Dealing with the reform of the Transplantation Law, the first issue of the new rubric “Philosophie aktuell” met with strong and lively interest from our readers. Subsequent to this discussion a growing number of reports were published dealing with violations of mandatory rules of conduct in transplantation medicine. Therefore the topic is revisited here from the slightly different vantage point “organ transplantation II: elucidation and confidence”.

Sommario. Prima che di definire un modello della coscienza e comprendere che cosa sia un fenomeno soggettivo, è necessario sviluppare una teoria della prospettiva in prima persona. Questa teoria deve essere concettualmente con- vincente, empiricamente plausibile e, soprattutto, aperta a nuovi sviluppi. Il quadro di riferimento concettuale deve essere coerente con il progresso scienti- fico. Le sue ipotesi fondamentali devono essere adattabili in modo da permette- re a nuovi risultati sperimentali di essere inseriti nel modello teorico. Questo ar- ticolo tenta (...) di definire le linee generali di una teoria in grado di offrire un’analisi rappresentazionale della prospettiva in prima persona. Tre proprietà fenomeniche sono centrali a quest’analisi: “egoicità” (la proprietà fenomenica; il senso di possesso di una sensazione), “selfhood” (l’esperienza cosciente di essere qualcuno) e la prospetticità (una caratteristica strutturale: il fatto che lo spazio fenomenico appaia organizzato attorno a un centro, una prospettiva su- per-modale). Questo articolo analizza queste proprietà da un punto di vista sia rappresentazionale che funzionale. Introdurrò nuovi vincoli concettuali per le rappresentazioni fenomeniche e due entità teoriche necessarie per capire che cosa sia la prospettiva in prima persona: “il modello fenomenico del sé” (PSM: phenomenal self model) e il “modello fenomenico della relazione intenzionale” (PMIR: phenomenal model of intentional relation). Un modello fenomenico del sé è una struttura rappresentazionale plurimodale, il cui contenuto costituisce il contenuto dell’esperienza del sé cosciente. Ha due caratteristiche importanti. Primo, è l’unica struttura rappresentazionale ancorata nel cervello da un colle- gamento funzionale permanente. Secondo, parti consistenti del PSM sono fe- nomenicamente trasparenti: non posso essere identificate come rappresentazioni all’interno del sistema. Sono intrappolate in quello che è stato definito un “in- genuo realismo auto-ingannevole”.. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty: From Perspective to the Chiasm,the Epistemic Rigor of an AnalogyHere, we wish to take up the discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm in light of the question of its status. Is it a matter of a metaphor without any cognitive value resulting from an analogical and arbitrary transfer from one domain to another, or is it a matter of a rigorous concept susceptible of being experimented upon, taken up again, or improved? If the latter is the case, what is (...) the nature of this concept? Is it descriptive, heuristic, or even logical? The question is worth asking insofar as it is not only the most orthodox positivists who may be likely to see, in this transfer of concept, nothing more than poetic license. Indeed, the most careful commentators authorized by Merleau-Ponty are in lockstep with the critics of his supposedly “literary” style. “Ambiguous” is thus the term, which more often describes Merleau-Ponty’s notions of encroachment, of reversibility, or even chiasm. First, we shall examine the function and the role of the concept of chiasm in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. We shall then establish its scope in order to be able to determine its exact status. It is only at the conclusion of this study that we will be able to show how this notion sheds light on Merleau-Ponty’s main concern, namely, to produce a