Several recent interpretations see Hegel's theory of the Concept as a form of conceptual realism, according to which finite reality is articulated by objectively existing concepts. More precisely, this theory has been interpreted as a version of natural kind essentialism, and it has been proposed that its function is to account for the possibility of genuine explanations. This suggests a promising way to reconstruct the argument that Hegel's theory of objective concepts is based on—an argument that shows that the possibility (...) of explanation rests on metaphysical preconditions and that natural kind essentialism gives the only adequate account of those preconditions. But in order for such a reconstruction to be successful, one needs to spell out the metaphysical features in virtue of which Hegelian natural kinds can account for the possibility of explanation. The article takes up this challenge. It offers the first detailed analysis of the modal fine-structure of Hegel's natural kind essentialism and shows how Hegel's position, thus understood, provides the details needed to complete the explanation-based argument. (shrink)

"Die Fähigkeit zur Freiheit, verstanden als vernünftige Selbstbestimmung, ist nach Hegel grundlegend für unser Denken und Erkennen ebenso wie für unser Wollen und Handeln: Der 'logische Raum der Gründe' ist für Hegel ein 'Reich der Freiheit'. Franz Knappik untersucht, wie Hegel diesen Gedanken in einer umfassenden Theorie entwickelt, die Logik, Metaphysik, Epistemologie und praktische Rationalität behandelt. In Auseinandersetzung mit analytischen Deutungsansätzen und Sachdiskussionen zeigt Knappik die Aktualität und Originalität von Hegels Position auf."--Cover.

Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 101 Heft: 1 Seiten: 92-134.

This article interprets Hegel's hierarchical theory of race as an application of his general views about the metaphysics of classification and explanation. We begin by offering a reconstruction of Hegel's hierarchical theory of race based on the critical edition of relevant lecture transcripts: we argue that Hegel's position on race is appropriately classified as racist, that it postulates innate mental deficits of some races, and that it turns racism from an anthropological into a metaphysical doctrine by claiming that the division (...) of humankind into races (at least in the Old World) is not a brute fact, but follows a ‘higher necessity’. We then summarize our interpretation of the relevant metaphysical background to this theory. On our reading, Hegel postulates an essentialist form of explanation that explains given kinds as stages in a teleological, non-temporal process through which the nature of a superordinate kind is realized. We argue that Hegel's views about a hierarchical and necessary division of humankind into races are an application of this model to the case of human diversity, motivated by explanatory considerations and subject to confirmation bias. By way of conclusion, we address two possible attempts to ‘save’ Hegelian philosophy from its racist baggage. (shrink)

On a widely held view, episodes of inner speech provide at least one way in which we become conscious of our thoughts. However, it can be argued, on the one hand, that consciousness of thoughts in virtue of inner speech presupposes interpretation of the simulated speech. On the other hand, the need for such self-interpretation seems to clash with distinctive first-personal characteristics that we would normally ascribe to consciousness of one’s own thoughts: a special reliability; a lack of conscious ambiguity (...) and incomprehensibility; and a sense of causal agency. I try to resolve this puzzle by proposing an account for the requisite self-interpretation of inner speech in terms of Bayesian probabilistic inference. Drawing on “perceptual loop” accounts of speech control, I argue that such interpretive probabilistic inferences are used for the control of inner speech, and that as a consequence of this function, they are biased toward the correct interpretations. I conclude by showing how this model can explain the first-personal characteristics of consciousness of one’s own thoughts. In the case of the sense of causal agency, the resulting explanation yields novel accounts for “audible thoughts” and thought insertion. (shrink)

On a widely held view, episodes of inner speech provide at least one way in which we become conscious of our thoughts. However, it can be argued, on the one hand, that consciousness of thoughts in virtue of inner speech presupposes interpretation of the simulated speech. On the other hand, the need for such self-interpretation seems to clash with distinctive first-personal characteristics that we would normally ascribe to consciousness of one’s own thoughts: a special reliability; a lack of conscious ambiguity (...) and incomprehensibility; and a sense of causal agency. I try to resolve this puzzle by proposing an account for the requisite self-interpretation of inner speech in terms of Bayesian probabilistic inference. Drawing on “perceptual loop” accounts of speech control, I argue that such interpretive probabilistic inferences are used for the control of inner speech, and that as a consequence of this function, they are biased toward the correct interpretations. I conclude by showing how this model can explain the first-personal characteristics of consciousness of one’s own thoughts. In the case of the sense of causal agency, the resulting explanation yields novel accounts for “audible thoughts” and thought insertion. (shrink)

