Given the importance of scientific research in shaping our perception of the world, and our senses of what policies will and won’t succeed in altering that world, it is of great practical, political, and moral importance that we carry out scientific research with integrity. The phenomenon of scientific fraud stands in the way of that, as scientists may knowingly enter claims they take to be false into the scientific literature, often knowingly doing so in defiance of norms they profess allegiance (...) to. In this chapter we take a look at some of the causes of scientific fraud, and how it might be manifested in large-scale research teams and situations of anonymous authorship. We find that such cases make trouble for what might seem like intuitive answers to the question “who should be held responsible for this fraud?”, and we argue that in such cases it would be better to hold the entire community responsible for seeing to it that there is less fraud. (shrink)

While the balance between individual privacy and government monitoring or corporate surveillance has been a frequent topic across numerous disciplines, the issue of privacy within the family has been largely ignored in recent privacy debates. Yet privacy intrusions between parents and children or between adult partners or spouses can be just as profound as those found in the more “public spheres” of life. Popular access to increasingly sophisticated forms of electronic surveillance technologies has altered the dynamics of family relationships. Monitoring, (...) mediated and facilitated by practices of both covert and overt electronic surveillance, has changed the nature of privacy within the family. Parents are tracking children via GPS-enabled cell phone tracking software and are monitoring the Internet use of family members. Parents, siblings, and children are also posting information about their family members online, often without consent, and are creating social media profiles for others online. Prior scholarly work in philosophy and law has primarily addressed the privacy of children from third parties, usually commercial entities, and in the context of making medical decisions. Less attention has been directed at exploring a more general right of privacy of one family member against parents, siblings, children, or spouses. In this article, we do just that. We consider several moral rules that determine appropriate privacy boundaries within the family. More specifically, we will consider when overt or covert surveillance of a child, spouse, or partner by an adult family member is morally permitted. (shrink)

We motivate five constraints on theorizing about sensory experience. We then propose a novel form of naturalistic intentionalism that succeeds where other theories fail by satisfying all of these constraints. On the proposed theory, which we call structure matching tracking intentionalism, brains states track determinables. Internal structural features of those states select determinates of those determinables for presentation in experience. We argue that this theory is distinctively well-positioned to both explain internal-phenomenal structural correlations and accord external features a role in (...) fixing phenomenology. In addition, we use the theory to shed light on how one comes to experience “missing shades”. (shrink)

Altruistic self-sacrifice is rare, supererogatory, and not to be expected of any rational agent; but, the possibility of giving up one's life for the common good has played an important role in moral theorizing. For example, Judith Jarvis Thomson (2008) has argued in a recent paper that intuitions about altruistic self-sacrifice suggest that something has gone wrong in philosophical debates over the trolley problem. We begin by showing that her arguments face a series of significant philosophical objections; however, our project (...) is as much constructive as critical. Building on Thomson's philosophical argument, we report the results of a study that was designed to examine commonsense intuitions about altruistic self-sacrifice. We find that a surprisingly high proportion of people judge that they should give up their lives to save a small number of unknown strangers. We also find that the willingness to engage in such altruistic self-sacrifice is predicted by a person's religious commitments. Finally, we show that folk-moral judgments are sensitive to agent-relative reasons in a way that diverges in important ways from Thomson's proposed intuitions about the trolley problem. With this in mind, we close with a discussion of the relative merits of folk intuitions and philosophical intuitions in constructing a viable moral theory. (shrink)

This text provides an introduction to the history and current state of theories of word meanings.

