At the 50-year anniversary of Fluxus, Ken Friedman looks back on the activities and achievements of a laboratory for art, architecture, design, and music. This article examines the political and economic context of the 1950s against which Fluxus emerged to become the most radical and experimental art project of the 1960s, thoroughly international in structure, with women as well as men in central roles. The article examines the hermeneutical interface of life and art through 12 Fluxus ideas: globalism, the (...) unity of art and life, intermedia, experimentalism, chance, playfulness, simplicity, implicativeness, exemplativism, specificity, presence in time, and musicality. (shrink)

The following is an essay on the notion of scientific explanation as unification. In it a new notion of content is used to explicate Michael Friedman's notion of "k-atomicity," and to explicate the notion of the surplus content of hypothesis h relative to evidence e. From this basis an analysis of unification as theoretical reduction is advanced. A second notion of unification, unification as reconciling prima facie incompatible statements, is introduced again with the aid of this new notion of (...) content. More generally, it is argued that rather than seek the essence of scientific explanation we should carefully catalog the various distinct explanatory virtues. Finally it is argue that in particular philosophical explanations put a high premium on the quality of unification through showing how to make compatible seemingly irreconcilable claims. (shrink)

Design Cybernetics: Navigating the New Design cybernetics offers a way of looking at ourselves – curious, creative, and ethical humans – as self-organising systems that negotiate their own goals in open-ended explorations of the previously unknown. It is a theory of and for epistemic practices that is deeply committed to the autonomy of others and hence offers no prescriptive methodology. Design cybernetics describes design practice as inextricable from conversation – a way of enquiring, developing shared understanding and reaching the new (...) that harnesses reliable control as well as error and serendipity. Recognising circular causality, observer-dependency and non-determinability, design cybernetics extends beyond tenets of scientific research into the creative, ethical and aesthetic domain. From this perspective, design is not an ill-conceived subset of scientific research. Instead, scientific research emerges as a particularly restricted subset of the broader human activity of design. This volume offers a cross-section of design cybernetic theory and practice with contributions ranging across architecture, interior lighting studies, product design, embedded systems, design pedagogy, design theory, social transformation design, research epistemology, art and poetics, as well as theatre and acting. Addressing designers, design educators and researchers interested in a rigorous, practice-based epistemology, it establishes design cybernetics as a foundational perspective of design research. “This is a conceptually elegant, well structured, and comprehensive presentation of design cybernetics. It fills a gap in the literature of the field.” Ken Friedman, Chair Professor, Tongji University “This book offers a valuable and timely introduction to second-order cybernetics as society grapples with complex issues like climate change and rising inequality.” Joichi Ito, Director of the MIT Media Lab. (shrink)

In the mid 1960s two artists associated with Fluxus, Milan Knk and Ken Friedman, began corresponding about the possibilities for conceptual and material exchange through the new media, or intermedia, of actions and correspondence art. To make connections across the geographic and political barrier between Eastern Europe and the West, they used flexible media within a distributive cognitive network to communicate about living and working counter to conformity and inertia in both places. Their use of intermedia reveals a pattern (...) of international information exchange that distinguishes contemporary art and experience from the modern. (shrink)

Natural Justice is a bold attempt to lay the foundations for a genuine science of morals using the theory of games. Since human morality is no less a product of evolution than any other human characteristic, the book takes the view that we need to explore its origins in the food-sharing social contracts of our prehuman ancestors. It is argued that the deep structure of our current fairness norms continues to reflect the logic of these primeval social contracts, but the (...) particular fairness norm a society operates is largely a product of cultural evolution. In pursuing this point, the book proposes a naturalistic reinterpretation of John Rawls' original position that reconciles his egalitarian theory of justice with John Harsanyi's utilitarian theory by identifying the environment appropriate to each. (shrink)

In Gemes (1990) I examined certain formal versions of hypothetico-deductivism (H-D) showing that they have the unacceptable consequence that "Abe is a white raven" confirms "All ravens are black"! In Gemes (1992) I developed a new notion of content that could save H-D from this bizarre consequence. In this paper, I argue that more traditional formulations of H-D also need recourse to this new notion of content. I present a new account of the vexing notion of the natural axiomatization of (...) a theory. The notion is used to construct a form of H-D that allows for the type of selective confirmation without which Glymour (1980a,b) claims H-D is hopeless. (shrink)

This paper considers the evolution of the problem of scientific rationality from Kant through Carnap to Kuhn. I argue for a relativized and historicized version of the original Kantian conception of scientific a priori principles and examine the way in which these principles change and develop across revolutionary paradigm shifts. The distinctively philosophical enterprise of reflecting upon and contextualizing such principles is then seen to play a key role in making possible rational intersubjective communication between otherwise incommensurable paradigms.

