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Summary

     Like deductive logic, inductive logic is widely studied by logicians. But referring to a logic of evidential support, inductive logic is basic to our ability to get along in the world, and is a backbone of scientific reasoning. Cause-effect inferences, generalizations and applied generalizations, and analogical inferences are recognized as distinct but overlapping kinds of inductive inferences. Each is ubiquitous in human thought, such that inductive, evidence-driven reasoning appears basic to the pursuit of search for knowledge and understanding. As defeasible or non-monotonic reasoning, inductive arguments and inferences cannot satisfy deductive soundness: The relation of one’s conclusion to one’s premises is enlarging or ampliative (Latin ampliare), such that there is no contradiction in the premises of an inductive argument being true, yet the conclusion false. The backside of this enlargement is the recognition of important concerns about the underdetermination of theories by the facts which they purport to explain (the underdetermination problem) and its implications for theories of scientific explanation, and for the aims and goals of scientific practices more generally. Whether the reasoner is rationally entitled to appeal to a principle of induction  --  the uniformity of nature assumption that the future will resemble the past --  or whether our reliance upon it is more a matter of animal faith, has relatedly been given much critical attention. At least since David Hume framed what has come to be known as the problem of induction, inductive skeptics and even philosophers intending to respond to Humean skepticism have taken especial note of the inherent limitations, and many special paradoxes and riddles, which attend our deep dependence upon inductive reasoning. Hume’s problem has many offshoots, and questions either directly about, or referring us back to inductive processes, continue to receive attention among philosophers in ways that extend far beyond logic and science. There are induction-connected problems for epistemologists, the lottery paradox as but one example, and for metaphysicians, as when we reflect upon what justification we have even for belief in other minds. But the very nature of inductive logic as non-monotonic logic, and inductive reasoning as enlarging or ampliative, may be what turns inductive reasoners from sole attention to armchair worries to empirical or evidence-driven research, and to the pursuit of new knowledge and increasing understanding of the natural world and our place within it.

Key works

     Early-modern natural philosophers rejuvenated and extended interest in scientific discovery and evidence-driven arguments, and Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum (1620) is one central work reflecting the rise of modern empiricism and the use of inductive reasoning.  In the Second Book of The Advancement of Learning, Bacon diagnoses the many “idols” of the human mind, concluding that “the formation of ideas and axioms by induction is without doubt the proper remedy to be applied for the keeping off and clearing away of idols.” David Hume shared much of Bacon’s empiricism, but while his mitigated skepticism differs quite substantially from radical skepticism, his A Treatise of Human Understanding (1739) articulates deep worries about the principle of induction. Some of the responses to Humean inductive skepticism try to justify the induction principle by appeal to natural kinds (Howard Sankey 2021) or as an inference to the best explanation (David Armstrong, 1983). Other responses have been dissolutionist, allowing that empirical beliefs and beliefs in a material world and other minds cannot have the certainty of necessary truths or deductive soundness, but arguing that this does not make them unreasonable, or that what Hume showed about induction is “inductive fallibilism, but no more” (Okasha 2001, 237). Inductivists have often battled hypothetical-deductivists and others in regard to scientific methods, and these debates boiled over into challenges to logical empiricism around and after mid-20th century. In “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” Carl Hempel (1965a) constructed the Raven Paradox as a thought-experiment helping us to constantly probe and test the steps of the established scientific processes. Yet Hempel also concedes in a postscript that Nelson Goodman’s “New Riddle of Induction” (1983; anticipated in 1946) focused around the projectability of predicates refutes his attempt to provide general criteria of confirmation that are similar to the criteria of deduction validity. The study of induction naturally connects with statistics and probability theory, and Bayesian Confirmation Theory (referring back to Reverend Thomas Bayes (c. 1701–61)) makes a stronger reply, however. It develops a formal apparatus for inductive logic, applying it to the study agents’ dispositions to update their beliefs in light of new evidence, and combining induction with theories of decision and action.

Introductions

Fitelson, Branden. 2006. “Inductive Logic.” In The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Vol. 1, A–M. Edited by Sahotra Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer, 384–394. New York: Routledge.

Hacking, Ian. An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511801297

Hawthorne, James, "Inductive Logic", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .

Skyrms, Brian. Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic. 4th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson, 2000.

