This was the title of a symposium held in Moscow, May 27–30, 1986, and organized by the “International Association for the Study of Dialectical Philosophy—Societas Hegeliana,” in collaboration with the Institute for Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Participation was by invitation only. Thirteen participants came from the Federal Republic of Germany, twelve from the U.S.S.R., six from the Democratic Republic of Germany, four each from France and Italy, two from Bulgaria, as well as one each from (...) Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Finland, Austria, Switzerland, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, and Canada. Papers had been distributed previously and were briefly summarized to allow for more lengthy discussions. The two languages used were Russian and German. Simultaneous translation was provided. (shrink)

To show that something is “possible” or “impossible” does not seem, for Hegel, to be a genuine concern for philosophy. In point of fact, “everything is possible,” because everything has the simple form of identity-with-itself, i.e., does not contradict itself, - and it is equally true that “everything is impossible,” because, in any concrete content, the determinacy can be taken as determined opposition and so as contradiction. Hegel therefore concludes that there is “no emptier talk” than that of such “possibilities” (...) and “impossibilities”. (shrink)

Translations, especially of important texts, tend to be controversial. In a collaborative translation, the controversy will start during the process itself, and may persist until the end. In our case this is reflected in two translators’ introductions. Translators and reviewers agree or disagree on the basis of certain principles. There are, one could say, two “schools”: those in favor of more contextual choices of terminology, and those striving for strict consistency. The first will be more inclined to distinguish between “technical” (...) and “non-technical” uses of the same term, and consider this to be part of the translator’s role. The latter will try to avoid making these distinctions, and leave as much room as possible for the reader to decide. The first also tend to see the translation as standing on its own, readily intelligible to those who are without any knowledge of the original language. The latter intend to serve primarily readers who are interested in developing some, progressively better, knowledge of the text in its original language. They will attach more importance to an extensive glossary, which ideally should be applicable to the translated author’s entire corpus. (shrink)

Une lecture de Hegel après Gadamer montre la fécondité de penser Denken dans son sens le plus inclusif en termes d’« articulation de sens ». Cette fécondité se révèle quand nous réarticulons la philosophie de Hegel en termes gadamériens. Si le langage est au centre de la pensée gadamérienne, la Logique de Hegel peut elle-même être comprise comme suivant « la piste du langage ». Cette relecture de Hegel nous amène à une compréhension de sa pensée – le « mauvais (...) » infini, la « méthode », le concept, l’Idée ou l’Absolu – qui n’est plus touchée par les critiques de Gadamer. Une fausse alternative est comprise comme différenciation d’un seul mouvement : le dialogique et le monologique, correspondant aux concepts hégéliens de Geist et de Idee, sont les deux versants essentiels de l’articulation universelle du sens. L’Esprit absolu et l’Idée de la philosophie – les trois syllogismes – se comprennent comme ouverture d’une pensée systématique, « complète » mais jamais exhaustive, nullement fixée et fermée, mais vivante et nécessairement ouverte à un infini d’articulations intérieures. (shrink)

L'effort principal de Merleau-Ponty, au début de son cheminement philosophique, consiste à amener l'expérience perceptive à l'expression de son propre sens.Pourquoi fallait-il commencer par le retour à l'expérience perceptive? Pour deux raisons qui finalement n'en font qu'une, mais dont la première fut plus explicitement reconnue par Merleau-Ponty au moment où il décida de consacrer ses thèses au problème de la perception. Il lui était évident, dès les années 1933–1934, que la perception est une forme d'expérience particulièrement mutilée et faussée par (...) les philosophies d'inspiration criticiste qui l'interprétaient «comme une opération intellectuelle par laquelle des données inextensives sont mises en relation et expliquées de telle sorte qu'elles finissent par constituer un univers objectif». Il est clair déjà que cette interprétation intellectualiste se base, par un côté, sur la conception empiriste des «sensations», et que la critique de l'intellectualisme devra être tout à la fois une critique de l'empirisme. (shrink)

