G. Ehrenberg, (...) and this informed both his private and public work; then through the 1840s Darwin transformed himself from a fascinated observer and consumer of others’ work into an expert on microscopy. I characterise this move as a piece of clever manoeuvring, and discuss more generally the kind of scientist—gentlemanly and expert—that Darwin was attempting to become.Keywords: Charles Darwin; Microscopy; Beagle voyage; Classification; Accuracy. (shrink)

In this handbook, I put into practice my philosophical views on children's mathematics. The handbook contains brief instructions and examples of mathematical activities. In the INSTRUCTIONS section, instructions are given on how, and in part why that way, to help preschool children in their mathematical development. In the ACTIVITIES section, there are examples of activities through which the child develops her mathematical abilities.

Boris Kment takes a new approach to the study of modality that emphasises the origin of modal notions in everyday thought. He argues that the concepts of necessity and possibility originate in counterfactual reasoning, which allows us to investigate explanatory connections. Contrary to accepted views, explanation is more fundamental than modality.

This paper analyzes the historical context and systematic importance of Kant's hypothetical use of reason. It does so by investigating the role of hypotheses in Kant's philosophy of science. We first situate Kant’s account of hypotheses in the context of eighteenth-century German philosophy of science, focusing on the works of Wolff, Meier, and Crusius. We contrast different conceptions of hypotheses of these authors and elucidate the different theories of probability informing them. We then adopt a more systematic perspective to discuss (...) Kant's idea that scientific hypotheses must articulate real possibilities. We argue that Kant's views on the intelligibility of scientific hypotheses constitute a valuable perspective on scientific understanding and the constraints it imposes on scientific rationality. (shrink)

I propose a general alethic theory of epistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent’s credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that the epistemic risk function is a scaled reflection of expected inaccuracy. This duality between risk and information enables us to explore the relationship between attitudes to epistemic risk, the choice of scoring rules in epistemic utility theory, and the selection of priors (...) in Bayesian epistemology more generally. (shrink)

We further investigate a divisibility relation on the set of BN ultrafilters on the set of natural numbers. We single out prime ultrafilters (divisible only by 1 and themselves) and establish a hierarchy in which a position of every ultrafilter depends on the set of prime ultrafilters it is divisible by. We also construct ultrafilters with many immediate successors in this hierarchy and find positions of products of ultrafilters.

Analysing several characteristic mathematical models: natural and real numbers, Euclidean geometry, group theory, and set theory, I argue that a mathematical model in its final form is a junction of a set of axioms and an internal partial interpretation of the corresponding language. It follows from the analysis that (i) mathematical objects do not exist in the external world: they are our internally imagined objects, some of which, at least approximately, we can realize or represent; (ii) mathematical truths are not (...) truths about the external world but specifications (formulations) of mathematical conceptions; (iii) mathematics is first and foremost our imagined tool by which, with certain assumptions about its applicability, we explore nature and synthesize our rational cognition of it. (shrink)

While there are satisfactory answers to the question “How should we teach children mathematics?”, there are no satisfactory answers to the question “What mathematics should we teach children?”. This paper provides an answer to the last question for preschool children (early childhood), although the answer is also applicable to older children. This answer, together with an appropriate methodology on how to teach mathematics, gives a clear conception of the place of mathematics in the children’s world and our role in helping (...) children develop their mathematical abilities. Briefly, children’s mathematics consists of the world of children’s internal activities that they eventually purposefully organize in order to understand and control the outside world and organize their overall activities in it. We need to support a child in mathematical activities that she does spontaneously and in which she shows interest, and we need to teach her mathematics that she is interested in developing through these activities. In doing so, we must be fully aware that the child’s mathematics is part of the child’s world of internal activities and is not outside of it. We help the child develop mathematical abilities by developing them in the context of her world and not outside of it. From the point of view of this conception, the standards established today are limiting and too focused on numbers and geometric figures: these topics are too prominent and elaborated, and other mathematical contents are subordinated to them. Adhering to the standards, we drastically limit the mathematics of the child’s world, hamper the correct mathematical development of a child, and we can turn her away from mathematics. (shrink)