Recently influential “rationalist” views of self-knowledge about our rational attitudes hold that such self-knowledge is essentially connected to rational agency, and therefore has to be particularly reliable, immediate, and distinct from third-personal access. This approach has been challenged by “theory theory” or “interpretationist” views of self-knowledge: on such views, self-knowledge is based on the interpretation of information about ourselves, and this interpretation involves the same mindreading mechanisms that we use to access other persons’ mental states. Interpretationist views are usually dismissed (...) as implausible and unwarranted by advocates of rationalism. In this article, I argue that rationalists should revise their attitude towards interpretationism: they can, and ought to, accept themselves a form of interpretationism. First, I argue that interpretationism is correct at least for a substantive range of cases. These are cases in which we respond to a question ab.. (shrink)

I propose a new reading of Hegel’s discussion of modality in the ‘Actuality’ chapter of the Science of Logic. On this reading, the main purpose of the chapter is a critical engagement with Spinoza’s modal metaphysics. Hegel first reconstructs a rationalist line of thought — corresponding to the cosmological argument for the existence of God — that ultimately leads to Spinozist necessitarianism. He then presents a reductio argument against necessitarianism, contending that as a consequence of necessitarianism, no adequate explanatory accounts (...) of facts about finite reality can be given. (shrink)

According to a view, which is common both in contemporary philosophy and in the history of philosophy, we possess a particular epistemic access to our own present intentional actions. This article examines accounts of this access, which have been put forward in Classical German Philosophy. After a short survey of the relevant Kantian background I discuss the positions that Schopenhauer and Fichte have proposed in this regard. Schopenhauer’s approach, which anticipates current theories of non-perceptual knowledge of one’s actions, turns out (...) to face substantial problems. Fichte, by contrast, offers an original alternative to non-perceptual accounts, which is based on the assumption of a practical form of perception.Nach einer Auffassung, die heutzutage ebenso wie in der Philosophiegeschichte weit verbreitet ist, besitzen wir einen besonderen epistemischen Zugang zu unseren eigenen gegenwärtigen intentionalen Handlungen. Dieser Beitrag untersucht Ansätze, die innerhalb der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie zur Deutung dieses Zugangs entwickelt wurden. Nach einer kurzen Diskussion des relevanten Kantischen Hintergrunds wende ich mich Schopenhauers und Fichtes einschlägigen Positionen zu. Schopenhauers Ansatz, der heute populäre Theorien eines nicht-wahrnehmungsgestützten Handlungswissens antizipiert, ist mit erheblichen Schwierigkeiten konfrontiert. Dagegen bietet Fichte eine originelle Alternative zu nicht-wahrnehmungsgestützten Theorien, die auf der Annahme einer praktischen Form von Wahrnehmung basiert. (shrink)

The contributions collected in this special issue explore the phenomenology of joint action from a broad range of different disciplinary and methodological angles, including philosophical investigation (both in the analytic and the phenomenological tradition), computational modeling, experimental study, game theory, and developmental psychology. They also vastly expand the range of discussed cases beyond the standard examples of house-painting and sauce-cooking, addressing, for example, collective musical improvisations, dancing, work at the Diversity and Equity office of a university, and historical examples of (...) collective violence such as the revolutionary Terror in France and the Nazis. In our introduction to this special issue, we group the contributions into three thematic areas – 1) the phenomenological fine-structure of joint action, 2) underlying mechanisms for joint action and 3) phenomenal preconditions for joint action. The first theme is discussed under a number of issues – a) components of the phenomenology of joint action, b) the I and the we in joint action, c) the effect of group size, structure and nature on the phenomenology of joint action and d) how do phenomenal relate to normative aspects of joint action? (shrink)

Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder (DPD) is a psychopathological condition in which subjects suffer from a massive alienation from themselves and the world around them. In recent years, several philosophers have proposed accounts that explain DPD in terms of an alteration in global features of normal consciousness, such as ‘mineness’. This article criticizes such accounts and develops an alternative approach, based on the observation that many mental states relate to the subject because of the kind of state they belong to. I argue that (...) most symptoms of DPD can be understood as impairments in such forms of self-relation. (shrink)

