This chapter offers an account of Crusius’ conception of freedom. In the first part of the chapter I sketch Crusius’ understanding of ‘Thelematology’ or ‘science of the will’ and his conception of the will itself. In the second part of the paper I provide an account of Crusius’ conception of freedom of the will and I focus on two topics: his understanding of freedom as self-determination and his conception of free choice. Contrary to how some of the (...) secondary literature portrays his view, I argue that freedom of the will, for Crusius, is not best described as the freedom to choose otherwise or liberty of indifference. On the contrary, Crusius argues that free choice is rarely indifferent to its choices and is most often strongly inclined towards certain ends that free choice must overcome and choose against. (shrink)

Kant’s account of practical justification for belief has attracted much attention in the literature, especially in recent years. In this context, scholars have generally emphasized the originality of Kant’s thought about belief (Glaube), and Kant indeed offers a definition of belief that is very different from views that were prevalent in eighteenth-century Germany. In this article, however, I argue that it is very likely that Christian August Crusius exerted influence on Kant’s definition of belief and his account of practical (...) justification. In turn, acknowledging this influence has relevant consequences for how we understand the phenomenology of Kantian belief. (shrink)

What is it that makes a mental state conscious? Recent commentators have proposed that for Kant, consciousness results from differentiation: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is distinguished, by means of our conceptual capacities, from other states and/or things. I argue instead that Kant’s conception of state consciousness is sensory: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is accompanied by an inner sensation. Interpreting state consciousness as inner sensation reveals an underappreciated influence of Crusius on Kant’s (...) view, solves some long-standing puzzles concerning Kant’s difficult doctrine of self-affection, and sheds light on his theory of inner experience. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the relevance of judgment for practical considerations by discussing Christian August Crusius’s conception of rational desire. According to my interpretation of Crusius’s distinction between rational and non-rational desire, we are responsible at least for our rational desires insofar as we can control them. And we can control our rational desires by judging whether what we want complies with our human nature. It should become clear that Crusius’s conception of rational desire is normative (...) in that we necessarily desire things that are compatible with our nature, such as our own perfection. Therefore, a desire is rational if the desired object is apt to satisfy the desires compatible with our nature. From a contemporary perspective, such a normative conception of rational desire might not appear very attractive; it is apt, however, to stimulate a debate on the normative criteria and the role of judgment for rational desire, which is the ultimate aim of this paper. (shrink)

Der Leipziger Pietist Chr. A. Crusius setzt sich mit dem von Leibniz und Wolff festgelegten „Satz vom zureichenden Grund“ auseinander, nach dem nicht nur jedes Naturgeschehnis, sondern auch jede Handlung des Menschen a priori determiniert zu verstehen ist. Zunächst kritisiert Crusius die Vieldeutigkeit des Begriffs „Grund“, wo er zunächst zwischen „Realgrund“ und „Erkenntnisgrund“ unterscheidet, und weiterhin ersteren in „wirkende Ursache“ und „Existentialgrund“, und letzteren in „Erkenntnisgrund a priori“ und „Erkenntnisgrund a posteriori“ einteilt. Nach Crusius hat menschliche freie (...) Handlung keinen eindeutig determinierenden Grund, sondern nur wirkende Ursache, die jeder seinerseits ablehnen kann. Crusius gründet seinen Freiheitsbegriff auf die Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre, nach der freie Handlungen wegen der Endlichkeit des Menschen nur a posteriori erkannt werden. In meinem Beitrag versuche ich zu zeigen, dass im Freiheitsbegriff von Crusius, der „Grundtätigkeit der Freiheit“, ein Muster der Vereinbarkeit von der empirisch orientierten Freiheit und dem Determinismus einzusehen ist. (shrink)

In this paper we examine some passages of a logical treatise by Christian August Crusius. It seems that Crusius anticipated what might be called the circle of deduction, first discussed by Lewis Carroll. The question now emerges: why was it possible for Crusius to have deeper logical insights than his contemporaries, given that he was not a brilliant logician? The answer here proposed traces these insights back to his very peculiar philosophical premisses, which have been important for (...) Kant's development in his early career. (shrink)

Das Anliegen dieses Artikels besteht darin, ausgehend von einer an drei zentralen Themen orienterten Analyse des Verhältnisses von Kants Schriften 1762/63 zu Crusius auf bedeutsame Aspekte des frühen Kantischen Philosophierens hinzuweisen und daraus Plausibilitätsannahmen für eine systematische und ideengeschichtliche Standortbestimmung desselben zu erarbeiten.