Article (Reprinted in "Oxford Readings in Philosophy: Nietzsche", edited by B. Leiter and J. Richardson, Oxford University Press, 2001.

We introduce a reducibility preordering between classes of countable structures, each class containing only structures of a given similarity type (which is allowed to vary from class to class). Though we sometimes work in a slightly larger context, we are principally concerned with the case where each class is an invariant Borel class (i.e. the class of all models, with underlying set $= \omega$, of an $L_{\omega_1\omega}$ sentence; from this point of view, the reducibility can be thought of as a (...) (rather weak) sort of $L_{\omega_1\omega}$-interpretability notion). We prove a number of general results about this notion, but our main thrust is to situate various mathematically natural classes with respect to the preordering, most notably classes of algebraic structures such as groups and fields. (shrink)

Game theory has proved a useful tool in the study of simple economic models. However, numerous foundational issues remain unresolved. The situation is particularly confusing in respect of the non-cooperative analysis of games with some dynamic structure in which the choice of one move or another during the play of the game may convey valuable information to the other players. Without pausing for breath, it is easy to name at least 10 rival equilibrium notions for which a serious case can (...) be made that here is the “right” solution concept for such games. (shrink)

Do conventions need to be common knowledge in order to work? David Lewis builds this requirement into his definition of a convention. This paper explores the extent to which his approach finds support in the game theory literature. The knowledge formalism developed by Robert Aumann and others militates against Lewis’s approach, because it shows that it is almost impossible for something to become common knowledge in a large society. On the other hand, Ariel Rubinstein’s Email Game suggests that coordinated action (...) is no less hard for rational players without a common knowledge requirement. But an unnecessary simplifying assumption in the Email Game turns out to be doing all the work, and the current paper concludes that common knowledge is better excluded from a definition of the conventions that we use to regulate our daily lives. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of Norman Daniels' and James Sabin's ‘Accountability for Reasonableness’ framework for making priority-setting decisions in health care in the face of widespread disagreement about values. Accountability for Reasonableness has been rapidly gaining worldwide acceptance, arguably to the point of becoming the dominant paradigm in the field of health policy. The framework attempts to set ground rules for a procedure that ensures that whatever decisions result will be fair, reasonable, and legitimate to the extent that even (...) those who would be adversely affected will have reason to abide by them. I argue that the framework's four conditions are inadequate to this task. While we certainly require a fair and legitimate procedure for making priority setting decisions in health care despite a lack of consensus on relevant ethical and political issues, we must significantly revise the four conditions, and we cannot avoid facing our substantive disagreements head on if we hope to arrive at decisions that would (and should) be acceptable to everyone. I offer two suggestions. First, there is need for greater public involvement in all stages of deliberation. Second, we should give up on the idea that we can simplify the task of democratic deliberation by disallowing particular kinds or reasons and types of reasoning. Reasons of all kinds should be on the table, but then should be judged on their merits, such as consistency, plausibility and explanatory power, without any regard for their alleged sources of authority. (shrink)

The ethical nature of transformational leadership has been hotly debated. This debate is demonstrated in the range of descriptors that have been used to label transformational leaders including narcissistic, manipulative, and self-centred, but also ethical, just and effective. Therefore, the purpose of the present research was to address this issue directly by assessing the statistical relationship between perceived leader integrity and transformational leadership using the Perceived Leader Integrity Scale (PLIS) and the Multi-Factor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ). In a national sample of (...) 1354 managers a moderate to strong positive relationship was found between perceived integrity and the demonstration of transformational leadership behaviours. A similar relationship was found between perceived integrity and developmental exchange leadership. A systematic leniency bias was identified when respondents rated subordinates vis-à-vis peer ratings. In support of previous findings, perceived integrity was also found to correlate positively with leader and organisational effectiveness measures. (shrink)

If the human race comes to an end relatively shortly, then we have been born at a fairly typical time in the history of humanity; if trillions of people eventually exist, then we have been born in the first surprisingly tiny fraction of all people. According to the 'doomsday argument' of Carter, Leslie, Gott and Nielsen, this means that the chance of a disaster which would obliterate humanity is much larger than usually thought. But treating possible observers in the same (...) way as those who actually exist avoids this conclusion: our existence is more likely in a race which is long-lived, and this cancels out the doomsday argument, so that the chance of a disaster is only what one would ordinarily estimate. (shrink)

