This article interprets Hegel's hierarchical theory of race as an application of his general views about the metaphysics of classification and explanation. We begin by offering a reconstruction of Hegel's hierarchical theory of race based on the critical edition of relevant lecture transcripts: we argue that Hegel's position on race is appropriately classified as racist, that it postulates innate mental deficits of some races, and that it turns racism from an anthropological into a metaphysical doctrine by claiming that the division (...) of humankind into races (at least in the Old World) is not a brute fact, but follows a ‘higher necessity’. We then summarize our interpretation of the relevant metaphysical background to this theory. On our reading, Hegel postulates an essentialist form of explanation that explains given kinds as stages in a teleological, non-temporal process through which the nature of a superordinate kind is realized. We argue that Hegel's views about a hierarchical and necessary division of humankind into races are an application of this model to the case of human diversity, motivated by explanatory considerations and subject to confirmation bias. By way of conclusion, we address two possible attempts to ‘save’ Hegelian philosophy from its racist baggage. (shrink)

It is increasingly realized today that Western modernity has not only promoted progressive ideals such as scientific thought, human rights and democratic political systems. Its history is also marked by a much darker side, one of brutal conquest, biological and cultural destruction, enslavement and exploitation of non-European peoples in the context of European colonialism. This dark side of Western modernity was legitimized by pro-colonial ideologies of property, war, civilization, progress and race. Such ideologies emerged in areas like jurisprudence and philosophy (...) since the 16th century, often building on views from classical antiquity (Pagden 1995). They shaped academic paradigms such as ‘scientific racism’, colonial anthropology and Orientalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and in many ways continue to influence contemporary societies and their academic practices. (shrink)

Social functions and functional explanations play a prominent role not only in our everyday reasoning but also in classical as well as contemporary social theory and empirical social research. This volume explores metaphysical, normative, and methodological perspectives on social functions and functional explanations in the social sciences. It aims to push the philosophical debate on social functions forward along new investigative lines by including up-to-date discussions of the metaphysics of social functions, questions concerning the nature of functional explanations within the (...) social domain, and various applications of functionalist theorising. As such, this is one of the first collections to exclusively address a variety of philosophical questions concerning the nature and relevance of social functions. (shrink)