To examine Heidegger's pedagogy is to be invited into a particular era and cultural reality—starting in Weimar Germany and progressing into the rise and fall of the Third Reich. In his attempt to reform the German university in a strictly hierarchical, authoritarian and nationalistic mold, Heidegger addressed one group of students and professors and not another. The petit‐bourgeois student and the future philosophers he invited with his ‘logic of recruitment’ into the corps of instructors, would share his coded language with (...) its built‐in taboos and censorship. The result was a rhetoric of absolute self‐reference and a semiotic of pure propaganda, based on the evocation of the ancient Greeks in which the philosopher meant to project all that was properly Germanic. Heidegger's rhetoric is exclusionary; its politics and its philosophy are interpenetrating. His lecture courses grew increasingly poeticized, and thus mired in ambiguity, evasion, elision, avoidance, grandiloquence. Parallels are drawn in this essay between Heidegger and our time. Is Heidegger's insistence on autocratic controls within the German university comparable to the corporate positions taken today by some educators? How does the shifting relation between disciplines affect the role of the specialist? How might the sciences morales or humanities, along with the much maligned ‘humanism’, be redefined morally and holistically? (shrink)

The essay distils from Badiou's writing a pedagogy based on his theories of knowledge and truth, as brought to bear on poetry and the arts. By following Badiou's implicit ontology of learning, which presupposes a dynamic and passionate engagement with a concrete situation, the essay argues that Badiou's view of modernity, in particular, contributes greatly to the educational topic, and offers an alternative teaching paradigm to the outmoded schools of criticism of the 20th century. It also argues that the concept (...) of universalism in education, as against identitarian particularism, is further evinced from a discussion of Badiou's study of St. Paul. (shrink)

To examine Heidegger's pedagogy is to be invited into a particular era and cultural reality—starting in Weimar Germany and progressing into the rise and fall of the Third Reich. In his attempt to reform the German university in a strictly hierarchical, authoritarian and nationalistic mold, Heidegger addressed one group of students and professors and not another. The petit‐bourgeois student and the future philosophers he invited with his ‘logic of recruitment’ into the corps of instructors, would share his coded language with (...) its built‐in taboos and censorship. The result was a rhetoric of absolute self‐reference and a semiotic of pure propaganda, based on the evocation of the ancient Greeks in which the philosopher meant to project all that was properly Germanic. Heidegger's rhetoric is exclusionary; its politics and its philosophy are interpenetrating. His lecture courses grew increasingly poeticized, and thus mired in ambiguity, evasion, elision, avoidance, grandiloquence. Parallels are drawn in this essay between Heidegger and our time. Is Heidegger's insistence on autocratic controls within the German university comparable to the corporate positions taken today by some educators? How does the shifting relation between disciplines affect the role of the specialist? How might the sciences morales or humanities, along with the much maligned ‘humanism’, be redefined morally and holistically? (shrink)

The essay draws on Michel Serres’ writings on education in order to derive from them a general theory. Though the polyglot philosopher never presented his philosophy of education as a formal system, it was a lifelong concern that he addressed from the perspectives of mathematics and physics; literature and myth; art and aesthetics; justice and the law. Ever elusive in his prose style, Serres was a magnetic and infectious educator who, ironically, and perhaps understandably, did not gain the sort of (...) following enjoyed by other French philosophers with whom he cuts such a contrast. The essay assesses the Serresian pedagogy in three key areas: the mutual translatability of the pedagogies of the humanities and arts versus those of the social and hard sciences; the urgent need for an environmental ethics of education; and the permeation of effective instruction by aesthetics. (shrink)

The essay distils from Badiou's writing a pedagogy based on his theories of knowledge and truth, as brought to bear on poetry and the arts. By following Badiou's implicit ontology of learning, which presupposes a dynamic and passionate engagement with a concrete situation, the essay argues that Badiou's view of modernity, in particular, contributes greatly to the educational topic, and offers an alternative teaching paradigm to the outmoded schools of criticism of the 20 th century. It also argues that the (...) concept of universalism in education, as against identitarian particularism, is further evinced from a discussion of Badiou's study of St. Paul. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction 21st Century Ethics and the Problem of Evil The Ontological Interdependency of the Arts and Sciences Teaching the Universal: The Model of St. Paul Modern Poetry and Truth‐Process: The Case of Mallarmé Conclusion Notes References.