counter-model of perspective and to promote a newcategory of relation – a concern which organizes the seemingly unrelated elements in his philosophy.Merleau-Ponty: dalla prospettiva al chiasma,il rigore epistemico di un’analogiaIntendiamo riprendere, in questa sede, la discussione sulla nozione di chiasma in Merleau-Ponty, alla luce di una domanda circa il suo statuto: si tratta di una metafora, priva di ogni valore cognitivo perché nata da un trasferimento analogico ed arbitrario da un campo semantico ad un altro, o si tratta di un concetto rigoroso, suscettibile di essere messo alla prova dell’esperienza e via via perfezionato? In tal caso, qual è la natura di questo concetto? È descrittiva, euristica, oppure logica? È interessante porre questa domanda dato che non sono solamente i positivisti più ortodossi, a vedere in questo trasferimento una semplice licenza poetica. In effetti, molti tra i commentatori più autorevoli di Merleau-Ponty aderiscono alle diverse critiche sollevate intorno alla presunta natura «letteraria» di questa espressione, e ritengono che il chiasma sia una semplice metafora. Interrogheremo innanzitutto la funzione e il ruolo di questo concetto nella filosofia di Merleau-Ponty al fine di determinarne l’esatto statuto. Solo al termine di questo studio preliminare potremo mostrare come questa nozione possa gettare nuova luce sulla preoccupazione principale di Merleau-Ponty, vero e proprio filo rosso che organizza in profondità tutti gli elementi apparentemente eterogenei della sua filosofia: vale a dire, il tentativo di produrre un contro-modello della prospettiva e una nuova categoria di relazione. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty: From Perspective to the Chiasm,the Epistemic Rigor of an AnalogyHere, we wish to take up the discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm in light of the question of its status. Is it a matter of a metaphor without any cognitive value resulting from an analogical and arbitrary transfer from one domain to another, or is it a matter of a rigorous concept susceptible of being experimented upon, taken up again, or improved? If the latter is the case, what is (...) the nature of this concept? Is it descriptive, heuristic, or even logical? The question is worth asking insofar as it is not only the most orthodox positivists who may be likely to see, in this transfer of concept, nothing more than poetic license. Indeed, the most careful commentators authorized by Merleau-Ponty are in lockstep with the critics of his supposedly “literary” style. “Ambiguous” is thus the term, which more often describes Merleau-Ponty’s notions of encroachment, of reversibility, or even chiasm. First, we shall examine the function and the role of the concept of chiasm in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. We shall then establish its scope in order to be able to determine its exact status. It is only at the conclusion of this study that we will be able to show how this notion sheds light on Merleau-Ponty’s main concern, namely, to produce a counter-model of perspective and to promote a newcategory of relation – a concern which organizes the seemingly unrelated elements in his philosophy.Merleau-Ponty: dalla prospettiva al chiasma,il rigore epistemico di un’analogiaIntendiamo riprendere, in questa sede, la discussione sulla nozione di chiasma in Merleau-Ponty, alla luce di una domanda circa il suo statuto: si tratta di una metafora, priva di ogni valore cognitivo perché nata da un trasferimento analogico ed arbitrario da un campo semantico ad un altro, o si tratta di un concetto rigoroso, suscettibile di essere messo alla prova dell’esperienza e via via perfezionato? In tal caso, qual è la natura di questo concetto? È descrittiva, euristica, oppure logica? È interessante porre questa domanda dato che non sono solamente i positivisti più ortodossi, a vedere