This chapter examines the recent work in psychology and experimental philosophy that has targeted the commonsense understanding of group minds. It begins by setting up the conceptual and empirical terrain on which claims about the group mind in commonsense psychology have been constructed. The chapter explains an analysis of the cross‐cultural data, which suggest a greater willingness to ascribe collective mentality in East Asian cultures. It addresses that the different strands of data together support the claim that commonsense psychology is (...) committed to a form of methodological holism, which allows for properties of individuals that critically depend on group membership. The chapter concludes by suggesting that this does not cut against philosophical and scientific attempts to defend the existence of collective intentions and group minds; it merely suggests that such projects must move beyond commonsense strategies for predicting and explaining individual behavior. (shrink)

‘Know-that’, like so many natural language expressions, exhibits patterns of use that provide evidence for its context-sensitivity. A popular family of views – call it prag- matic invariantism – attempts to explain the shifty patterns by appeal to a pragmatic thesis: while the semantic meaning of ‘know-that’ is stable across all contexts of use, sentences of the form ‘S knows [doesn’t know] that p’ can be used to communicate a pragmatic content that depends on the context of use. In this (...) paper, the author argues that pragmatic invariantism makes inaccurate predictions for a wide range of well- known use data and is committed to attributing systematic pragmatic error to ordinary speakers. But pragmatic error is unprecedented, and it is doubtful that speakers are systematically wrong about what they intend to communicate. (shrink)

Multivariate pattern analysis, or MVPA, has become one of the most popular analytic methods in cognitive neuroscience. Since its inception, MVPA has been heralded as offering much more than regular univariate analyses, for—we are told—it not only can tell us which brain regions are engaged while processing particular stimuli, but also which patterns of neural activity represent the categories the stimuli are selected from. We disagree, and in the current paper we offer four conceptual challenges to the use of MVPA (...) to make claims about neural representation. Our view is that the use of MVPA to make claims about neural representation is problematic. (shrink)

This article describes and discusses research into lifelong learning in secondary schools that was undertaken at the Australian Council for Educational Research. The project explored ways of helping secondary school students develop an intrinsic interest in learning, in the belief that such an approach will encourage young people to keep learning throughout their lives. Skills and values that help young people to develop characteristics of lifelong learners are outlined. The article suggests that development of these characteristics may be impeded by (...) the strong influence of competitive end-of-school assessment in many schools, and the difficulty of changing the practices and attitudes of some of the people who play a significant role in a young person's education: parents and teachers. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Getting Out of the Gate Banking the Turn in Pursuit of Fairness Counting Down the Laps in Pursuit of Happiness The Bell Lap Notes.

We show that it is impossible in quantum mechanics to describe two separated physical systems. This is due to the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. It is possible to give a description of two separated systems in a theory which is a generalization of quantum mechanics and of classical mechanics, in the sense that this theory contains both theories as special cases. We identify the axioms of quantum mechanics that make it impossible to describe separated systems. One of these axioms (...) is equivalent to the superposition principle. We show how these findings throw a different light on the paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. (shrink)

In "Plato's Ghost" Jeremy Gray presented many connections between mathematical practices in the nineteenth century and the rise of mathematical platonism in the context of more general developments, which he refers to as modernism. In this paper, I take up this theme and present a condensed discussion of some arguments put forward in favor of and against the view of mathematical platonism. In particular, I highlight some pressures that arose in the work of Frege, Cantor, and Gödel, which support adopting (...) a platonist position. The aim of this discussion is to provide an historically informed introduction to the philosophical position of mathematical platonism and to point at some of its mathematical and philosophical roots in the nineteenth century. (shrink)

This book contains thirteen original essays about Puritan culture in colonial New England. Prompted by the growing interest in secular studies, as well as postnational, transnational, and postcolonial critique in the humanities, American Literature and the New Puritan Studies seeks to represent and advance contemporary interest in a field long recognized, however problematically, as foundational to the study of American literature. It invites readers of American literature and culture to reconsider the role of seventeenth-century Puritanism in the creation of the (...) United States of America and its consequent cultural and literary histories. It also records the significant transformation in the field of Puritan studies that has taken place in the last quarter century. In addition to re-reading well known texts of seventeenth-century Puritan New England, the volume contains essays focused on unknown or lesser studied events and texts, as well as new scholarship on post-Puritan archives, monuments, and historiography. (shrink)

We welcome Mikhalevich & Powell’s (2020) (M&P) call for a more “‘inclusive”’ animal ethics, but we think their proposed shift toward a moral framework that privileges false positives over false negatives will require radically revising the paradigm assumption in animal research: that there is a clear line to be drawn between sentient beings that are part of our moral community and nonsentient beings that are not.

