Algorithmic fairness and resentment

Philosophical Studies:1-33 (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper we develop a general theory of algorithmic fairness. Drawing on Johnson King and Babic’s work on moral encroachment, on Gary Becker’s work on labor market discrimination, and on Strawson’s idea of resentment and indignation as responses to violations of the demand for goodwill toward oneself and others, we locate attitudes to fairness in an agent’s utility function. In particular, we first argue that fairness is a matter of a decision-maker’s relative concern for the plight of people from different groups, rather than of the outcomes produced for different groups. We then show how an agent’s preferences, including in particular their attitudes to error, give rise to their decision thresholds. Tying these points together, we argue that the agent’s relative degrees of concern for different groups manifest in a difference in decision thresholds applied to these groups.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,164

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Actual — V. (rawlsian) hypothetical-consent.Conrad Johnson - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (1):41 - 48.
Corrigendum: On the Impossibility of Any Future Metaphysics.[author unknown] - 1961 - Philosophical Studies 12 (3):48-48.
On Sturgeon’s “The rational Mind”. [REVIEW]Juan Comesaña - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10):3205-3213.
Rawls’s Original Position and Algorithmic Fairness.Ulrik Franke - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):1803-1817.
Correction: Ordinary Language and Absolute Certainty.[author unknown] - 1950 - Philosophical Studies 1 (3):48-48.
Correction to: Embodied mind sparsism.Stuart Clint Dowland - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):701-701.
Moral intuitions and justification in ethics.Stefan Sencerz - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (1):77 - 95.
Addendum.[author unknown] - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 36 (4):433-433.
Editorial.[author unknown] - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (1):1-2.
Corrigendum.[author unknown] - 1960 - Philosophical Studies 11 (6):96-96.
Introduction.[author unknown] - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (2):113-118.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-08-31

Downloads
38 (#397,063)

6 months
14 (#151,397)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Boris Babic
California Institute of Technology
Zoë Johnson King
Harvard University

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references