There are two rival models on how to interpret causal chains in Kant. Traditional event-event models take it that events are causes of events, which are in turn causes of other events. Watkins’s causal powers interpretation, on the contrary, has it that substances have unchangeable grounds, and the series of events is only a series within the effect. By comparing Kant to Crusius, I argue that, to some extent, both approaches can be combined. For the powers of substances are (...) made active by other powers, but, at the same time, powers belong to the nature of a substance and are unchangeable. Moreover, non-causal properties that resemble Crusian existential grounds contribute to the effect as well. Finally, I give an account of the mereology of events by drawing on Kant’s resolution of the Second Antinomy. (shrink)

L’article se propose d’analyser le rôle joué par la pensée de Christian August Crusius dans la genèse et l’articulation de la Preisschrift kantienne de 1762. Décidément anti-wolffien, Kant opte pour la méthode analytique comme seule capable d’assurer la scientificité de la philosophie. Dans un double mouvement de rapprochement et de prise de distance par rapport à certaines thèses crusiennes centrales, il entend démontrer que la certitude atteignable en métaphysique est suffisante pour la conviction, qu’elle est toute aussi « sûre (...) » et « complète » que la certitude mathématique. Ne pouvant fonder cette certitude sur une simple conviction subjective, selon le principe de Crusius, Kant s’éloignera définitivement de ce dernier, non sans avoir intégré dans sa propre doctrine des éléments crusiens fondamentaux. (shrink)

L’article se propose d’analyser le rôle joué par la pensée de Christian August Crusius dans la genèse et l’articulation de la Preisschrift kantienne de 1762. Décidément anti-wolffien, Kant opte pour la méthode analytique comme seule capable d’assurer la scientificité de la philosophie. Dans un double mouvement de rapprochement et de prise de distance par rapport à certaines thèses crusiennes centrales, il entend démontrer que la certitude atteignable en métaphysique est suffisante pour la conviction, qu’elle est toute aussi « sûre (...) » et « complète » que la certitude mathématique. Ne pouvant fonder cette certitude sur une simple conviction subjective, selon le principe de Crusius, Kant s’éloignera définitivement de ce dernier, non sans avoir intégré dans sa propre doctrine des éléments crusiens fondamentaux. (shrink)

Der in Leipzig lehrende Philosoph und Theologe Christian August Crusius (1715-1775) ist bisher vorwiegend im Rahmen der Kant-Forschung berücksichtigt worden. Dabei war Crusius einer der ersten ernstzunehmenden Kritiker der Philosophie von Christian Wolff, der entscheidende Impulse von Christian Thomasius aufgriff, philosophisch vertiefte und bis in die zweite Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts wirkungsvoll tradierte. Der Sammelband nimmt die unterschiedlichen Aspekte des philosophischen und theologischen Schaffens von Crusius in den Blick und rekonstruiert die eigenständige Kontur eines Denkers, der einerseits (...) auf allen Gebieten der Philosophie tätig war und andererseits nach seiner Berufung zum Professor der Theologie ausschließlich an seinem theologischen OEuvre arbeitete. Auf der damit greifbaren Spannung zwischen Philosophie und Theologie liegt ein Hauptaugenmerk des interdisziplinären Sammelbandes. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyse conceptions of induction and certainty in Wolff and Crusius, highlighting their competing conceptions of physics. We discuss (i) the perspective of Wolff, who assigned induction an important role in physics, but argued that physics should be an axiomatic science containing certain statements, and (ii) the perspective of Crusius, who adopted parts of the ideal of axiomatic physics but criticized the scope of Wolff’s ideal of certain science. Against interpretations that take Wolff’s proofs in (...) physics to be based on empirical statements that are probable, we show how inductively established statements, coupled with assumptions concerning the uniformity of nature, can be certain according to Wolff. We examine Crusius’ little known work on physics and show that he attacked Wolff, arguing that many statements of physics are probable. We provide a discussion of the reception of methodological rules similar to Newton’s Regulae Philosophandi, discussing different interpretations of such rules. We conclude by briefly hinting at how the debate between Wolff and Crusius provides historical context for understanding Kant’s philosophy of natural science. (shrink)