Both in research on Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVHs) and in their clinical assessment, it is common to distinguish between voices that are experienced as ‘inner’ (or ‘internal’, ‘inside the head’, ‘inside the mind’,...) and voices that are experienced as ‘outer’ (‘external’, ‘outside the head’, ‘outside the mind’,...). This inner/outer-contrast is treated not only as an important phenomenological variable of AVHs, it is also often seen as having diagnostic value. In this article, we argue that the distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ (...) voices is ambiguous between different readings, and that lack of disambiguation in this regard has led to flaws in assessment tools, diagnostic debates and empirical studies. Such flaws, we argue furthermore, are often linked to misreadings of inner/outer-terminology in relevant 19th and early twentieth century work on AVHs, in particular, in connection with Kandinsky’s and Jaspers’s distinction between hallucinations and pseudo-hallucinations. (shrink)

A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00536-7.

Natural Kind Essentialism is the view that the objects of sciences like physics, chemistry and biology fall into natural kinds, and that such kinds have essences—sets of properties possession of which is necessary and sufficient for kind-membership. Since Putnam and Kripke brought NKE back onto the philosophical agenda, it has found many advocates. But comparatively little attention has been paid to the question of how this view can be positively motivated. After illustrating the current need for an argument for NKE (...) through critical discussions of Putnam’s, Kripke’s and Ellis’s arguments for NKE, this article aims to show that Hegel offers the resources for an original argument for the view. This argument works by deriving metaphysical implications from an account of what it means to understand an explanandum. (shrink)

there can be little doubt that in its influence on the development of post-Kantian German Idealism, Spinoza’s philosophy is second only to Kant’s. Important strands of philosophical debate within the idealist movement go back to the famous dispute on Spinozism that is triggered by Jacobi’s On the Doctrine of Spinoza. Idealists like Maimon, Schelling, and Hegel thoroughly engaged with Spinoza’s writings, and Schelling himself even adopts a version of Spinozism at some stages of his career. Yet, while a substantive amount (...) of scholarship has been devoted to Spinoza’s influence on the idealist movement,1 there is surprisingly little discussion in the literature about the idealists’ views on one of the most crucial... (shrink)

It is increasingly realized today that Western modernity has not only promoted progressive ideals such as scientific thought, human rights and democratic political systems. Its history is also marked by a much darker side, one of brutal conquest, biological and cultural destruction, enslavement and exploitation of non-European peoples in the context of European colonialism. This dark side of Western modernity was legitimized by pro-colonial ideologies of property, war, civilization, progress and race. Such ideologies emerged in areas like jurisprudence and philosophy (...) since the 16th century, often building on views from classical antiquity (Pagden 1995). They shaped academic paradigms such as ‘scientific racism’, colonial anthropology and Orientalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and in many ways continue to influence contemporary societies and their academic practices. (shrink)

This introduction is part of the special issue ‘ Self-knowledge in perspective’ guest edited by Fleur Jongepier and Derek Strijbos. // Papers included in the special issue: Transparency, expression, and self-knowledge Dorit Bar-On -/- Self-knowledge and communication Johannes Roessler -/- First-person privilege, judgment, and avowal Kateryna Samoilova -/- Self-knowledge about attitudes: rationalism meets interpretation Franz Knappik -/- How do you know that you settled a question? Tillmann Vierkant -/- On knowing one’s own resistant beliefs Cristina Borgoni -/- Self-knowledge and (...) imagination Peter Langland-Hassan -/- Transparent emotions? A critical analysis of Moran’s transparency claim Naomi Kloosterboer -/- Mind-making practices: the social infrastructure of self-knowing agency and responsibility Victoria McGeer -/- Pluralistic folk psychology and varieties of self-knowledge : an exploration Kristin Andrews -/-. (shrink)

Das Verhaltnis von Spekulation und Vorstellung in Hegels enzyklopadischem System ist von einer eigentumlichen Spannung gekennzeichnet. Spekulation ist nicht nur die kritische Reinigung der Inhalte der Vorstellung von ihren Vorurteilen und Irrtumern, sondern zugleich Anerkennung des endlichen, vorstellenden Denkens innerhalb seiner Grenzen, sowohl auf dem Gebiet der Erkenntnistheorie als auch der Religion. Wie verhalten sich aber Spekulation und Vorstellung zueinander in verschiedenen Teilen des enzyklopadischen Systems, in der Logik und der Philosophie des Geistes? Diesem Zusammenhang gehen die Beitrage des Tagungsbandes (...) im Detail nach und uberprufen kritisch das enzyklopadische Zusammenspiel von Spekulation und Vorstellung in den Spharen des subjektiven und des absoluten Geistes. Mit Beitragen von: Kazimir Drilo, Markus Gabriel, Christoph Halbig, Gunnar Hindrichs, Axel Hutter, Franz Knappik, Anton Friedrich Koch, Christian Georg Martin, Jan Rohls, Rainer Schafer. (shrink)

