Whose values should count – those of patients or the general public – when adopting the quality-adjusted life year framework for healthcare decision making is a long-standing debate. Specific disciplines, such as economics, are not wedded to a particular side of the debate, and arguments for and against the use of patient values have been discussed at length in the literature. In 2012, Sinclair proposed an approach, grounded within patient preference theory, which sought to avoid a perceived unfair discrimination against (...) people with disabilities when using values from the general public. Key assumptions about general public values that beget this line of thinking were that ‘disabled states always tally with lower quality of life’, and the use of standardised instruments means that ‘you are forced into a fixed view of disability as a lower value state’. Drawing on recent contributions to the health economics literature, we contend that such assumptions are not inherent to the incorporation of general public values for the estimation of QALYs. In practice, whether health states of people with disabilities are of ‘lower value’ is, to some extent, a reflection of the health state descriptions that members of the public are asked to value. (shrink)

Explores how the emotional experience of gratitude has been enlisted in neoliberal governance through the language of debt. In The Art of Gratitude, Jeremy David Engels sketches a genealogy of gratitude from the ancient Greeks to the contemporary self-help movement. One of the most striking things about gratitude, Engels finds, is how consistently it is described using the language of indebtedness. A chief purpose of this, he contends, is to make us more comfortable living lives in debt, with the (...) nefarious effect of pacifying the citizenry so we are less likely to speak out about social and economic injustice. To counteract this, he proposes an alternative art of gratitude-as-thanksgiving that is inspired by Indian philosophy, particularly the yoga philosophy of the Bhagavad Gita and Patanjali’s Yoga-Sutras. He argues that this art of gratitude can challenge neoliberalism by reorienting our politics away from resentment, anger, and guilt and toward a democratic ethic of thanksgiving and the common good. Jeremy David Engels is the Sherwin Early Career Professor in the Rock Ethics Institute and Associate Professor of Communication Arts and Sciences at Penn State University. He is the author of The Politics of Resentment: A Genealogy and Enemyship: Democracy and Counter-Revolution in the Early Republic. (shrink)

English summary: Since Herodotus and Thucydides the assumption that the historic structures of the past sooner or later reappear in the present and future has provided a methodological basis for all serious historic philosophical debate, and the ultimate social self-justification within historical disciplines. In addition to a broad methodological introduction to the subject, this volume contains selected contributions to the cyclical and biological patterns of thought in the philosophy of history including such diverse thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Sallust, Virgil, (...) Livy, Seneca, Orosius, Simplicius, Proclus, Joachim of Fiore, Machiavelli, Vico, Kant, Hegel, Spengler, Thomas Mann, Toynbee, Huntington and Fukuyama. German description: Seit Herodot und Thukydides gilt die Annahme, daa die historischen Strukturen der Vergangenheit fruher oder spater auch in Gegenwart und Zukunft wiederkehren, als methodologische Grundlage allen echten geschichtsphilosophischen Argumentierens und als ultimative gesellschaftliche Selbstbegrundung der historischen Disziplinen. Unter den verschiedenen diesbezuglichen Denkschulen, welche sich in der Antike und im Abenland herausgebildet haben, war die Vermutung, politische oder kulturelle Einheiten konnten sich analog zum Lebenszyklus naturlicher Korper verhalten und biologistische bzw. zyklische Etappen wie Geburt, Wachstum, Reife, Alter und Tod bzw. Neubeginn erleben, ganz besonders wirkmachtig und pragt auch heute noch unter dem Schlagwort vom Aufstieg und Niedergang der groaen Hochkulturen unser Verstandnis von den notwendigen Etappen einer jeden Zivilisation. Vorliegender Band beinhaltet, neben einer breiten methodologischen Einfuhrung in das Thema, ausgewahlte Beitrage zu zyklischen und biologistischen Denkstrukturen in der Geschichtsphilosophie so unterschiedlicher Denker wie Platon, Aristoteles, Polybios, Sallust, Vergil, Livius, Seneca, Orosius, Simplikios, Proklos, Joachim von Fiore, Machiavelli, Vico, Kant, Hegel, Spengler, Thomas Mann, Toynbee, Huntington und Fukuyama. (shrink)

