Internal consistency and the inner model hypothesis

Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):591-600 (2006)
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Abstract

There are two standard ways to establish consistency in set theory. One is to prove consistency using inner models, in the way that Gödel proved the consistency of GCH using the inner model L. The other is to prove consistency using outer models, in the way that Cohen proved the consistency of the negation of CH by enlarging L to a forcing extension L[G].But we can demand more from the outer model method, and we illustrate this by examining Easton's strengthening of Cohen's result:Theorem 1. There is a forcing extensionL[G] of L in which GCH fails at every regular cardinal.Assume that the universe V of all sets is rich in the sense that it contains inner models with large cardinals. Then what is the relationship between Easton's model L[G] and V? In particular, are these models compatible, in the sense that they are inner models of a common third model? If not, then the failure of GCH at every regular cardinal is consistent only in a weak sense, as it can only hold in universes which are incompatible with the universe of all sets. Ideally, we would like L[G] to not only be compatible with V, but to be an inner model of V.We say that a statement is internally consistent iff it holds in some inner model, under the assumption that there are innermodels with large cardinals.

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References found in this work

The negation of the singular cardinal hypothesis from o(K)=K++.Moti Gitik - 1989 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 43 (3):209-234.
A simple maximality principle.Joel David Hamkins - 2003 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 68 (2):527-550.
Co-stationarity of the Ground Model.Natasha Dobrinen & Sy-David Friedman - 2006 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (3):1029 - 1043.

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