Several recent interpretations see Hegel's theory of the Concept as a form of conceptual realism, according to which finite reality is articulated by objectively existing concepts. More precisely, this theory has been interpreted as a version of natural kind essentialism, and it has been proposed that its function is to account for the possibility of genuine explanations. This suggests a promising way to reconstruct the argument that Hegel's theory of objective concepts is based on—an argument that shows that the possibility (...) of explanation rests on metaphysical preconditions and that natural kind essentialism gives the only adequate account of those preconditions. But in order for such a reconstruction to be successful, one needs to spell out the metaphysical features in virtue of which Hegelian natural kinds can account for the possibility of explanation. The article takes up this challenge. It offers the first detailed analysis of the modal fine-structure of Hegel's natural kind essentialism and shows how Hegel's position, thus understood, provides the details needed to complete the explanation-based argument. (shrink)

This article interprets Hegel's hierarchical theory of race as an application of his general views about the metaphysics of classification and explanation. We begin by offering a reconstruction of Hegel's hierarchical theory of race based on the critical edition of relevant lecture transcripts: we argue that Hegel's position on race is appropriately classified as racist, that it postulates innate mental deficits of some races, and that it turns racism from an anthropological into a metaphysical doctrine by claiming that the division (...) of humankind into races (at least in the Old World) is not a brute fact, but follows a ‘higher necessity’. We then summarize our interpretation of the relevant metaphysical background to this theory. On our reading, Hegel postulates an essentialist form of explanation that explains given kinds as stages in a teleological, non-temporal process through which the nature of a superordinate kind is realized. We argue that Hegel's views about a hierarchical and necessary division of humankind into races are an application of this model to the case of human diversity, motivated by explanatory considerations and subject to confirmation bias. By way of conclusion, we address two possible attempts to ‘save’ Hegelian philosophy from its racist baggage. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 101 Heft: 1 Seiten: 92-134.

"Die Fähigkeit zur Freiheit, verstanden als vernünftige Selbstbestimmung, ist nach Hegel grundlegend für unser Denken und Erkennen ebenso wie für unser Wollen und Handeln: Der 'logische Raum der Gründe' ist für Hegel ein 'Reich der Freiheit'. Franz Knappik untersucht, wie Hegel diesen Gedanken in einer umfassenden Theorie entwickelt, die Logik, Metaphysik, Epistemologie und praktische Rationalität behandelt. In Auseinandersetzung mit analytischen Deutungsansätzen und Sachdiskussionen zeigt Knappik die Aktualität und Originalität von Hegels Position auf."--Cover.

Recently influential “rationalist” views of self-knowledge about our rational attitudes hold that such self-knowledge is essentially connected to rational agency, and therefore has to be particularly reliable, immediate, and distinct from third-personal access. This approach has been challenged by “theory theory” or “interpretationist” views of self-knowledge: on such views, self-knowledge is based on the interpretation of information about ourselves, and this interpretation involves the same mindreading mechanisms that we use to access other persons’ mental states. Interpretationist views are usually dismissed (...) as implausible and unwarranted by advocates of rationalism. In this article, I argue that rationalists should revise their attitude towards interpretationism: they can, and ought to, accept themselves a form of interpretationism. First, I argue that interpretationism is correct at least for a substantive range of cases. These are cases in which we respond to a question ab.. (shrink)

On a widely held view, episodes of inner speech provide at least one way in which we become conscious of our thoughts. However, it can be argued, on the one hand, that consciousness of thoughts in virtue of inner speech presupposes interpretation of the simulated speech. On the other hand, the need for such self-interpretation seems to clash with distinctive first-personal characteristics that we would normally ascribe to consciousness of one’s own thoughts: a special reliability; a lack of conscious ambiguity (...) and incomprehensibility; and a sense of causal agency. I try to resolve this puzzle by proposing an account for the requisite self-interpretation of inner speech in terms of Bayesian probabilistic inference. Drawing on “perceptual loop” accounts of speech control, I argue that such interpretive probabilistic inferences are used for the control of inner speech, and that as a consequence of this function, they are biased toward the correct interpretations. I conclude by showing how this model can explain the first-personal characteristics of consciousness of one’s own thoughts. In the case of the sense of causal agency, the resulting explanation yields novel accounts for “audible thoughts” and thought insertion. (shrink)

On a widely held view, episodes of inner speech provide at least one way in which we become conscious of our thoughts. However, it can be argued, on the one hand, that consciousness of thoughts in virtue of inner speech presupposes interpretation of the simulated speech. On the other hand, the need for such self-interpretation seems to clash with distinctive first-personal characteristics that we would normally ascribe to consciousness of one’s own thoughts: a special reliability; a lack of conscious ambiguity (...) and incomprehensibility; and a sense of causal agency. I try to resolve this puzzle by proposing an account for the requisite self-interpretation of inner speech in terms of Bayesian probabilistic inference. Drawing on “perceptual loop” accounts of speech control, I argue that such interpretive probabilistic inferences are used for the control of inner speech, and that as a consequence of this function, they are biased toward the correct interpretations. I conclude by showing how this model can explain the first-personal characteristics of consciousness of one’s own thoughts. In the case of the sense of causal agency, the resulting explanation yields novel accounts for “audible thoughts” and thought insertion. (shrink)

