The objective of this study is the delineation of a philosophical tradition linking Epicurus’ ethical philosophy to Democritus. Specifically, Warren seeks to demonstrate that there is an ethical tradition of Democriteanism, anchored in atomism. Tracing its outlines demands extensive philosophical and philological sleuthing. It is inevitable that such a project will tell only a likely story for it is beset with challenges at virtually every stage. The challenges begin with Democritus himself. His ethical fragments, extensive in number, rest on the (...) insecure foundation of Stobaeus’ anthology and a collection known as The Sayings of Democrates. Is Democrates the familiar atomist from Abdera or someone else? Further, do the ethical fragments have any foundation in Democritean atomism? Warren admits that any claim of a foundation of Democritean ethics in his physics is only a conjecture. (shrink)

English summary: It seems that reason is less a universal principle than something inherently bound to the contexts in which it appears. These contributions to a conference held on the occasion of Christoph Schwobel's 60th birthday explore the character of reason's manifold contexts: the grounding of reason in the inner word of God 's Trinitarian life as well as the disclosure of reason and and its limits in human conversation. German description: Vernunft scheint in der Gegenwart weniger ein allgemeines Prinzip (...) als eine in Kontexte eingebundene Grosse zu sein. Die Beitrage einer Tagung anlasslich von Christoph Schwobels 60. Geburtstag, gehen der Frage nach dem Charakter dieser Kontextbindung nach: der Begrundung der Vernunft im trinitarischen Gesprach wie der Erschliessung und Problematisierung der Vernunft im menschlichen Gesprach. Mit Beitragen von V. Brummer, G. van den Brink, C. Drobe, H. J. Eckstein, D.-M. Grube, J. Halfwassen, S. Heine, F. Hermanni, E. Herms, W. Harle, W. Homolka, W. Jeanrond, R. W. Jenson, D. Kelsey, A. F. Koch, A. Kupsch, V. Leppin, P.-C. Lai, P. Lo, A. Min, J. Moltmann, M. Muhling, P. Peterson, M. Sarot, F. Schweitzer, A. Torrance, J. Webster, M. Welker, M. Wendte, M. Wisse, H. Wisskirchen und L. Zak. (shrink)

The self seems to be a unitary entity remaining stable across time. Nevertheless, current theorizing conceptualizes the self as a number of interacting sub-systems involving perception, intention and action (self-model). One important function of such a self-model is to distinguish between events occurring as a result of one's own actions and events occurring as the result of somebody else's actions. We conducted an fMRI experiment that compared brain activation after an abrupt mismatch between one's own movement and its visual consequences (...) with an abrupt mismatch between one's own movement and somebody else's visually perceived hand movement. A right fronto-parietal network was selectively active during a sudden mismatch between one's own observed and performed hand action. (shrink)

The objective of this study is the delineation of a philosophical tradition linking Epicurus’ ethical philosophy to Democritus. Specifically, Warren seeks to demonstrate that there is an ethical tradition of Democriteanism, anchored in atomism. Tracing its outlines demands extensive philosophical and philological sleuthing. It is inevitable that such a project will tell only a likely story for it is beset with challenges at virtually every stage. The challenges begin with Democritus himself. His ethical fragments, extensive in number, rest on the (...) insecure foundation of Stobaeus’ anthology and a collection known as The Sayings of Democrates. Is Democrates the familiar atomist from Abdera or someone else? Further, do the ethical fragments have any foundation in Democritean atomism? Warren admits that any claim of a foundation of Democritean ethics in his physics is only a conjecture. (shrink)

Empirical approaches on topics such as consciousness, self-awareness, or introspective perspective, need a conceptual framework so that the emerging, still unconnected findings can be integrated and put into perspective. We introduce a model of self-consciousness derived from phenomenology, philosophy, the cognitive, and neurosciences. We will then give an overview of research data on one particular aspect of our model, self-agency, trying to link findings from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Finally, we will expand on pathological aspects of self-agency, and in particular (...) on psychosis in schizophrenia. We show, that a deficient self-monitoring system underlies, in part, hallucinations and formal thought (language) disorder in schizophrenia. We argue, that self-consciousness is a valid construct and can be studied with the instruments of cognitive and neuroscience. (shrink)