We propose a characterization of mathematical experiments in terms of a setup, a process with an outcome, and an interpretation. Using a broad notion of process, this allows us to consider arithmetic calculations and geometric constructions as components of mathematical experiments. Moreover, we argue that mathematical experiments should be considered within a broader context of an experimental research project. Finally, we present a particular case study of the genesis of a geometric construction to illustrate the experimental use of hand drawings (...) and computers in mathematical practice. (shrink)

In Miletus, about 550 B.C., together with our world-picture cosmology was born. This book tells the story. In Part One the reader is introduced in the archaic world-picture of a flat earth with the cupola of the celestial vault onto which the celestial bodies are attached. One of the subjects treated in that context is the riddle of the tilted celestial axis. This part also contains an extensive chapter on archaic astronomical instruments. Part Two shows how Anaximander (610-547 B.C.) blew (...) up this archaic world-picture and replaced it by a new one that is essentially still ours. He taught that the celestial bodies orbit at different distances and that the earth floats unsupported in space. This makes him the founding father of cosmology. Part Three discusses topics that completed the new picture described by Anaximander. Special attention is paid to the confrontation between Anaxagoras and Aristotle on the question whether the earth is flat or spherical, and on the battle between Aristotle and Heraclides Ponticus on the question whether the universe is finite or infinite. (shrink)

The neural reuse framework developed primarily by Michael Anderson proposes that brain regions are involved in multiple and diverse cognitive tasks and that brain regions flexibly and dynamically interact in different combinations to carry out cognitive functioning. We argue that the evidence cited by Anderson and others falls short of supporting the fundamental principles of neural reuse. We map out this problem and provide solutions by drawing on recent advances in network neuroscience, and we argue that methods employed in network (...) neuroscience provide the means to fully engage in a research program operating under the principles of neural reuse. (shrink)

In this paper we examine some of the astrological content in Proclus' exegesis of the 'nuptial number' in Republic 545d, ff. The downfall of the best city-state is said by Socrates to be due to the fact that the Guardians, for all their wisdom, make a mistake about the timing of the breeding of future rulers and this mistake is somehow due to perception. We argue that Proclus' Republic Commentary is best understood as supposing that the Guardians are highly capable (...) astrologers who can -- up until one fateful day -- reliably hit the astrological trifecta: they combine conception astrology with natal and katarchic astrology. The marriage festivals are timed so that future Guardians are conceived under the right stars, with pregnancies of the right duration, and are born under the right stars, with guardian daemons whose names and natures are known through an astrologically-oriented theurgic practice. All this (and more) Proclus took to be hinted at through Socrates' opaque specification of the marriage number. (shrink)

ABSTRACTÉmilie du Châtelet’s recently-discovered Essai sur l’optique offers new insights into her early natural philosophy. Here I analyse the Essai in detail, focusing on Du Châtelet’s use of attr...

language-theoretic attempt to ground a post-liberal theory of democracy on Kant's intuitions concerning subjective autonomy is flawed because it leaves unexamined the internally contradictory experiential content of the Cartesian subject's experience of self. This case is made through reference to aspects of Habermas’ reconstructions of Kant and Mead; iek's criticisms of Kant, Heidegger and Habermas; and Honneth's idea that autonomy, for the post-Cartesian self, involves the ability of the subject to come to terms with the experience of negativity. The article (...) concludes by arguing that a post-liberal account of democracy needs to leave behind the Kantian notion of autonomous subjectivity and base itself on a fundamentally different, post-individualist understanding of the self. Key Words: autonomy • critical theory • democratic theory • Jürgen Habermas • Axel Honneth • subjectivity • Slavojiek. (shrink)