Postural instability marks a prevalent symptom of Parkinson’s disease. It often manifests in increased body sway, which is commonly assessed by tracking the Center of Pressure. Yet, in terms of postural control, the body’s Center of Mass, and not CoP is what is regulated in a gravitational field. The aim of this study was to explore the effect of early- to mid-stage PD on these measures of postural control in response to unpredictable visual perturbations. We investigated three cohorts: 18 patients (...) with early to mid-stage PD [Hoehn & Yahr stage ; 1.94 ± 0.70]; a group of 15 age-matched controls ; and a group of 12 young healthy adults. Participants stood on a force plate to track their CoP, while the movement of their entire body was recorded with a video-based motion tracking system to monitor their CoM. A moving room paradigm was applied through a head-mounted virtual reality headset. The stimulus consisted of a virtual tunnel that stretched in the anterior-posterior direction which either remained static or moved back and forth in an unpredictable fashion.We found differences in mean sway amplitude and mean velocities of CoP and CoM between the groups under both conditions, with higher MSA of CoP and CoM for PD and higher mean velocities of both variables for PD and ECT when compared with YCT. Visual perturbation increased mean CoP velocity in all groups but did not have effects on mean CoM velocity or MSA. While being significantly lower for the young adults, the net effect of visual perturbation on mean CoP velocity was similar between patients with PD and age-matched controls. There was no effect of the visual perturbation on mean CoM velocity for any of the groups.Our simultaneous assessment of CoP and CoM revealed that postural control is reflected differently in CoM and CoP. As the motion of CoM remained mostly unaffected, all groups successfully counteracted the perturbation and maintained their balance. Higher CoP velocity for PD and ECT revealed increased corrective motion needed to achieve this, which however was similar in both groups. Thus, our results suggest increased effort, expressed in CoP velocity, to be an effect of age rather than disease in earlier stages of PD. (shrink)

Why is religion such a widespread human experience? In enlightenment Scotland, philosophers had already attempted to answer this question turning to natural histories of mankind, and to a careful analysis of the human mind and of those cognitive capacities responsible for religious-type beliefs and attitudes. This early approach is also echoed today, as scholars from the cognitive sciences seek to show how religious-type beliefs and practices are produced either directly or as a by-product of natural cognitive processes. Others continue to (...) study the dependence of religious beliefs on cultural traditions, symbolic meanings and ritualistic practices. The authors of this special issue continue this discussion, focusing on specific topics and challenges posed by current studies on religion as a natural phenomenon. (shrink)