Die Subjektivitat ist das ureigene Grundthema der Phanomenologie. Allerdings kann die Phanomenologie die Subjektivitat nicht zum Thema machen, ohne die Frage nach der Intersubjektivitat zu stellen. Beide Problemfelder sind derart aufeinander bezogen, dass sie nicht unabhangig voneinander behandelt werden konnen. Die Phanomenologie aber eignet sich besonders gut dazu, die Art und Weise der Zusammengehorigkeit von Subjektivitat und Intersubjektivitat zu erforschen, weil sie nicht von vornherein eine ubergreifende Vernunft oder einen allumfassenden Geist zugrunde legt. Vielmehr macht sie gerade die Singularitat des (...) einzelnen Subjekts und sein einmaliges Verhaltnis zu den ebenso singularen Mitsubjekten zum Problem. Diese Einsicht liegt den funfzehn Beitragen des vorliegenden Sammelbandes zugrunde. Dirk Fonfara, Michela Summa, Irene Breuer, Walter Schweidler, Michael Wallner, Alice Pugliese, Meike Siegfried, Anna Orlikowski, Thiemo Breyer, Antonio Cimino, Jesus Guillermo Ferrer Ortega, Christian Rossner, Daniel Biro, Inga Romer und Klaus Held gehen in ihren Beitragen der Frage nach der Subjektivitat und ihrer Bezogenheit auf die Intersubjektivitat aus verschiedenen Perspektiven nach. Dabei kommt immer wieder eine Spannung zwischen den beiden Grundbegriffen zum Vorschein, deren Bedeutung und Reichweite ausgelotet wird. (shrink)

Leaders, particularly new leaders, seek to establish high levels of trust, as it has been associated with higher levels of effectiveness and group outcomes. This study is designed to understand how trust changes and develops for leaders in a new role and the implications of that change. Although calls for research on trust over time have been made for the past 2 decades, our knowledge of this phenomenon is still quite limited. The findings indicate that leader and unit performance is (...) a function not only of absolute trust level, but is also affected by the direction and magnitude of change in trust across time periods, with the highest levels of effectiveness being associated with leaders who exhibited an increase in trust from the group over time. The data also suggest that the direction and rate at which trust grew was determined by initial expectations and transformational leadership behaviors. (shrink)

Scheitern wie Gelingen sind ambivalente und zugleich existentielle Erfahrungen des Menschen. Die Sehnsucht, das eigene Leben als gelingend zu erfahren, ist dabei Ausdruck des menschlichen Strebens nach Glück. Das Wagnis einer unwiderruflichen Lebensentscheidung ist dabei der verbindlichste Ausdruck individueller Sinnstiftung für ein gelingendes Leben. Zur Frage, welche Gründe dem Gelingen oder Scheitern eines biografischen Lebensprojektes zugrunde liegen, hat Klaus Demmer wesentliche Überlegungen angestellt, denen in dieser Arbeit nachgegangen wird. Zentral ist dabei die Verhältnisbestimmung von sittlicher Persönlichkeit und Identität. Indem das (...) vorgelegte Konzept aus philosophischer, soziologischer und psychologischer Perspektive befragt wird, zeigt der Autor die Anschlussfähigkeit der moraltheologischen Erwägungen für den gegenwärtigen Diskurs um denBegriff der Identität auf. (shrink)

Stoicism was one of the new philosophical movements of the Hellenistic period. The name derives from the porch (stoa poikilê) in the Agora at Athens decorated with mural paintings, where the members of the school congregated, and their lectures were held. Unlike ‘epicurean,’ the sense of the English adjective ‘stoical’ is not utterly misleading with regard to its philosophical origins. The Stoics did, in fact, hold that emotions like fear or envy (or impassioned sexual attachments, or passionate love of anything (...) whatsoever) either were, or arose from, false judgements and that the sage—a person who had attained moral and intellectual perfection—would not undergo them. The later Stoics of Roman Imperial times, Seneca and Epictetus, emphasise the doctrines (already central to the early Stoics' teachings) that the sage is utterly immune to misfortune and that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Our phrase ‘stoic calm’ perhaps encapsulates the general drift of these claims. It does not, however, hint at the even more radical ethical views which the Stoics defended, e.g. that only the sage is free while all others are slaves, or that all those who are morally vicious are equally so. Though it seems clear that some Stoics took a kind of perverse joy in advocating views which seem so at odds with common sense, they did not do so simply to shock. Stoic ethics achieves a certain plausibility within the context of their physical theory and psychology, and within the framework of Greek ethical theory as that was handed down to them from Plato and Aristotle. It seems that they were well aware of the mutually interdependent nature of their philosophical views, likening philosophy itself to a living animal in which logic is bones and sinews; ethics and physics, the flesh and the soul respectively (another version reverses this assignment, making ethics the.. (shrink)