Der Band 14 des Internationalen Jahrbuchs des Deutschen Idealismus ist dem Thema der Auseinandersetzung von Kant und den Vertretern des Deutschen Idealismus mit den Rationalisten gewidmet. Beleuchtet werden in den Beiträgen die Beziehungen von Kant zu Wolff und Leibniz; von Fichte zu Spinoza und Leibniz, von Hegel zu Descartes und Spinoza, von Schelling zu Spinoza sowie von Novalis zu Spinoza. Die Auseinandersetzung mit diesen Bezügen bietet die Möglichkeit, Transformation und Kontinuität konkreter metaphysischer Themen der Frühen Neuzeit zu diskutieren. In vielen (...) Beiträgen wird darüber hinaus auch zum Thema gemacht, inwiefern und in welchem Sinne Kant und die deutschen Idealisten selbst eine 'rationalistische' Philosophie vertreten. Autori*innen des Bandes sind: Brady Bowman, Daniel Breazeale, Karin de Boer, Willem de Vries, Johannes Haag, Dietmar Heidemann, Thomas Hilgers, Marco Ivaldo, Anja Jauernig, Franz Knappik, Jane Kneller, Brandon C. Look, John McCumber, Yitzhak Y. Melamed, Oliver Sensen, Paul Ziche. Der Band bietet Einzelstudien herausragender Wissenschaftler*innen zum Verhältnis zweier wichtiger Traditionen in der Geschichte der Philosophie. (shrink)

This book contains the definitive statement of Franz Brentano's views on meta physics. It is made up of essays which were dictated by Brentano during the last ten years of his life, between 1907 and 1917. These dictations were assembled and edited by Alfred Kastil and first published by the Felix Meiner Verlag in 1933 under the title Kategorienlehre. Kastil added copious notes to Brentano's text. These notes have been included, with some slight omissions, in the present edition; the (...) bibliographical references have been brought up to date. Brentano's approach to philosophy is unfamiliar to many contemporay readers. I shall discuss below certain fundamental points which such readers are likely to find the most difficult. I believe that once these points are properly understood, then what Brentano has to say will be seen to be of first importance to philosophy. THE PRIMACY OF THE INTENTIONAL To understand Brentano's theory of being, one must realize that he appeals to what he calls inner perception for his paradigmatic uses of the word "is". For inner perception, according to Brentano, is the source of our knowledge of the nature of being, just as it is the source of our knowledge of the nature of truth and of the nature of good and evil. And what can be said about the being of things that are not apprehended in inner perception can be understood only by analogy with what we are able to say about ourselves as thinking subjects. (shrink)

Growing out of concerns for environment-development interlinkages expressed at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 1972, this volume is a compilation of edited versions of statements made at that conference and at the ...

Recent accounts of actual causation are stated in terms of extended causal models. These extended causal models contain two elements representing two seemingly distinct modalities. The first element are structural equations which represent the or mechanisms of the model, just as ordinary causal models do. The second element are ranking functions which represent normality or typicality. The aim of this paper is to show that these two modalities can be unified. I do so by formulating two constraints under which extended (...) causal models with their two modalities can be subsumed under so called which contain just one modality. These two constraints will be formally precise versions of Lewissystem of weights or priorities” governing overall similarity between possible worlds. (shrink)

The paper provides an argument for the thesis that an agent’s degrees of disbelief should obey the ranking calculus. This Consistency Argument is based on the Consistency Theorem. The latter says that an agent’s belief set is and will always be consistent and deductively closed iff her degrees of entrenchment satisfy the ranking axioms and are updated according to the ranktheoretic update rules.