in questo trasferimento una semplice licenza poetica. In effetti, molti tra i commentatori più autorevoli di Merleau-Ponty aderiscono alle diverse critiche sollevate intorno alla presunta natura «letteraria» di questa espressione, e ritengono che il chiasma sia una semplice metafora. Interrogheremo innanzitutto la funzione e il ruolo di questo concetto nella filosofia di Merleau-Ponty al fine di determinarne l’esatto statuto. Solo al termine di questo studio preliminare potremo mostrare come questa nozione possa gettare nuova luce sulla preoccupazione principale di Merleau-Ponty, vero e proprio filo rosso che organizza in profondità tutti gli elementi apparentemente eterogenei della sua filosofia: vale a dire, il tentativo di produrre un contro-modello della prospettiva e una nuova categoria di relazione. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty: From Perspective to the Chiasm,the Epistemic Rigor of an AnalogyHere, we wish to take up the discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm in light of the question of its status. Is it a matter of a metaphor without any cognitive value resulting from an analogical and arbitrary transfer from one domain to another, or is it a matter of a rigorous concept susceptible of being experimented upon, taken up again, or improved? If the latter is the case, what is (...) the nature of this concept? Is it descriptive, heuristic, or even logical? The question is worth asking insofar as it is not only the most orthodox positivists who may be likely to see, in this transfer of concept, nothing more than poetic license. Indeed, the most careful commentators authorized by Merleau-Ponty are in lockstep with the critics of his supposedly “literary” style. “Ambiguous” is thus the term, which more often describes Merleau-Ponty’s notions of encroachment, of reversibility, or even chiasm. First, we shall examine the function and the role of the concept of chiasm in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. We shall then establish its scope in order to be able to determine its exact status. It is only at the conclusion of this study that we will be able to show how this notion sheds light on Merleau-Ponty’s main concern, namely, to produce a counter-model of perspective and to promote a newcategory of relation – a concern which organizes the seemingly unrelated elements in his philosophy.Merleau-Ponty: dalla prospettiva al chiasma,il rigore epistemico di un’analogiaIntendiamo riprendere, in questa sede, la discussione sulla nozione di chiasma in Merleau-Ponty, alla luce di una domanda circa il suo statuto: si tratta di una metafora, priva di ogni valore cognitivo perché nata da un trasferimento analogico ed arbitrario da un campo semantico ad un altro, o si tratta di un concetto rigoroso, suscettibile di essere messo alla prova dell’esperienza e via via perfezionato? In tal caso, qual è la natura di questo concetto? È descrittiva, euristica, oppure logica? È interessante porre questa domanda dato che non sono solamente i positivisti più ortodossi, a vedere in questo trasferimento una semplice licenza poetica. In effetti, molti tra i commentatori più autorevoli di Merleau-Ponty aderiscono alle diverse critiche sollevate intorno alla presunta natura «letteraria» di questa espressione, e ritengono che il chiasma sia una semplice metafora. Interrogheremo innanzitutto la funzione e il ruolo di questo concetto nella filosofia di Merleau-Ponty al fine di determinarne l’esatto statuto. Solo al termine di questo studio preliminare potremo mostrare come questa nozione possa gettare nuova luce sulla preoccupazione principale di Merleau-Ponty, vero e proprio filo rosso che organizza in profondità tutti gli elementi apparentemente eterogenei della sua filosofia: vale a dire, il tentativo di produrre un contro-modello della prospettiva e una nuova categoria di relazione. (shrink)