Vickers, John M. 2018. “Inductive Reasoning,” Oxford Bibliographies. Oxford University Press.

https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0171.xml

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  1. Du Châtelet, Induction, and Newton’s Rules for Reasoning.Aaron Wells - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32.
    I examine Du Châtelet’s methodology for physics and metaphysics through the lens of her engagement with Newton’s Rules for Reasoning in Natural Philosophy. I first show that her early manuscript writings discuss and endorse these Rules. Then, I argue that her famous published account of hypotheses continues to invoke close analogues of Rules 3 and 4, despite various developments in her position. Once relevant experimental evidence and some basic constraints are met, it is legitimate to inductively generalize from observations; general (...)
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  2. Induction and Certainty in the Physics of Wolff and Crusius.Hein van den Berg & Boris Demarest - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-22.
    In this paper, we analyse conceptions of induction and certainty in Wolff and Crusius, highlighting their competing conceptions of physics. We discuss (i) the perspective of Wolff, who assigned induction an important role in physics, but argued that physics should be an axiomatic science containing certain statements, and (ii) the perspective of Crusius, who adopted parts of the ideal of axiomatic physics but criticized the scope of Wolff’s ideal of certain science. Against interpretations that take Wolff’s proofs in physics to (...)
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  3. Induction et loi naturelle chez Mill.Antoine Brandelet - 2021 - le Philosophoire 55 (2021/1):205-224.
    John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic (1843) is often considered to be a work that defends an inductivist epistemology. In this article, I propose to question this status by examining the definition of induction set out in Mill’s book, and the consequences that can be deduced from it. I show that Mill’s inductivism implies a methodology of scientific research in which deductive reasoning is just as important, if not more important, than inductive methods, so that the classical opposition between induction (...)
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  4. Making decisions with evidential probability and objective Bayesian calibration inductive logics.Mantas Radzvilas, William Peden & Francesco De Pretis - forthcoming - International Journal of Approximate Reasoning:1-37.
    Calibration inductive logics are based on accepting estimates of relative frequencies, which are used to generate imprecise probabilities. In turn, these imprecise probabilities are intended to guide beliefs and decisions — a process called “calibration”. Two prominent examples are Henry E. Kyburg's system of Evidential Probability and Jon Williamson's version of Objective Bayesianism. There are many unexplored questions about these logics. How well do they perform in the short-run? Under what circumstances do they do better or worse? What is their (...)
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  5. Behind the mask: unmasking the social construction of leadership amongst officer cadets of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.Jeff Tibbett - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Northumbria at Newcastle
    This thesis explores Officer Cadets' social construction of leadership at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS). It addresses calls for more research into leadership behaviours. Taking a social constructionist perspective, the thesis focuses on unmasking the social construction of Leadership amongst Officer Cadets. This study adopts a reflexive approach, acknowledging the centrality of the researcher in the co-construction of the data. The thesis develops interdisciplinary links between the theoretical areas of Dark Leadership to problematize and inform contemporary understandings of Officer (...)
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  6. Hasty Generalizations Are Pervasive in Experimental Philosophy: A Systematic Analysis.Uwe Peters & Olivier Lemeire - 2023 - Philosophy of Science.
    Scientists may sometimes generalize from their samples to broader populations when they have not yet sufficiently supported this generalization. Do such hasty generalizations also occur in experimental philosophy? To check, we analyzed 171 experimental philosophy studies published between 2017 and 2023. We found that most studies tested only Western populations but generalized beyond them without justification. There was also no evidence that studies with broader conclusions had larger, more diverse samples, but they nonetheless had higher citation impact. Our analyses reveal (...)
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  7. Belief expansion, contextual fit and the reliability of information sources.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2001 - In Varol Akman (ed.), Modeling and Using Context. pp. 421-424.
    We develop a probabilistic criterion for belief expansion that is sensitive to the degree of contextual fit of the new information to our belief set as well as to the reliability of our information source. We contrast our approach with the success postulate in AGM-style belief revision and show how the idealizations in our approach can be relaxed by invoking Bayesian-Network models.
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  8. Onko tieteellinen strukturalismi mahdollista ilman modaalirealismia?Ilkka Pättiniemi & Ilmari Hirvonen - 2016 - In Ilkka Niiniluoto, Tuomas Tahko & Teemu Toppinen (eds.), Mahdollisuus. Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland. pp. 94–102.