Kant’s introduction in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (KrV) of a spontaneity proper to the understanding is often thought to be one of the central innovations of his Critical philosophy. As I show in this paper, however, a number of thinkers within the 18th century German tradition in the time before the KrV (including the pre-Critical Kant himself) had already developed a robust conception of the spontaneity of the mind, a conception which, in many respects lays the groundwork for Kant’s (...) later, rather more influential account. To illustrate this, I consider three accounts of the spontaneity of the mind—those of Crusius, the pre-Critical Kant, and Tetens—which, while distinct, nonetheless relate to and explicitly draw upon one another in important ways, forming as it were the interconnected and, thus far, largely overlooked pre-Critical context for Kant’s discussion of the spontaneity of the understanding in the KrV. As I conclude, while Kant’s own account of the spontaneity of the understanding, and particularly of the I think clearly departs from these accounts, it nonetheless continues to connect in significant ways with the trailblazing discussions of his immediate predecessors. (shrink)

This article aims to highlight the extent to which Kant’s account of belief draws on the views of his contemporaries. Situating the non-evidentialist features of Crusius’s account of belief within his broader account, I argue that they include antecedents to both Kant’s distinction between pragmatic and moral belief and his conception of a postulate of pure practical reason. While moving us closer to Kant’s arguments for the first postulate, however, both Crusius’s and Meier’s arguments for the immortality of (...) the soul fail to anticipate the most important aspect of their Kantian counterparts. Developing the non-evidentialist features of Basedow’s account of belief, I distinguish it from its Pascalian and Jamesian relatives and argue that it is the clearest antecedent to Kant’s arguments for the first and second postulates. Finally, I consider the development of Kant’s account of belief after the first Critique in light of the foregoing, and discuss the broader implications of my analysis. (shrink)

In the history of philosophy, voluntarists—that is, philosophers committed to some version of the freedom of indifference—have worried about its metaphysical credentials, but only a few, at least to my knowledge, have attempted to argue for more than its mere existence. Freedom of indifference is the option to choose between opposites in a given situation. In this paper, I present the ambitious attempt of the German pre-Kantian philosopher Christian August Crusius (1715–1775) to argue for the claim that we have (...) freedom of indifference as a matter of hypothetical necessity. The point is that, in his view, there can be no actual world without freedom of indifference. This is not a logical but a metaphysical truth. I argue that a possible (motivational) reason for Crusius’s choice to tread this slippery path is that he attempts to bestow some metaphysical dignity on the freedom of indifference. As a consequence, this metaphysical value of freedom of indifference shapes the relation between the divine and free, rational agents in a way that is completely different from a rationalist’s conception such as Leibniz’s. In this paper, I give a plausible interpretation of a metaphysical argument that has been neglected in the relevant literature. (shrink)

Crusius est consideré comme l'un des plus importants critiques des théories philosophiques de Leibniz et de Wolff. Dans ce contexte, outre la critique de l'interprétation du principe de la raison telle que l'ont soutenue Leibniz et Wolff, il faut surtout citer le refus de l'utilisation de la méthode mathématique dans la philosophie. Le développement de la théorie des substances simples conçue par Crusius servira d'exemple pour démontrer le refus de cette méthode dans la métaphysique. La définition de la (...) substance simple, à laquelle Crusius parvient en ce fondant sur la distinction entre raison d'être et raison de connaître, s'offre à la pensée de Leibniz comme à la pensée de Wolff. Cependant, quand Crusius rejette l'interprétation de la substance simple comme point mathématique, il attaque surtout Leibniz. Ainsi la théorie de Crusius des substances simples doit être avant tout considéré comme une critique de la monadologie leibnizienne. (shrink)