Mylan Engel, Jr. has proposed a straightforward and attractive explanation of the internalism-externalism controversy (IEC) in contemporary epistemology. Engel's explanation posits that there are two distinct kinds of epistemic justification, and the IEC has arisen because epistemologists have inadvertently overlooked the fact that they are not all concerned with the same subject matter (internalists are concerned with one kind of epistemic justification while externalists are concerned with another kind). In this paper, I will explain two difficulties with (...) class='Hi'>Engel's proposed explanation. The first difficulty concerns the claim that there are two kinds of epistemic justification. The second difficulty concerns whether Engel's proposed explanation is adequate to explain internalist concerns. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Beyond EngelClinical Pragmatism as the Foundation of Psychiatric PracticeDavid H. Brendel (bio)Keywordsbiopsychosocial model, pluralism, pragmatism, psychiatryFor many years now, there has been growing recognition of the powerful role of pragmatic reasoning in numerous disciplines, including bioethics, medicine, law, political science, and philosophy (Dickstein 1998; Rosenthal, Hausman, and Anderson 1999). But until recently, philosophical pragmatism was neglected by scholars exploring the clinical challenges and theoretical underpinnings of psychiatry. In his (...) noteworthy article The Biopsychosocial Model and Philosophic Pragmatism: Is George Engel a Pragmatist?, Bradley Lewis offers a significant contribution to the small but gradually increasing literature in this area. Lewis appropriately presents Engel as a major figure in twentieth-century American medicine and psychiatry, a critic and a visionary who dared to question the dominant paradigm of biomedical reductionism (Engel 1977)—a paradigm that led to important scientific advances, but also restricted the physician’s understanding of the patient as a complex individual with an inner world and interpersonal relationships. Lewis argues that medicine and psychiatry a generation after Engel’s seminal 1977 paper can be revitalized by reinterpreting Engel in the intellectual tradition of classical American pragmatism and neo-pragmatism. Placing Engel in the pragmatic tradition, Lewis suggests, could enhance the biopsychosocial model and have substantial benefits for both individual patients and society as a whole.There is no disputing Lewis’s argument that a pragmatic philosophy of medicine and psychiatry is a noble goal. In fact, in my book Healing Psychiatry: Bridging the Science/Humanism Divide (Brendel 2006), I present philosophical pragmatism as the most compelling theoretical approach to clinical psychiatry in the twenty-first century—the approach that is most likely to empower the clinician and the patient to collaboratively develop a treatment plan that heeds the multidimensional complexity of the patient’s life, recognizes the confusion and uncertainty that grows out of this complexity, and aims for a favorable therapeutic outcome. Drawing on work of the classical American pragmatists and contemporary pragmatic bioethicists, I identify four dimensions of philosophical pragmatism that provide a sound foundation for clinical work, which I call the “four ps”: (1) diagnostic formulations and treatment plans in psychiatry are practical insofar as they focus on results rather than a commitment to any particular theory; (2) they are pluralistic [End Page 311] insofar as they incorporate explanatory concepts that span the biopsychosocial spectrum; (3) they are participatory and collaborative, not imposed authoritatively by the clinician; and (4) they are provisional, open-ended, and malleable to newly acquired information and evolution of the patient’s condition.Lewis casts Engel as a philosophical pragmatist who battled the Goliath of biomedical reductionism that had come to dominate American medicine and psychiatry in the latter half of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, however, regardless of how elegantly Lewis reinterprets Engel, he cannot render him a full-blown pragmatist for the medicine and psychiatry of the twenty-first century. Lewis provides quotations to suggest that Engel valued a results-oriented clinical sensibility, for example “the value of a scientific model is measured not by whether it is right or wrong but by how useful it is” (Engel 1980). But Engel was not fully committed to clinical outcome as the supreme judge of theory in medicine and psychiatry. Lewis notes that Engel understood the biopsychosocial model as less “a matter of compassion and humanity” and more a matter of “rigorous application of the principles and practices of science”; he was a man of his time who could not fully escape the scientism of the day. Working within this scientistic world, he distinguished himself by reintroducing psychological, sociological, and humanistic concepts into clinical medicine, which had become obsessed with the power and robustness of the natural sciences but had neglected the suffering human subject and the social context of illness. Engel undoubtedly hoped the biopsychosocial model would lead to better clinical results but, unlike the classical American pragmatists and contemporary pragmatic bioethicists, he did not make a systematic case for privileging clinical outcome above strict adherence to scientific theory.In fact, Engel’s biopsychosocial model runs the risk of becoming a reified end in itself; those who unquestioningly espouse its basic tenets are in danger of... (shrink)

This book expounds the dialectical conception of science largely implicit in the writings of Marx and Engels, offering a sympathetic reconstruction of a philosophy of science commensurate with Marx's thought. Drawing on a reading of dialectics found in Plato and Hegel, it recasts Marx's implicit ontology in terms of dialectical conceptions of the world, as these conceptions have responded to the growing sophistication of modern science. It thus deepens our understanding of materialist philosophy as it relates to science and draws (...) out Marx's logic of science in light of continuing discussions. As such, it will appeal to philosophers with interests in the nature and development of science, and Marxist thought. (shrink)