There has recently been a wave of attempts to make sense of the role of de se thoughts in linguistic communication. A majority of the attempts assume a Perryan or a Lewisian view of de se thought. Views with these assumptions, I suggest, come in four varieties: uncentering (Egan 2007, Kölbel 2013, Moss 2012), recentering (Heim 2004, Weber 2012), multicentering (Kindermann 2014, Ninan 2010, Torre 2009), and no centering (Kaplan 1989, Perry 1979). I argue first that all four varieties of (...) centering are committed to what I call a shifting operation on the hearer's part. I argue second that, against common assumption, there is no real choice to make between the views. By showing that attempts to establish an advantage for some view over the others fail across the board, I make the case for neutralism regarding the varieties of centering – the claim that coverage of the empirical data is exactly the same for each view, and that the views are broadly equal in simplicity and elegance. (shrink)

This book develops a novel approach to distributed cognition and collective intentionality. It is argued that collective mentality should be only be posited where specialized subroutines are integrated in a way that yields skillful, goal-directed behavior that is sensitive to concerns that are relevant to a group as such.

In the last two decades, philosophy of neuroscience has predominantly focused on explanation. Indeed, it has been argued that mechanistic models are the standards of explanatory success in neuroscience over, among other things, topological models. However, explanatory power is only one virtue of a scientific model. Another is its predictive power. Unfortunately, the notion of prediction has received comparatively little attention in the philosophy of neuroscience, in part because predictions seem disconnected from interventions. In contrast, we argue that topological predictions (...) can and do guide interventions in science, both inside and outside of neuroscience. Topological models allow researchers to predict many phenomena, including diseases, treatment outcomes, aging, and cognition, among others. Moreover, we argue that these predictions also offer strategies for useful interventions. Topology-based predictions play this role regardless of whether they do or can receive a mechanistic interpretation. We conclude by making a case for philosophers to focus on prediction in neuroscience in addition to explanation alone. (shrink)

Was sind systematische Metaphern? Wie intelligent ist die Buchstabenschrift? Müssen Wahrheitstheorien wahr sein? Wie ist das Verhältnis von Sachen (i.e. kulturellen Gegenständen) und Sätzen (d.h. sprachlichen Einheiten) zu beschreiben? Dirk Westerkamps grundlegende Untersuchung widmet sich dem noch kaum systematisch behandelten Verhältnis von Sprach- und Kulturphilosophie. - Die Aufgabe der Kulturphilosophie besteht in der theoretischen Reflexion kultureller Tatsachen. Sprache wird ihr dabei nicht nur als Medium des kulturellen Gedächtnisses zum Thema: Die Sprache ist sowohl selbst eine kulturelle Tatsache als auch Bedingung (...) der Möglichkeit kultureller Faktizität überhaupt. Die Kulturphilosophie muss sich daher der Sprachanalyse bedienen, um ihren Gegenstand, das sich ständig neu anordnende Ensemble kultureller Tatsachen, angemessen bestimmen zu können. In einer Reihe von gründlichen Einzelstudien untersucht Dirk Westerkamp das Verhältnis von Sachen und Sätzen als systematisches Problem, das die Formen der symbolischen Reflexivität der Sprache in zwei ihrer wichtigsten philosophischen Facetten zu diskutieren erlaubt: in sowohl sprachphilosophischer wie wahrheitstheoretischer Hinsicht. Sprache und Schrift werden damit auf doppelte Weise thematisch: einmal als symbolische Ordnung kultureller Tatsachen und zweitens als Medien unseres Wahrheitsverständnisses. Entsprechend geht es im ersten Teil des Buches anhand des Leitbegriffs der symbolischen Reflexion um Verstehen und Nichtverstehen, Metaphern und Schrifttheorie und im zweiten um die Problematik einer sprachpragmatischen Wahrheitstheorie kultureller Tatsachen. In der hierfür gewählten Perspektive wechseln nicht nur historische und systematische, sondern auch methodische Zugänge: Sprachanalyse, Hermeneutik und Kulturphilosophie gehen eine ebenso spannungsreiche wie produktive Verbindung ein. (shrink)

Does the brain behave indeterministically? I argue that accounting for ion channels, key functional units in the brain, requires indeterministic models. These models are probabilistic, so the brain does behave indeterministically in a weak sense. I explore the implications of this point for a stronger sense of indeterminism. Ultimately I argue that it is not possible, either empirically or through philosophical argument, to show that the brain is indeterministic in that stronger sense.