Exploring the predicates of education from theoretical, practical and historical perspectives, this book revalorizes the central role of the humanities in the ethical and aesthetic formation of the individual.

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2016 Heft: 212 Seiten: 7-26.

In his recent book The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson defends, amongst other things, the claim that moral rightness and wrongness come in degrees and that, therefore, the standard view that an act’s being morally right or wrong is a one-off matter ought to be rejected. An ethical theory not built around a gradualist conception of moral rightness and wrongness is, according to Peterson, unable to account adequately for the phenomenon of moral conflicts. I argue in this paper (...) that Peterson’s defence of this claim is not convincing. Over and above this negative result, a careful assessment of Peterson’s case for degrees of rightness reveals that the theoretical corridor for accounting for moral conflicts without a gradualist conception of rightness and wrongness is relatively narrow. As I show, the only way of avoiding the conclusion of Peterson’s argument is to reject his conception of the ‘final analysis’ that an ethical theory provides, i.e. of what the theory ultimately has to say about individual acts and their normative properties. According to Peterson, such a final analysis should be seen as comprising the all-things-considered judgements yielded by the theory, and nothing else. As it turns out, the only alternative to this account that is compatible with the standard view about moral rightness and wrongness is to conceive of the final analysis as also containing judgements about morally relevant factors, or aspects, and the way in which they are normatively relevant. (shrink)

Thoughtful Images: Philosophy Illustrated is the first systematic investigation of how artists throughout the ages have illustrated philosophical texts, ideas, concepts, and theories. The book begins by developing a theory of visual illustrations of philosophical texts and undermining what the author calls "the denigration of illustration." The book then takes a more historical approach, beginning in Ancient Greece and Rome and proceeding through Medieval illuminations and printed broadsides to the frontispieces of philosophical texts. Throughout, attention is paid to how technological (...) developments enable different means for illustrating philosophy. (shrink)

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Community (EC) has been criticized for causing a misallocation of resources, inequitable income transfers, and enormous budgetary costs. The purpose of this paper is to examine the political economy of agriculture and agricultural policy in the EC. The results of the analysis indicate that conflicts between national political objectives and broader, community-wide concerns are important factors in the performance of EC agriculture. The pressures for reform of the CAP will lead to modification (...) of the system, but changes in EC agricultural policy are likely to be moderate because of the inherent inertia of the policy-making process. As a result, the agricultural system in the EC will probably continue to evolve in an atmosphere of crisis with most reforms directed at symptoms rather than fundamental problems. (shrink)

The behavior of individuals currently living will generally have long-term consequences that affect the well-being of those who will come to live in the future. Intergenerational interdependencies of this nature raise difficult moral issues because only the current generation is in a position to decide on actions that will determine the nature of the world in which future generations will live. Although most are willing to attach some weight to the interests of future generations, many would argue that it is (...) not necessary to treat these interests as equivalent to those of the current generation. A common approach in this context is to use a system of discounting to evaluate future benefits and harms. This paper assesses the logic of discounting drawing on the writings of economists and philosophers. Much of the economic literature concerns the choice of an appropriate social discount rate. The social discount rate can be taken to reflect beliefs about the rights of future generations, a subject that has been extensively debated in the phioosophic literature. The writings of both economists and philosophers concerned with the weight to attach to the interests of future generations are reviewed and evaluated in this paper and the implications for environmental policy are discussed. (shrink)