Alexander Bogdanov’s first work of philosophy, Basic Elements of the Historical View of Nature, was fundamentally influenced by Friedrich Engels. As a Marxist philosopher seeking to elaborate a comprehensive, systematic, and scientific worldview appropriate for worker–students, Bogdanov found inspiration in Engels’s Anti-Dühring, which provided him with his monist conception of being and his ‘historical view of nature’ and pointed him toward three critical elements of his work: the monism of motion, Spinoza’s naturalist and determinist system, and Charles Darwin’s conception of (...) natural selection. Bogdanov’s overall goal was to demonstrate that in nature, life, the psyche, and society there is no such thing as self-generated motion; all change occurs because of external action. For the individual and for society this means that existence determines consciousness, and societies evolve as a result of their struggle for existence, which is manifested first and foremost in labor. (shrink)

Early to mid-nineteenth-century America experienced a cultural fascination with oneness or monism--the notion that individuals are not separate from divinity but, rather, that the individual soul is an incarnation of the universal soul. Everything is one. This buzz of monism was traceable in part to translations of the Vedas by Indian philosopher Rammohun Roy and found some of its fullest expression in the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman. This oneness tradition is what animates Jeremy David Engels--not (...) only because we can't understand Emerson, Whitman, and other American philosophers without it, but because Engels thinks this tradition offers a way of thinking and acting that can meet the ethical challenges of everyday democracy in the present. The Ethics of Oneness is not only a brilliant study of the centrality of the Bhagavad Gita in the philosophy of Emerson and Whitman and a compelling reception history of the Gita in America, it is also a constructive project of moral and political philosophy intended to open possibilities for the present. If the lessons of oneness are taken to heart, Engels thinks, it ispossible to counter the pervasive, problematic American ideals of separation, competition, hierarchy, exclusion, and domination. For both Emerson and Whitman, American democracy requires a firm ontological foundation of oneness that is beyond question if it is to survive and thrive. (shrink)

The biopsychosocial (BPS) model has been of considerable utility to those researching health and illness. This has been particularly the case for critical realists and those with a systemic orientation to their work. Whilst the strengths of the model are conceded in this article, its limitations are also examined. These relate to its ontological sophistication being compromised by its proneness to epistemological naivety. It is a model to explain the emergence of disease and disability, not a reflexive theory applicable to (...) the whole field of health research. This tension is linked to the emergence of a re-orientation of medical knowledge away from bio-medical reductionism. From the outset the model was not about a general critique, or a grand theory, of health and illness. Instead it was a useful intervention, on the part of medical practitioners, like George Engel and Adolf Meyer, to create a reformed medical model on behalf of their profession. Case studies of the problematics of diagnosis and medicalization are offered to illuminate the limitations of the BPS model for health researchers. (shrink)

“utopophobia” is a diverse and long-established phenomenon. Recent discussion of the notion of “realism” in political philosophy has illuminated one form that the fear of utopia can take—namely, suspicion and disapproval of normative standards that are unlikely ever to be achieved—but has not exhausted all that is of interest here.1 The present paper is concerned with a different variety of utopophobia: namely, the historically influential but not well-understood hostility of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels toward the provision of plans and (...) blueprints of the ideal society of the future.2There seems little doubt about the existence of this Marxian utopophobia. (Note that I use the.. (shrink)

Helen Macfarlane, revolutionary social critic, feminist and Hegelian philosopher was the first English translator of Karl Marx and Fredrich Engel's theCommunist Manifesto. Her original translation is included in this edition. Marx publicly admired her as a rare and original thinker and journalist. This book recreates her intellectual and political world at a key turning point in European history.

Plekhanov and the tragedy of the Second International -- Marxism, history & socialist consciousness -- The political and intellectual odyssey of Alex Steiner -- The theoretical and historical origins of the pseudo-left -- The science of political perspective -- It was all Engels' fault: a review of Tom Rockmore's Marx after Marxism.