I propose a new reading of Hegel’s discussion of modality in the ‘Actuality’ chapter of the Science of Logic. On this reading, the main purpose of the chapter is a critical engagement with Spinoza’s modal metaphysics. Hegel first reconstructs a rationalist line of thought — corresponding to the cosmological argument for the existence of God — that ultimately leads to Spinozist necessitarianism. He then presents a reductio argument against necessitarianism, contending that as a consequence of necessitarianism, no adequate explanatory accounts (...) of facts about finite reality can be given. (shrink)

According to a view, which is common both in contemporary philosophy and in the history of philosophy, we possess a particular epistemic access to our own present intentional actions. This article examines accounts of this access, which have been put forward in Classical German Philosophy. After a short survey of the relevant Kantian background I discuss the positions that Schopenhauer and Fichte have proposed in this regard. Schopenhauer’s approach, which anticipates current theories of non-perceptual knowledge of one’s actions, turns out (...) to face substantial problems. Fichte, by contrast, offers an original alternative to non-perceptual accounts, which is based on the assumption of a practical form of perception.Nach einer Auffassung, die heutzutage ebenso wie in der Philosophiegeschichte weit verbreitet ist, besitzen wir einen besonderen epistemischen Zugang zu unseren eigenen gegenwärtigen intentionalen Handlungen. Dieser Beitrag untersucht Ansätze, die innerhalb der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie zur Deutung dieses Zugangs entwickelt wurden. Nach einer kurzen Diskussion des relevanten Kantischen Hintergrunds wende ich mich Schopenhauers und Fichtes einschlägigen Positionen zu. Schopenhauers Ansatz, der heute populäre Theorien eines nicht-wahrnehmungsgestützten Handlungswissens antizipiert, ist mit erheblichen Schwierigkeiten konfrontiert. Dagegen bietet Fichte eine originelle Alternative zu nicht-wahrnehmungsgestützten Theorien, die auf der Annahme einer praktischen Form von Wahrnehmung basiert. (shrink)

The contributions collected in this special issue explore the phenomenology of joint action from a broad range of different disciplinary and methodological angles, including philosophical investigation (both in the analytic and the phenomenological tradition), computational modeling, experimental study, game theory, and developmental psychology. They also vastly expand the range of discussed cases beyond the standard examples of house-painting and sauce-cooking, addressing, for example, collective musical improvisations, dancing, work at the Diversity and Equity office of a university, and historical examples of (...) collective violence such as the revolutionary Terror in France and the Nazis. In our introduction to this special issue, we group the contributions into three thematic areas – 1) the phenomenological fine-structure of joint action, 2) underlying mechanisms for joint action and 3) phenomenal preconditions for joint action. The first theme is discussed under a number of issues – a) components of the phenomenology of joint action, b) the I and the we in joint action, c) the effect of group size, structure and nature on the phenomenology of joint action and d) how do phenomenal relate to normative aspects of joint action? (shrink)

Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder (DPD) is a psychopathological condition in which subjects suffer from a massive alienation from themselves and the world around them. In recent years, several philosophers have proposed accounts that explain DPD in terms of an alteration in global features of normal consciousness, such as ‘mineness’. This article criticizes such accounts and develops an alternative approach, based on the observation that many mental states relate to the subject because of the kind of state they belong to. I argue that (...) most symptoms of DPD can be understood as impairments in such forms of self-relation. (shrink)

Both in research on Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVHs) and in their clinical assessment, it is common to distinguish between voices that are experienced as ‘inner’ (or ‘internal’, ‘inside the head’, ‘inside the mind’,...) and voices that are experienced as ‘outer’ (‘external’, ‘outside the head’, ‘outside the mind’,...). This inner/outer-contrast is treated not only as an important phenomenological variable of AVHs, it is also often seen as having diagnostic value. In this article, we argue that the distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ (...) voices is ambiguous between different readings, and that lack of disambiguation in this regard has led to flaws in assessment tools, diagnostic debates and empirical studies. Such flaws, we argue furthermore, are often linked to misreadings of inner/outer-terminology in relevant 19th and early twentieth century work on AVHs, in particular, in connection with Kandinsky’s and Jaspers’s distinction between hallucinations and pseudo-hallucinations. (shrink)

there can be little doubt that in its influence on the development of post-Kantian German Idealism, Spinoza’s philosophy is second only to Kant’s. Important strands of philosophical debate within the idealist movement go back to the famous dispute on Spinozism that is triggered by Jacobi’s On the Doctrine of Spinoza. Idealists like Maimon, Schelling, and Hegel thoroughly engaged with Spinoza’s writings, and Schelling himself even adopts a version of Spinozism at some stages of his career. Yet, while a substantive amount (...) of scholarship has been devoted to Spinoza’s influence on the idealist movement,1 there is surprisingly little discussion in the literature about the idealists’ views on one of the most crucial... (shrink)

Natural Kind Essentialism is the view that the objects of sciences like physics, chemistry and biology fall into natural kinds, and that such kinds have essences—sets of properties possession of which is necessary and sufficient for kind-membership. Since Putnam and Kripke brought NKE back onto the philosophical agenda, it has found many advocates. But comparatively little attention has been paid to the question of how this view can be positively motivated. After illustrating the current need for an argument for NKE (...) through critical discussions of Putnam’s, Kripke’s and Ellis’s arguments for NKE, this article aims to show that Hegel offers the resources for an original argument for the view. This argument works by deriving metaphysical implications from an account of what it means to understand an explanandum. (shrink)

A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00536-7.