There has been much discussion of changing agricultural structure in the United States. In this paper, the author reviews some of the factors contributing to structural change in the United States and describes the policies adopted by the European Community with respect to agricultural structure. The European experience with structural policies suggests that this approach is not very promising for the United States where no specific structural policies exist. The argument developed in this paper is that structural changes in agriculture (...) are simply one example of economic adjustment in a capitalist economy, that economic adjustments are generally desirable although they are not costless, and that discussions of agricultural structure should focus on methods to alleviate the costs of adjustment rather than on efforts to prevent change. (shrink)

Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy is an accessible and thought-provoking examination of the way films raise and explore complex philosophical ideas. Written in a clear and engaging style, Thomas Wartenberg examines films’ ability to discuss, and even criticize ideas that have intrigued and puzzled philosophers over the centuries such as the nature of personhood, the basis of morality, and epistemological skepticism. Beginning with a demonstration of how specific forms of philosophical discourse are presented cinematically, Wartenberg moves on to (...) offer a systematic account of the ways in which specific films undertake the task of philosophy. Focusing on the films The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, Modern Times, The Matrix, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, The Third Man, The Flicker , and Empire , Wartenberg shows how these films express meaningful and pertinent philosophical ideas. This book is essential reading for students of philosophy with an interest in film, aesthetics, and film theory. It will also be of interest to film enthusiasts intrigued by the philosophical implications of film. (shrink)

The tendency to attribute foundationalist ambitions to the Vienna Circle has long obscured our view of its attempted revolution in philosophy. The present paper makes the case for a consistently epistemologically anti-foundationalist interpretation of all three of the Circle's main protagonists: Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath. Corresponding to the intellectual fault lines within the Circle, two ways of going about the radical reorientation of the pursuit of philosophy will then be distinguished and the contemporary potential of Carnap's and Neurath's project explored.

Logical Empiricism is commonly regarded as uninterested in, if not hostile to sociological investigations of science. This paper reconstructs the views of Otto Neurath and Philipp Frank on the legitimacy and relevance of sociological investigations of theory choice. It is argued that while there obtains a surprising degree of convergence between their programmatic pronouncements and the Strong Programme, the two types of project nevertheless remain distinct. The key to this differences lies in the different assessment of a supposed dilemma facing (...) post-Mertonian sociologists of science. (shrink)

Neurath's proposal for the form of protocol statements explicates the multiple embedding of a singular sentence as specifying different conditions for the acceptance of such a sentence as a bona fide scientific datum. Before theories are accepted or rejected in the light of such evidence, however, a further condition must be met which Neurath did not formalize. The different conditions are discussed and shown to constitute a naturalistic theory of scientific data and a pragmatic theory of theory acceptance.

Property rights are important institutions that influence economic performance and reflect the historical, cultural, and political realities of particular societies. Drawing on a variety of concepts from legal and economic studies, a framework for explaining the origin and evolution of property rights is developed and applied to the specific case of changing ground water rights in Nebraska. The Nebraska case is an interesting example of reliance on local control in regulating water use. Despite the importance of local initiatives in ground (...) water management, this case also illustrates the need for external support from the judicial and legislative systems. The evolution of ground water property rights in Nebraska, as in other parts of the United States, has been conditioned by historical circumstances and changing values and attitudes as well as by economic and political forces. (shrink)

In this paper we propose a formal theory of partitions (ways of dividing up or sorting or mapping reality) and we show how the theory can be applied in the geospatial domain. We characterize partitions at two levels: as systems of cells (theory A), and in terms of their projective relation to reality (theory B). We lay down conditions of well-formedness for partitions and we define what it means for partitions to project truly onto reality. We continue by classifying well-formed (...) partitions along three axes: (a) degree of correspondence between partition cells and objects in reality; (b) degree to which a partition represents the mereological structure of the domain it is projected onto; and (c) degree of completeness and exhaustiveness with which a partition represents reality. This classification is used to characterize three types of partitions that play an important role in spatial information science: cadastral partitions, categorical coverages, and the partitions involved in folk categorizations of the geospatial domain. (shrink)

Thomas E. Hill, Jr.; Servility and Self-Respect, The Monist, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 January 1973, Pages 87–104, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist197357135.