This article examines Friedrich Engels's little noticed communitarian sympathies, especially as expressed in his 1844 article 'kommunistischen Ansiedlungen'. These sympathies are in conflict with the considered and more critical view of communitarian socialism that he subsequently came to share with Karl Marx. I have four ambitions in the article: first, to provide some characterisation of this 'communitarian moment' in Engels's early intellectual evolution; second, to raise a number of worries about the argument of this particular article; third, to illuminate some (...) of the interesting variety in nineteenth-century communitarianism; and fourth, to insist on the complexity of questions about 'feasibility'. I maintain that Engels underestimates the variety of contemporary communitarianism, and that his appeal to the existence of intentional communities in America and Britain as proof of the feasibility of communism is unsuccessful. (shrink)

‘Marx on tax’ as an effective antidote to inequality is an overlooked theme within his own output, but also for our own time. Marx theorising on tax is seen even by pre-eminent Marxists as an empty box, but Marx and Engels in fact had plenty to say about tax. Their coverage embraces progressive taxes, both on capital and income, a strong preference for direct over indirect taxation, inheritance tax, land-value tax, taxes on financial transactions, and state finances around the world. (...) Tax also provides the battleground for a rare sight of Marx as campaigning activist, in 1848, matched in the same period by close ally Wilhelm Wolff. The tax policies of Marx and Engels have been neglected because they are primarily to be found in their journalism and letters. They are no anachronistic curiosity but perfectly applicable to the income and wealth inequalities of our own era. (shrink)

This short article shows that Heller’s assertion that I have announced the death of the early modern French bourgeoisie is misplaced. At the same time, it defends the view that a prolonged period of economic stasis together with the low level of bourgeois classness make it impossible to sustain Engel’s view that absolute monarchy rested on a supposed balance between it and the nobility. In conclusion, it is suggested that Marxist analysis cannot be reduced to a treatment of class-anatogonisms.

The most valuable political theoretical contribution made by Marx's idea of socialism is towards the resolution of the seeming opposition of mass democracy and rational government. Marx follows Hegel's redefinition of political rationalization as the actualization of the nascent self?consciousness of the existing ethical world when he uses socialism as a statement of those tendencies of bourgeois society that will create the perspectives of social awareness that allow mass democracy. This thesis is made against aspects of the interpretation of Marx's (...) relation to Hegel in Bolshevik political theory. I claim that the Bolshevik idea of socialism as the militant political intervention of the dictatorship of the proletariat develops, through Engels, a position taken with respect to Hegel's philosophy of right in Marx's Rhenish Journal articles. This idea is, however, pre?Hegelian in the sense that it is open to a democratic criticism based on the philosophy of right understood in an alternative fashion. In his writings after leaving the Rhenish Journal and up to the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts Marx makes this alternative available, and the notion of socialism he arrives at here turns on an awareness of the contradictions which make the militant political imposition of freedom impossible. Whereas for Bolshevism socialism is to be imposed on existing society, for Marx it is more the development within that society that makes possible mass democratic freedom. (shrink)

This book re-exaimes the Kantian and Hegalian influences on Marx and Engels's philosophical materialism.

There is no doubt that Marx and Engels rejected animal rights. However, they did embrace the communist principle, "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his need." Furthermore, they acknowledged that nonhuman animals have needs. So the principle can enjoin us to respect animals' needs, even if they lack certain abilities (e.g., tool-making, perhaps even self-consciousness). I argue that it is essentially speciesist to restrict this principle to human beings, and that its acceptance implies either animal rights (...) or a substantive equivalent. Marxism may have to undergo a profound dialectical transformation in light of the implications of its own maxim. (shrink)

This classroom edition includes _On the Social Contract_, the _Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts_, the _Discourse on the Origins of Inequality_, and the Preface to _Narcissus_. Each text has been newly translated and includes a full complement of explanatory notes. The editors’ introduction offers students diverse points of entry into some of the distinctive possibilities and challenges of each of these fundamental texts, as well as an introduction to Rousseau’s life and historical situation. The volume also includes annotated (...) appendices that help students to explore the origins and influences of Rousseau’s work, including excerpts from Hobbes, Pascal, Descartes, Mandeville, Diderot, Voltaire, Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant, Joseph de Maistre, Kant, Hegel, and Engels. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 100 Heft: 2 Seiten: 527-528.