Ce fut un projet ambitieux que de réunir des géants de la philosophie contemporaine pour dèbattre les enjeux de la rationalité d'aujourd'hui. Non seulement ne fallait-il pas craindre d'aborder des questions de taille, qui sont d'une extrême importance, mais encore ne devait-on pas hésiter à composer avec des intérêts fort divergents. De ce fait, les résultats dont fait état ce livre représentent une variété de points de vue, hétérogènes certes, mais qui contribuent tous, de prés ou de loin, à une (...) même question concernant la «possibilité d'une théorie de la rationalité», selon les paroles mêmes de l'éditeur. Bien sûr que le livre ne répond pas en exhibant une théorie toute faite, mais on peut dire que le volume que nous discuterons est une mine d'or, riche en indications pour une éventuelle théorie de la rationalité, et ce malgré certains handicaps qui auraient pu entraver le projet dès le départ. J'en signale deux. (shrink)

Calls to hold artificial intelligence to account are intensifying. Activists and researchers alike warn of an “accountability gap” or even a “crisis of accountability” in AI. Meanwhile, several prominent scholars maintain that accountability holds the key to governing AI. But usage of the term varies widely in discussions of AI ethics and governance. This chapter begins by disambiguating some different senses and dimensions of accountability, distinguishing it from neighboring concepts, and identifying sources of confusion. It proceeds to explore the idea (...) that AI operates within an accountability gap arising from technical features of AI as well as the social context in which it is deployed. The chapter also evaluates various proposals for closing this gap. I conclude that the role of accountability in AI ethics and governance is vital but also more limited than some suggest. Accountability’s primary job description is to verify compliance with substantive normative principles—once those principles are settled. Theories of accountability cannot ultimately tell us what substantive standards to account for, especially when norms are contested or still emerging. Nonetheless, formal mechanisms of accountability provide a way of diagnosing and discouraging egregious wrongdoing even in the absence of normative agreement. Providing accounts can also be an important first step toward the development of more comprehensive regulatory standards for AI. (shrink)

Inspired by Heidegger’s concept of the clearing of being, and by Wittgenstein’s ideas on human practice, Theodore Schatzki offers a novel approach to understanding the constitution and transformation of social life. Key to the account he develops here is the context in which social life unfolds—the "site of the social"—as a contingent and constantly metamorphosing mesh of practices and material orders. Schatzki’s analysis reveals the advantages of this site ontology over the traditional individualist, holistic, and structuralist accounts that have (...) dominated social theory since the mid-nineteenth century. A special feature of the book is its development of the theoretical argument by sustained reference to two historical examples: the medicinal herb business of a Shaker village in the 1850s and contemporary day trading on the Nasdaq market. First focusing on the relative simplicity of Shaker life to illuminate basic ontological characteristics of the social site, Schatzki then uses the sharp contrast with the complex and dynamic practice of day trading to reveal what makes this approach useful as a general account of social existence. Along the way he provides new insights into many major issues in social theory, including the nature of social order, the significance of agency, the distinction between society and nature, the forms of social change, and how the social present affects its future. (shrink)

This book addresses key topics in social theory such as the basic structures of social life, the character of human activity, and the nature of individuality. Drawing on the work of Wittgenstein, the author develops an account of social existence that argues that social practices are the fundamental phenomenon in social life. This approach offers insight into the social formation of individuals, surpassing and critiquing the existing practice theories of Bourdieu, Giddens, Lyotard and Oakeshott. In bringing Wittgenstein's work to bear (...) on issues of social theory the book shows the relevance of his work to a body of thought to which it has never been applied. The book will be of particular interest to philosophers of the social sciences, a wide range of social theorists in political science and sociology, as well as some literary theorists. (shrink)

Elizabeth Barnes and Mari Mikkola raise the important question of whether certain recent approaches to metaphysics exclude feminist metaphysics. My own approach does not, or so I argue. I do define “substantive” questions in terms of fundamentality; and the concepts of feminist metaphysics are nonfundamental. But my definition does not count a question as being nonsubstantive simply because it involves nonfundamental concepts. Questions about the causal structure of the world, including the causal structure of the social world, are generally substantive (...) because their answers are not sensitive to any alternate, equally good conceptual choices we could have made. I also argue that such questions are substantive regardless of the ontology of social kinds. (shrink)