Taking its cue from the famous articles in which the Jesuit Marcel Chossat, in the early decades of the last century, was the first to suggest that the doctrine of the real distinction between being and essence should be attributed to Giles of Rome, and not to Thomas Aquinas, the article proposes to consider the Neoplatonic matrix of Giles’ distinction, and to re-examine in more detail the doctrine of participation, which is the real trigger of the controversy between Giles (...) and Henry of Ghent. It suggests that Thomas Aquinas, Henry and Giles all three draw on the Proclean tradition, but each choosing different elements, as attested especially by the different readings of the fourth and ninth proposition of the De causis. Finally, it points out that the purpose of the distinction between being and essence is not at all, in Aquinas, to account for the contingency of creation, but to highlight the superiority of God not only with respect to all that possesses matter, but also to all that possesses only a form, even if intrinsically necessary. The distance between Giles and Aquinas could not be greater in this respect: the Dominican Master is not at all interested in showing the radical contingency of all creatures, including separate substances. On the contrary, insofar as he defends the idea that separate substances, as pure forms, are inseparable from their being, it remains true that one could legitimately speak, with regard to this aspect, of “St Thomas’ Averroism”, as Chossat wanted. (shrink)

Taking its cue from the famous articles in which the Jesuit Marcel Chossat, in the early decades of the last century, was the first to suggest that the doctrine of the real distinction between being and essence should be attributed to Giles of Rome, and not to Thomas Aquinas, the article proposes to consider the Neoplatonic matrix of Giles’ distinction, and to re-examine in more detail the doctrine of participation, which is the real trigger of the controversy between Giles (...) and Henry of Ghent. It suggests that Thomas Aquinas, Henry and Giles all three draw on the Proclean tradition, but each choosing different elements, as attested especially by the different readings of the fourth and ninth proposition of the De causis. Finally, it points out that the purpose of the distinction between being and essence is not at all, in Aquinas, to account for the contingency of creation, but to highlight the superiority of God not only with respect to all that possesses matter, but also to all that possesses only a form, even if intrinsically necessary. The distance between Giles and Aquinas could not be greater in this respect: the Dominican Master is not at all interested in showing the radical contingency of all creatures, including separate substances. On the contrary, insofar as he defends the idea that separate substances, as pure forms, are inseparable from their being, it remains true that one could legitimately speak, with regard to this aspect, of “St Thomas’ Averroism”, as Chossat wanted. (shrink)

This immense investigation, covering logic, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, aesthetics, religion, ethics, politics, and pedagogy, rests mainly on two notions: 1) that of syneteric judgments, which make a realist epistemology and ontology possible; and 2) that of partial being: a finite individual is only partially, being in space and time; becoming is a transmission of quantity of being and is a descending process. This thesis leads to a reformulation of St. Thomas' Fourth Way, and, inter alia, to a (...) liberal, non-optimistic, anti-utopian moral and political viewpoint.--R. N. S. (shrink)

When making decisions, humans can observe many kinds of information about others' activities, but their effects on performance are not well understood. We investigated social learning strategies using a simple problem-solving task in which participants search a complex space, and each can view and imitate others' solutions. Results showed that participants combined multiple sources of information to guide learning, including payoffs of peers' solutions, popularity of solution elements among peers, similarity of peers' solutions to their own, and relative payoffs from (...) individual exploration. Furthermore, performance was positively associated with imitation rates at both the individual and group levels. When peers' payoffs were hidden, popularity and similarity biases reversed, participants searched more broadly and randomly, and both quality and equity of exploration suffered. We conclude that when peers' solutions can be effectively compared, imitation does not simply permit scrounging, but it can also facilitate propagation of good solutions for further cumulative exploration. (shrink)

After a short summary of the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’ conception of being given by E. Gilson, according which the actus essendi is existence, the article sets out the criticisms addressed to this conception by P.T. Geach and A. Kenny, showing that they converge with the criticism developed by the author himself in an article of 1979 on Aristotle. In the author’s view, the best reply to this criticism given by the Thomists is the reply of S.L. Brocks, who (...) has shown that the actus essendi is the perfect way of being which belongs only to God. The author shows that this conception is confirmed by some passages of Thomas’ De ente et essentia. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION Although the writings of Thomas Reid are very fertile and interesting, his life is biographically barren in comparison to such seventeenth - and ...

THE NATURE OF ART is a collection of 29 seminal, historically-organized readings that are focused on a basic philosophical question: What is Art? Including writings from the Western tradition'both Continental and Analytic traditions'as well as non-Western, minority, and feminist writings, this volume provides students with a rich set of resources to explore this matter both broadly and deeply. Introductions to each reading situate the selection amidst each respective thinker's body of work and the greater philosophical context in which the remarks (...) arose. Reading questions accompany each selection, drawing students' attention to key points to be encountered. Hailed by reviewers and adopters for its clarity and rigor, Wartenberg's THE NATURE OF ART offers a lively and engaging introduction to the philosophy of art. (shrink)

The newly updated Right and Wrong 2nd Edition is an accessible introduction to the major traditions in western philosophical ethics, written in a lively and engaging style. It is designed for entry-level ethics courses and includes real-life ethical scenarios chosen to appeal directly to students. Greatly expanded and improved, this successful text introduces students to the major ethical traditions, and provides a simple methodology for resolving ethical dilemmas Treats teleological and deontological approaches to ethics as the two most important traditions, (...) but now includes chapters on virtue ethics and the ethics of care The very accessible writing style speaks directly to students’ own experience Draws examples from three types of real-life ethical scenarios submitted by students: academic dishonesty, partying, and personal relationships Provides a concise treatment of this notoriously complex subject, perfect for entry-level ethics and applied ethics courses. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Personhood: A Start Are Dolphins Persons? Language and the Hand Personhood Redefined Conclusion: What Kind of Beings Are Dolphins?