En s’appuyant sur l’historiographie russe la plus récente, cet article retrace le parcours de l’académicien soviétique David Riazanov, de son premier engagement aux côtés des populistes russes à son exécution lors des grandes purges. L’article se concentre principalement sur la contribution essentielle de Riazanov à la fondation de la « marxologie » scientifique à travers la création de l’Institut MarxEngels de Moscou en 1921. En présentant l’éditeur de la première MEGA tant comme un érudit marxiste respecté que comme un (...) militant inflexible opposé à l’emprise de Staline sur le parti, l’article traite également des enjeux inhérents à toute recherche marxologique, comme la difficile articulation entre approche scientifique et impératif politique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:George Engel’s Legacy for the Philosophy of Medicine and PsychiatryBradley Lewis (bio)KeywordsBiopsychosocial model, George Engel, pragmatism, philosophy of medicine, philosophy of psychiatryEach of the respondents to this paper raises critical and important concerns. I am grateful for the quality of their insights. David Brendel’s response, along with his recent book, Healing Psychiatry: Bridging the Science/Humanism Divide, resembles my efforts in several ways. Like Brendel, I too (...) believe that the American pragmatic philosophy can be helpful in healing the splits and divisions within psychiatry. And, like Brendel, I believe that psychiatry would benefit from what he calls the “four ps” of pragmatism. Where we differ with regard to George Engel and his biopsychosocial model seems to be less about philosophy and more about strategy. Brendel argues that Engel was too scientistic in his manifest reasoning to be considered a pragmatist. I agree with this description of Engel. But, strategically, we can go beyond Engel’s manifest reasoning to draw out the implications of Engel’s writings in a pragmatic fashion. I am not saying that Engel did this himself; I am only saying that it is very possible to reinterpret Engel along these lines.Brendel also argues that the biopsychosocial model itself needs improvement. But, just as it is possible to update Engel’s theoretical scaffold, we can also update Engel’s biopsychosocial model. Along the lines of Brendel’s concerns, we can easily revise the model so that we remember that not all problems need complex analysis and interventions. Some problems are relatively simple and can have a simple solution. We can also revise the model so we include questions of consumer participation and the provisional nature of the clinical encounter. I see nothing in the biopsychosocial model that contradicts either of these concerns. Yes, the biopsychosocial model needs to be updated, refurbished, expanded, and reimagined. That is my point in the paper.The traction of Brendel’s concerns is not can we reinterpret Engel? or can we refresh the biopsychosocial model?—of course we can. The traction of his concern seems to be “should we?” To this strategic question, Brendel’s answer is no and my answer is yes. I argue that it is a good idea to refresh and refurbish Engel and his biopsychosocial model because it helps to create a connection with an important tradition within both medicine and psychiatry: the tradition of balanced, broadminded, nuanced, patient-centered and anti-reductionistic [End Page 327] care. This tradition is important because medicine and psychiatry seem perpetually vulnerable to the temptations of reductionist approaches and to what Engel, and Nassir Ghaemi more recently, call “dogmatism” (Engel 1977, 130; Ghaemi, 2003, 301). Whether reductionism and dogmatism take the form of biopsychiatry, or psychoanalysis, or antipsychiatry, or cognitive-behavioral therapy, the problems of dogmatism are the same.I am sure Brendel would agree with this, which is why he raises pluralism to such a prominent position in his own reasoning. The difference is that Brendel believes we can better get to this kind of balanced clinical care by letting go of the past figures like Engel and moving into the bright light of the twenty-first century. Maybe so. But my thinking when I wrote the paper goes the other way around. For me, if clinical medicine and psychiatry more carefully tended to its history and tradition, it would be less likely to fall sway to the next Johnny-come-lately reductionistic model.Jeffery Spike’s memories of George Engel during the years they worked together at the University of Rochester School of Medicine provide a good sense of why Engel is an important figure to remember and to pay homage. As Spike puts it, Engel was not only a “legendary figure” with an “almost mythical diagnostic ability,” Engel “probably had more influence on the philosophy of medicine in the United States than any other person, physician, or philosopher.” Both of these accomplishments help to explain why Engel is worth remembering.Those of us in medicine and psychiatry all know mythical clinicians and teachers—the ones who seem like Michael Jordan used to seem on the basketball court, able to somehow make even... (shrink)