We continue the research of an extension of the divisibility relation to the Stone‐Čech compactification. First we prove that ultrafilters we call prime actually possess the algebraic property of primality. Several questions concerning the connection between divisibilities in and nonstandard extensions of are answered, providing a few more equivalent conditions for divisibility in. Results on uncountable chains in are proved and used in a construction of a well‐ordered chain of maximal cardinality. Probably the most interesting result is the existence of (...) a chain of type in. Finally, we consider ultrafilters without divisors in and among them find the greatest class. (shrink)

We construct and study structures imitating the field of complex numbers with exponentiation. We give a natural, albeit non first-order, axiomatisation for the corresponding class of structures and prove that the class has a unique model in every uncountable cardinality. This gives grounds to conjecture that the unique model of cardinality continuum is isomorphic to the field of complex numbers with exponentiation.

In this paper we develop a general theory of algorithmic fairness. Drawing on Johnson King and Babic’s work on moral encroachment, on Gary Becker’s work on labor market discrimination, and on Strawson’s idea of resentment and indignation as responses to violations of the demand for goodwill toward oneself and others, we locate attitudes to fairness in an agent’s utility function. In particular, we first argue that fairness is a matter of a decision-maker’s relative concern for the plight of people from (...) different groups, rather than of the outcomes produced for different groups. We then show how an agent’s preferences, including in particular their attitudes to error, give rise to their decision thresholds. Tying these points together, we argue that the agent’s relative degrees of concern for different groups manifest in a difference in decision thresholds applied to these groups. (shrink)

We continue the exploration of various aspects of divisibility of ultrafilters, adding one more relation to the picture: multiplicative finite embeddability. We show that it lies between divisibility relations \ and \. The set of its minimal elements proves to be very rich, and the \-hierarchy is used to get a better intuition of this richness. We find the place of the set of \-maximal ultrafilters among some known families of ultrafilters. Finally, we introduce new notions of largeness of subsets (...) of \, and compare it to other such notions, important for infinite combinatorics and topological dynamics. (shrink)

The essential role of language in rational cognition is analysed. The approach is functional: only the results of the connection between language, reality, and thinking are considered. Scientific language is analysed as an extension and improvement of everyday language. The analysis gives a uniform view of language and rational cognition. The consequences for the nature of ontology, truth, logic, thinking, scientific theories, and mathematics are derived.

In this paper, we reflect on the connection between the notions of organism and organisation, with a specific interest in how this bears upon the issue of the reality of the organism. We do this by presenting the case of Buffon, who developed complex views about the relation between the notions of “organised” and “organic” matter. We argue that, contrary to what some interpreters have suggested, these notions are not orthogonal in his thought. Also, we argue that Buffon has a (...) view in which organisation is not just ubiquitous, but basic and fundamental in nature, and hence also fully natural. We suggest that he can hold this view because of his anti-mathematicism. Buffon’s case is interesting, in our view, because he can regard organisation, and organisms, as perfectly natural, and can admit their reality without invoking problematic supernaturalist views, and because he allows organisation and the organismal to come in kinds and degrees. Thus, his view tries to do justice to two cautionary notes for the debate on the reality of the organism: the need for a commitment to a broadly naturalist perspective, and the need to acknowledge the interesting features of organisms through which we make sense of them. (shrink)

In this article, logical concepts are defined using the internal syntactic and semantic structure of language. For a first-order language, it has been shown that its logical constants are connectives and a certain type of quantifiers for which the universal and existential quantifiers form a functionally complete set of quantifiers. Neither equality nor cardinal quantifiers belong to the logical constants of a first-order language.

We continue the research of the relation $\hspace {1mm}\widetilde {\mid }\hspace {1mm}$ on the set $\beta \mathbb {N}$ of ultrafilters on $\mathbb {N}$, defined as an extension of the divisibility relation. It is a quasiorder, so we see it as an order on the set of $=_{\sim }$ -equivalence classes, where $\mathcal {F}=_{\sim }\mathcal {G}$ means that $\mathcal {F}$ and $\mathcal {G}$ are mutually $\hspace {1mm}\widetilde {\mid }$ -divisible. Here we introduce a new tool: a relation of congruence modulo an (...) ultrafilter. We first recall the congruence of ultrafilters modulo an integer and show that $=_{\sim }$ -equivalent ultrafilters do not necessarily have the same residue modulo $m\in \mathbb {N}$. Then we generalize this relation to congruence modulo an ultrafilter in a natural way. After that, using iterated nonstandard extensions, we introduce a stronger relation, which has nicer properties with respect to addition and multiplication of ultrafilters. Finally, we introduce a strengthening of $\hspace {1mm}\widetilde {\mid }\hspace {1mm}$ and show that it also behaves well with respect to the congruence relation. (shrink)