David Ekdahl (2023), in a constructive and thoughtful commentary, outlines both points of agreement with and suggestions for further research arising from our paper ‘Crossing the Fictional Line: Moral Graveness, the Gamer’s Dilemma, and the Paradox of Fictionally Going Too Far’ (Montefiore & Formosa, 2023).

According to a widely held view, a Kantian intuition functions like a singular term. I argue that this view is false. Its apparent plausibility, both textual and philosophical, rests on attributing to Kant a Fregean conception of judgment. I show that Kant does not hold a Fregean conception of judgment and argue that, as a consequence, intuition cannot be understood on analogy with singular terms.

In this book Thomas Wren uncovers and assesses the largely hidden philosophical assumptions about human motivation that have shaped contemporary psychological ...

In der Tugendlehre Kants findet die allgemeine ethische Orientierung, wie sie der Kategorische Imperativ ausdrückt, Anwendung auf die Bedingungen der menschlichen Existenz. Die vorliegende Untersuchung rekonstruiert den Kantischen Ansatz vor dem Hintergrund der gegenwärtigen, vor allem aristotelischen Tugendethik und löst dabei den Kantischen Tugendbegriff kritisch von seinen zeitbedingten Prägungen. Auf so erneuerter Grundlage wird eine transzendentalphilosophische Ethikkonzeption entfaltet, die den methodischen und inhaltlichen Einsichten der jüngeren Theorieentwicklung Rechnung trägt. Zu den Ergebnissen zählt die Bestimmung einzelner Tugenden, deren ethische Orientierung an (...) konkreten Strukturen unserer alltäglichen Praxis demonstriert wird. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary volume questions one of the most fundamental tenets of social theory by focusing on detachment, an important but neglected aspect of social life. Going against the grain of recent theoretical celebrations of engagement, this book challenges us to re-think the relational basis of social theory. In so, doing it brings to light the productive aspects of disconnection, distance and detachment. Rather than treating detachment simply as the moral inversion of compassion and engagement, the volume brings together empirical studies (...) and theoretical comments by leading anthropologists, sociologists and science studies scholars. Taken together, these illustrate the range of contexts within which distance and disconnection can offer meaningful frameworks for action. Positioned at the cutting edge of social theory, this landmark volume will be of great interest to students and academics across the social sciences and humanities. (shrink)

Big Ideas for Little Kids includes everything a teacher, a parent, or a college student needs to teach philosophy to elementary school children from picture books. Written in a clear and accessible style, the book explains why it is important to allow young children access to philosophy during primary-school education. Wartenberg also gives advice on how to construct a "learner-centered" classroom, in which children discuss philosophical issues with one another as they respond to open-ended questions by saying whether they agree (...) or disagree with what others have said. (shrink)

Some theories of goodness are descriptively rich: they have much to say about what makes things good. Neo-Aristotelian accounts, for instance, detail the various features that make a human being, a dog, a bee good relative to facts about those forms of life. Famously, such theories of relative goodness tend to be comparatively poor: they have little or nothing to say about what makes one kind of being better than another kind. Other theories of goodness—those that take there to be (...) absolute goodness—are comparatively rich: they offer grounds for judging some types of things better than others because they have more absolute goodness. Moorean accounts, for example, can tell us that humans and human experiences are superior to bees and blades of grass. But such theories tend to be descriptively poor: they struggle to tell us in virtue of what this is so. In this essay we motivate and flesh out a view that splits the difference between accounts of goodness as relative and accounts of goodness as absolute. Such a view holds promise only if the mechanics of this kind of metaphysics of goodness can be worked out. Here we present a view on which the paradigm for absolute goodness is God and the paradigm for each kind of relative goodness is a divine idea. (shrink)

Proceedings of a conference held in Apr. 2008 in Washington, D.C.