Big Ideas for Little Kids includes everything a teacher, a parent, or a college student needs to teach philosophy to elementary school children from picture books. Written in a clear and accessible style, the book explains why it is important to allow young children access to philosophy during primary-school education. Wartenberg also gives advice on how to construct a "learner-centered" classroom, in which children discuss philosophical issues with one another as they respond to open-ended questions by saying whether they agree (...) or disagree with what others have said. (shrink)

_Taking Picture Books Seriously: What can we learn about philosophy through children's books?_ This warm and charming volume casts a spell on adult readers as it unveils the surprisingly profound philosophical wisdom contained in children's picture books, from Dr Seuss's _Sneetches_ to William Steig's _Shrek!_. With a light touch and good humor, Wartenberg discusses the philosophical ideas in these classic stories, and provides parents with a practical starting point for discussing philosophical issues with their children. Accessible and multi-layered, it answers (...) questions like, Is it okay for adults to deceive kids? What's the difference between saying the Mona Lisa is a great painting and vanilla is your favorite flavor? Each chapter includes illustrations commissioned especially for this book. (shrink)

Kantian responses to three related questions are considered: Given the limits of our altruistic sentiments, is it possible for us to act beneficently as duty seems to require? What are we morally required to do for others besides respecting their rights? Why is this a reasonable requirement? Although the importance of empirical facts in deliberation is undeniable, the distinction between a practical deliberative point of view and the perspective of empirical inquiry proves to be crucial. Kant's grounds for an imperfect (...) duty of beneficence are examined. From a deliberative perspective, we must assume that we can act beneficently, even when lacking altruistic sentiments, provided we understand the good reasons for doing so. (shrink)

This essay regarding Kantian moral epistemology focuses specifically on one normative version of Kantian constructivism. The aim is to examine the justificatory role of actual, hypothetical, and possible consent in Kantian ethics. The importance of actual consent is more limited and derivative than commonly thought, and the difference between possible and hypothetical consent standards has been exaggerated. Review of formulas of the Categorical Imperative and the idea of an original contract confirms these claims, and familiar objections to appeals to hypothetical (...) consent are not decisive against the Kantian position. For example, arguably, hypothetical agreement does not serve merely as a dubious proxy for actual consent, reduce value to empirical fact, alienate us from common moral standards, or depend on circular reasoning. (shrink)

Offers an explanation of Kant's denial that there can be any genuine moral dilemmas and criticizes Alan Donagan's claim that we can put ourselves into a moral dilemma by our own wrongdoing. Although genuine moral dilemmas, in which one would be wrong no matter what one did, are impossible, “gaps” in moral theory may leave us with no resolution in tragic cases of moral conflict. Kantian moral theory has such gaps, but attempts to develop theories without such gaps are not (...) necessarily desirable. Finally, the essay addresses “residues” of moral feeling and attitude after one has acted in a case of tragic conflict in which one could find no morally better option. Perhaps surprisingly, Kantians should affirm that, even though feeling guilty for the choice is inappropriate, there is an important sense in which one should feel especially bad about those one has harmed, and regret one's own role, in such cases. (shrink)

The focus here is on what individuals value and pursue when considered apart from moral considerations. Personal values are contrasted with various kinds of moral values, but the central question is whether having the former commits one to the latter. Textual evidence casts doubt on the recently popular thesis that, in Kant's view, in setting ends agents thereby express a rational commitment to the objective goodness of their ends and acts. Unfortunately, influential Kantian arguments seem to use that dubious thesis (...) to argue that even minimally rational agents are rationally committed to moral standards. A further troublesome issue considered here is whether, independently of debates about free will, Kant's idea that we “set ends” as an “act of freedom” implies an untenable voluntarism about how we come to have our basic goals. (shrink)

Hans Hahn's long-neglected philosophy of mathematics is reconstructed here with an eye to his anticipation of the doctrine of logical pluralism. After establishing that Hahn pioneered a post-Tractarian conception of tautologies and attempted to overcome the traditional foundational dispute in mathematics, Hahn's and Carnap's work is briefly compared with Karl Menger's, and several significant agreements or differences between Hahn's and Carnap's work are specified and discussed.