‘Know-that’, like so many natural language expressions, exhibits patterns of use that provide evidence for its context-sensitivity. A popular family of views – call it prag- matic invariantism – attempts to explain the shifty patterns by appeal to a pragmatic thesis: while the semantic meaning of ‘know-that’ is stable across all contexts of use, sentences of the form ‘S knows [doesn’t know] that p’ can be used to communicate a pragmatic content that depends on the context of use. In this (...) paper, the author argues that pragmatic invariantism makes inaccurate predictions for a wide range of well- known use data and is committed to attributing systematic pragmatic error to ordinary speakers. But pragmatic error is unprecedented, and it is doubtful that speakers are systematically wrong about what they intend to communicate. (shrink)

How should we account for the contextual variability of knowledge claims? Many philosophers favour an invariantist account on which such contextual variability is due entirely to pragmatic factors, leaving no interesting context-sensitivity in the semantic meaning of ‘know that.’ I reject this invariantist division of labor by arguing that pragmatic invariantists have no principled account of embedded occurrences of ‘S knows/doesn’t know that p’: Occurrences embedded within larger linguistic constructions such as conditional sentences, attitude verbs, expressions of probability, comparatives, and (...) many others, I argue, give rise to a threefold problem of embedded implicatures. (shrink)

I compare the discussion on exclusivism in religion to the discussion on exclusivism in general. With defenders of religious exclusivism, such as Plantinga, I argue that it is a subset of general exclusivism and is as little blameworthy as the latter is. This explains why defenders of religious exclusivism are right in assuming that the burden of proof is on the shoulders of the critics of exclusivism. Yet, this answer solves only part of the problem. It answers only the first (...) order question of whether it is legitimate to hold exclusivist truth claims in religion. It does not answer the second order question of how, in what spirit, they should be held. I argue that there are contexts in which exclusivist truth claims should be held in a humble fashion, for example contexts in which (cognitive) ambiguity reigns. If they are held in those contexts in an overconfident fashion, they are epistemically and/or morally blameworthy. Since religion is characterized by a measure of (cognitive) ambiguity, exclusivist religious truth claims should be held in a humble fashion. They are thus blameworthy if held in an overconfident fashion. Yet, if held in a modest spirit, there is nothing wrong with religious exclusivism. (shrink)

Wann immer wir etwas sehen, horen, fuhlen oder riechen, erscheint uns etwas. Was aber bedeutet es, dass jemandem etwas erscheint? Was ist der mentale Zustand, in dem sich jemand befindet, wenn ihm etwas erscheint (der Zustand des Erscheinens)? Diese nur scheinbar harmlose Frage steht im Zentrum der vorliegenden Untersuchung. Die Antwort, die verteidigt wird, lautet: Zustande des Erscheinens sind ihrem Wesen nach transparent. D. h. in einem Zustand des Erscheinens sind dem Subjekt dieses Zustandes ausschliesslich die Gegenstande dieser Zustande prasent, (...) niemals aber das Subjekt oder der Zustand selbst (zumindest nicht als solche). Diese Antwort widerspricht einigen in der Philosophie des Geistes tief verwurzelten Auffassungen. Eine davon ist die Auffassung, das phanomenale Bewusstsein von Zustanden des Erscheinens bestunde in irgendeiner unmittelbaren Bekanntschaft mit eben diesen Zustanden. In Wahrheit, so wird argumentiert, hat das fragliche Bewusstsein eine auf die Welt gerichtete Struktur. Es ist nichts anderes als das Prasent-Sein von Gegenstanden in Zustanden des Erscheinens. Dieses Ergebnis hat bedeutende Konsequenzen. Es stellt insbesondere die klassische Taxonomie mentaler Zustande in Frage. Einerseits lasst sich die Unterscheidung von intentionalen und phanomenalen Eigenschaften nicht aufrechterhalten. Denn das phanomenale Bewusstsein von Zustanden des Erscheinens ist eine Art der Intentionalitat. Andererseits lasst sich die Einheit des Merkmals der Intentionalitat nicht aufrechterhalten. Denn die Intentionalitat von Zustanden des Erscheinens ist von grundsatzlich anderer Art als die Intentionalitat propositionaler Einstellungen. Es wird daher vorgeschlagen, nicht weiter zwischen intentionalen und phanomenalen Zustanden zu unterscheiden, sondern zwischen verschiedenen Arten intentionaler Zustande. (shrink)