Typisierungsleistungen der Massenkultur treten exemplarisch im Film hervor. Filme sind Formen, mit denen die Gesellschaft sich in ihren eigenen Wirklichkeiten und Möglichkeiten für die Augen eines Massenpublikums beschreibt. Sie richten die Wahrnehmung und die Kommunikation auf die Beobachtung kohärenter Möglichkeitsräume aus. Ihr Publikum laden sie dazu ein, sein Leben mit dem Leben in den Filmwelten zu vergleichen, denn die Differenz zwischen Leben und Kino steht nicht in Frage. Filme besitzen dieses Potential dank ihrer diagrammatischen Form. Bilder, Worte und Musik verschränken (...) sich in ihnen zu einer komplexen Einheit, deren Prägnanz und sinn-liche Wucht Erfahrungen innerweltlicher Transzendenz erlauben. Dieses Buch plädiert dafür, mit zeichenphilosophischen Mitteln zur Einheit der Differenz von Metaphysik, Religionsphilosophie und politischer Philosophie zurückzukehren. Aus der Beobachtung der modernen Kultur heraus entfaltet es einen systematischen philosophischen Anspruch. Exemplarisch werden”starke“Bilder analysiert, die scheinbar so weit Auseinanderliegendes wie Metaphysik, Religion und Politik in ihrer semiotischen Funktion verschränken. In seiner Darstellung hebt Rustemeyer charakteristische Züge der modernen westlichen Kultur hervor, indem er sie in den Horizont abendlän-discher Sinnformen stellt. Vorstellungen von Gott, Staat und Vernunft, von Individuum und Gesellschaft oder vom guten Leben, die uns in Filmen begegnen, sind in einer abendländischen Tradition verwurzelt, die Religion, Metaphysik und Politik in einen engen Zusammenhang rückt. (shrink)

Plato's Tim. 90b1-c6 describes a pathway to the soul's salvation via the study of the heavens. This paper poses three questions about this theme in Platonism: 1. The epistemological question: How is the paradigmatic function of the visible heavenly bodies to be reconciled with various Platonic misgivings about the faculty of perception? 2. The metaphysical question: How can »assimilation« to the motions of bodies in the realm of Becoming provide for the salvation of souls when souls are »higher«- a mid-point (...) between Being and Becoming? 3. The psychological question: What can it mean for an incorporeal soul to utilise the motions of a body for an ethical and cognitive paradigm? And provides an account of how Proclus and some of his fellow Neoplatonists answered these questions. (shrink)

In honour of Detlef Dürr, we report on a mathematical rigorous computation of the electric vacuum polarisation current and extract the well-known expression for the second order perturbation. Intermediate steps in the presented calculation demonstrate, to the knowledge of the authors for the first time, mathematical rigorous versions of the combined dimensional and Pauli-Villars regularisation schemes. These are employed as computational tools to infer convenient integral representations during the computation. The said second order expression is determined up to a remaining (...) degree of freedom of a real number–without ill-defined terms from start to end. (shrink)