Logic begins but does not end with the study of truth and falsity. Within truth there are the modes of truth, ways of being true: necessary truth and contingent truth. When a proposition is true, we may ask whether it could have been false. If so, then it is contingently true. If not, then it is necessarily true; it must be true; it could not have been false. Falsity has modes as well: a false proposition that could not have been (...) true is impossible or necessarily false; one that could have been true is merely contingently false. The proposition that some humans are over seven feet tall is contingently true; the proposition that all humans over seven feet tall are over six feet tall is necessarily true; the proposition that some humans are over seven feet tall and under six feet tall is impossible, and the proposition that some humans are over nine feet tall is contingently false. Of these four modes of truth, let us focus on necessity, plus a fifth: possibility. A proposition is possible if it is or could have been true; hence propositions that are either necessarily true, contingently true, or contingently false are possible. Notions that are similar to the modes of truth in being concerned with what might have been are called modal. Dispositions are modal notions, for example the disposition of fragility. Relatedly, there are counterfactual conditionals, for example “if this glass were dropped, it would break.” And the notion of supervenience is modal.1 But let us focus here on necessity and possibility. Modal words are notoriously ambiguous (or at least context-sensitive2). I may reply to an invitation to give a talk in England by saying “I can’t come; I have to give a talk in California the day before”. This use of “can’t” is perfectly appropriate. But it would be equally appropriate for me to say that I could cancel my talk in California (although that would be rude) and give the talk in England instead. What I cannot do is give both talks.. (shrink)

How does science work? _Making Truth: Metaphor in Science_ argues that most laypeople, and many scientists, do not have a clear understanding of how metaphor relates to scientific thinking. With stunning clarity, and bridging the worlds of scientists and nonscientists, Theodore L. Brown demonstrates the presence and the power of metaphorical thought. He presents a series of studies of scientific systems, ranging from the atom to current topics in chemistry and biology such as protein folding, chaperone proteins, and global (...) warming. These case studies provide the basis for far-reaching conclusions about science as an intellectual and social practice and about the nature of scientific truth. (shrink)

This paper presents a new solution to the problem of peer disagreement that distinguishes two principles of rational belief, here called probability and autonomy. When we discover that we disagree with peers, there is one sense in which we rationally ought to suspend belief, and another in which we rationally ought to retain our original belief. In the first sense, we aim to believe what is most probably true according to our total evidence, including testimony from peers and authorities. In (...) the second, we aim to base our beliefs only on objective evidence and argumentation, even if that lowers the probability of their being true. The first principle of rational belief tends to serve the short-term epistemic interests of individuals, while the second tends to serve the long-term epistemic interests of both individuals and groups. The best way to reconcile these principles in cases of peer disagreement is to associate them with two corresponding species of belief, here called perception and opinion. (shrink)

Counterpossibles are counterfactuals that involve some metaphysical impossibility. Modal normativism is a non-descriptivist account of metaphysical necessity and possibility according to which modal claims, e.g. ‘necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried’, do not function as descriptive claims about the modal nature of reality but function as normative illustrations of constitutive rules and permissions that govern the use of ordinary non-modal vocabulary, e.g. ‘bachelor’. In this paper, I assume modal normativism and develop a novel account of counterpossibles and claims about metaphysical similarity (...) between possible and impossible worlds. I argue that considerations of metaphysical similarity between various impossible worlds and the actual world only require us to tacitly consider how the actual constitutive rules that govern the use of our terms change in order to accommodate the description of some hypothetical impossible scenario. I then argue for my account by raising worries for alternative epistemic and realist accounts of counterpossibles and showing how my account avoids those worries. (shrink)

I expand modal normativism, a theory of metaphysical modality, to give a normativist account of metaphysical explanation. According to modal normativism, basic modal claims do not have a descriptive function, but instead have the normative function of enabling language users to express semantic rules that govern the use of ordinary non-modal vocabulary. However, a worry for modal normativism is that it doesn’t keep up with all of the important and interesting metaphysics we can do by giving and evaluating metaphysical explanations. (...) So, I advance modal normativism by arguing that metaphysical explanations also have a normative rather than descriptive function. In particular, non-causal explanatory claims have formal and semantic properties that make them expressively stricter than basic modal claims and so are better suited to express fine-grained aspects of semantic rules. A major payoff of my normativist account of metaphysical explanations is that it yields a plausible story about how we come to evaluate and know metaphysical explanations—we do this primarily by conceptual analysis. I also respond to a number of objections, including the objection that the epistemic payoffs of my view are not worth the metaphysical costs. (shrink)

According to Timothy Williamson, we should accept the simplest and most powerful second-order modal logic, and as a result accept an ontology of "bare possibilia". This general method for extracting ontology from logic is salutary, but its application in this case depends on a questionable assumption: that modality is a fundamental feature of the world.