    Filosofian piirissä on viime aikoina käyty intensiivistä keskustelua metafysiikan naturalisoinnista ja tieteellisen metafysiikan mahdollisuudesta. Yksi tämän keskustelun keskeisistä teoksista on James Ladymanin ja Don Rossin (sekä osin John Collierin ja David Spurrettin) kirjoittama Every Thing Must Go (2007). Tässä kirjassa Ladyman ja Ross puolustavat, omien sanojensa mukaan, neopositivistista skientismiä. Heidän ohjelmansa on skientistinen, koska Ladymanin ja Rossin mukaan tiede on ainoa tapa tutkia todellisuutta objektiivisesti. Neopositivismi ilmenee puolestaan siinä, että heidän ohjelmansa tukeutuu eräänlaiseen verifikaatioperiaatteeseen. Ladymanin ja Rossin verifikaatioperiaate ei kuitenkaan (...)
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  9. What Can Armstrongian Universals Do for Induction?William Peden - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (3):1145-1161.
    David Armstrong argues that necessitation relations among universals are the best explanation of some of our observations. If we consequently accept them into our ontologies, then we can justify induction, because these necessitation relations also have implications for the unobserved. By embracing Armstrongian universals, we can vindicate some of our strongest epistemological intuitions and answer the Problem of Induction. However, Armstrong’s reasoning has recently been challenged on a variety of grounds. Critics argue against both Armstrong’s usage of inference to the (...)
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  10. Thomas Reid on Induction and Natural Kinds.Stephen Harrop - 2022 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 20 (1):1-18.
    I examine the views of Thomas Reid with respect to a certain version of the problem of induction: Why are inductions using natural kinds successful, and what justifies them? I argue that while both Reid holds a kind of conventionalist view about natural kinds, this conventionalism has a realistic component which allows him to answer both questions.
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  11. EL FALSACIONISMO POPPERIANO: UN INTENTO INDUCTIVO DE EVADIR LA INDUCCIÓN.Maribel Barroso - 2015 - Episteme NS: Revista Del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad Central de Venezuela 36 (1):29-39.
    En el presente trabajo expongo la propuesta falsacionista de Karl Popper como resultado de su solución al problema de la inducción. En este sentido, la analizo bajo sus dos aspectos, el lógico y el metodológico. La idea detrás de ello es mostrar, en primer lugar, que su solución lógica al problema de la inducción es totalmente independiente de los criterios metodológicos que propone para la elección entre teorías rivales, y en segundo lugar, que estos últimos constituyen una transgresión a su (...)
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  12. Sur le problème de l’induction : une réponse en acier (a Steel answer).Kevin Kaiser - 2018 - Ithaque 23:49-73.
    Le problème de l’induction (humien) a récemment été abordé par Steel dans son article de 2010. Celui-ci soutient que les théories d’apprentissage formelles permettent de justifier logiquement le principe de l’induction, ce dernier assurant la fiabilité logique des méthodes. Cette proposition a été critiquée par Howson en 2011, ce dernier mettant en doute la possibilité même qu’une méthode puisse être logiquement fiable. Bien que Steel ait offert une réponse à cette critique, il n’y répond pas directement. Dans le présent article, (...)
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  13. Summa und System: Historie und Systematik vollendeter bottom-up- und top-down-Theorien.Jens Lemanski - 2013 - Münster, Deutschland: mentis.
    ›Bottom-up‹ und ›top-down‹ sind heutzutage gängige Methodenbezeichnungen in allen Bereichen der Wissenschaft. Dennoch sind beide Methoden keine Entdeckung der Moderne, sondern wurden unter Begriffen wie beispielsweise ›Auf-‹ und ›Abstieg‹, ›Induktion‹ und ›Deduktion‹ in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte häufig verwendet, um komplexe Wissensbestände vollständig aufzuarbeiten und zu strukturieren. Paradigmatisch für eine derartige Aufarbeitung stehen die mittelalterliche Summa und das neuzeitliche System. Aktuellen Studien zufolge hat aber bereits Dionysius Areopagita in der Spätantike eine derartige Summe verfasst, während in der Neuzeit erst J. G. Fichtes (...)
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  14. More on induction in the language with a satisfaction class.Henryk Kotlarski & Zygmunt Ratajczyk - 1990 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 36 (5):441-454.
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  15. Penny Pinching and Backward Induction.Martin Hollis - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (9):473.
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  16. A note on the $\Pi^0_2$ -induction rule.Ulrich Kohlenbach - 1995 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 34 (4):279-283.
    It is well-known (due to C. Parsons) that the extension of primitive recursive arithmeticPRA by first-order predicate logic and the rule ofΠ 2 0 -inductionΠ 2 0 -IR isΠ 2 0 -conservative overPRA. We show that this is no longer true in the presence of function quantifiers and quantifier-free choice for numbersAC 0,0-qf. More precisely we show that ℐ :=PRA 2 +Π 2 0 -IR+AC 0,0-qf proves the totality of the Ackermann function, wherePRA 2 is the extension ofPRA by number (...)
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  17. On Principles of Inductive Definition.Bernhard Banaschewski - 1960 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 6 (15-22):248-257.