In his paper, "Explanations of Irrelevance" (1983), Paul Horwich proposes an amended version of hypothetico-deductivism, (H-D * ). In this discussion note it is shown that (H-D * ) has the consequence that "A is a non-black raven" confirms "All ravens are black" relative to any tautology! It is noted that Horwich's (H-D * ) bears a strong resemblance to Hempel's prediction criterion of confirmation and that the prediction criterion faces the same obstacle. A related problem for hypothetico-deductivism in its (...) simplest form--that is, E confirms H iff E is an (observational) consequence of H--is displayed. The discussion concludes with a suggestion about how (H-D * ) and simple hypothetico-deductivism might be amended in order to avoid these results. (shrink)

This article criticises one of Stuart Rachels' and Larry Temkin's arguments against the transitivity of 'better than'. This argument invokes our intuitions about our preferences of different bundles of pleasurable or painful experiences of varying intensity and duration, which, it is argued, will typically be intransitive. This article defends the transitivity of 'better than' by showing that Rachels and Temkin are mistaken to suppose that preferences satisfying their assumptions must be intransitive. It makes cler where the argument goes wrong by (...) showing that it is a version of Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise. (shrink)

There are two standard ways to establish consistency in set theory. One is to prove consistency using inner models, in the way that Gödel proved the consistency of GCH using the inner model L. The other is to prove consistency using outer models, in the way that Cohen proved the consistency of the negation of CH by enlarging L to a forcing extension L[G].But we can demand more from the outer model method, and we illustrate this by examining Easton's strengthening (...) of Cohen's result:Theorem 1. There is a forcing extensionL[G] of L in which GCH fails at every regular cardinal.Assume that the universe V of all sets is rich in the sense that it contains inner models with large cardinals. Then what is the relationship between Easton's model L[G] and V? In particular, are these models compatible, in the sense that they are inner models of a common third model? If not, then the failure of GCH at every regular cardinal is consistent only in a weak sense, as it can only hold in universes which are incompatible with the universe of all sets. Ideally, we would like L[G] to not only be compatible with V, but to be an inner model of V.We say that a statement is internally consistent iff it holds in some inner model, under the assumption that there are innermodels with large cardinals. (shrink)

Based on the relevant logic R, the system R# was proposed as a relevant Peano arithmetic. R# has many nice properties: the most conspicuous theorems of classical Peano arithmetic PA are readily provable therein; it is readily and effectively shown to be nontrivial; it incorporates both intuitionist and classical proof methods. But it is shown here that R# is properly weaker than PA, in the sense that there is a strictly positive theorem QRF of PA which is unprovable in R#. (...) The reason is interesting: if PA is slightly weakened to a subtheory P+, it admits the complex ring C as a model; thus QRF is chosen to be a theorem of PA but false in C. Inasmuch as all strictly positive theorems of R# are already theorems of P+, this nonconservativity result shows that QRF is also a nontheorem of R#. As a consequence, Ackermann's rule γ is inadmissible in R#. Accordingly, an extension of R# which retains its good features is desired. The system R##, got by adding an omega-rule, is such an extension. Central question: is there an effectively axiomatizable system intermediate between R# and R##, which does formalize arithmetic on relevant principles, but also admits γ in a natural way? (shrink)

This volume looks outward to the twenty-first century and to the dynamics of this first truly global age. It asks the fundamental question: how might human societies live? In contrast to the orthodoxies of academic Philosophy and International Relations in much of the twentieth century, which marginalised or rejected the study of ethics, the contributors here believe that there is nothing more political than ethics, and therefore deserving of scholarly analysis. By exploring some of the oldest questions about duties and (...) obligations within and beyond humanly constructed boundaries, the essays help us ponder the most profound question in world politics today: who will the twenty-first century be for? (shrink)

It's hard to say exactly when modern science began. Many scholars would date it at roughly 1600, when both Kepler and Galileo started using precision measurement to map the universe. But one thing is certain: starting from whatever date we choose, modern science was, in many important ways and right from the start, deeply antagonistic to established religion.

’Tis vain to talk of adding quantities which after the addition will continue to be as distinct as they were before; one man’s happiness will never be another man’s happiness: a gain to one man is no gain to another: you might as well pretend to add 20 apples to 20 pears.