There is growing support for the view that social categories like men and women refer to “objective types” (Haslanger 2000, 2006, 2012; Alcoff 2005). An objective type is a similarity class for which the axis of similarity is an objective rather than nominal or fictional property. Such types are independently real and causally relevant, yet their unity does not derive from an essential property. Given this tandem of features, it is not surprising why empirically-minded researchers interested in fighting oppression and (...) marginalization have found this ontological category so attractive: objective types have the ontological credentials to secure the reality (and thus political representation) of social categories, and yet they do not impose exclusionary essences that also naturalize and legitimize social inequalities. This essay argues that, from the perspective of these political goals of fighting oppression and marginalization, the category of objective types is in fact a Trojan horse; it looks like a gift, but it ends up creating trouble. I argue that objective type classifications often lack empirical adequacy, and as a result they lack political adequacy. I also provide, and in reference to the normative goals described above, several arguments for preferring a social ontology of natural kinds with historical essences. (shrink)

First published, here, in English. Reproduced (also in English) in Adorno's Gesammelte Schriften, 20.I.

[ES] Esta es una discusión de algunos temas vagamente conectados en los artículos de Saul Kripke «The first person» y «Frege’s theory of sense and reference». [EN] This is a discussion of some loosely connected issues in Saul Kripke’s articles «The first person» and «Frege’s theory of sense and reference».

This book develops an original Heideggerian account of the timespace and indeterminacy of human activity while describing insights that this account provides into the nature of activity, society and history. Drawing on empirical examples, the book argues that activity timespace is a key component of social space and time, shows that interwoven timespaces form an essential infrastructure of social phenomena, offers a novel account of the existence of the past in the present, and defends the teleological character of emotional and (...) ceremonial actions. (shrink)

Thus, says Hare, a judgment that someone is happy is an appraisal, not a statement of fact. I do not wish to deny that there are some uses of 'happy', ascribed to a person or to a life, for which this is the case; but I would like to maintain that there are other uses of 'happy', philosophically important ones, in which a judgment that a third person is happy is not an appraisal, but is rather a report about him (...) which may be true or false; and in which a first person judgment that one is happy, while it involves an appraisal, is still a report which may be true or false. (shrink)

Many scholars of organizations see social enterprise as a promising approach to advancing social justice but neglect to scrutinize the normative foundations and limitations of this optimism. This article draws on Rawlsian political philosophy to investigate whether and how social enterprises can support social justice. We propose that this perspective assigns organizations a duty to foster institutional capacity, a concept we define and elaborate. We investigate how this duty might apply specifically to social enterprises, given their characteristic features. We theorize (...) six different mechanisms through which social enterprises might successfully discharge this duty. These results affirm the value of conversation between organizational studies and political philosophy and shed new light on debates regarding social enterprise, institutional theory, and several other topics. (shrink)

Kripke's objections to descriptivism may be modified to apply to Scott Soames's pragmatic account from his book Beyond Rigidity. Further, intuitions about argument-validity threaten any theory in the vicinity of Soames's.

Stephanie Morain and Emily Largent’s (2023) target article “Think Pragmatically: Investigators’ Obligations to Patient-Subjects When Research is Embedded in Care” identified a number of important c...

The Theme A substance is a composite particular. If it is composed of further particulars, will the substance itself be one or many? ...

I argue that we can accept modal normativism—a view that the function of modal claims is to express semantic rules—while also accepting possible worlds semantics. I argue that by keeping the metaphysical insights of normativism at the level of metasemantics—i.e., at the level of accounts of what metaphysically explains facts about the meaning of modal claims—it is open to the normativist to wholeheartedly accept possible worlds semantics.

In July 2020, more than 1000 companies that advertise on social media platforms withdrew their business, citing failures of the platforms (especially Facebook) to address the proliferation of harmful content. The #StopHateForProfit movement invites reflection on an understudied topic: the ethics of boycotting by corporations. Under what conditions is corporate boycotting permissible, required, supererogatory, or forbidden? Although value-driven consumerism has generated significant recent discussion in applied ethics, that discussion has focused almost exclusively on the consumption choices of individuals. As this (...) article underscores, value-driven consumerism by business corporations complicates these issues and invites further examination. We propose principles for the ethics of boycotting by corporations, indicate how these principles relate to different CSR paradigms, and show how these insights can help assess recent instances of corporate boycotting. (shrink)

One of the most eminent Heidegger scholars of our time, Theodore Kisiel has found worldwide critical acclaim, his particular strength being to set Heidegger's ...