The question of how to define the concept of social power has been a focus of controversy among social theorists. In this paper, I put forward a definition of social power that avoids many of the pitfalls of previous attempts at such a definition. Roughly, I define the power which one agent has over another as the ability that the dominant agent has to control the situation within which the subservient agent acts. Using this basic definition of power, I go (...) on to define many of the central forms in which power actually exists, forms that are conceptualized by such concepts as force, coercion, and influence. I show that these different forms of power can all be understood as specifications of the generic definition of power that I offered and go on to develop an account of how they function in relation to one another in actual relationship of social power. (shrink)

Hegel’s discussion of sense certainty in the Phenomenology of Spirit contains the following, humorous, observation.

The Philosophy of Nature does not begin, as we expect, with nature. Instead, Hegel describes the practical and theoretical approaches we make to nature as philosophers; that is, in thought and, metaphorically, with our teeth. This ledge on the climb into nature is often overlooked as we rush from the logic into space and time. There may be two reasons for this. The first is a natural expectation that a philosophy of nature begin by describing natural phenomena, not our approaches (...) to them. The second is that the terms ‘practical’ and ‘theoretical’, familiar from the Logic and Philosophy of Spirit, may seem at first glance to be out of place here. Whatever the reason, these paragraphs have not been discussed at any length in the secondary literature. (shrink)

It is a violation of legitimate academic freedom to attempt to link Catholicism to a particular school of economic thought and shut down all further debate. Whether the realm of human choice, which economics describes, is subject to an array of cause-and-effect relationships is obviously a matter for human reason to determine. From there, reason can then investigate these relationships. Although economic policy has a moral dimension, economics as a positive scienceconsists merely of an edifice of cause-and-effect relationships, and to (...) that extent is as autonomous as the purely descriptive sides of all other sciences. (shrink)

Offers a “practical” interpretation of Kant's famous thesis that only a good will is unconditionally good. Rather than providing a criterion for praise and blame, this thesis affirms the moral priority of a will to do what is right, no matter what it costs in terms of conditional goods. So understood, the thesis is not subject to many objections that critics have raised, for example, that it prescribes self‐righteous preoccupation with one's moral purity.

Reviews briefly Kant's conceptions of punishment and conscience and then considers the role of punishment and conscience as motives in a moral life. From a Kantian perspective, both motives seem to lack moral worth. We note, however, that some motives, such as anticipation of grief and a desire to do worthy deeds, can be interpreted in two ways, one commendable and the other less so. By analogy, the essay argues that anticipation of punishment and pangs of conscience can motivate us (...) in two different ways, one morally worthy and the other not. (shrink)

Contrasts utilitarian, Kantian, and deep retributive views about the relations between wrongdoing and suffering because of one's wrongdoing. Kant maintains that, although wrongdoers are intrinsically liable to suffer self‐reproach and moral disapproval of others, wrongdoing does not entail “deserving to suffer” in a sense providing intrinsic practical reasons to inflict suffering. Arguably, even Kant's most infamous remarks on punishment fail to prove otherwise. Contrary to common impressions, Kant is best understood as holding a mixed theory in which the retributive policies (...) that Kant endorses lack deep retributive justification. Some implications for the justice of current practices of punishment are explored. (shrink)

In this book Thomas Wren uncovers and assesses the largely hidden philosophical assumptions about human motivation that have shaped contemporary psychological ...