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  18. Δ11-Good Inductive Definitions Over The Continuum.Jacques Grassin - 1981 - Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 27 (1):11-16.
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  19. Sur certains modes de fonder nos jugements concernant les événements futurs.Izydora Dambska - 1963 - Logique Et Analyse 6 (21):232.
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  20. Stove, David. Against the Idols of the Age.Scott Campbell - 2001 - Review of Metaphysics 54 (4):943-945.
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  21. La dissolution de la foi.L. Dugas - 1898 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 46:225 - 252.
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  22. La dissolution de la personnalité.S. Jankelevitch - 1907 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 64:539 - 546.
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  23. Grue: Some remarks.James Hullett & Robert Schwartz - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (9):259-271.
  24. On the nature of inductive inference.Felix Kaufmann - 1945 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 6 (4):602-609.
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  25. Inductive inference in the limit of empirically adequate theories.Bernhard Lauth - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (5):525 - 548.
    Most standard results on structure identification in first order theories depend upon the correctness and completeness (in the limit) of the data, which are provided to the learner. These assumption are essential for the reliability of inductive methods and for their limiting success (convergence to the truth). The paper investigates inductive inference from (possibly) incorrect and incomplete data. It is shown that such methods can be reliable not in the sense of truth approximation, but in the sense that the methods (...)
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  26. The uniformity of nature.Frederick Pollock - 1876 - Mind 1 (3):425-426.
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  27. Ways of pastmaking.Paul A. Roth - 2002 - History of the Human Sciences 15 (4):125-143.
    Riddles of induction – old or new, Hume’s or Goodman’s – pose unanswered challenges to assumptions that experiences logically legitimate expectations or classifications. The challenges apply both to folk beliefs and to scientific ones. In particular, Goodman’s ‘new riddle’ famously confounds efforts to specify how additional experiences confirm the rightness of currently preferred ways of organizing objects, i.e. our favored theories of what kinds there are.1 His riddle serves to emphasize that neither logic nor experience certifies accepted groupings of objects (...)
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  28. Do Stimuli Elicit Behavior?—A Study in the Logical Foundations of Behavioristics.William W. Rozeboom - 1960 - Philosophy of Science 27 (2):159-170.
    It has become customary in modern behavioristics to speak of stimuli as though they elicit responses from organisms. But logically this is absurd, for analysis of the grammatical roles of stimulus and response concepts shows that stimuli and responses differ in logical type from causes and effects. The "S elicits R" formula thus stands revealed as elliptical for a more complicated form of assertion. The trouble with this ellipsis, however, is that by suppressing vital components of formal structure in behavioral (...)
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  29. Barker and Achinstein on Goodman.Gary Sollazzo - 1972 - Philosophical Studies 23 (1-2):91 - 97.
    Barker and Achinstein think that it is not possible for a predicate like grue to serve as well as a predicate like green in the role of a qualitative or non-positional predicate. Their arguments consist in a number of attempts to show that one who possesses green in his language can do things with that predicate which one who must work with grue instead cannot do. However, they succeed in showing only that a qualitative predicate is better adapted to our (...)
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  30. Three problems in induction.Nathan Stemmer - 1971 - Synthese 23 (2-3):287 - 308.
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Induction, Misc
  1. Induction, Conjunction Introduction, and Safety.Bin Zhao - 2023 - Philosophy 98 (4):477-483.
    Depending on whether we are somewhat tolerant of nearby error-possibilities or not, the safety condition on knowledge is open to a strong reading and a weak reading. In this paper, it is argued that induction and conjunction introduction constitute two horns of a dilemma for the safety account of knowledge. If we opt for the strong reading, then the safety account fails to account for inductive knowledge. In contrast, if we opt for the weak reading, then the safety account fails (...)
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  2. Epistemology Normalized.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):89-145.
    We offer a general framework for theorizing about the structure of knowledge and belief in terms of the comparative normality of situations compatible with one’s evidence. The guiding idea is that, if a possibility is sufficiently less normal than one’s actual situation, then one can know that that possibility does not obtain. This explains how people can have inductive knowledge that goes beyond what is strictly entailed by their evidence. We motivate the framework by showing how it illuminates knowledge about (...)
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  3. Handbook of the History of Logic. Volume 10: Inductive Logic.Dov M. Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann & John Woods (eds.) - 2011 - Elsevier.