Philosophically, one of the most important questions in the enterprise termed confirmation theory is this: Why should one stick to well confirmed theories rather than to any other theories? This paper discusses the answers to this question one gets from absolute and incremental Bayesian confirmation theory. According to absolute confirmation, one should accept ''absolutely well confirmed'' theories, because absolute confirmation takes one to true theories. An examination of two popular measures of incremental confirmation suggests the view that one should stick (...) to incrementally well confirmed theories, because incremental confirmation takes one to (the most) informative (among all) true theories. However, incremental confirmation does not further this goal in general. I close by presenting a necessary and sufficient condition for revealing the confirmational structure in almost every world when presented separating data. (shrink)

The Spohnian paradigm of ranking functions is in many respects like an order-of-magnitude reverse of subjective probability theory. Unlike probabilities, however, ranking functions are only indirectly—via a pointwise ranking function on the underlying set of possibilities W —defined on a field of propositions A over W. This research note shows under which conditions ranking functions on a field of propositions A over W and rankings on a language L are induced by pointwise ranking functions on W and the set of (...) models for L, ModL, respectively. (shrink)

First published in English in1966, _The True and The Evident_ is a translation of Franz Brentano’s posthumous _Wahrheit und Evidenz_, edited by Oscsar Kraus. The book includes Brentano’s influential lecture "On the Concept of Truth", read before the Vienna Philosophical Society, a variety of essays, drawn from the immense wealth of Brentano’s unpublished material, and letters written by him to Marty, Kraus Hillebrand, and Husserl. Brentano rejects the familiar versions of the "correspondence theory of truth" and proposes to define (...) the true in terms of the evident. In criticising the metaphysical assumptions presupposed by the correspondence theory, he sets forth a conception of language and reality that has subsequently become known as "reism". (shrink)

Philosophers typically rely on intuitions when providing a semantics for counterfactual conditionals. However, intuitions regarding counterfactual conditionals are notoriously shaky. The aim of this paper is to provide a principled account of the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. This principled account is provided by what I dub the Royal Rule, a deterministic analogue of the Principal Principle relating chance and credence. The Royal Rule says that an ideal doxastic agent’s initial grade of disbelief in a proposition \(A\) , given that the (...) counterfactual distance in a given context to the closest \(A\) -worlds equals \(n\) , and no further information that is not admissible in this context, should equal \(n\) . Under the two assumptions that the presuppositions of a given context are admissible in this context, and that the theory of deterministic alethic or metaphysical modality is admissible in any context, it follows that the counterfactual distance distribution in a given context has the structure of a ranking function. The basic conditional logic V is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the resulting rank-theoretic semantics of counterfactuals. (shrink)

Bayesianism is the position that scientific reasoning is probabilistic and that probabilities are adequately interpreted as an agent's actual subjective degrees of belief, measured by her betting behaviour. Confirmation is one important aspect of scientific reasoning. The thesis of this paper is the following: if scientific reasoning is at all probabilistic, the subjective interpretation has to be given up in order to get right confirmation—and thus scientific reasoning in general. The Bayesian approach to scientific reasoning Bayesian confirmation theory The example (...) The less reliable the source of information, the higher the degree of Bayesian confirmation Measure sensitivity A more general version of the problem of old evidence Conditioning on the entailment relation The counterfactual strategy Generalizing the counterfactual strategy The desired result, and a necessary and sufficient condition for it Actual degrees of belief The common knock-down feature, or ‘anything goes’ The problem of prior probabilities. (shrink)

This paper presents a new analysis of C.G. Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation [Hempel C. G. (1945). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: The Free Press, pp. 3–51.], differing from the one Carnap gave in §87 of his [1962. Logical foundations of probability (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.]. Hempel, it is argued, felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at true hypotheses and another (...) aiming at informative hypotheses. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative hypotheses. I then show that one can have Hempel’s cake and eat it too. There is a logic that takes into account both of these two conflicting aspects. According to this logic, a sentence H is an acceptable hypothesis for evidence E if and only if H is both sufficiently plausible given E and sufficiently informative about E. Finally, the logic sheds new light on Carnap’s analysis. (shrink)

Der Band 'Versuch über die Erkenntnis' wurde von A. Kastil im Jahre 1925 in der Philosophischen Bibliothek herausgegeben. Seinen Inhalt bildet hauptsächlich Franz Brentanos nachgelassene, umfangreiche Schrift: 'Nieder mit den Vorurteilen!' Sie trägt den Untertitel: 'Ein Mahnwort an die Gegenwart, im Geiste von Bacon und Descartes von allem blinden Apriori sich loszusagen'. Die aus dem Jahre 1903 stammende Abhandlung: 'Nieder mit den Vorurteilen!' beschäftigt sich im I. und II. Teil vorwiegend mit Kants synthetischen Urteilen a priori, die mit aller (...) Entschiedenheit abgelehnt werden, weil wir - nach Brentanos Auffassung - in ihnen keine Erkenntnisse, sondern nur blinde Vorurteile gegeben haben. (shrink)

This paper shows that causation in the sense of Lewis is a special case of causation in the sense of Spohn.