The literature on Dreams of a Spirit-Seer typically emphasises the ways that Kant’s complex 1766 work prefigures his critical turn. Kant indeed criticises Wolffian «dreamers of reason» and defines metaphysics as a «science of the limits of human reason». It has not been noted, however, that Kant’s first restriction on human knowledge in Dreams is targeted at knowledge of fundamental physical forces. Moreover, Kant criticises the ‘pneumatological’ laws of mental forces, insisting that these cannot be known through analogy with physical (...) forces. This paper presents the historical context of Kant’s claims and argues that his critique of the philosophical concept of force (Kraft) is primarily in dialogue with one of Wolff’s most renowned critics, Crusius. On this basis, I contend that Kant’s examination of our capacity to know fundamental physical and mental forces is an important aspect of his early critique of metaphysics. I defend my account by contrasting it with Alison Laywine’s interpretation. (shrink)

Working on a biography of his predecessor Erwin Rohde, Otto Crusius approached historical theologian Franz Overbeck, who was one of Rohde’s best friends. Overbeck sent Crusius copies of most of the letters he had received from Rohde, and Crusius used them for his book, which was published early 1902 and still is the best biographical work on Rohde. In the spring of 1902 Crusius visited Overbeck in Basel, and Overbeck in particular came to value their acquaintance. (...) Their correspondence, stretching from 1901 until Overbeck’s death in 1905, contains important personal and substantial views on Rohde, his relationship with Nietzsche, as well as on philological and literary topics, including Overbeck’s feud with Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, Nietzsche’s sister. (shrink)

This article provides an account of the Enlightenment dispute over hermeneutical skepticism with particular reference to the idea of hermeneutical probability in the philosophical work of Christian August Crusius. The essay sheds new light on the hermeneutical issues addressed in the philosophical school of the so-called Thomasians based mainly in Leipzig in the first half of the eighteenth century. The paper deals with Crusius’ wide-ranging efforts to cope with the uncertain character of most parts of human knowledge and (...) his attempts to construct a workable theory of hermeneutical probability. This raises points of central interest relating to probabilism in the methodology of textual interpretation and connects Crusius to contemporary discussions of hermeneutical skepticism. (shrink)

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion.

This paper is the second part of the investigation. Chr. A. Crusius in the “Way to the Certainty and Adequacy of Human Knowledge” introduced the most developed alternative view to Wolffian position regarding symbolic and contemplating correlation. He preferred the contemplating cognition and tied its functioning with imagination. Kant in the “Critique of Pure Reason” brings about a terminology revolution and changes the style of the problem consideration. He turns the proceeding from F. Viet and G.W. Leibniz’s art “speciosa (...) generalis”, which was earlier thought as symbolic, into a priori figurative synthesis. Following the changes in the nature of sensibility and understanding treatment, Kant rejects the opposition of intuitive or contemplative and symbolic in favour of the following oppositions: intuitive is opposed to discursive, while the contemplation is opposed to the understanding concept. The figurative synthesis as a result of transcendental faculty of imagination instead of the former empirical imagery creates the schematic possibility of the empirical image per se. This well-developed Kant’s position unwittingly put aside Wolff’s program of reduction of the symbolic cognition to quasi-intuitive one. However, today this program can have a practical importance and enrich the problem of the cognition visibility. (shrink)

Tra le diverse proposte ermeneutiche capaci di dare valore alla critica che Christian August Crusius rivolge al razionalismo leibniziano-wolffiano ce n’è una che pone al centro dell’attenzione la relazione che intercorre tra antropologia e teodicea. Il discorso crusiano intorno all’uomo svolge al suo interno il ruolo di fondamento esplicativo della risposta alla questione del male in un mondo voluto da Dio. La teodicea viene così considerata per quello che è in primo luogo: l’espressione di una visione incentrata sull’essere razionale (...) finito, sulla creatura umana. (shrink)

The extent of the originality and relevance of Kant's ethics is undeniable. But it is not so evident the fact that the Kant's moral philosophy as a whole was not suddenly built, but it was dependent on a profound debate with the philosophical tradition, especially with the German scholastic tradition, a debate which led to the assimilation or appropriation of several of its aspects. With special regard to the history of the development of the categorical imperative, it is not possible (...) to be indifferent to the influence of the practical philosophy of the Enlightenment German philosopher and theologian, Christian August Crusius. The aim of this article is thus to try to identify, taking into account the distinction of praxis in problematic and moral and the contrast between prudence and morality, some points of intersection between the moral philosophy of Crusius and Kant in its origin. (shrink)