Volume IV (which comprises two half-volumes) focuses on the life sciences, whose object of research is life itself, that which (necessarily) mediates between the physical and the psyche. Typical philosophical questions in this context include: What is “life” in the sense of the term relevant to the life sciences? How do we know that life has not “always existed” but must have arisen in the course of abiogenesis from inanimate nature? And how is it possible to know something about how (...) evolution has occurred? These are explored in the first half-volume. In its second half-volume, the book first deals with methodological and conceptual questions regarding the concrete natural history of mankind. Examples for pertinent questions in this context are: "What would be adequate criteria for singling out autapomorphic traits defining the genus "homo"?" and "Has the concept of "race" biological meaning and reality?" (Spoiler: The answer to the latter question is "no".) In the context of that question, a considerable part of the second half-volume deals with the history of "scientific" theories of race from the 17th century up until the 1990ies. In particular, Kant's theory of race and his racism (as well as his sexism) are discussed thoroughly. Pertinent questions are: "Did Kant invent the concept of race?", "Was Kant the founder of "scientific racism"?", "Did Kant invent and promote a concept of "racial purity"?" and "Did Kant endorse slave trade?". Furthermore, for anyone whose own philosophical positions rest on Kantian premises, the following questions will be of special importance: "Is Kant's racism implied by his transcendental philosophy?" and "Is Kant's racism implied by his ethics?" Regarding all these questions, the contributions of important authors like Eze, Bernasconi, Kleingeld and Mills are discussed and critically examined. Finally, the second half-volume closes with a thorough exploration of the methodological foundations of neuroscience and its limitations as a contribution to philosophy of mind (which as such will have its say in Volume VI). (shrink)

This Article presents an innovative institutional strategy for global climate protection, quite distinct from, but ultimately complementary to and supportive of the currently stalled UNFCCC climate treaty negotiations. The bottom-up strategy relies on a variety of smallerscale transnational cooperative arrangements, involving not only states but sub-national jurisdictions, firms, and CSOs, to undertake activities whose primary goal is not climate mitigation but which will achieve greenhouse gas reductions as an inherent byproduct. This strategy avoids the inherent problems in securing an enforceable (...) treaty to secure the global public good of climate protection by mobilizing other incentives - including economic self-interest, energy security, cleaner air, and furtherance of international development - to motivate such actors to cooperate on actions that will also benefit the climate. These bottom-up regimes will contribute to global climate action not only by achieving emissions reductions in the short-term, but also by linking the bottom-up regimes to the UNFCCC system through greenhouse gas monitoring and reporting systems. In these ways, the bottom-up strategy will help secure eventual agreement on a global climate treaty. (shrink)

Gesprekken tussen filosoof en ecoloog Johan Braeckman en moraalfilosoof Dirk Verhofstadt over de evolutietheorie van Darwin, religie, irrationalieit, humanisme en atheïsme."--Publisher information.

Aus den wirtschaftlichen Turbulenzen des vergangenen Jahrzehnts leitet sich die Frage nach der Verantwortung fur die Gestaltung der Wirtschaftslandschaft ab. Die Arbeit untersucht daher, ob betriebswirtschaftliche Hochschullehrer die Werte ihrer Studierenden beeinflussen wollen und entwickelt ein detailliertes konzeptionelles Modell. Zur Modellvalidierung werden deskriptive Analysen, Strukturgleichungsmodelle und Clusteranalysen auf Daten aus einer weltweiten Befragung von 1.741 betriebswirtschaftlichen Hochschullehrern angewendet. Die Analysen zeigen weltweit eine starke Intention zur Wertebeeinflussung, mit besonderer Werteskepsis in Deutschland. Die Unterstutzung von Kollegen und Verbanden erwies sich als (...) wichtige Voraussetzung fur die Steigerung der Beeinflussungsintention.". (shrink)

Critics of functionalism about the mind often rely on the intuition that collectivities cannot be conscious in motivating their positions. In this paper, we consider the merits of appealing to the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity. We demonstrate that collective mentality is not an affront to commonsense, and we report evidence that demonstrates that the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity is, to some extent, culturally specific rather (...) than universally held. This being the case, we argue that mere appeal to the intuitive implausibility of collective consciousness does not offer any genuine insight into the nature of mentality in general, nor the nature of consciousness in particular. (shrink)

To this day, there persists a widespread assumption that Adorno's references to Marx - and especially to Marx's critique of political economy - represent a relic from an early and short-lived stage of Adorno's theoretical development. On the basis of relevant and largely unpublished textual sources, this book refutes this thesis while showing that the centre of Adorno's critical theory of society is occupied by a critique not only of political economy, but of economy in general.