In this book, which thoroughly revises and greatly expands his classic work Sameness and Substance, David Wiggins retrieves and refurbishes in the light of twentieth-century logic and logical theory certain conceptions of identity, of substance and of persistence through change that philosophy inherits from its past. In this new version, he vindicates the absoluteness, necessity, determinateness and all or nothing character of identity against rival conceptions. He defends a form of essentialism that he calls individuative essentialism, and then a (...) form of realism that he calls conceptualist realism. In a final chapter he advocates a human being-based conception of the identity and individuation of persons, arguing that any satisfactory account of personal memory must make reference to the life of the rememberer himself. This important book will appeal to a wide range of readers in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Do psychological traits predict philosophical views? We administered the PhilPapers Survey, created by David Bourget and David Chalmers, which consists of 30 views on central philosophical topics (e.g., epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language) to a sample of professional philosophers (N = 314). We extended the PhilPapers survey to measure a number of psychological traits, such as personality, numeracy, well-being, lifestyle, and life experiences. We also included non-technical ‘translations’ of these views for eventual use (...) in other populations. We found limited to no support for the notion that personality or demographics predict philosophical views. We did, however, find that some psychological traits were predictive of philosophical views, even after strict correction for multiple comparisons. Findings include: higher interest in numeracy predicted physicalism, naturalism, and consequentialism; lower levels of well-being and higher levels of mental illness predicted hard determinism; using substances such as psychedelics and marijuana predicted non-realist and subjectivist views of morality and aesthetics; having had a transformative or self-transcendent experience predicted theism and idealism. We discuss whether or not these empirical results have philosophical implications, while noting that 68% of our sample of professional philosophers indicated that such findings would indeed have philosophical value. (shrink)

Interpretation -- Introduction -- Interpreting Plato -- The political culture of Plato's early dialogues -- Dialogue -- Character and history -- The mouthpiece principle -- Forms of evidence -- Desire -- Socrates and eros -- The subjectivist conception of desire -- Instrumental and terminal desire -- Rational and irrational desires -- Desire in the critique of Akrasia -- Interpreting Lysis -- The deficiency conception of desire -- Inauthentic friendship -- Platonic desire -- Antiphilosophical desires -- Knowledge -- Excellence as wisdom (...) -- The epistemic unity of excellence -- Dunamis and technê -- Goodness and form -- The epistemological priority of definitional knowledge -- Ordinary ethical knowledge -- Method -- The Socratic fallacy -- Socrates' pursuit of definitions -- Hupothesis -- Two postulates -- The geometrical illustration -- Geometrical analysis -- The method of reasoning from a postulate -- Elenchus and hupothesis -- Knowledge and aitia -- F-conditions -- Cognitive security -- Aporia -- Forms of aporia -- Dramatic aporia -- The example of Charmides -- Charmides as autobiography -- The politics of Sôphrosunê -- Critias' Philotimia -- Self-knowledge and the knowledge of knowledge -- Knowledge of knowledge and knowledge of the good -- Philosophy and the polis. (shrink)