It is somewhat misleading to think of the Franciscans as forming a “school” in ethics, since there was a fair bit of diversity among Franciscans. Nonetheless, one can identify certain characteristic tendencies of Franciscan moral thought, and certain “celebrity” Franciscans whose views in ethics and moral psychology are particularly noteworthy. I shall first offer an overview of the general character of Franciscan moral thought in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries and then turn to a more detailed examination of (...) the thought of John Duns Scotus (1265/66-1308) and William Ockham (c. 1288-1347) on three central matters of debate: the nature of the virtues, the relationship between intellect and will, and the relationship between moral requirements and the divine will. (shrink)

Father Williams explains how the conscience is formed through our training and experiences and informed by the Holy Spirit, making it an essential tool for daily living. He uses familiar and surprising characters to illustrate the positive choices conscience can direct--and the disaster that results when a conscience is undeveloped or ignored. Questions he tackles include "Is it more important to be smart or good?""Is there a morally right thing to do in every situation?" and "Is the Christian moral life (...) an exciting adventure, or a necessary burden?" Rich, provocative, and practical for everyday decision making, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG is a must-read for all who hunger for personal holiness. (shrink)

The reaction to Darwin's Origin of Species varied in many countries according to the roles played by national scientific institutions and traditions and the attitudes of religious and political groups. The contributors to this volume, including M. J. S. Hodge, David Hull, and Roberto Moreno, gathered in 1972 at an international conference on the comparative reception of Darwinism. Their essays look at early pro- and anti-Darwinism arguments, and three additional comparative essays and appendices add a larger perspective. For this paperback (...) edition, Thomas F. Glick has added a new preface commenting on recent research. (shrink)

For courses in Business Ethics A fresh approach to the assumptions that underlie business practices Two recent events — the 2008 economic meltdown and the ongoing concentration of the nation's wealth in the hands of a very small percentage of the population — have led many people to question a number of basic assumptions about business, corporations, and the workings of contemporary free-market capitalism in a global economy. Written as a dialogue between Socrates and a hypothetical contemporary CEO,Socrates Comes to (...) Wall Street leads students to think critically about perspectives and practices that are taken as “givens” in most American business schools and corporations. Employing this original and provocative approach, author Thomas White seeks to encourage the next generation of business leaders to be more astute about the implications of their actions, and to act more prudently and more fairly than we have seen in the recent past. (shrink)

Shrek! focuses on an issue in the philosophy of language, a relatively new area of philosophical investigation that first emerged during the twentieth century. Some philosophers disagree with the claim that you cannot separate the descriptive and evaluative elements of linguistic statements. This is because they take descriptive statements to be the basic elements of language, to which our subjective attitudes get attached later in a contingent manner. At its most basic level language presents a symbolic picture of facts in (...) the world. Shrek! presents what philosophers call a thought experiment that purports to show that the descriptive and evaluative contents of sentences are really distinct. The chapter ends by suggesting how to discuss the philosophy of language with children. (shrink)

In Daniel Manus Pinkwater's quirkily illustrated book, The Big Orange Splot, a strange accident leads a man to change his life. The book presents an important claim that the existentialists and other philosophers have embraced: That the life of conformity is one that people ought to avoid, despite its attractiveness. Instead of living a life just like everyone else and fulfilling expectations that others have for us, our lives should resemble the transformed facades of all the homes on Mr. Plumbean's (...) street: reflections of our own, individual dreams. (shrink)

The chapter talks about Shel Silverstein's The Giving Tree, which is a favorite of many children, adults, and teachers. The story of a relationship between a boy and a tree is charming for, despite the vicissitudes of the relationship, the two end up together at the end, with the boy — now an old man — sitting contentedly on the tree — itself reduced to a mere stump. The book raises an important issue in the field of environmental ethics. It (...) asks us to recognize that between childhood and old age, people operating within the Western tradition of ethics are not mindful of the value that the non‐human beings in their environment have for them as well as for future generations. Harkening to such warnings, environmental ethicists have attempted to raise important issues about our relationship with the other beings that make up our world. (shrink)