    Inductive Logic is number ten in the 11-volume Handbook of the History of Logic. While there are many examples were a science split from philosophy and became autonomous (such as physics with Newton and biology with Darwin), and while there are, perhaps, topics that are of exclusively philosophical interest, inductive logic — as this handbook attests — is a research field where philosophers and scientists fruitfully and constructively interact. This handbook covers the rich history of scientific turning points in Inductive (...)
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  4. Theory, Evidence, Data: Themes from George E. Smith.Marius Stan & Christopher Smeenk - 2023 - Springer.
    A volume of papers inspired by the work of George E. Smith on confirmation and evidence in advanced science—from Newton's gravitation theory to the physics of molecules.
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  5. Sensitivity and inductive knowledge revisited.Guido Melchior - forthcoming - Dialectica.
    The orthodox view about sensitivity and induction has it that beliefs formed via induction are insensitive. Since inductive knowledge is highly plausible, this problem is usually regarded as a reductio argument against sensitivity accounts of knowledge. Some adherents of sensitivity defend sensitivity against this objection, for example by considering backtracking interpretations of counterfactuals. All these extant views about sensitivity and induction have to be revised, since the problem of sensitivity and induction is a different one. Regardless of whether we allow (...)
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  6. Philosophical reasoning about science: a quantitative, digital study.Moti Mizrahi & Michael Adam Dickinson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).
    In this paper, we set out to investigate the following question: if science relies heavily on induction, does philosophy of science rely heavily on induction as well? Using data mining and text analysis methods, we study a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 14,199) in order to answer this question empirically. If philosophy of science relies heavily on induction, just as science supposedly does, then we would expect to find significantly more inductive arguments than (...)
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  7. Coherence of Inferences.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    It is usually accepted that deductions are non-informative and monotonic, inductions are informative and nonmonotonic, abductions create hypotheses but are epistemically irrelevant, and both deductions and inductions can’t provide new insights. In this article, I attempt to provide a more cohesive view of the subject with the following hypotheses: (1) the paradigmatic examples of deductions, such as modus ponens and hypothetical syllogism, are not inferential forms, but coherence requirements for inferences; (2) since any reasoner aims to be coherent, any inference (...)
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  8. Social categories in the making: construction or recruitment?Samuli Reijula - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12315-12330.
    Real kinds, both natural and social categories, are characterized by rich inductive potential. They have relatively stable sets of conceptually independent projectable properties. Somewhat surprisingly, even some purely social categories show such multiple projectability. The article explores the origin of the inductive richness of social categories and concepts. I argue that existing philosophical accounts provide only a partial explanation, and mechanisms of boundary formation and stabilization must be brought into view for a more comprehensive account of inductively rich social categories.
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  9. Inductive knowledge and lotteries: Could one explain both ‘safely’?Haicheng Zhao & Peter Baumann - 2021 - Ratio 34 (2):118-126.
    Safety accounts of knowledge claim, roughly, that knowledge that p requires that one's belief that p could not have easily been false. Such accounts have been very popular in recent epistemology. However, one serious problem safety accounts have to confront is to explain why certain lottery‐related beliefs are not knowledge, without excluding obvious instances of inductive knowledge. We argue that the significance of this objection has hitherto been underappreciated by proponents of safety. We discuss Duncan Pritchard's recent solution to the (...)
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  10. Reconsidering the Alleged Cases of Knowledge from Falsehood.Kok Yong Lee - 2020 - Philosophical Investigations 44 (2):151-162.
    A number of philosophers have recently proposed several alleged cases of “knowledge from falsehood,” i.e., cases of inferential knowledge epistemised by an inference with a false crucial premise. This paper examines such cases and argues against interpreting them as cases of knowledge from falsehood. Specifically, I argue that the inferences in play in such cases are in no position to epistemise their conclusions.
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  11. Optimization of Scientific Reasoning: a Data-Driven Approach.Vlasta Sikimić - 2019 - Dissertation,
    Scientific reasoning represents complex argumentation patterns that eventually lead to scientific discoveries. Social epistemology of science provides a perspective on the scientific community as a whole and on its collective knowledge acquisition. Different techniques have been employed with the goal of maximization of scientific knowledge on the group level. These techniques include formal models and computer simulations of scientific reasoning and interaction. Still, these models have tested mainly abstract hypothetical scenarios. The present thesis instead presents data-driven approaches in social epistemology (...)