This is the second part of a two-part paper. It can be read independently of the first part provided that the reader is prepared to go along with the unorthodox views on game theory which were advanced in Part I and are summarized below. The body of the paper is an attempt to study some of the positive implications of such a viewpoint. This requires an exploration of what is involved in modeling “rational players” as computing machines.

One of the most important discoveries of the last thirty years is the extent to which the pattern of anaphoric interpretations is determined by the geometry of syntactic structure. As our understanding of these phenomena has steadily grown, the theory of syntax has often been driven by discoveries in this domain, and it is no accident that Chomsky's Binding Theory was a centerpiece of the principles and parameters approach of the 1980s. However, what remained accidental in Chomsky's theory, and in (...) most of the theories that have followed it, is the apparently complementary distribution of forms that support anaphora for a given antecedent. This book argues not only that the complementary distribution in question is robust empirically, but that its existence is derived by a competitive theory of anaphora. It is demonstrated in detail that the competitive theory provides a far better explanation of anti-locality, anti-subject orientation and the range of apparently exceptional distributions that have been long been problematic for other approaches, such as Chomsky's Binding Theory and the influential predication-based theory of Reinhart and Reuland. (shrink)

I argue that Descartes' Second Causal Proof of God in the Third Meditation evidences, and commits him to, the belief that time is "strongly discontinuous" -- that is, that there is actually a gap between each consecutive moment of time. Much of my article attempts to reconcile this interpretation, the "received view," with Descartes' statements about time, space, and matter in his other writings, including his correspondence with various philosophers.

Although far from unanimous, there seems to be a general consensus that neither mind nor brain can be reduced without remainder to the other. This essay argues that indeed both mind and brain need to be included in a nonreductionistic way in any genuinely integral theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate such integration, this essay presents the results of an extensive cross-cultural literature search on the ‘mind’ side of the equation, suggesting that the mental phenomena that need to be (...) considered in any integral theory include developmental levels or waves of consciousness, developmental lines or streams of consciousness, states of consciousness, and the self . A ‘master template’ of these various phenomena, culled from over one-hundred psychological systems East and West, is presented. It is suggested that this master template represents a general summary of the ‘mind’ side of the brain-mind integration. The essay concludes with reflections on the ‘hard problem', or how the mind-side can be integrated with the brain-side to result a more integral theory of consciousness. (shrink)

Skeptical problems arising for Kant's version of transcendental idealism have been raised from Kant's own time to the present day. By focussing on how such problems originally arose in the wake of Kant's work, and on the first formulations of absolute idealism by Schelling, I argue that the skeptical problems in question ultimately depend on fundamental features of Kant's philosophy of natural science. As a result, Naturphilosophie and the organic conception of nature cannot easily be separated from the deep and (...) insightful response to these problems offered by absolute idealism. (shrink)

Booth explains that international relations are a critical level in the business of determining who gets what across the world. He gives an introduction and shows how they directly or indirectly affect all our lives.

This short paper begins with a summary of the views of a sympathetic game theorist on the current state of play in what is still called the New Institutional Economics. It continues with a much abbreviated summary of my own attempts to treat justice as a kind of institution in the hope that this will serve as a case study in how game theory can serve as a useful intellectual framework for the study of human institutions.

Because it consists of an entire family of specific theories derived from the same first principles, rational choice offers one approach to generate explanations that provide for micro-macro links, and to attack a wide variety of empirical problems in macrosociology. The aims of this paper are (1) to provide a bare skeleton of all rational choice arguments; (2) to demonstrate their applicability to a range of macrosociological concerns by reviewing a sample of both new and classic works; and (3) to (...) discuss the weaknesses of current rational choice theory and the possibilities for its future development. (shrink)

Residential rent control is a contentious issue in many jurisdictions throughout the world. While tenant groups have often argued vociferously in defence of control, landlord groups and the vast majority of economists have been equally vehement in their criticisms. This paper examines some key normative issues involved in rent control. In particular I examine arguments in favor of control based on the alleged unfairness of winfall profits, upon affordability, and finally on the creation of rights to security of tenure. Various (...) objections by libertarian and free market philosophers and economists are examined. I conclude with a somewhat limited defense of rent control as used in specific situations as part of a more comprehensive policy to satisfy the normative demands at the root of tenant pressure for rent control. (shrink)

(2005). Ernst Cassirer and Contemporary Philosophy of Science. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the german traditionissue editor: damian veal, pp. 119-128.