If definitive evidence concerning treatment effectiveness becomes available from an ongoing randomized clinical trial, then the trial could be stopped early, with the public release of results benefiting current and future patients. However, stopping an ongoing trial based on accruing outcome data requires methodological rigor to preserve validity of the trial conclusions. This has led to the use of formal interim monitoring procedures, which include inefficacy monitoring that will stop a trial early when the experimental treatment appears not to be (...) working. For participants, inefficacy monitoring is especially important as it ensures that they are not being treated worse than if they had not enrolled on the trial. We discuss the importance of reporting with trial results the formal interim inefficacy monitoring guidelines that were utilized, and, if none were used, the reasons for their absence. A survey of two leading medical journals suggests that this is not current practice. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Kant adopted, throughout his career, a position that is much more akin to classical accounts of epigenesis, although he does reject the more radical forms of epigenesis proposed in his own time, and does make use of preformationist sounding terms. I argue that this is because Kant thinks of what is pre-formed as a species, not an individual or a part of an individual; has no qualm with the idea of a specific, teleological principle (...) or force underlying generation, and conceives of germs and predispositions as specific constraints on such a principle or force. Neither of these conceptions of what is “preformed”, I argue, is in strict opposition to classical epigenesis. I further suggest that Kant’s lingering use of preformationist terminology is due to his belief that this is required to account for the specificity of the specific generative force; his resistance towards the unrestricted plasticity of the generative force in radical epigenesis, which violates species-fixism; and his insistence on the internal, organic basis of developmental plasticity and variation within species. I conclude by suggesting that this terminological and interpretative peculiarity is partly due to a larger shift in the natural philosophical concerns surrounding the debate on epigenesis and preformation. Specifically, it is a sign that the original reasons for resisting epigenesis, namely its use of specific, teleological principles and its commitment to the natural production of biological structure, became less of a concern, whereas unrestricted plasticity and its undermining of fixism became a real issue, thereby also becoming the focal point of the debate. (shrink)

Evidential decision theory (EDT) says that the choiceworthiness of an option depends on its evidential connections to possible outcomes. Causal decision theory (CDT) holds that it depends on your beliefs about its causal connections. While Newcomb cases support CDT, Arif Ahmed has described examples that support EDT. A new account is needed to get all cases right. I argue that an option A's choiceworthiness is determined by the probability that a good outcome ensues at possible A‐worlds that match actuality in (...) the facts causally unaffected by your decision (the “unaffected facts”). Moreover, you should evaluate A on the assumption that A is compossible with the unaffected facts. This view entails that you should use EDT when evaluating A on the assumption that the unaffected facts determine your action, but use CDT when assessing A on the opposite assumption. A's choiceworthiness equals a weighted average of these conditional assessments. The weights are determined by your beliefs about whether the unaffected fact determine your action. This account gets both Newcomb and Ahmed cases right. According to an influential view, whether you take the unaffected facts to determine your action can make a difference to whether you can regard yourself as free and the action as being under your control. While my account is neutral on this issue, it entails that whether you take the unaffected facts to determine your action is important in a different way: it matters to whether you should follow EDT or CDT. (shrink)

Este ensayo intenta mostrar las posibilidades analíticas del concepto de pausa sugerido por Estanislao Zuleta, a partir de su lectura del capítulo 1 de El Capital de Marx. Enlazándolo con desarrollos recientes de Kojin Karatani y Slavoj Zizek, muestra que el concepto de pausa –equivalente al de brecha o salto mortal de los dos últimos– introduce la emergencia de muchos mundos posibles en la metamorfosis de las mercancías en dinero, estableciendo la posibilidad permanente de la crisis. En consecuencia, ni las (...) crisis conducen a la revolución política, ni ésta puede detener la reproducción del capital: la revolución es una tarea de todos los días. (shrink)

We investigate two questions, the relevance of memory for evaluative conditioning effects based on smell-taste pairings, and the potential preparedness of smell-taste combinations for...