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  12. Hypothesis Testing in Scientific Practice: An Empirical Study.Moti Mizrahi - 2020 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (1):1-21.
    It is generally accepted among philosophers of science that hypothesis testing is a key methodological feature of science. As far as philosophical theories of confirmation are con...
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  13. How to Play the Lottery Safely?Haicheng Zhao - 2023 - Episteme 20 (1):23-38.
    According to the safety principle, if one knows that p, one's belief that p could not easily have been false. One problem besetting this principle is the lottery problem – that of explaining why one does not seem to know that one will lose the lottery purely based on probabilistic considerations, prior to the announcement of the lottery result. As Greco points out, it is difficult for a safety theorist to solve this problem, without paying a heavy price. In this (...)
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  14. On the Probability of Plenitude.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (5):267-292.
    I examine what the mathematical theory of random structures can teach us about the probability of Plenitude, a thesis closely related to David Lewis's modal realism. Given some natural assumptions, Plenitude is reasonably probable a priori, but in principle it can be (and plausibly it has been) empirically disconfirmed—not by any general qualitative evidence, but rather by our de re evidence.
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  15. Laura Snyder, Reforming philosophy. [REVIEW]Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2009 - Rivista di Filosofia 100 (2):324-325.
    In this book the analysis of the relationship between Whewell and Mill is extended from the theme of induction, the topic the author starts with, to the comparison between the two projects of an overall reform of knowledge. These programmes announce themselves to the general public as proclamations of war for or against the academic, political and religious establishment; however, when viewed from the inside, they more or less consciously share very similar objectives. This applies both to the scientific method (...)
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  16. Sceptical Theism and the Paradox of Evil.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):319-333.
    Given plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence and undercutting defeat, many believe that the force of the evidential problem of evil depends on sceptical theism’s being false: if evil is...
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  17. The Future of Human-Artificial Intelligence Nexus and its Environmental Costs.Petr Spelda & Vit Stritecky - 2020 - Futures 117.
    The environmental costs and energy constraints have become emerging issues for the future development of Machine Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI). So far, the discussion on environmental impacts of ML/AI lacks a perspective reaching beyond quantitative measurements of the energy-related research costs. Building on the foundations laid down by Schwartz et al., 2019 in the GreenAI initiative, our argument considers two interlinked phenomena, the gratuitous generalisation capability and the future where ML/AI performs the majority of quantifiable inductive inferences. The (...)
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  18. Non-Inferential Transitions: Imagery and Association.Eric Mandelbaum & Jake Quilty-Dunn - forthcoming - In Timothy Chan & Anders Nes (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. New York, NY, USA:
    Unconscious logical inference seems to rely on the syntactic structures of mental representations (Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum 2018). Other transitions, such as transitions using iconic representations and associative transitions, are harder to assimilate to syntax-based theories. Here we tackle these difficulties head on in the interest of a fuller taxonomy of mental transitions. Along the way we discuss how icons can be compositional without having constituent structure, and expand and defend the “symmetry condition” on Associationism (the idea that associative links and (...)
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  19. Menachem Fisch. Creatively Undecided: Toward a History and Philosophy of Scientific Agency. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017. Pp. 304. $27.92. [REVIEW]Karim Bschir - 2019 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 9 (1):189-192.
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  20. Epistemological Aspects of Hope.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Claudia Blöser & Titus Stahl (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Hope. London: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 135-151.
    Hope is an attitude with a distinctive epistemological dimension: it is incompatible with knowledge. This chapter examines hope as it relates to knowledge but also to probability and inductive considerations. Such epistemic constraints can make hope either impossible, or, when hope remains possible, they affect how one’s epistemic situation can make hope rational rather than irrational. Such issues are especially relevant to when hopefulness may permissibly figure in practical deliberation over a course of action. So I consider cases of second-order (...)
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