This paper starts by indicating the analysis of Hempel's conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel, 1945) as presented in Huber (submitted). There I argue contra Carnap (1962, Section 87) that Hempel felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at plausible theories and another aiming at informative theories. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative theories. The main part of the paper (...) consists in working out the claim that one can have Hempel's cake and eat it too - in the sense that there is a logic of theory assessment that takes into account both of the two conflicting aspects of plausibility and informativeness. According to the semantics of this logic, a is an acceptable theory for evidence β if and only if a is both sufficiently plausible given β and sufficiently informative about β. This is spelt out in terms of ranking functions (Spohn, 1988) and shown to represent the syntactically specified notion of an assessment relation. The paper then compares these acceptability relations to explanatory and confirmatory consequence relations (Flach, 2000) as well as to nonmonotonic consequence relations (Kraus et al., 1990). It concludes by relating the plausibility-informativeness approach to Carnap's positive relevance account, thereby shedding new light on Carnap's analysis as well as solving another problem of confirmation theory. (shrink)

The question I am addressing in this paper is the following: how is it possible to empirically test, or confirm, counterfactuals? After motivating this question in Section 1, I will look at two approaches to counterfactuals, and at how counterfactuals can be empirically tested, or confirmed, if at all, on these accounts in Section 2. I will then digress into the philosophy of probability in Section 3. The reason for this digression is that I want to use the way observable (...) absolute and relative frequencies, two empirical notions, are used to empirically test, or confirm, hypotheses about objective chances, a metaphysical notion, as a role-model. Specifically, I want to use this probabilistic account of the testing of chance hypotheses as a role-model for the account of the testing of counterfactuals, another metaphysical notion, that I will present in Sections 4 to 8. I will conclude by comparing my proposal to one non-probabilistic and one probabilistic alternative in Section 9. (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is that we can justify induction deductively relative to one end, and deduction inductively relative to a different end. I will begin by presenting a contemporary variant of Hume ’s argument for the thesis that we cannot justify the principle of induction. Then I will criticize the responses the resulting problem of induction has received by Carnap and Goodman, as well as praise Reichenbach ’s approach. Some of these authors compare induction to deduction. Haack compares (...) deduction to induction, and I will critically discuss her argument for the thesis that we cannot justify the principles of deduction next. In concluding I will defend the thesis that we can justify induction deductively relative to one end, and deduction inductively relative to a different end, and that we can do so in a non-circular way. Along the way I will show how we can understand deductive and inductive logic as normative theories, and I will briefly sketch an argument to the effect that there are only hypothetical, but no categorical imperatives. (shrink)

On Jewish Learning collects essays, speeches, and letters that express Rosenzweig's desire to reconnect the profound truths of Judaism with the lives of ordinary people.

This note is a sequel to Huber. It is shown that obeying a normative principle relating counterfactual conditionals and conditional beliefs, viz. the royal rule, is a necessary and sufficient means to attaining a cognitive end that relates true beliefs in purely factual, non-modal propositions and true beliefs in purely modal propositions. Along the way I will sketch my idealism about alethic or metaphysical modality.

Blumenberg‘s phenomenological anthropology replaces the traditional question: What is the human being? with the following question: How is being human even possible? This question expresses a great mistrust over the ability of copying with human life. According to Blumenberg, man can survive only when he keeps distance from the threatening world in a literal as well as metaphorical sense. As an upright animal, who sees and can be seen, he can experience being hunted but also being the hunter in order (...) to bring himself into safety from what threatens him as well as succeeding in hunting. In a metaphorical sense, man takes distance from the almighty reality through myths, religion, science, technology, art, resp . culture as reliable ways to cope with anxiety and threats in this, for him, dangerous and nameless world. (shrink)

Ein unveröffentlichter Text (Nachlaß-Paginierung: 30604 – 30620) Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Wilhelm Baumgartner -/- Wahrscheinlich Palermo, März 1900; zur Datierung vgl. die inhaltliche Übereinstimmung mit dem Brief an A. Marty vom 28.3.1900 im Anhang. -/- Emilie grüsst. -/- Emilie Brentano. Der Briefwechsel Brentano-Marty wird z.Z. bei der Franz Brentano Forschung an der Universität Würzburg von W. Baumgartner für eine kritische Edition bearbeitet.