Skeptical problems arising for Kant's version of transcendental idealism have been raised from Kant's own time to the present day. By focussing on how such problems originally arose in the wake of Kant's work, and on the first formulations of absolute idealism by Schelling, I argue that the skeptical problems in question ultimately depend on fundamental features of Kant's philosophy of natural science. As a result, Naturphilosophie and the organic conception of nature cannot easily be separated from the deep and insightful response to these problems offered by absolute idealism.
Keywords Kant   Scepticism   McDowell
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DOI 10.1080/00201740500497266
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References found in this work BETA

The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism.Roger Squires - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (145):558-560.

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Between the Bounds of Experience and Divine Intuition: Kant's Epistemic Limits and Hegel's Ambitions.James Kreines - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):306 – 334.
Gödel, Kant, and the Path of a Science.Srećko Kovač - 2008 - Inquiry: Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):147-169.
Schelling, Hegel, and Evolutionary Progress.J. M. Fritzman & Molly Gibson - 2012 - Perspectives on Science 20 (1):105-128.

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